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Abstract 
 
This thesis will examine the type of equitable claim known as a ‘mere equity’. The 
basic characteristics of a mere equity are well established. A mere equity is 
‘proprietary’ in that it can be enforced against certain third parties and is capable of 
alienation in favour of certain third parties. Despite its proprietary flavour, however, 
a mere equity does not amount to an interest in any property to which it relates. The 
main consequence of this is that a mere equity is postponed to any interest, legal or 
equitable, subsequently purchased for value and without notice of the mere equity. 
While the core features of mere equities are settled, there is much confusion 
over the underlying legal nature and practical function of these claims. This confusion 
has produced the criticism that mere equities are an anomalous category, and brought 
into question whether mere equities should even exist as a juridical concept. This state 
of affairs is clearly unsatisfactory, especially given that mere equities are the admitted 
basis of a sizable body of equitable doctrines, including rescission, rectification and 
proprietary estoppel. 
This thesis aims to demystify mere equities. It will show that the existing 
scholarly literature has not adequately engaged with the concept of a mere equity. It 
will then look afresh at the primary legal materials in order to fill in the conceptual 
gaps. In short, the thesis will argue that a mere equity is an equitable right of action: a 
simple claim to pursue a particular equitable remedy against a particular defendant. A 
mere equity, therefore, is a right in personam—a claim binding on a small and definite 
class of people—albeit one which has been extended to third parties in accordance 
with equitable principles. The identification of these principles will be a major concern 
of the thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis examines the class of equitable claims which are known as ‘mere equities’. 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate the legal nature and practical function of mere 
equities as these claims are understood and applied within the English legal system. 
Part two of this chapter will introduce the concept of a mere equity and 
highlight the basic features and consequences of this category of claim. Part three will 
explain the rationale for investigating mere equities. Part four will clarify the key 
questions which the thesis will answer and explain why these questions are important. 
Finally, part five will provide an overview of the subsequent chapters and their 
findings. 
 
 
PART II: THE BASIC FEATURES OF MERE EQUITIES 
 
Mere equities are equitable claims of a particular type. They are recognised in the 
English legal system and in certain other jurisdictions, notably Australia.1 From an 
examination of the cases, it appears that mere equities have two defining 
characteristics. First, they are what might be described as ‘proprietary’ claims. Second, 
despite their proprietary character, they do not amount to so called ‘equitable interests’ 
in property. Each of these features will now be outlined. 
 
 
1. Proprietary claims 
 
It is necessary to be clear about our terminology. The terms ‘property’ and 
‘proprietary’ are ‘notoriously ambiguous’:2 a claim can be described as ‘property’ or 
                                                     
1 See especially Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265. 
2 RC Nolan, ‘Equitable Property’ (2006) 122 LQR 232, 233. 
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‘proprietary’ for a number of different purposes depending on the context.3 Very often, 
however, these terms are used to describe a claim which is capable of enforcement 
against at least some third parties, and which may also be capable of alienation in 
favour of certain third parties.4 It is for these purposes that mere equities are referred 
to as ‘proprietary’ here. 
It is well established that mere equities possess the qualities of enforceability 
against, and alienability in favour of, third parties which justify the description of these 
claims as ‘proprietary’.5 On the one hand, it has been stated numerous times in the 
cases that, as a general principle, mere equities are capable of binding successors in 
title to any land or other property to which they relate.6 Furthermore, in relation to 
registered land, the enforceability of mere equities against third parties has been placed 
on a statutory footing. Thus s 116 of the Land Registration Act 2002 declares that ‘for 
the avoidance of doubt’ both a mere equity and an equity by estoppel (which is in fact 
a kind of mere equity, as demonstrated in chapter three7) ‘in relation to registered land 
… has effect from the time the equity arises as an interest capable of binding 
successors in title’.8 This provision codifies the earlier ruling of Mervyn Davies J in 
Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd9—which was approved by Neuberger 
J in Nurdin & Peacock plc v DB Ramsden & Co Ltd10 and Holaw (470) Ltd v Stockton 
Estates Ltd11—that a mere equity in reference to registered land has ‘the quality of 
being capable of enduring through different ownerships of the land’.12 On the other 
                                                     
3 See ibid 236. 
4 See National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1247G-48A (Lord 
Wilberforce). See also JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s 
Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2014) ch 4. But see K Gray, 
‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50 CLJ 252, 292-93. 
5 See, eg, M Neave and M Weinberg, ‘The Nature and Function of Equities (Part I)’ (1978-1980) 6 
University of Tasmania Law Review 24, 24. 
6 Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee [1956] 1 Ch 7 (Ch) 19 (Upjohn J); National Provincial Bank Ltd v 
Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 9 (Ch) 14 (Cross J); National Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings Car 
Mart Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 665 (CA) 686 (Lord Denning MR); National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth 
[1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1226D-E (Lord Hodson) 1238B (Lord Upjohn); Blacklocks v JB Developments 
(Godalming) Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 183 (Ch) 195C-F (Mervyn Davies J); Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [1999] 
All ER (D) 433 (CA) [99] (Potter LJ); Howlaw (470) Ltd v Stockton Estates Ltd (2001) 81 P&CR 29 
(Ch) [65] (Neuberger J). See below ch 4, pt II, s 1. 
7 Ch 3, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
8 See also Mortgage Express v Lambert [2016] EWCA Civ 555 [18] (Lewison LJ). 
9 Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 183 (Ch) 195C-196F (Mervyn Davies 
J). But see DG Barnsley, ‘Rectification, Trusts and Overriding Interests’ [1983] Conv 361. 
10 Nurdin & Peacock plc v DB Ramsden & Co Ltd [1999] 1 EGLR 119 (Ch) 125 (Neuberger J). 
11 Howlaw (470) Ltd v Stockton Estates Ltd (2001) 81 P&CR 29 (Ch) [69] (Neuberger J). 
12 Quoting National Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 665 (CA) 696 (Russell 
LJ). See also Malory Enterprises Ltd v Cheshire Homes (UK) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 151, [2002] Ch 
216 [68] (Arden LJ). But see Collings v Lee (2001) 82 P&CR 3 (CA) [22] (Nourse LJ). 
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hand, as regards the alienability of mere equities, it is generally acknowledged in the 
case law that a mere equity may be capable of being assigned or devised by its owner 
in favour of a third party.13 
 
 
2. The distinction between mere equities and equitable interests 
 
Despite the fact that mere equities are proprietary in character, it is well established 
that these claims fall short of being what are referred to as ‘equitable interests’ in 
property.14 It follows that a distinction is to be drawn between two sub-sets of equitable 
proprietary claims: the first consisting of claims which count as equitable interests; the 
second consisting of mere equities. 
The dividing-line between equitable interests (or ‘equitable estates’ as they are 
sometimes called) and mere equities (or ‘equities’ as they are sometimes called) has 
been acknowledged by judges in various cases. The well-known case of Phillips v 
Phillips15 (see below) appears to be the earliest example. In that case, Lord Westbury 
LC alluded to the distinction when he made reference to ‘an equity as distinguished 
from an equitable estate’.16 Since Phillips, the dividing-line between mere equities and 
equitable interests has been recognised, both expressly and tacitly, in numerous 
decisions.17 For example, in Cave v Cave,18 a case where misappropriated trust monies 
                                                     
13 Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265, 290-91 (Menzies J); 
Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 183 (Ch) 195C-F (Mervyn Davies J); 
Howlaw (470) Ltd v Stockton Estates Ltd (2001) 81 P&CR 29 (Ch) [46] (Neuberger J). See below ch 
6, pt II. 
14 Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee [1956] 1 Ch 7 (Ch) 18 (Upjohn J). 
15 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 45 ER 1164. 
16 Ibid 218; 1167 (Lord Westbury LC). 
17 Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 (Ch) 647 (Fry J); Cloutte v Storey [1911] 1 Ch 18 (Ch) 24 
(Neville J); Re Clarke’s Settlement Trust [1916] 1 Ch 467 (Ch) 473 (argument); Abigail v Lapin 
[1934] AC 491 (PC) 505 (Lord Wright); Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee [1956] 1 Ch 7 (Ch) 18 (Upjohn 
J); National Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 9 (Ch) 14 (Cross J); National 
Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 665 (CA) 686 (Lord Denning MR); 
National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1238B (Lord Upjohn); Latec 
Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265, 277 (Kitto J) 288-89 (Menzies 
J); Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 (HL) 721B (Lord Wilberforce); Lloyds Bank plc v 
Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 (HL) 112G (argument); CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200 (HL) 
203 (argument); Bland v Ingram’s Estates Ltd (Ch, 13 April 1999) 10-11 (Peter Leaver QC); 
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [1999] All ER (D) 433 (CA) [99] (Potter LJ); Howlaw (470) Ltd v Stockton 
Estates Ltd (2001) 81 P&CR 29 (Ch) [65] (Neuberger J); IRC v Eversden [2002] EWHC 1360 (Ch) 
[14] (Lightman J); Clarke v Meadus [2010] EWHC 3117 (Ch) [75] (Warren J); Drayne v McKillen 
[2011] EWHC 3326 (QB) [43] (Coulson J); Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees 
Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 195, [2012] 3 WLR 597 [103] (Lloyd LJ). 
18 Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 (Ch) 647 (Fry J). 
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had been used to purchase land, Fry J cited Phillips and then formulated the question 
which he had to decide as follows: ‘[I]s the right of the [beneficiaries] to follow this 
money into the land an equitable estate or interest, or is it an equity as distinguished 
from an equitable estate?’. Likewise, in Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee,19 Upjohn J 
observed that ‘The Court of Equity has been careful to distinguish between two kinds 
of equities, first, an equity which creates an estate or interest in the land and, secondly, 
an equity which falls short of that’. Another case in which the distinction was 
acknowledged is Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding.20 There, Lord Wilberforce observed 
that ‘There is good authority, which I do not presume to doubt, for a sharp distinction 
between’ equities and equitable interests.21 A more recent example is Drayne v 
McKillen,22 where Coulson J observed that ‘The distinction between equitable 
interests, on the one hand, and mere equities on the other, is made in a number of the 
cases’. 
The main consequence of the dividing-line between mere equities and 
equitable interests concerns an equitable rule of priorities which was first systemised 
in the case of Phillips. This rule relates to the circumstances in which a purchaser of a 
purely equitable interest is permitted to raise the plea of bona fide purchase for value 
without notice. 
 
 
i. Mere equities and the plea of purchase for value without notice 
 
The plea of bona fide purchase for value without notice is a specialised form of 
defence.23 Historically, it defined both the substantive and the administrative divide 
between the equitable and common law jurisdictions,24 and in this connection was 
famously described by Lord Henley LC as ‘the polar star of equity’.25 Since the 
                                                     
19 Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee [1956] 1 Ch 7 (Ch) 18 (Upjohn J). 
20 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 (HL). 
21 Ibid 721B (Lord Wilberforce). 
22 Drayne v McKillen [2011] EWHC 3326 (QB) [43] (Coulson J). 
23 See generally L Tucker, N Le Poidevin and J Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts (19th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2015) paras 41-117-41-142; J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2015) paras 4-017-4-041. 
24 See D Fox, ‘Purchase for Value without Notice’ in PS Davies, S Douglas and J Goudkamp (eds), 
Defences in Equity (Hart Publishing 2018) 53. 
25 Stanhope v Earl Verney (1761) 2 Eden 81, 85; 28 ER 826, 828 (Lord Henley LC). 
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passing of the Judicature Acts 1873 and 187526—and the resultant abolition of the 
administrative divide between equity and the common law27—the plea has inevitably 
lost some of its historical significance.28 Today, the main significance of the plea 
sounds in the equitable rules on priorities.29 In this connection, as a general rule,30 the 
plea can be raised by a purchaser of a legal interest in property against an earlier 
equitable claim affecting the same property.31 The evidential onus is on the purchaser 
to establish all the elements which comprise the plea:32 in the words of Farwell J in Re 
Nisbet and Potts’ Contract,33 ‘the plea of purchaser for value without notice is a single 
plea, to be proved by the person pleading it; it is not to be regarded as a plea of 
purchaser for value, to be met by a reply of notice’. However, if the purchaser 
successfully maintains the plea, then he acquires ‘an absolute, unqualified, 
unanswerable defence’ against the earlier equitable claim.34 
The dividing line between equitable interests and mere equities is significant 
as regards the plea because it affects the circumstances in which it is allowable for a 
purchaser of an equitable—as distinguished from a legal—interest to raise the plea 
against an earlier equitable claim. In this connection, the rule is that if the earlier claim 
amounts to an equitable interest, then it is not allowable for the purchaser to raise the 
plea of purchase for value without notice; whereas if the earlier claim is a mere equity, 
then it is allowable for the purchaser to maintain the plea.35 In consequence, mere 
equities have what may be described as a special vulnerability to the plea of purchase 
for value without notice: unlike equitable interests—which can only be defeated by a 
plea of purchase for value of a legal interest without notice—mere equities can be 
defeated by a plea of purchase for value of either a legal or an equitable interest 
                                                     
26 Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875. 
27 See generally J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) paras 1-015-1-031. 
28 See especially Ind, Coope & Co v Emmerson (1887) 12 App Cas 300 (HL) 310-11 (Lord 
Herschell). 
29 JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and 
Remedies (5th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2014) ch 8. 
30 In relation to land, the plea has been curtailed by statutory systems of registration, in particular, the 
systems for registration of title (Land Registration Act 2002) and land charges (Land Charges Act 
1972): J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) para 4-019. 
31 See, eg, Pilcher v Rawlins (1872) LR 7 Ch App 259 (CA). 
32 A-G v Biphosphated Guano Co (1879) 11 Ch D 327 (CA) 337 (Thesinger LJ); Re Nisbet and Potts’ 
Contract [1905] 1 Ch 391 (Ch) 402 (Farwell J); C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and 
Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 8-005. 
33 Re Nisbet and Potts’ Contract [1905] 1 Ch 391 (Ch) 402 (Farwell J). 
34 Pilcher v Rawlins (1872) LR 7 Ch App 259 (CA) 269 (James LJ). 
35 See, eg, Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 (Ch) 646-47 (Fry J). 
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without notice.36 As Worthington puts it, ‘mere equities are more fragile than 
Equitable interests. They are defeated by any interest subsequently acquired by bona 
fide purchasers’.37 
The consequences for priorities of the distinction between equitable interests 
and mere equities were originally systemised in the case of Phillips mentioned above. 
In Phillips, the owner of the equity of redemption in certain lands first granted a 
rentcharge issuing out of the land to the plaintiff and then transferred the equity of 
redemption to the defendants. When subsequently the plaintiff brought an action to 
enforce his security over the land, the defendants sought to rely on the plea of purchase 
for value without notice.38 The Lord Chancellor, Lord Westbury, held that the plaintiff 
was entitled to enforce his interest against the defendants, ruling that the plea of 
purchase for value without notice was not available in a case like the present, where 
the court had to determine the priority between competing equitable interests. This 
ruling disposed of the case and therefore was the ratio of the Lord Chancellor’s 
decision. However, in the course of his judgment, the Lord Chancellor also outlined 
obiter three situations where the plea of purchase for value without notice was 
available.39 Of interest here is the third situation mentioned by the Lord Chancellor, 
which he described as follows: 
 
Thirdly, where there are circumstances that give rise to an equity as 
distinguished from an equitable estate—as for example, an equity to set aside 
a deed for fraud, or to correct it for mistake—and the purchaser under the 
instrument maintains the plea of purchase for valuable consideration without 
notice, the Court will not interfere.40 
 
                                                     
36 Ibid; Cloutte v Storey [1911] 1 Ch 18 (Ch) 24 (Neville J); Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee [1956] 1 Ch 
7 (Ch) 19 (Upjohn J); National Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 9 (Ch) 14 
(Cross J); National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1238C-D (Lord Upjohn); 
Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265, 277 (Kitto J); Voyce v 
Voyce (1991) 62 P&CR 290 (CA) 294 (Dillon LJ); Mid-Glamorgan CC v Ogwr BC (1994) 68 P&CR 
1 (CA) 9 (Hoffmann LJ); Howlaw (470) Ltd v Stockton Estates Ltd (2001) 81 P&CR 29 (Ch) [65] 
(Neuberger J); Halifax plc v Omar [2002] EWCA Civ 121, [2002] 2 P&CR 26 [84] (Jonathan Parker 
LJ). But see Thompson v Foy [2009] EWHC 1076 (Ch), [2010] 1 P&CR 16 [134] (Lewison J). 
37 S Worthington, Equity (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 97-98. 
38 The defendant’s plea was dismissed at first instance by Sir John Stuart V-C on technical grounds: 
Phillips v Phillips (1861) 3 Giff 200, 66 ER 382. 
39 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 217-18; 45 ER 1164, 1167 (Lord Westbury LC). 
40 Ibid 218; 1167 (Lord Westbury LC). 
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There is controversy among scholars as to what Lord Westbury LC actually meant by 
this statement.41 While interesting from a historical point of view, however, from a 
doctrinal point of view the debate in this area is largely otiose. This is because judges 
in a long line of cases since Phillips have consistently held that the meaning of the 
above statement—commonly known as the third proposition in Phillips—is that it is 
allowable for a purchaser of an equitable interest to raise the plea of purchase for value 
without notice against an earlier mere equity as distinguished from an equitable 
interest.42 Consequently, Phillips is understood today to have systemised the rule of 
priorities that, whilst it is not permissible for a purchaser of an equitable interest to 
raise the plea of purchase for value without notice against an earlier equitable interest 
(the ratio of Phillips), it is allowable for such a purchaser to raise the plea against an 
earlier mere equity (the so-called third proposition in Phillips). 
It is necessary to note that if a mere equity relates to registered land, then it is 
irrelevant that this type of claim has a special vulnerability to the plea of purchase for 
value without notice. As noted above, s 116 of the Land Registration Act 2002 
confirms that a mere equity in relation to registered land counts as an ‘interest’ for the 
purposes of the Act. The result is that, under the priority rules set down in the 2002 
Act,43 the priority of a mere equity affecting registered land is either protected—for 
instance by notice in the register44—or not protected, in which case the mere equity is 
liable to be postponed to any subsequent disposition of an interest which is made for 
value and completed by registration.45 In either case, the plea of purchase for value 
without notice has absolutely no role to play in determining the priority of the mere 
equity vis-à-vis subsequently created interests.46 It follows that, when speaking of 
claims in reference to registered land, a mere equity is not treated any differently to 
an equitable interest—or indeed legal interests.47 Nevertheless, the dividing-line 
between mere equities and equitable interests continues to be significant as regards the 
                                                     
41 See especially D O’Sullivan, ‘The Rule in Phillips v Phillips’ (2002) 118 LQR 296. See also below 
ch 4, pt III, s 3. 
42 See fn 36 above. 
43 See especially Land Registration Act 2002, ss 28-29. 
44 Ibid s 29(2)(a)(i). 
45 Ibid s 29(1). 
46 C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell 2012) para 7-067, point (c). 
47 Ibid; C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson (eds), Goff and Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment 
(9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) para 37-35. 
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priority of competing equitable claims to personal property—for instance money, 
goods or securities—and unregistered land. 
 
 
PART III: THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE THESIS 
 
The preceding exposition shows that the basic features and consequences of mere 
equities can be ascertained from the authorities with relative ease. In other words, the 
case and statute law present a fairly clear picture of the effect which a mere equity is 
likely to have on the outcome of litigation in relation to which that mere equity plays 
a significant role. Despite this apparent clarity, however, there are more fundamental 
questions about mere equities which remain largely unanswered. In particular, there 
seems to be great confusion over mere equities’ legal nature and practical function—
that is to say, what mere equities are and the job which they do. This confusion has 
given rise to the criticism that mere equities are an anomalous category which largely 
defies detailed analysis.48 Indeed, it is not for nothing that one commentator likens the 
concept of a mere equity to ‘a grey and murky fog, consistent in depth of colour, the 
boundaries hazy and ill-defined’.49 
It might be argued that since it is generally well understood how mere equities 
are liable to play out in the resolution of concrete legal problems, the more theoretical 
investigation proposed by this thesis into the nature and function of mere equities is 
strictly unnecessary. Such an outlook, however, would be simplistic, since the lack of 
clarity surrounding mere equities does give rise to genuine problems. For one thing, 
the consequences of any juridical claim are conceptually a result of—or are justified 
by reference to—that claim’s underlying legal nature. In consequence, the lack of 
clarity over mere equities’ legal nature makes it difficult to assess whether the 
established features of mere equities are soundly based. This is especially the case as 
regards the proprietary features of mere equities and the special vulnerability of these 
                                                     
48 See especially National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1238B-G (Lord 
Upjohn); Law Commission, Land Registration for the Twenty-first Century: A Conveyancing 
Revolution (Law Com No 271, 2001) para 5.35; PH Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts (12th edn, 
OUP 2012) 20; S Worthington, Equity (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 82; L Tucker, N Le Poidevin and J 
Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) para 33-021. 
49 AR Everton, ‘“Equitable Interests” and “Equities”—In Search of a Pattern’ (1976) 40 Conv 209, 
209. 
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claims to the plea of bona fide purchase for value without notice.50 This lack of clarity 
may also make it more difficult to predict what effect a mere equity is likely to have 
in novel cases which are not covered by existing precedent. For another thing, 
uncertainty over the function which mere equities perform means that it is not possible 
to ask some important qualitative questions about these claims, in particular, the extent 
to which mere equities are suited to their identified role as compared with other 
potential categories of equitable response, for instance, the trust. 
The present confusion over the nature and function of mere equities is bound 
to leave a question mark over whether mere equities should even exist as a category 
of equitable claim. This would not be such an unsatisfactory state of affairs if mere 
equities were of marginal importance. However, mere equities are far from being a 
footnote in the wider scheme of equitable doctrines and remedies. As will be 
demonstrated in chapter three,51 mere equities are the admitted basis of several very 
familiar modes of equitable intervention, including rescission in equity, rectification 
and proprietary estoppel. The concept of a mere equity, therefore, is by no means 
trivial; it is the substantive foundation for a sizable body of equitable doctrine, 
touching upon many of the sub-topics into which the private law is traditionally 
divided, including areas as diverse as property, contract and restitution.52 Thus mere 
equities play an important role as an organising concept within the equitable system, 
a fact which makes the current uncertainty surrounding these claims all the more 
problematic. 
Accordingly, the overarching aim of this thesis is to carry out an investigation 
that will rectify the present uncertainty over the mere equity’s legal nature and 
practical function. In order to achieve this aim, the thesis will address a number of 
questions. 
 
 
PART IV: THE QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED 
                                                     
50 See Law Commission, Land Registration for the Twenty-first Century: A Conveyancing Revolution 
(Law Com No 271, 2001) para 5.35. 
51 Ch 3, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
52 As evidenced by the fact that most textbooks on these subjects contain paragraphs dealing with 
mere equities: see, eg, C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real 
Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) paras 8-012-8-013; C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S 
Watterson (eds), Goff and Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 
paras 37-30, 37-35; H Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) vol 1, para 
7-141. 
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This thesis will address five key questions. The first question is, ‘What are the different 
claims which are, or might be, mere equities as distinguished from equitable interests?’ 
This question will be dealt with in chapter three, and will entail an examination of the 
primary legal evidence in order to ascertain the different claims that are properly 
classified as mere equities. While the question does not directly address the nature or 
function of mere equities, it is nevertheless a crucial first step in the subsequent 
analysis. Simply put, in order to be able to determine the nature and function of mere 
equities, it is necessary to be able to identify at least the main types of claims which 
qualify as mere equities. These concrete examples are essential, because they are the 
raw data against which any theory or proposal regarding the nature or function of mere 
equities is to be tested. 
The second question which this thesis will answer is ‘What is the legal nature 
of the dividing line between mere equities and equitable interests?’ This question 
begins to address the legal nature of mere equities, and will also be dealt with in 
chapter three. Answering the question will require a detailed comparison to be made 
between the different kinds of ‘mere equities’, on the one hand, and the different types 
of ‘equitable interests’, on the other hand, so that the likely nature of the dividing line 
between these two categories can be identified. Clearly, it is important to identify this 
dividing line if the legal nature of mere equities is to be properly understood. Indeed, 
the fact that mere equities are proprietary but nevertheless fall short of being ‘equitable 
interests’ is what makes these claims stand out as a distinct category; it is furthermore 
the underlying reason that mere equities are treated differently from equitable interests 
as regards the plea of bona fide purchase for value without notice. It follows that a 
credible account of the distinction between mere equities and equitable interests is 
central to any attempt at finding a cogent explanation for mere equities and their 
particular characteristics. 
The third question which the thesis will answer is, ‘What is the underlying 
doctrinal basis for the proprietary features of mere equities?’ This question will be 
addressed in chapters four, five and six. It concerns how, in juridical terms, mere 
equities exhibit the characteristics of enforceability against, and assignability in favour 
of, third parties. The question will involve a detailed examination of the rules and 
principles on which the proprietary features of mere equities are founded. 
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The proposed examination of these rules and principles is necessary in order 
to gain a proper understanding of mere equities. Clearly, it would not be sufficient 
simply to pronounce that these claims are ‘proprietary’ and allow the matter to rest 
there. Indeed, there are at least three reasons why the proprietary characteristics of 
mere equities merit detailed analysis. First, locating these characteristics within their 
proper doctrinal framework should do much to save mere equities from the criticism 
that they are an anomalous category which defies comprehensive analysis. Second, as 
suggested above, it is necessary to know what rules and principles underpin the 
proprietary features of mere equities in order to be able to evaluate whether these 
features are soundly based, and also to be able to predict whether these features will 
be in play in cases which are not covered by existing precedent. Third, identifying the 
doctrinal basis for the proprietary features of mere equities may have wider 
implications for the law as regards, for example, whether the courts are likely in future 
cases to take the step of reclassifying mere equities as equitable interests (a possibility 
that will be discussed in chapter eight53). 
The fourth and fifth questions which this thesis will answer are respectively 
‘What function do mere equities perform?’ and ‘How well do mere equities perform 
their identified function?’ These questions will be dealt with in chapter seven. They 
directly address the lack of clarity over the function which mere equities perform by 
asking what practical role these claims play within the wider socio-economic context. 
On the one hand, answering the fourth question will entail a close examination of the 
different situations in which mere equities are known to have arisen in order to infer 
what function mere equities are likely to be performing in these situations. On the 
other hand, the fifth question will involve an evaluation of how well adapted mere 
equities are to the performance of their allocated function given their established legal 
nature, especially in comparison with other potential categories of equitable 
response—in particular the trust. 
 
 
PART V: OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
 
                                                     
53 Ch 8, pt III, s 3. 
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The chapters which follow will address each of the questions outlined above. Chapter 
two will establish the necessity for the present thesis by carrying out a full review of 
the relevant secondary literature. The chapter will show that while various 
commentators have touched on the questions which this thesis poses, as matters stand, 
none of these questions has been sufficiently addressed in the exiting literature. This 
finding will justify the subsequent chapters, which will seek to remedy the deficiency 
in the present scholarly literature by taking a fresh look at the primary legal materials 
in the light of the questions posed. Finally, having established the necessity for this 
thesis, chapter two will outline and then justify the predominantly doctrinal 
methodology which the thesis will use in order to achieve its aims. 
Chapter three will consider the dividing line between mere equities and 
equitable interests. The chapter will first carry out a review of the cases in order to 
ascertain which equitable claims have expressly been classified by the courts as ‘mere 
equities’ or ‘equitable interests’. The chapter will then compare the ‘confirmed’ mere 
equities with the ‘confirmed’ equitable interests in order to evaluate the likely nature 
of the dividing line between these two categories. Finally, the chapter will apply its 
definition of the dividing line between mere equities and equitable interests in order 
to determine what claims, beyond the judicially confirmed examples of mere equities, 
might also be mere equities. 
The findings in chapter three will answer the first and second questions which 
this thesis poses. In answer to the first question (namely, ‘What are the different claims 
which are, or might be, mere equities as distinguished from equitable interests?’), the 
chapter will conclude that (i) equitable claims to have a transaction rescinded, (ii) 
claims to have a document rectified and (iii) claims to seek relief under the doctrine 
of proprietary estoppel are judicially confirmed examples of mere equities, while (iv) 
claims to have a contract specifically performed, (v) claims to seek relief against the 
forfeiture of a lease and (vi) claims to seek relief against the foreclosure of a mortgage 
could potentially be mere equities, but have not been judicially confirmed as such. In 
answer to the second question (namely, ‘What is the legal nature of the dividing line 
between mere equities and equitable interests?’), the chapter will argue that the 
dividing line between mere equities and equitable interests is that equitable interests, 
on the one hand, are composites of juridical claims which include at least some rights 
in rem while mere equities, on the other hand, are equitable rights of action and 
therefore pure rights in personam. 
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Chapters four, five and six will investigate the doctrinal basis for the 
proprietary features of mere equities. Chapters four and five will focus on the 
enforceability of mere equities against third parties, while chapter six will look at the 
assignability of mere equities in favour of third parties. 
Chapter four will critically examine the idea that the enforceability of mere 
equities against third parties is founded on orthodox conceptions of property. The 
chapter will show that while a handful of cases do disclose some evidence for a 
property-based analysis of the third party effects of mere equities,54 this analysis is not 
in fact workable within the wider doctrinal framework. Finally, the chapter will 
critically consider, and ultimately reject, the theory, which has been put forward by 
certain scholars, that a mere equity to rescind or rectify a transfer is capable of binding 
third parties because it constitutes an imperfection in the title which the transferee 
acquires in the affected asset.55 
These findings will clear the air for chapter five, which will consider the 
alternative idea that the enforceability of mere equities against third parties is 
grounded in equitable notions of unconscionability. Chapter five will argue for the 
existence of a principle, which the chapter will term the conscience-based principle, 
pursuant to which a right in personam may be imposed afresh against the successor in 
title of the person originally bound by that right. The chapter will support this 
argument by appealing to historical cases in which courts of equity applied the 
conscience-based principle in order to enforce what was then a right in personam 
against successors in title. The chapter will then propose that the conscience-based 
principle is the doctrinal basis for the enforceability of mere equities against third 
parties, and will outline the advantages of this analysis. In particular, the chapter will 
argue that this analysis explains why mere equities are treated differently from 
equitable interests as regards the plea of bona fide purchase for value without notice. 
As noted above, chapter six will examine the doctrinal basis for the other 
proprietary feature which mere equities have been known to exhibit, namely, 
assignability in favour of third parties. The chapter will argue that since mere equities 
are equitable rights of action (as established in chapter three), the assignment of these 
                                                     
54 Ie, National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL); Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel 
Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265; Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] 
1 Ch 183 (Ch). 
55 See especially D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 
2014) paras 21.29-21.30. 
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claims is governed by the more wide-ranging principles which apply to the assignment 
of rights of action in general. Having outlined these core principles and demonstrated 
how they apply to mere equities, the chapter will turn to consider a group of cases 
which are problematic in light of these core principles.56 The chapter will then suggest 
three different ways in which these cases can be explained, before proceeding to 
evaluate which of these explanations is the most plausible. 
Taken together, chapters four, five and six will answer the third question which 
this thesis poses (namely, ‘What is the underlying doctrinal basis for the proprietary 
features of mere equities?’). In answer to this question, it will be concluded, firstly, 
that the underlying doctrinal basis for the enforceability of mere equities against third 
parties is the conscience-based principle and, secondly, that the underlying doctrinal 
basis for the assignability of mere equities in favour of third parties is the general 
principle that a bare right of action cannot be assigned unless it is ancillary to some 
property right or interest, in which case it can be assigned together with the property 
right or interest.57 
Chapter seven will investigate the practical function which mere equities 
perform. The chapter will begin this investigation by analysing the different kinds of 
case in which a mere equity has been found to exist in order to ascertain the jointly 
necessary factual elements of this type of claim. The chapter will then expand on this 
analysis by taking a normative approach to the question of why these particular factual 
elements contribute to establishing a mere equity. Finally, the chapter will draw on the 
foregoing analysis in order to infer what function mere equities perform, before 
proceeding to evaluate how well mere equities perform their identified function as 
compared with other potential categories of equitable response, in particular the trust. 
The findings in chapter seven will answer the fourth and fifth questions which 
this thesis poses. In answer to the fourth question (namely, ‘What function do mere 
equities perform?’), the chapter will conclude that mere equities perform the function 
of upholding the common interest which all members of a coherent, cohesive society 
have in affording a measure of protection to persons who have acted in some way to 
their detriment under the influence of their own honest mistake or one of the species 
of fraud. In answer to the fifth question (namely, ‘How well do mere equities perform 
                                                     
56 Ie, Gresley v Mousley (1859) 4 De G&J 78, 45 ER 31; Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337; 
Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v Brougham (1882) 7 App Cas 307 (PC). 
57 See, eg, Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 (HL) 703F-G (Lord Roskill). 
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their identified function?’), the chapter will conclude that the legal nature of mere 
equities as bare equitable rights of action means that they are well adapted to the 
performance of their identified function. 
Finally, chapter eight will present a summary of the key findings and 
arguments which will have been made in the earlier chapters. Chapter eight will then 
highlight some of the potential implications of these findings for legal practice and 
doctrine more broadly. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review and Methodology 
 
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 
As seen in chapter one,1 the overarching purpose of this thesis is to investigate the 
legal nature and practical function of mere equities. In order to achieve this objective, 
the thesis aims to answer the following questions: (i) What are the different claims 
which are, or might be, mere equities as distinguished from equitable interests? (ii) 
What is the legal nature of the dividing line between mere equities and equitable 
interests? (iii) What is the underlying doctrinal basis for the proprietary features of 
mere equities? (iv) What function do mere equities perform? (v) How well do mere 
equities perform their identified function? 
The aim of this chapter is to set out the necessary groundwork for the following 
chapters. The chapter will begin by carrying out a full review of the relevant literature. 
It will demonstrate that although various commentators have touched on the questions 
which this thesis poses, as things stand, none of these questions has been adequately 
addressed in the existing literature—hence justifying the following chapters’ more 
detailed investigation into these questions. Next, the chapter will outline and then 
justify the primarily doctrinal methodology which this thesis will use in order to 
achieve its aims. 
 
 
PART II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
While the body of academic literature which touches on mere equities is quite modest, 
it would be incorrect to say that mere equities have been overlooked. A number of 
academic articles have been written which either deal with mere equities directly or 
consider them in connection with some closely related topic.2 And because, as 
                                                     
1 Ch 1, pt I. 
2 See especially HWR Wade, ‘Husband and Wife—Deserted Wife’s Right to Matrimonial Home—
Equitable Interests and “Mere Equities”’ [1955] CLJ 158; RE Megarry, ‘Mere Equities, the Bona Fide 
Purchaser and the Deserted Wife’ (1955) 71 LQR 480; AR Everton, ‘“Equitable Interests” and 
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observed in chapter one,3 mere equities are relevant to many of the different sub-topics 
into which the private law is traditionally divided, these rights find their way into a 
diverse range of books. Among these books, the most useful for our purposes tend to 
be books on equity or equity and trusts,4 as well as a small number of more specialist 
books, each dealing with one of the doctrines which are generally acknowledged to 
generate mere equities, such as rescission or rectification.5 Other books which contain 
useful discourse on mere equities include works on sub-topics as diverse as land law,6 
contract law,7 the law of unjust enrichment8 and the law of assignment.9 
This part will carry out a review of the existing literature, focusing in particular 
on how previous academic commentary on mere equities relates to the questions which 
this thesis is asking. Mostly, this review will deal with secondary sources such as 
articles and books rather than with primary legal materials like cases and statutes. This 
makes sense because, since this thesis will take a primarily doctrinal approach (see 
below), it will be necessary for the chapters which follow to engage with the relevant 
primary materials in detail. 
 
 
1. What are the different claims which are, or might be, mere equities as 
distinguished from equitable interests? 
 
                                                     
“Equities”—In Search of a Pattern’ (1976) 40 Conv 209; M Neave and M Weinberg, ‘The Nature and 
Function of Equities (Part I)’ (1978-1980) 6 University of Tasmania Law Review 24; M Neave and M 
Weinberg, ‘The Nature and Function of Equities (Part II)’ (1978-1980) 6 University of Tasmania Law 
Review 115; D O’Sullivan, ‘The Rule in Phillips v Phillips’ (2002) 118 LQR 296. 
3 Ch 1, pt III. 
4 See especially PH Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts (12th edn, OUP 2012) 20-25; JD Heydon, MJ 
Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th edn, 
LexisNexis Butterworths 2014) ch 4; L Tucker, N Le Poidevin and J Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts 
(19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) paras 33-020-33-021; J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2015) paras 2-006-2-008. 
5 See especially D Hodge, Rectification: The Modern Law and Practice Governing Claims for 
Rectification for Mistake (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) paras 6-09-6-10; D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R 
Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) paras 16.12-16.17. 
6 See, eg, C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2012) paras 8-012-8-013. 
7 See, eg, H Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) vol 1, para 7-141. 
8 See, eg, C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson (eds), Goff and Jones: The Law of Unjust 
Enrichment (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) paras 37-30, 37-35. 
9 See, eg, M Smith, The Law of Assignment (2nd edn, OUP 2013). 
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Today, most commentators are in agreement that the rights which arise under the 
equitable doctrines of rescission (ie, undue influence,10 unconscionable conduct,11 
innocent misrepresentation12) and rectification (ie, common mistake,13 unilateral 
mistake14) are mere equities.15 And while the term ‘interests’ is also frequently used 
to describe these rights, it is usually clear from the context that this term is being used 
in a general sense to describe all rights of a proprietary character, and not in 
contradistinction to ‘mere equities’. 
A few commentators have bucked the general trend, but they are few and far 
between.16 Most notably, Chambers has expressed disagreement with what he 
describes as the ‘common assumption’17 that the rights which arise under the equitable 
doctrines of rescission and rectification are always mere equities. According to 
Chambers, if a transferor conveys property in circumstances of undue influence or 
mistake, thus entitling the transferor to recover the property by exercising a right to 
rescind or rectify the conveyance, then the transferee holds the property on resulting 
trust for the transferor, who accordingly takes an immediate equitable interest in the 
property, not just a mere equity.18 It is fair to say, however, that commentators who 
take the view that rights of rescission or rectification can amount to equitable interests 
as distinguished from mere equities are clearly in a minority.19 
                                                     
10 See generally D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 
2014) paras 6.75-6.120. 
11 See generally ibid paras 7.62-7.96. 
12 See generally ibid ch 4. 
13 See generally D Hodge, Rectification: The Modern Law and Practice Governing Claims for 
Rectification for Mistake (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) ch 3. 
14 See generally ibid ch 4. 
15 See, eg, HWR Wade, ‘Husband and Wife—Deserted Wife’s Right to Matrimonial Home—
Equitable Interests and “Mere Equities”’ [1955] CLJ 158, 160; RE Megarry, ‘Mere Equities, the Bona 
Fide Purchaser and the Deserted Wife’ (1955) 71 LQR 480, 482; AR Everton, ‘“Equitable Interests” 
and “Equities”—In Search of a Pattern’ (1976) 40 Conv 209, 210; M Neave and M Weinberg, ‘The 
Nature and Function of Equities (Part I)’ (1978-1980) 6 University of Tasmania Law Review 24, 25; 
PH Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts (12th edn, OUP 2012) 21-22; C Harpum, S Bridge and M 
Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 8-012; 
M Smith, The Law of Assignment (2nd edn, OUP 2013) para 2.90; JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG 
Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th edn, LexisNexis 
Butterworths 2014) ch 4; L Tucker, N Le Poidevin and J Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts (19th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2015) para 33-021; J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2015) para 2-006, including fn 22. 
16 See especially JB Ames, ‘Purchase for Value Without Notice’ (1887) 1 Harvard Law Review 1, 2; 
R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (OUP 1997) ch 7. 
17 R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (OUP 1997) 184. 
18 Ibid ch 7. 
19 Furthermore, Chambers himself appears to have abandoned the theory that a right to rescind or 
rectify gives the claimant an immediate, automatic equitable interest in any recoverable assets: R 
Chambers, ‘Resulting Trusts’ in A Burrows and A Rodger (eds), Mapping the Law: Essays in 
Memory of Peter Birks (OUP 2006) 256, 261. 
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Previously, there was disagreement among commentators over the correct 
classification of the rights which arise under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.20 On 
the one hand, there were commentators who argued that the inchoate status of these 
rights meant that they were purely personal.21 On the other, there were commentators 
who accepted that these rights, despite their inchoate status, were proprietary rights 
similar to rights of rescission and rectification.22 However, there have been two 
developments which have largely taken away the impetus behind the view that rights 
of proprietary estoppel are purely personal. First, there have been a number of cases 
where it was decided that rights of proprietary estoppel could be enforced against third 
parties,23 thus demonstrating that these rights are capable of being more than purely 
personal, at least in some circumstances.24 Second, as explained in chapter one,25 the 
Land Registration Act 2002 has declared that ‘equities by estoppel’ in relation to 
registered land are proprietary in character.26 The outcome of these developments is 
that today a majority of commentators accept that the rights which arise under the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel are mere equities.27 
Accordingly, there is a clear consensus among commentators that the rights 
which arise under the equitable doctrines of rescission, rectification and proprietary 
estoppel are mere equities as distinguished from equitable interests. As far as the 
secondary literature is concerned, therefore, these rights can be said to represent the 
‘core examples’ of mere equities. 
                                                     
20 JE Martin, ‘Casenotes: Editor’s Notes’ [1992] Conv 53, 57; C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, 
Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 16-028; M 
Thompson and M George, Thompson’s Modern Land Law (6th edn, OUP 2017) 589-90; J-A 
MacKenzie and A Nair, Textbook on Land Law (19th edn, OUP 2018) 420. 
21 D Hayton, ‘Developing the Law of Trusts for the Twenty-first Century’ (1990) 106 LQR 87, fn 26. 
See also P Critchley, ‘A Via Media for Estoppel and Third Parties’ [1998] Conv 502. 
22 M Neave and M Weinberg, ‘The Nature and Function of Equities (Part I)’ (1978-1980) 6 
University of Tasmania Law Review 24, 25; S Baughen, ‘Estoppels over Land and Third Parties: An 
Open Question?’ (1994) 14 LS 147. 
23 See, eg, Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29 (CA); ER Ives Investment Ltd v High [1967] 2 QB 379 
(CA); Voyce v Voyce (1991) 62 P&CR 290 (CA). 
24 M Thompson and M George, Thompson’s Modern Land Law (6th edn, OUP 2017) 590. 
25 Ch 1, pt II, s 1. 
26 Land Registration Act 2002, s 116. But see B McFarlane, ‘Proprietary Estoppel and Third Parties 
after the Land Registration Act 2002’ (2003) 62 CLJ 661. 
27 See, eg, M Neave and M Weinberg, ‘The Nature and Function of Equities (Part I)’ (1978-1980) 6 
University of Tasmania Law Review 24, 25; C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and Wade: 
The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 16-028; J McGhee (ed), Snell’s 
Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) para 2-006, fn 22. See also Halifax plc v Curry Popeck 
[2008] EWHC 1692 (Ch) [26] (Norris J). 
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Outside of these core examples, there is no consistency of approach in the 
secondary literature about what other rights might be mere equities, although a few 
commentators have made ad hoc suggestions in this regard. These suggestions 
include: (i) the rights of mortgagees to consolidation of mortgages;28 (ii) claims to re-
open a foreclosure of mortgaged property;29 (iii) claims to seek relief against the 
forfeiture of a lease;30 (iv) the rights of persons who are entitled to inherit in reference 
to the unadministered estate of the deceased;31 (v) the rights of purchasers under estate 
contracts;32 (vi) rights to assert an equitable interest in property which has been 
identified though the equitable tracing rules.33 
The difficulty is that many of these suggestions are doctrinally questionable or 
based on arguably impressionistic reasoning. For one thing, certain rights in the above 
list are protected by remedies which have been made available against a third party 
purchaser for value of an equitable interest without notice.34 This is something which 
ought not to be possible if these rights were mere equities. This is because, as 
explained in chapter one,35 one of the key consequences of a right being a mere equity 
is that that right can be defeated by any third party purchaser for value without notice, 
including a purchaser of a merely equitable interest.36 
For another thing, it seems that some rights in the above list may have been 
classified as ‘mere equities’ solely because they do not confer a present right to the 
enjoyment of identifiable property and therefore, or so the argument runs, cannot be 
classified as ‘equitable interests’. Indeed, this is the reason which Virgo gives for 
                                                     
28 PH Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts (12th edn, OUP 2012) 21-22. 
29 HWR Wade, ‘Husband and Wife—Deserted Wife’s Right to Matrimonial Home—Equitable 
Interests and “Mere Equities”’ [1955] CLJ 158, 160; C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and 
Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 8-012. 
30 Law Commission, Land Registration for the Twenty-first Century: A Conveyancing Revolution 
(Law Com No 271, 2001) para 5.33, point (4). See also Explanatory Notes to the Land Registration 
Act 2002, para 186. 
31 G Virgo, The Principles of Equity and Trusts (2nd edn, OUP 2016) 76-78. See also PS Davies, G 
Virgo and EH Burn, Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2016) 49, 51. 
32 JE Penner, The Law of Trusts (10th edn, OUP 2016) para 4.8. 
33 J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) para 2-006. 
34 See, eg, Ireson v Denn (1796) 2 Cox 426, 30 ER 197: a mortgagee of two distinct estates upon 
distinct mortgages from the same mortgagor was allowed to enforce his right to consolidate both 
mortgages against a purchaser of the equity of redemption in one estate without notice of the 
mortgage of the other estate. See also C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The 
Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 25-067. 
35 Ch 1, pt II, s 2. 
36 See, eg, Mid-Glamorgan CC v Ogwr BC (1994) 68 P&CR 1 (CA) 9 (Hoffmann LJ). See further the 
authorities cited above at ch 1, fn 36. 
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suggesting that right (iv) is a mere equity.37 Yet this reasoning derives from the 
underlying proposition that the characteristic of conferring a present right to the 
enjoyment of identifiable property is a necessary feature of all equitable interests. 
None of the commentators in question, however, supports this proposition with any 
evidence or discussion. Furthermore, the proposition goes against the grain of recent 
scholarship, which suggests that the core feature of proprietary interests is not that 
they confer any particular entitlement to benefit, but that they include the right to 
exclude other people from the enjoyment of identifiable property.38 It follows that the 
classification of at least right (iv) as a mere equity is founded on reasoning which is 
doubtful to say the least. 
Therefore it is clear that, beyond the core examples of rights of rescission, 
rectification and proprietary estoppel, there is confusion in the secondary literature 
about what rights are properly classified as mere equities as distinguished from 
equitable interests. This is unfortunate because, as explained in chapter one,39 different 
consequences attach to equitable interests and mere equities respectively—the main 
difference being that an equitable interest can only be defeated by the plea of bona 
fide purchase for value without notice if the interest purchased is legal, whereas a mere 
equity can be defeated by the plea even if the interest purchased is merely equitable.40 
The problem of classification will be addressed in chapter three. As already 
explained,41 that chapter will begin by carrying out a full review of the case law in 
order to identify the various rights which the courts have definitively classified as mere 
equities or equitable interests. The chapter will then compare the different rights which 
have been classified in this way in order to define the nature of the distinction between 
mere equities and equitable interests (see below). Armed with this definition, the 
chapter will then return to consider the problem of classification. It will look at the 
various rights which the courts have not definitively classified as mere equities or 
equitable interests and will consider, in the light of the distinction between these 
categories, into which category each of these rights is likely to fall. 
 
                                                     
37 G Virgo, The Principles of Equity and Trusts (2nd edn, OUP 2016) 76-78. 
38 K Grey, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50 CLJ 252, 294; RC Nolan, ‘Equitable Property’ (2006) 122 
LQR 232, 234-35. 
39 Ch 1, pt II, s 2. 
40 See fn 36 above. 
41 See above ch 1, pt V. 
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2. What is the legal nature of the dividing line between mere equities and 
equitable Interests? 
 
From what has just been said, it is clear that the proper definition of the dividing line 
between mere equities and equitable interests is central to the problem of classification 
in cases where the status of a particular equitable proprietary right as a mere equity or 
an equitable interest is uncertain. Yet this is not the only reason that the distinction 
between mere equities and equitable interests is, as Megarry puts it, ‘of considerable 
importance’.42 It is also important because the mere equity can only be considered a 
defensible concept if this distinction serves to justify the different consequences that 
attach to mere equities as compared to equitable interests: in particular the rule that 
mere equities, unlike equitable interests, can be defeated by all purchasers for value 
without notice, including purchasers of merely equitable interests.43 
Given the general importance of the distinction between mere equities and 
equitable interests, it is not surprising that a number of commentators have sought to 
explain this distinction.44 Precisely how much clarity this scholarly attention has 
brought to this area is questionable: Pettit, for one, complains that ‘it is … difficult to 
find two writers who share the same view’.45 Yet while it is true that academic 
accounts of the distinction between mere equities and equitable interests differ as to 
their details, it seems, more often than not, that this lack of congruity is more apparent 
than real. 
Thus it seems that the majority of commentators are in general, albeit 
unspoken, agreement that the reason mere equities are distinct from equitable interests 
is that mere equities are, in one sense or another, more susceptible to the discretion of 
the court than equitable interests. Wade is probably the first commentator to have 
                                                     
42 RE Megarry, ‘Mere Equities, the Bona Fide Purchaser and the Deserted Wife’ (1955) 71 LQR 480, 
480. 
43 See fn 36 above. 
44 See especially HWR Wade, ‘Husband and Wife—Deserted Wife’s Right to Matrimonial Home—
Equitable Interests and “Mere Equities”’ [1955] CLJ 158; AR Everton, ‘“Equitable Interests” and 
“Equities”—In Search of a Pattern’ (1976) 40 Conv 209; M Neave and M Weinberg, ‘The Nature and 
Function of Equities (Part I)’ (1978-1980) 6 University of Tasmania Law Review 24; M Neave and M 
Weinberg, ‘The Nature and Function of Equities (Part II)’ (1978-1980) 6 University of Tasmania Law 
Review 115. 
45 PH Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts (12th edn, OUP 2012) 22. 
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expressed this view,46 suggesting that the supposedly discretionary nature of mere 
equities may be what distinguishes them from equitable interests: 
 
The dividing line between equitable interests and mere equities is perhaps the 
discretionary character of the latter. Equitable claims to set aside deeds, or to 
secure their rectification, or to reopen a foreclosure, are at the discretion of the 
court in a way which does not apply to equitable titles such as those of 
beneficiaries under a trust or a mortgagor’s equity of redemption.47 
 
Everton adopts a slightly different approach.48 She eschews the expression ‘mere 
equity’ to describe a category of equitable proprietary right,49 distinguishing instead 
between what she terms ‘patent equitable interests’ and ‘latent equitable interests’. On 
the one hand, patent equitable interests, which Everton broadly equates with ‘equitable 
interests’ traditionally so called, are rights which ‘depend for their existence simply 
upon the act of the parties’.50 On the other hand, latent equitable interests, which 
Everton broadly equates with ‘mere equities’ traditionally so called, are rights which 
depend for their existence ‘upon the successful pursuit of a remedy’.51 
Everton not only adopts a different taxonomy from Wade, she also criticises 
elements of his reasoning.52 Yet, on closer inspection, the variances between these two 
scholars mask a pronounced similarity in approach. Thus both Wade and Everton 
concur that the reason ‘mere equities’ (or ‘latent equitable interests’) are distinct from 
‘equitable interests’ (or ‘patent equitable interests’) is that the former, but not the latter, 
are contingent on the discretion of the court, such that the existence or consequences 
of the former cannot be predicted with absolute certainty unless and until the court 
either grants or refuses relief. As Everton herself puts it: 
                                                     
46 HWR Wade, ‘Husband and Wife—Deserted Wife’s Right to Matrimonial Home—Equitable 
Interests and “Mere Equities”’ [1955] CLJ 158. 
47 Ibid 160. Writing together, Megarry and Wade would repeat the suggestion that a mere equity is 
‘more at the discretion of the court’: see RE Megarry and HWR Wade, The Law of Real Property (5th 
edn, Stevens & Sons Ltd 1984) 147. These words are reproduced at C Harpum, S Bridge and M 
Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 8-013. 
48 AR Everton, ‘“Equitable Interests” and “Equities”—In Search of a Pattern’ (1976) 40 Conv 209. 
49 Everton suggests that the term ‘mere equity’ might be reserved for rights ‘of an exclusively 
personal nature’: see ibid 220. However, this would be inconsistent with the ordinary usage of ‘mere 
equity’ to describe a type of proprietary claim: see above ch 1, pt II, s 1. 
50 AR Everton, ‘“Equitable Interests” and “Equities”—In Search of a Pattern’ (1976) 40 Conv 209, 
215. 
51 Ibid 218. 
52 Ibid 212-13. 
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Unlike … an interest under a trust, the existence of which in no way depends 
upon the vindication of an equitable claim, the interest arising from a voidable 
conveyance cannot be said, in the period between the execution of the 
conveyance and the awarding of rescission, to enjoy [anything] other than a 
‘shadow like’ existence …53 
 
Other commentators have expressed the same basic idea, albeit using different 
terminology. A typical formulation is that a mere equity, in contrast with an equitable 
interest, has an ‘inchoate status’ which continues up until the point at which the mere 
equity is successfully enforced, whereupon the mere equity is said to ‘crystallise’ into 
a full equitable beneficial or security interest.54 With respect, this seems to be just 
another way of saying that a mere equity enjoys nothing more than a ‘shadow like’ 
existence in the period from its inception to its enforcement. 
Neave and Weinberg warrant a special mention. Writing together,55 they argue 
in favour of the thesis that, when the court acknowledges a category of equitable right 
for the first time, that right begins as a fully discretionary, purely personal right—
which Neave and Weinberg term an ‘undefined equity’56—but that an undefined 
equity is apt over time to become progressively more defined and to acquire, where 
appropriate, proprietary characteristics. According to Neave and Weinberg, the 
distinction between equitable interests and mere equities is best understood in terms 
of this process. On the one hand, equitable interests are rights which have reached the 
most advanced stage in their development, having become, Neave and Weinberg 
allege, strictly non-discretionary and capable of enforcement against all third parties, 
except for purchasers for value of legal interests without notice. On the other hand, 
mere equities are rights which, although they are no longer fully discretionary and 
have acquired certain proprietary characteristics, are still at an intermediate stage in 
their development, and thus are not as ‘defined’ as equitable interests. However, it is 
                                                     
53 Ibid 214. 
54 See especially J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) para 2-006; C 
Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson (eds), Goff and Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2016) paras 37-30-37-31. 
55 M Neave and M Weinberg, ‘The Nature and Function of Equities (Part I)’ (1978-1980) 6 
University of Tasmania Law Review 24; M Neave and M Weinberg, ‘The Nature and Function of 
Equities (Part II)’ (1978-1980) 6 University of Tasmania Law Review 115. 
56 M Neave and M Weinberg, ‘The Nature and Function of Equities (Part I)’ (1978-1980) 6 
University of Tasmania Law Review 24, 26. 
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intrinsic to Neave and Weinberg’s thesis that the ‘mere equity’ label is transient, since 
the potential exists for even confirmed mere equities to complete their development 
and become full equitable interests in future cases.57 
Neave and Weinberg adopt a broadly similar approach to Wade and Everton. 
Like Wade and Everton, Neave and Weinberg place emphasis on the less defined 
quality of mere equities as compared with the supposedly non-discretionary character 
of equitable interests. However, Neave and Weinberg take this basic idea further by 
attempting to make sense of it within the ambit of their more general theory of how 
equitable proprietary interests develop. In this way, Neave and Weinberg lend greater 
weight than Wade and Everton to judicial creativity and decision making as factors 
underpinning the distinction between mere equities and equitable interests.58 
Accordingly, although commentators cannot quite agree on exactly what the 
distinction between mere equities and equitable interests is, it nevertheless seems that 
the greater part of scholarly opinion is in favour of the view that this distinction has 
something to do with the supposedly more discretionary character of mere equities. It 
is important to emphasise, however, that this view is not the only one to have been put 
forward in the secondary literature. 
An alternative line of inquiry which has become apparent only comparatively 
recently identifies equitable interests with ‘duties’ and mere equities with 
‘liabilities’.59 In broad outline, this view maintains that the basis of an equitable 
interest is some ‘duty’ or ‘obligation’ in reference to the enjoyment of definite property 
owed by one party to another. In contrast, a mere equity is said not to include any such 
duty or obligation, but consists of a ‘liability’ incurred by one party to have his legal 
rights in reference to definite property ‘reduced or extinguished’ at the instance of 
another party,60 who therefore can be said to have a form of ‘power’.61 
McFarlane, Hopkins and Neild are among the commentators who adopt this 
analysis.62 Writing together, they suggest that the reason the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel initially generates an ‘equity’ rather than an ‘equitable interest’ is that that 
                                                     
57 For discussion of this possibility see below ch 8, pt III, s 3. 
58 See PH Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts (12th edn, OUP 2012) 22. 
59 For discussion of the distinction between a ‘duty’ and a ‘liability’ see WN Hohfeld, ‘Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913-1914) 23 Yale Law Journal 
16, 28 et seq. 
60 E McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law (4th edn, LexisNexis UK and Penguin Books 2010) 30. 
61 D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 16.17. 
62 B McFarlane, N Hopkins and S Nield, Land Law (OUP 2017). 
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doctrine does not impose any immediate duty on the defendant, but rather gives the 
claimant a power to apply to the court for equitable relief against the defendant.63 
Furthermore, these commentators propose that the same analysis is applicable to other 
situations where the claimant is said to have a ‘mere equity’,64 and cite rights in 
rescission as an example: 
 
… if B transfers a right to A as a result of A’s misrepresentation, and B 
therefore has a power to rescind the transfer and regain the right, it is not true 
to say that A is under an immediate duty to B: after all, B may decide to let the 
transfer stand. That does not mean, however, that A’s position is secure: as B 
may choose to rescind the transfer and regain the right, A is subject to a 
liability.65 
 
McFarlane, Hopkins and Neild are not the only commentators to suggest that the 
expression ‘mere equity’ signifies a kind of power.66 Of particular note is Häcker, who 
posits that where a transferor is entitled to recover property by exercising an equitable 
right to rescind an earlier conveyance, the transferor has a so called ‘power in rem’,67 
which Häcker identifies with the term ‘mere equity’.68 The concept of a power in rem 
will be critically considered in chapter four.69 For present purposes, however, it is 
significant that Häcker concurs with the basic idea that the term ‘mere equity’, when 
used in contradistinction with ‘equitable interest’, denotes a species of power. 
The various attempts which previous commentators have made to explain the 
distinction between mere equities and equitable interests will provide the basis for the 
discussion in chapter three. As explained above,70 that chapter will begin by reviewing 
the case law in order to identify the various rights which the courts have definitively 
                                                     
63 Ibid 176-77. 
64 Ibid 177. 
65 Ibid. 
66 See especially P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 299-300; B Häcker, ‘Proprietary 
Restitution after Impaired Consent Transfers: A Generalised Power Model’ (2009) 68 CLJ 324, 351; 
M Balen, ‘What is the Status of a Restitutionary Power to Revest Title in Insolvency’ (2011) 22 KLJ 
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67 B Häcker, ‘Proprietary Restitution after Impaired Consent Transfers: A Generalised Power Model’ 
(2009) 68 CLJ 324, 329-31. 
68 Ibid 351. 
69 Ch 4, pt V. 
70 Ch 1, pt V. 
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classified as ‘mere equities’ or ‘equitable interests’. This first step is necessary 
because, without a clear idea of what the established categories of ‘mere equity’ and 
‘equitable interest’ are, there is no way of evaluating what the dividing line between 
mere equities and equitable interests might be. The chapter will then turn to consider 
the likely nature of this dividing line. It will argue against the leading view that the 
distinction between mere equities and equitable interests has something to do with the 
discretionary characteristics of mere equities.71 The chapter will then put forward an 
alternative account of this distinction which, it will be argued, is more closely aligned 
with the view that a mere equity is a form of liability rather than a duty or obligation.72 
 
 
3. What is the underlying doctrinal basis for the proprietary features of mere 
equities? 
 
As demonstrated in chapter one,73 mere equities possess two features which justify the 
description of these claims as ‘proprietary’. First, a mere equity can be enforced 
against all third parties except for bona fide purchasers for value without notice.74 
Second, a mere equity can, in certain circumstances, be assigned or devised in favour 
of a third party.75 
It is almost universally accepted in the secondary literature that mere equities 
have these proprietary features.76 There are one or two commenters who take the 
contrary view, arguing that mere equities are incapable of affecting anyone except the 
original parties,77 but these commentators are in a very small minority. The following 
statement by Worthington is typical of mainstream opinion: 
 
                                                     
71 Ch 3, pt III, s 1. 
72 Ch 3, pt III, s 2. 
73 Ch 1, pt II, s 1. 
74 See especially the authorities cited above at ch 1, fn 6. 
75 See especially the authorities cited above at ch 1, fn 13. 
76 See especially S Worthington, Equity (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 299; D Hodge, Rectification: The 
Modern Law and Practice Governing Claims for Rectification for Mistake (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 
para 1-46; L Tucker, N Le Poidevin and J Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2015) para 33-021; J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) para 2-007. 
77 See, eg, R Pearce and W Barr, Pearce and Stevens’ Trusts and Equitable Obligations (7th edn, 
OUP 2018) 21. 
37 
 
[A mere equity] is the weakest of Equity’s proprietary interests, but 
nevertheless it is an interest that can be transferred to others and enforced 
against third parties who are volunteers or who have notice of [the claimant’s] 
claim, although not against others.78 
 
However, although the majority of commentators agree that mere equities can be 
enforced against, and assigned to, third parties, very few commentators have given 
any consideration to the rules and principles on which these proprietary features are 
founded. This is unfortunate. As explained in chapter one,79 there are three reasons 
why, in order to develop a proper understanding of mere equities, it is necessary to go 
further than merely stating that these rights are proprietary in character and to 
investigate the doctrinal and theoretical basis of these proprietary features. First, 
locating these characteristics within their proper doctrinal framework should do much 
to defend mere equities from the criticism that they are an anomalous category that 
defies comprehensive analysis.80 Second, it is necessary to know what rules and 
principles underpin the proprietary features of mere equities in order to be able to 
evaluate whether these features are soundly based, and also to be able to predict 
whether these features will be applicable in cases which are not covered by existing 
precedent. Third, identifying the doctrinal basis for the proprietary features of mere 
equities may have wider implications for the law as regards, for example, whether the 
courts are likely in future cases to take the step of reclassifying mere equities as 
equitable interests (a possibility that will be considered in chapter eight81). 
While the existing commentary in this area is exceedingly sparse, there are 
nevertheless a small handful commentators who have made some attempt to explain 
the doctrinal basis on which a mere equity can be enforced against third parties—
although these attempts, it is fair to say, are perfunctory at best. Among these 
commentators, two competing strands of thought can be identified. First, there are 
some commentators who suggest that the enforceability of mere equities against third 
parties is founded on the traditional principle of property law that a transferor of 
property cannot pass to his transferee a greater title than that which he actually 
                                                     
78 S Worthington, Equity (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 299. 
79 Ch 1, pt IV. 
80 See above ch 1, pt III. 
81 Ch 8, pt III, s 3. 
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possesses.82 The authors of The Law of Rescission give what is arguably the clearest 
enunciation of this view: 
 
[A claim to recover property on rescission] is an imperfection in the title of the 
[original] transferee. Nemo dat quod non habet (no one may give a title greater 
than he has) that imperfection must persist unless and until a subsequent 
transferee obtains a better title, free from the claim to recover the asset upon 
rescission. A person taking with notice or as a volunteer from the initial 
transferee under the voidable transaction does not obtain a better title. They 
obtain only their predecessor’s defeasible title.83 
 
Second, there are other commentators who, it seems, tend towards the view that a mere 
equity is notionally a personal claim, but that the courts may nevertheless consent to 
allow such a claim to be enforced against a volunteer or one taking with notice on 
equitable grounds of conscience.84 Unfortunately, however, neither the commentators 
who appeal to traditional principles of property law, nor those who make reference to 
equitable grounds of conscience, backs up his or her assertions with any detailed 
evidence or discussion. 
Similar criticisms can be levelled against the existing scholarly accounts of the 
rules and principles which underlie the assignment of mere equities to third parties. 
The very few commentators who touch upon this subject seem to be in general 
agreement that a mere equity can only be assigned together with some property right 
or interest to which that mere equity is ancillary.85 None of these commentators, 
however, explores the meaning and application of this supposed rule in any significant 
detail. It is hard to say precisely what the reason is for this lack of curiosity, but the 
most likely cause is that the assignability of mere equities to third parties does not, at 
first glance, strike one as a subject which is liable to give rise to significant doctrinal 
or theoretical difficulties. After all, it has long been accepted that even purely personal 
                                                     
82 See especially D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 
2014) para 21.29-21.30. 
83 Ibid para 21.29. See also R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2011) para 3-05. 
84 See P Critchley, ‘A Via Media for Estoppel and Third Parties’ [1998] Conv 502, 508. See also K 
Gray and SF Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th edn, OUP 2009) para 3.4.12. 
85 See especially D Hodge, Rectification: The Modern Law and Practice Governing Claims for 
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rights, such as contractual debts, can be assigned in equity.86 Nevertheless, it is 
suggested that, for the three reasons given above, the assignability of mere equities to 
third parties is a subject which merits a detailed investigation: the sort of investigation 
which the current body of academic writing fails to deliver. 
In summary, it is clear that the rules and principles which underpin a mere 
equity’s proprietary features have not been sufficiently considered in the secondary 
literature. One of the principal aims of this thesis is to fill this gap. 
As already explained,87 chapters four and five will examine the enforceability 
of mere equities against third parties. These chapters will build on the two existing 
stands of academic opinion identified above. Chapter four will consider the approach 
which appeals to traditional principles of property law, and will argue that this 
approach, whilst enjoying some support in the case law, is contrary to the weight of 
modern authority and inconsistent with the established rule that a mere equity cannot 
be enforced against a purchaser for value of even an equitable interest without notice. 
This will clear the air for chapter five, which will seek to develop, and then argue in 
favour of, the view that the enforceability of mere equities is founded on equitable 
grounds of conscience. 
Finally, chapter six will investigate the assignability of mere equities in favour 
of third parties. The chapter will begin by explaining the core principles which 
underlie this proprietary characteristic. The chapter will then demonstrate that, while 
the core principles are reasonably clear in and of themselves, there is an important 
group of cases which are very difficult to harmonise with the core principles. The 
chapter will then introduce three alternative approaches to how these cases can be 
understood, and will evaluate which of these approaches is the most plausible. 
 
 
4. What function do mere equities perform (and how well do mere equities 
perform their identified function)? 
 
The function of mere equities is a subject which very few commentators have 
considered. Nevertheless, those commentators who have touched on this area seem to 
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share substantively the same point of view: that mere equities perform the function of 
preventing injustice in situations where none of the more traditional forms of equitable 
response, such as the trust, is available. In other words, mere equities are portrayed as 
rights which perform a strictly residual function, filling in lacunae which are left over 
by other more well established, and correspondingly less flexible, categories of 
equitable claim. 
Neave and Weinberg, whose arguments have already been considered, are 
among the commentators who suggest that mere equities operate to prevent injustice 
in novel situations.88 According to them, the concept of an ‘equity’ is invoked in cases 
where the claim asserted by the claimant against the defendant does not ‘fall within a 
traditionally defined category’.89 The ninth edition of Hanbury’s Modern Equity 
adopts a similar position, asserting that the phrase ‘an equity’ is obviously ‘not a 
technical one, but a residual one, used where no more technical phrase is available’.90 
In a similar vein, Hudson suggests that mere equities are ad hoc claims which ‘arise 
on a case-by-case basis … in circumstances in which the courts think it necessary to 
do justice between the parties’.91 
Despite this apparent consensus of academic opinion that mere equities serve 
the function of confronting residual forms of injustice, there is, in the estimation of the 
present writer, something intellectually lazy about this point of view. For one thing, it 
is arguably meaningless to say that the function of mere equities is to fill in gaps which 
are left over by other forms of juridical response, especially since, at bottom, this kind 
of ‘gap filling’ is the traditional role of equity92 and, correspondingly, of all equitable 
claims, whether they are classified as purely personal equities, mere equities or 
equitable proprietary interests. For another thing, it is difficult to see how it can be 
said that mere equities, as a rule, fall outside the ‘traditional’ range of equitable 
responses. After all, the equitable remedies of rescission and rectification (claims to 
which are almost certainly mere equities, as will be demonstrated in chapter three93) 
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are amongst the most well established and time honoured forms of equitable 
intervention.94 
Setting these misgivings aside, it is suggested that the real problem with the 
existing literature in this field is that no commentator has explored the alternative 
possibility that the various kinds of mere equity, rather than serving a residual role, 
perform the specific function of remedying one particular type of injustice. It is 
difficult to say exactly why this possibility has not been considered. The most likely 
reason, however, is that the wide variability of the cases where mere equities have 
been held to arise—including, among others, cases of innocent misrepresentation, 
undue influence, unconscionable dealing, mistake, and equitable estoppel—is liable 
to give the impression that all mere equities cannot be responses to the same type of 
injustice, save perhaps at a nonsensically high level of generality. Perhaps it is 
inevitable, therefore, that many commentators will, either knowingly or unknowingly, 
dismiss out of hand the idea that all mere equities respond to a uniform species of 
injustice. 
Whatever the reason, it is unfortunate that this idea has not been investigated 
in the academic literature. After all, such an investigation could reveal that all mere 
equities do, in actual fact, perform the specialised function of preventing one particular 
form of injustice. Such a finding could have profound implications, not least in helping 
to define the mere equity’s unique role within the wider scheme of equitable rights 
and interests. In particular, it could shed light on the vexed problem of explaining why 
mere equities take the legal form which they do, and not some alternative form, such 
as a beneficial interest under a trust.95 
As explained already,96 the function of mere equities will be addressed in 
chapter seven. That chapter will begin by considering the different situations in which 
the core examples of mere equities—ie, rights in rescission, rectification and 
proprietary estoppel—have been held to exist. It will argue that, in each of these 
situations, the mere equity is responding to the same basic form of injustice: namely 
the injustice which exists where a person acts to his detriment in consequence of some 
vitiating factor, such as mistake or undue influence. The chapter will then argue that 
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preventing this form of injustice is the proper function of all the core examples of mere 
equities. Finally, the chapter will consider the secondary, but nevertheless important, 
question of how well mere equities perform their identified function. The chapter will 
argue that mere equities are uniquely well adapted to their identified function. 
 
 
5. Literature review: Conclusion 
 
From the foregoing review, it is clear that a number of other commentators have 
touched on the questions which this thesis poses. It is also clear, however, that as 
things stand none of these questions has been sufficiently addressed in the existing 
literature. The following chapters will remedy this deficiency. They will do this by 
taking a fresh look at the primary materials in the light of the questions posed, seeking 
to build on the existing literature where possible and, where this is not possible, filling 
in the conceptual gaps. 
Having concluded our review of the relevant academic literature, the second 
part of this chapter will now outline and then justify the predominantly doctrinal 
methodology which the present thesis will employ in subsequent chapters in order to 
achieve its aims. 
 
 
PART III: METHODOLOGY 
 
In answering the various questions which it poses, the present thesis will adopt a 
mainly doctrinal approach by concentrating on the analysis of primary legal materials, 
that is to say, cases and statutes.97 This is appropriate because, as explained in chapter 
one,98 the overarching purpose of this thesis is to investigate the nature and function 
of ‘mere equities’ as these rights are understood and applied within the English legal 
system. And as Nolan observes: 
 
                                                     
97 See generally S Bartie, ‘The Lingering Core of Legal Scholarship’ (2010) 30 LS 345, 347-50. 
98 Ch 1, pt I. 
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When analysing concepts from a particular legal system … it is appropriate to 
attribute meaning to such terms by reference to sources regarded as 
authoritative within that system. … In the English legal system, the 
authoritative sources are statutes applicable in England and decided court cases 
of binding (or clearly persuasive) force in English courts.99 
 
The sources of authority with which this thesis will be dealing will mainly be cases. 
These will include certain cases from other jurisdictions, in particular Australia, 
especially where these sources have been treated as persuasive by the English 
authorities.100 This emphasis on cases is appropriate because the concept of a mere 
equity, like most other equitable rights, interests and entitlements, is primarily a 
creation of the courts. However, the present thesis cannot, and will not, ignore the role 
of statue, for, as with numerous other juridical concepts which derive primarily from 
the cases, the mere equity has been recognised, and for certain purposes modified, by 
statute: most notably by the Land Registration Act 2002.101 This thesis will also make 
use of secondary materials such as books and articles where these provide commentary 
on the primary materials or serve to explicate key concepts. 
However, although the methodology of the present thesis will be primarily 
doctrinal, the thesis will not shy away from the contextual analysis of the law. On the 
contrary, the thesis will be mindful throughout of the normative foundations of the 
different doctrines, principles and concepts which it will inevitably encounter. 
Furthermore, in order to properly analyse the significance of certain concepts, it will 
be necessary on occasion for the thesis to adopt a more explicitly contextual approach. 
For example, chapter seven will not only analyse the likely function which has been 
conferred on mere equities by the cases; it will also examine how this function relates 
to wider social objectives, and consider how this may have influenced the form which 
mere equities take.102 
In a nutshell, therefore, the methodology of the present thesis will be primarily 
doctrinal. This is appropriate given the topic and overarching purpose of the thesis. 
Nevertheless, the thesis will not adopt a purely ‘black letter’ approach, but will be 
                                                     
99 RC Nolan, ‘Equitable Property’ (2006) 122 LQR 232, 234. 
100 See especially Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265: 
discussed above at ch 4, pt III, ss 1, 3(i). 
101 See especially Land Registration Act 2002, s 116. 
102 Ch 7, pts III, IV. 
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mindful throughout of the normative basis of the different doctrines, principles and 
concepts encountered. Furthermore, it will be necessary on occasion for the thesis to 
engage in the contextual analysis of legal concepts. 
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Chapter 3 
The Dividing Line between Mere Equities and Equitable 
Interests 
 
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter aims to answer the first two questions which this thesis asks, namely 
‘What are the different claims which are, or might be, mere equities as distinguished 
from equitable interests?’ and ‘What is the legal nature of the dividing line between 
mere equities and equitable interests?’ 
In answering these two questions, the chapter will take an interlinked 
approach. Part two will review the case law in order to ascertain which equitable 
proprietary claims have been classified by the courts as mere equities, on the one hand, 
or equitable interests, on the other. This will provide a partial answer to the first 
question, because it will result in a list of claims whose status as mere equities has 
been judicially confirmed. Part three will then compare the ‘confirmed’ examples of 
mere equities with the ‘confirmed’ examples of equitable interests in order to evaluate 
what the legal nature of the dividing line between these two categories is likely to be. 
This will provide an answer the second question. Finally, part four will apply the 
definition (ascertained in part three) of the dividing line between mere equities and 
equitable interests in order to analyse what claims, besides the judicially confirmed 
examples of mere equities, might also be mere equities. This analysis will complete 
the first question. 
 
 
PART II: REVIEWING THE CASE LAW 
 
As explained already, this part will carry out a review of the case law in order to 
ascertain which equitable proprietary rights have been classified by the courts as mere 
equities, on the one hand, or equitable interests, on the other. A comprehensive review 
is considered necessary because the relevant cases do not appear to have been drawn 
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together elsewhere. The part will first explain how the relevant cases were found. It 
will then present the findings that were made as a result of reviewing these cases. 
 
 
1. Finding the relevant cases 
 
The first step in reviewing the case law was to find the relevant cases. This was 
achieved through a number of methods. The most fruitful method, in terms of the 
quantity of data gathered, was carrying out a series of online searches for key terms 
on the Westlaw UK database. 
The first of these searches was for the phrase ‘mere equity’.1 This returned 
about 160 cases. Each instance of the term was than examined in order to eliminate all 
instances where it could positively be established that the term was not being used in 
the relevant sense: ie, to denote a claim that belongs to the subordinate category of 
equitable proprietary claim which, in contrast with an equitable interest, is incapable 
of binding purchasers of even equitable interests for value without notice. 
About two thirds of the cases were eliminated in this way. The majority of 
these cases fell into five main groups. First, there were cases where the term ‘mere 
equity’ was not used to denote any subordinate category of equitable claim, but instead 
was applied in a much wider sense to mean ‘a claim that is merely equitable’ in 
contrast with a legal claim.2 Second, there were a high number of cases where a 
mortgagor was described as having a ‘mere equity’ of redemption.3 These cases were 
                                                     
1 The plural form ‘mere equities’ was included in the search. 
2 See, eg, Symmes v Symonds (1703) 4 Brown 328, 328; 2 ER 222, 222 (headnote); Earl of Pomfret v 
Windsor (1752) 2 Ves Sen 472, 478; 28 ER 302, 306 (argument); Purdew v Jackson (1824) 1 Russ 1, 
70; 38 ER 1, 23 (Lord Gifford MR); Astley v Milles (1827) 1 Sim 298, 343; 57 ER 588, 605 (Sir 
Anthony Hart V-C); Greenwood v Churchill (1843) 6 Beav 314, 318, 319; 49 ER 846, 848, 849 
(argument); Fulham v M’Carthy (1848) 1 HLC 703, 709; 9 ER 937, 940 (Lord Cottenham LC); Prior 
v Ongley (1850) 10 CB 25, 32; 138 ER 11, 14 (Talfourd J); Rooper v Harrison (1855) 2 K&J 86, 106; 
69 ER 704, 712 (argument); Heath v Crealock (1873) LR 18 Eq Cas 215, 229, 231 (argument); 
Gordon v James (1885) 30 Ch D 249 (CA) 256 (Cotton LJ). 
3 See, eg, The Case of the Creditors of Sir Charles Cox (1734) 3 P Wms 341, 341; 24 ER 1092, 1092 
(headnote); Fawcet v Lowther (1751) 2 Ves Sen 300, 303; 28 ER 193, 196 (Lord Hardwicke LC); 
Waring v Ward (1802) 7 Ves Jun 332, 338; 32 ER 136, 138 (Lord Eldon LC); Carlisle v Blamire 
(1807) 8 East 487, 496; 103 ER 430, 434 (Lord Ellenborough CJ); Scott v Scholey (1807) 8 East 467, 
473, 483; 103 ER 423, 425, 428 (argument); Earl of Oxford v Rodney (1807) 14 Ves Jun 417, 424; 33 
ER 581, 583 (Sir W Grant MR); Wilkins v Fry (1816) 1 Mer 244, 266; 35 ER 665, 673 (Sir W Grant 
MR); Wythe v Henniker (1833) 2 My & K 635, 643; 39 ER 1087, 1090 (argument); Bandon v Becher 
(1835) 9 Bligh NS 532, 564; 5 ER 1388, 1400 (argument); Moores v Choat (1839) 8 Sim 508, 515; 59 
ER 202, 205 (argument); Berrington v Evans (1839) 3 Y & C Ex 384, 388; 160 ER 751, 753 
(argument); Freeman v Edwards (1848) 2 Ex 732, 737; 154 ER 685, 687 (argument); Walsh v 
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eliminated because an equity of redemption is manifestly not a mere equity: it is an 
interest in the land enforceable against all persons except a purchaser of a legal interest 
for value without notice and is not at the discretion of the court in any discernible 
sense.4 Third, there were some instances where the term ‘mere equity’ was used 
synonymously with ‘personal equity’ to mean an equitable claim which is incapable 
of affecting third parties.5 Fourth, there were certain cases where ‘mere equity’ was 
used to describe something which was not an equitable claim per se: for example a 
moral criterion against which the meaning of a contract was to be determined.6 Fifth, 
there were a number of cases which had been included in the search results despite the 
fact that the term ‘mere equity’ did not appear in the case report. In almost all cases, 
this had happened because the search engine had identified the term ‘mere equity’ in 
the case analysis documents which are included with every case listed on the Westlaw 
UK database.7 
Once all the cases which could be eliminated had been eliminated, there 
remained a list of around sixty cases which could not positively be excluded from the 
present review.8 (Although it was anticipated that at least some of these cases may be 
of little or no consequence to the eventual findings.) 
                                                     
Trevanion (1850) 15 QB 733, 754; 117 ER 636, 643 (Patteson J); Flory v Denny (1852) 7 Ex 581, 
584; 155 ER 1080, 1081 (argument); Rowe v May (1854) 18 Beav 613, 616; 52 ER 241, 242 (Sir John 
Romilly MR); Childers v Childers (1857) 1 De G&J 482, 491; 44 ER 810, 814 (Knight Bruce LJ); 
Cuthbertson v Irving (1859) 4 H&N 742, 751; 157 ER 1034, 1038 (argument); Dighton v Withers 
(1862) 31 Beav 423, 425; 54 ER 1202, 1203 (Sir John Romilly); Re Cowbridge Railway Co (1868) 
LR 5 Eq 413, 417 (Sir W Page Wood V-C); London and County Banking Co Ltd v Ratcliffe (1881) 6 
HL 722 (HL) 728 (Lord Selborne LC); Onward Building Society v Smithson [1892] 1 Ch 1 (CA) 12 
(Lindley LJ); Copestake v Hoper [1908] 2 Ch 10 (CA) 15 (argument); Assaf v Fuwa [1955] AC 215 
(PC) 222 (Lord Porter); Guiana Industrial and Commercial Investments Ltd v Inland Revenue 
Commissioner (No 2) [1971] AC 841 (PC) 850C (Lord Donovan); Re Bond Worth [1980] 1 Ch 228 
(Ch) 252B, 253B (Slade J); Northern Bank Ltd v Martin [2013] NICh 1 [13] (Deeny J). See also AR 
Everton, ‘“Equitable Interests” and “Equities”—In Search of a Pattern’ (1976) 40 Conv 209, 209, fn 
1. 
4 See Casborne v Scarfe (1738) 1 Atk 603, 605; 26 ER 377, 379 (Lord Hardwicke LC); See also C 
Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2012) para 24-011. 
5 See, eg, National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1228B-E (Lord Cohen); 
Dolphin Quays Development Ltd v Mills [2006] EWHC 931, [2007] 1 P&CR 12 [52] (Peter Leaver 
QC). 
6 See, eg, Stevenson v Snow (1761) 1 Black W 318, 319; 96 ER 178, 179 (Lord Mansfield CJ). 
7 There were, however, some genuine flukes. For instance, one report was included in the search 
results because it contained the passage ‘an Injunction will be granted to stay Waste in Behalf of an 
Infant in Ventre sa mere; Equity will likewise, in some particular Cases, restrain the Tenant from 
committing Waste, where it is dispunishable by Law’: Tracy v Tracy (1744) 1 Eq Ca Abr 399, 399; 
21 ER 1131, 1131. 
8 For a full list of the cases that were found as a result of this review, see Appendix A below. 
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The rest of the online searches centred on the term ‘equity’.9 These searches 
were necessary because, as is well known, mere equities are sometimes referred to 
simply as ‘equities’. In consequence, if just the phrase ‘mere equity’ had been searched 
for, then the risk would have been run of excluding a significant number of relevant 
cases. To point out just one aspect of the matter, several of the cases which are 
generally acknowledged to be among the most important to the concept of a mere 
equity do not actually contain the phrase ‘mere equity’.10 For example, in the keynote 
case of Phillips v Phillips,11 Lord Westbury LC speaks of ‘an equity as distinguished 
from an equitable estate’,12 but the phrase ‘mere equity’ does not appear in the case 
report. 
A search for the term ‘equity’ on the Westlaw UK database returned a very 
high number of results: about 60,000 cases. However, because the word ‘equity’ is 
notoriously ambiguous—in addition to a ‘mere equity’ it can mean, inter alia, the body 
of rules and principles that derive from the historical Court of Chancery, the moral 
basis of those rules and principles, an equitable claim other than a mere equity, etc13—
it was predicted that many instances of the term in the above search would denote 
something other than a mere equity. This prediction was borne out when the results 
were partially examined: in the vast majority of instances, it seemed that ‘equity’ was 
being used generally to mean the system of rules and principles which comprise the 
equitable jurisdiction. 
Ideally, the solution to this problem would have been to examine each of the 
search results and to ascertain in each case the sense in which the term ‘equity’ was 
being used. However, given the high number of cases involved, it was felt that this 
approach would not be practical: quite simply, it would have taken too long to examine 
every instance of the term, especially in light of the fact that in many of the 60,000 or 
so cases the word ‘equity’ may have appeared multiple times. Accordingly, it was 
decided that the search terms would have to be refined in order to produce a more 
                                                     
9 Again, the plural form ‘equities’ was included in the searches. 
10 See, eg, Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 45 ER 1164; Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 
(Ch). 
11 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 45 ER 1164. 
12 Ibid 218; 1167 (Lord Westbury LC). 
13 See National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1253A-B (Lord Wilberforce); 
AR Everton, ‘“Equitable Interests” and “Equities”—In Search of a Pattern’ (1976) 40 Conv 209, 209, 
citing RE Megarry and PV Baker, Snell’s Principles of Equity (27th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1973); JD 
Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and 
Remedies (5th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2014) ch 4. 
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focused set of results, whilst limiting as far as possible the risk that relevant cases 
might be excluded. 
Two methods for reducing the search results were tested. The first method was 
to exclude from the search terms certain phrases in which the word ‘equity’ was not 
likely to denote a mere equity. For example, in phrases like ‘in equity’ or ‘by equity’, 
the word ‘equity’ is far more likely to be referring to the equitable jurisdiction—for 
example ‘legal analysis is as important in equity as in the common law’14; ‘they may 
be required by equity to account as if they were trustees or fiduciaries, although they 
are not’15 —than it is to any kind of equitable claim. However, while this method 
proved successful at reducing the number of search results, it did not reduce them 
sufficiently to make a full examination of the results practical. 
The second method was more successful. This approach was to search for 
instances of the term ‘equity’ which appeared in close proximity with other words or 
phrases which are closely associated with the concept of a mere equity. A number of 
different combinations were tried. For example, a search was made for instances of 
‘equity’ within the same paragraph as ‘equitable interest’ or any of a number of 
analogous phrases, such as ‘equitable estate’, ‘beneficial interest’, ‘proprietary 
interest’, etc. Another search was made for instances of ‘equity’ within the same 
sentence as any of a number of words and phrases that related to remedies and 
doctrines with which mere equities are closely connected—for example, ‘rescission’, 
‘rescind’, ‘set aside’, ‘rectification’, ‘rectify’, ‘correct’, ‘estoppel’, etc. With each 
search that was carried out, the aim was to strike a balance between two conflicting 
objectives: on the one hand, ensuring that the search terms identified every relevant 
case; on the other hand, keeping the quantity of search results at a manageable level. 
Collectively these searches returned about 2,000 results. Each separate 
instance of the term ‘equity’ which the search engine had identified was then examined 
in order to eliminate any results which did not appear to be germane. Because, as noted 
above, the word ‘equity’ is highly ambiguous, it would not have been practical to 
eliminate only those instances where it could positively be established that ‘equity’ 
was not being used in the relevant sense—this being the approach that was adopted in 
                                                     
14 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] UKSC 58, [2015] AC 1503 [95] (Lord 
Reed JSC) (emphasis added). 
15 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10, [2014] AC 1189 [9] (Lord Sumption JSC) 
(emphasis added). 
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reference to the term ‘mere equity’. Instead, results were eliminated except where it 
could be discerned form the context that ‘equity’ may reasonably be referring to a 
mere equity properly so called. 
Following this procedure, the vast majority of the results were eliminated, 
leaving a list of about thirty cases in which it could reasonably be discerned that at 
least one instance of the term ‘equity’ was being used to denote a ‘mere equity’.16 
These remaining cases where then added to the sixty or so cases which were identified 
in the original search. 
A separate search for the term ‘equitable interest’ was not carried out. The term 
‘equitable interest’ is ambiguous,17 but in the vast majority of contexts the term is used 
simply to refer to an equitable claim in relation to property, typically one with 
proprietary characteristics. Indeed, mere equities are frequently and properly referred 
to as ‘interests’ in this broad sense.18 The main context in which it can be said with 
reasonable certainty that the term ‘equitable interest’ is being used in the more limited 
sense—ie, to refer to a claim that belongs to the subordinate category of equitable 
proprietary claim which is capable of binding, inter alia, purchasers of equitable (but 
not legal) interests for value without notice—is where that term is being used in 
contrast with ‘mere equity’ or ‘equity’. Since most (if not all) of these instances had 
likely already been found in the previous searches for ‘mere equity’ and ‘equity’, it 
was anticipated that a separate search for ‘equitable interest’ and the consequent 
examination of the results would have yielded a disproportionately small quantity of 
fresh data given the amount of time that such an examination would have taken. 
Another consideration was that the importance of equitable interests to the present 
thesis is necessarily incidental, the real focus of the thesis being, as explained in 
chapter one,19 the legal nature and practical function of mere equities. 
In addition to the online searches, the secondary literature was re-examined in 
order to ascertain which cases had been cited by other commentators for the 
proposition that a given claim is a mere equity or an equitable interest. It was 
discovered (reassuringly) that the vast majority of these cases had already been 
identified in the online searches, although a small number of cases were found which 
                                                     
16 For a full list of the cases that were found as a result of this review, see Appendix A below. 
17 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 (HL) 721A (Lord Wilberforce). 
18 See especially Land Registration Act 2002, s 116. 
19 Ch 1, pt I. 
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had not previously been identified.20 These cases where then added to the list of 
potentially relevant cases, bringing the total number of cases to about 100.21 
The next step was simply to review these cases in order to ascertain which 
equitable proprietary claims had been identified by the courts as mere equities, on the 
one hand, or equitable interests, on the other hand. The findings that were made as a 
result of this review will now be presented. 
 
 
2. The findings 
 
The findings that were made as a result of reviewing the relevant cases were as 
follows. 
 
 
i. Confirmed mere equities 
 
First, it was found that there are certain equitable claims which have been identified 
as mere equities in a substantial number of cases, and therefore can be said to represent 
the confirmed examples of mere equities. These claims are (i) all claims to have a 
                                                     
20 Eg, Re Ffrench’s Estate (1887) 21 LR Ir 83; Fuller v Judy Properties Ltd (1992) 64 P&CR 176 
(CA). 
21 For a full list of the cases that were found as a result of this review, see Appendix A below. 
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transaction rescinded in equity (as opposed to at common law),22 (ii) all claims to have 
a document rectified23 and (iii) all so called equities by estoppel.24 
Since these claims will be discussed extensively in this chapter and later 
chapters, it is necessary to briefly outline the circumstances in which they can arise 
and the incidents of the relief to which they entitle the claimant.25 (Note that in chapter 
seven the different circumstances in which these claims can arise will be considered 
greater detail.26) 
First, in order for an equitable claim to rescind to arise, it is necessary for a 
person to enter a transaction in circumstances where his consent to do so is impaired 
(but not voided) by some vitiating factor: for example the misrepresentation,27 undue 
                                                     
22 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 218; 45 ER 1164, 1167 (Lord Westbury LC); Cave v 
Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 (Ch) 649 (Fry J); Re Clarke’s Settlement Trust [1916] 1 Ch 467 (Ch) 473 
(argument); Abigail v Lapin [1934] AC 491 (PC) 505 (Lord Wright); National Provincial Bank Ltd v 
Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 9 (Ch) 14 (Cross J); Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 
691 (HL) 721 (Lord Wilberforce); CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200 (HL) 203 (argument); 
Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 (CA) 22 (Millett LJ); Twinsectra Ltd v 
Yardley [1999] All ER (D) 433 (CA) [99] (Potter LJ); Collings v Lee (2001) 82 P&CR 3 (CA) [22] 
(Nourse LJ); Thompson v Foy [2009] EWHC 1076 (Ch), [2010] 1 P&CR 16 [134] (Lewison J); 
Drayne v McKillen [2011] EWHC 3326 (QB) [43] (Coulson J); Independent Trustee Services Ltd v 
GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 195, [2012] 3 WLR 597 [103] (Lloyd LJ); Mortgage 
Express v Lambert [2016] EWCA Civ 555 [16] (Lewison LJ); Mid-Glamorgan CC v Ogwr BC (1994) 
68 P&CR 1 (CA) 9 (Hoffmann LJ); National Crime Agency v Robb [2014] EWHC 4384 (Ch), [2015] 
3 WLR 23 [44] (Sir Terence Etherton QC); Re Crown Holdings (London) Ltd (in liq) [2015] EWHC 
1876 (Ch) [38]-[39] (MH Rosen QC); Bainbridge v Bainbridge [2016] EWHC 898 (Ch) [24] (Master 
Matthews). 
23 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 218; 45 ER 1164, 1167 (Lord Westbury LC); National 
Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 9 (Ch) 14 (Cross J); National Provincial 
Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1238 (Lord Upjohn); Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding 
[1973] AC 691 (HL) 721 (Lord Wilberforce); Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] 
1 Ch 183 (Ch) 195 (Mervyn Davies J); CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200 (HL) 203 
(argument); Howlaw (470) Ltd v Stockton Estates Ltd (2001) 81 P&CR 29 (Ch) [65] (Neuberger J); 
Halifax plc v Curry Popeck [2008] EWHC 1692 (Ch) [26] (Norris J); Cherry Tree Investments Ltd v 
Landmain Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 736, [2013] Ch 305 [113] (Lewison LJ); Elwood v Goodman [2013] 
EWCA Civ 1103, [2014] Ch 442 [35] (Patten LJ). 
24 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 (HL) 721 (Lord Wilberforce); Lloyds Bank plc v 
Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 (HL) 112-13 (argument); Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, [2007] 2 AC 
432 [37] (Lord Walker); Powell v Benney [2007] EWCA Civ 1283 [24] (Sir Peter Gibson); Halifax 
plc v Curry Popeck [2008] EWHC 1692 (Ch) [26] (Norris J); AIB Group (UK) plc v Turner [2015] 
EWHC 3994 (Ch) [47] (Anthony Elleray QC). 
25 See generally D Hodge, Rectification: The Modern Law and Practice Governing Claims for 
Rectification for Mistake (Sweet & Maxwell 2010); C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and 
Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) ch 16; D O’Sullivan, S Elliott 
and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014); J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) chs 12, 15, 16. 
26 Ch 7, pt II. 
27 See, eg, Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1 (CA). 
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influence28 or unconscionable conduct29 of another person, or his own serious mistake 
about the legal effect of the transaction30 or some other matter that is fundamental to 
the transaction.31 The equitable claim to rescind gives the person who entered the 
transaction a right to go to the court to acquire the appropriate remedy. In granting 
rescission in equity, the court aims to undo the transaction ab initio by achieving 
substantial restitutio in integrum—that is to say, restoring the different parties as 
nearly as possible to their original positions.32 In order to achieve this aim, the court 
orders the reciprocal restitution of all assets which have passed under the transaction.33 
In the case of money, restitution will usually be pecuniary34 while, in the case of other 
assets such as land, goods or securities, restitution will ordinarily be specific.35 The 
court also orders any financial adjustments which are necessary to achieve substantial 
restitutio in integrum.36 This may involve, for example, the taking of accounts for any 
benefits which have been derived from the ownership of the assets in question or the 
making of allowances for the depreciation of such assets.37 
Second, in order for a person to acquire an equitable claim to have a document 
rectified, it is necessary for that person to execute a legal document—for example a 
deed or other legally binding instrument—whilst under a misapprehension about the 
true meaning of the document. Rectification is an equitable remedy whereby the court 
changes the wording of the defective instrument in order to make it accord with the 
meaning which it was intended or presumed to convey.38 Once the document has been 
amended in this way, it is automatically treated as if it had originally been executed in 
                                                     
28 See, eg, Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 (CA). 
29 See, eg, Boustany v Pigott (1995) 69 P&CR 298 (PC). See also Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total 
Oil Great Britain Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 87 (Ch) 94H-95C (Peter Millett QC), varied [1985] 1 WLR 173 
(CA). 
30 See, eg, Gibbon v Mitchell [1990] 1 WLR 1304 (Ch). 
31 See, eg, Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26, [2013] 2 AC 108. 
32 Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 WLR 129 (CA) 137B (Sir Donald Nicholls V-C); Shalson v Russo 
[2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] Ch 281 [122] (Rimer J); D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, 
The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 13.01. 
33 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] Ch 281 [122] (Rimer J). 
34 See Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74 (PC) 102G-103B (Lord Mustill). See generally D 
O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) paras 15.33-
15.38. 
35 See, eg, Nottidge v Prince (1860) 2 Giff 246, 271; 66 ER 103, 113 (Sir John Stuart V-C): specific 
restitution of securities obtained by means of undue influence ordered. See generally D O’Sullivan, S 
Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) paras 15.04-15.13. But see 
Mahoney v Purnell [1996] 3 All ER 61 (QB). 
36 See generally D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 
2014) ch 17. 
37 Erlanger v The New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218 (HL) 1278 (Lord Blackburn). 
38 See American Airlines v Hope [1974] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 301 (HL) 307, col 1 (Lord Diplock). 
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its rectified form, and the rights of the parties to the document are determined 
accordingly.39 
Third, an equity by estoppel arises in any case where the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel is in play. Proprietary estoppel is a flexible doctrine40 and hence famously 
difficult to pin down definitionally.41 Taking a broad view of the matter, however, it 
seems that judges and commentators generally agree that cases of proprietary estoppel 
have the following necessary features.42 First, one party (A) leads another party (B) to 
believe that he, B, already has or in future will acquire a particular right to property43 
which A owns. Second, B acts to his detriment in reliance on this belief. Third, this 
belief is false or turns out to be ill-founded. 
An equity by estoppel entitles B to go to the court to seek equitable relief. In 
granting this relief, the court aims to confer the minimum award which is necessary to 
avoid an unconscionable outcome.44 However, the form which this award takes is not 
defined by any fixed rules or principles, but is at the discretion of the court.45 
Accordingly, the relief which the court awards can take a wide variety of different 
forms: for example the court may order A, inter alia, to convey his entire interest in 
the property to B,46 to grant some limited right over the property to B,47 to pay a 
particular sum of money to B,48 or to refrain from exercising his legal rights over the 
property in a certain way.49 
                                                     
39 See Craddock Brothers v Hunt [1923] 2 Ch 136 (CA) 151 (Lord Sterndale MR), 160 (Warrington 
LJ); Dalkia Utilities Services plc v Celtech International Ltd [2006] EWHC Civ 63, [2006] 2 P&CR 9 
[107] (Clarke J). See generally D Hodge, Rectification: The Modern Law and Practice Governing 
Claims for Rectification for Mistake (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) paras 1-54-1-62. 
40 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752 [46] (Lord 
Walker). 
41 See J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) para 12-032. 
42 See Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498 (Ch) 1503H (Edward Nugee QC); Thorner v Major [2009] 
UKHL 18, [2009] 1 WLR 776 [29] (Lord Walker); C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and 
Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 16-001. It is important to 
note that the elements of proprietary estoppel are not ‘watertight compartments’: Gillett v Holt [2001] 
Ch 210 (CA) 225C (Robert Walker LJ). 
43 Almost all the reported cases concern rights over land, but in principle proprietary estoppel is 
equally available in relation to personal property: see Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] 
UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752 [14] (Lord Scott). 
44 Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA 159, [2003] 1 P&CR 8 [56] (Robert Walker LJ); Stack v Dowden 
[2007] UKHL 17, [2007] 2 AC 432 [37] (Lord Walker). 
45 See Campbell v Griffin [2001] EWCA Civ 990 [36] (Robert Walker LJ). See also C Harpum, S 
Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2012) para 16-001, point (iii), para 16-020. 
46 See, eg, Voyce v Voyce (1991) 62 P&CR 290 (CA). 
47 See, eg, Crabb v Arun DC [1976] 1 Ch 179 (CA). 
48 See, eg, Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA 159, [2003] 1 P&CR 8. 
49 See, eg, Maharaj v Chand [1986] 1 AC 898 (PC). 
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ii. Contractual licences and deserved wives’ equities 
 
Second, it was found that, in a series of cases that were decided in the 1950s and 1960s, 
certain claims began to be enforced in equity against third parties and subsequently 
were classified as mere equities, only for it to be ruled in later cases that these claims 
were, in fact, incapable of binding third parties. These claims were (i) the rights of a 
contractual licensee50 and (ii) the so called equity of a wife who had been deserted by 
her husband to remain in occupation of the family home.51 
Since these claims were eventually ruled to be incapable of binding third 
parties,52 they are neither mere equities nor equitable interests properly so called, for 
these latter claims are proprietary. It follows that the rights of a contractual licensee 
and the equity of a deserted wife are not directly relevant to the present chapter. 
Nevertheless, these claims will be discussed extensively in chapter five.53 As 
explained already, chapter five will seek to develop, and then to argue in favour of, 
the view that the enforceability of mere equities against third parties is founded on 
equitable grounds of conscience. The reason the above claims are relevant to chapter 
five is that the stated principle according to which these claims were temporarily 
extended to third parties was, it seems, a conscience-based principle. 
 
 
iii. Outliers 
                                                     
50 Errington v Errington [1952] 1 KB 290 (CA). 
51 Bendall v McWhirter [1952] 2 QB 466 (CA); Lee v Lee [1952] 2 QB 489 (CA); Ferris v Weaven 
[1952] 2 All ER 233 (QB); Bradley-Hole v Cusen [1953] 1 QB 300 (CA); Lloyds Bank Ltd v Trustee 
of the Property of O— —, a Bankrupt [1953] 1 WLR 1460 (Ch); Barclays Bank Ltd v Bird [1954] 1 
Ch 274 (Ch); Street v Denham [1954] 1 WLR 624; Jess B Woodcock & Sons Ltd v Hobbs [1955] 1 
WLR 152 (CA); Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee [1956] 1 Ch 7 (Ch); Churcher v Street [1959] 1 Ch 251 
(Ch); National Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 9 (Ch); National Provincial 
Bank Ltd v Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 665 (CA). But see Thompson v Earthy [1951] 2 KB 
596 (KB). 
52 As regards the deserted wife’s equity, see National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 
1175 (HL). Note that after the decision in National Provincial Bank the Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 
was enacted to give a husband or wife a statutory right to occupy the matrimonial home. The statutory 
right has since been recast in the Family Law Act 1996, s 30-32. As regards the contractual licence, 
see Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold [1989] 1 Ch 1 (CA). See also P Sparkes, ‘Leasehold Terms and 
Contractual Licences’ (1988) 104 LQR 175, 177-78; J Hill, ‘Leases, Licences and Third Parties’ 
(1988) 51 MLR 226. 
53 Ch 5, pt II, s 2, sub-s iii. 
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Third, it was found that there are certain claims which are almost never given as 
examples of mere equities in the cases, but which judges in isolated cases have 
intimated are or might be mere equities. Thus in Castellan v Hobson54 the Vice-
Chancellor, Sir William Milbourne James, had to decide who had the beneficial 
interest in certain shares in the situation where A held the shares on trust for B who, 
in turn, held his rights on trust for C. The Vice-Chancellor held that C was the real 
beneficial owner, and characterised B as having a ‘mere equity’.55 In Shiloh Spinners 
Ltd v Harding56 the question arose whether an equitable right of entry was capable of 
being registered under the Land Charges Act 1925. On the one hand, the respondent 
submitted that all equitable claims to land were capable of being either registered 
under the Land Charges Act 1925 or overreached under s 2 of the Law of Property Act 
1925, and that since a right of entry was not suitable for overreaching, it should 
regarded as a registrable charge on land, despite the fact that the right of entry did not 
obviously fit into any of the classes of registrable charge set out in s 10 of the Land 
Charges Act 1925. On the other hand, the appellant countered that mere equities were 
not capable of being either registered as land charges or overreached,57 and that an 
equitable right of entry was a mere equity. Lord Wilberforce gave the leading 
judgment, and although he did not directly approve the submission that an equitable 
right of entry was a mere equity, he clearly found the appellant’s arguments 
convincing.58 In Fuller v Judy Properties Ltd,59 Dillon J suggested that the claim of 
lessees to seek equitable relief against the forfeiture of their lease after the landlord 
had re-entered was an ‘equity’ capable in principle of binding third parties. Finally, in 
Halifax plc v Curry Popeck60 Norris J intimated that a claim to seek the specific 
performance of a contract was an example of a mere equity. 
Thus although there is some evidence that the courts have identified (i) the 
claims of intermediate trustees, (ii) equitable rights of entry, (iii) claims to seek relief 
against the forfeiture of a lease and (iv) claims to have a contract specifically 
                                                     
54 Castellan v Hobson (1870) LR 10 Eq Cas 47. 
55 Ibid 51 (Sir William Milbourne James V-C). 
56 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 (HL). 
57 Contra Mortgage Express v Lambert [2016] EWCA Civ 555, [2017] Ch 93. See also E Lees, 
‘Overreaching Mere Equities: Mortgage Express v Lambert’ [2017] Conv 72. 
58 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 (HL) 720-21 (Lord Wilberforce). 
59 Fuller v Judy Properties Ltd (1992) 64 P&CR 176 (CA) 184 (Dillon LJ). 
60 Halifax plc v Curry Popeck [2008] EWHC 1692 (Ch) [26] (Norris J). 
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performed as mere equities, this evidence is limited to a very small number of cases. 
Accordingly, these claims are best regarded as outliers rather than as confirmed 
instances of mere equities. 
It is necessary to mention Bland v Ingram’s Estates Ltd.61 In that case, Peter 
Leaver QC, sitting as a deputy judge of the Chancery Division, ruled that a plaintiff 
with an equitable charge over leasehold property had only a ‘mere equity’ and 
accordingly did not have a sufficient interest to seek equitable relief against the 
forfeiture of the lease.62 However, while the deputy judge may have been correct in 
holding that the equitable charge did not give the plaintiff a title to the relief which 
she sought, his assertion that her rights constituted a mere equity should be rejected. 
This is because, as will presently be demonstrated, the evidence of the cases indicates 
that equitable charges and all other equitable security interests are ‘equitable interests’ 
as distinguished from ‘mere equities’. 
 
 
iv. Equitable interests 
 
Fourth, it was found that there are a number of cases where the court described a 
particular class of claim as an ‘equitable interest’ or ‘equitable estate’ and the context 
indicated that the court was using the term ‘equitable interest’ or ‘equitable estate’ to 
the exclusion of ‘mere equity’ or ‘equity’. 
The claims which have been classified as equitable interests in this way include 
the prototypical example of the rights of a beneficiary of a trust in reference to assets 
which are identifiable as falling within the trust fund.63 This classification includes the 
rights of a beneficiary in reference to assets which, having been wrongfully taken from 
the trust fund, are not currently in the hands of a properly appointed trustee.64 It also 
                                                     
61 Bland v Ingram’s Estates Ltd (Ch, 13 April 1999). 
62 The decision in Bland was reversed on other grounds by the Court of Appeal: see Bland v Ingram’s 
Estates Ltd [2001] Ch 767 (CA). The court did not discuss the deputy judge’s assertion that an 
equitable chargee has a mere equity rather than an equitable interest. 
63 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1238B (Lord Upjohn); 
Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 195, [2012] 3 WLR 
597 [104] (Lloyd LJ). For an account of how particular assets are defined as falling within a particular 
trust fund and why, see RC Nolan, ‘Property in a Fund’ (2004) 120 LQR 108. See further RC Nolan, 
‘The Administration and Maladministration of Funds in Equity: Making a Coherent Set of Choices’ in 
PG Turner (ed), Equity and Administration (CUP 2016) 74-80. 
64 Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 195, [2012] 3 WLR 
597 [104] (Lloyd LJ). 
58 
 
includes the right of a beneficiary to assert an equitable interest in assets which are 
identifiable as the exchange product of assets which have been wrongfully taken from 
the trust fund. This latter point was established in Cave v Cave.65 In that case, money 
had been misappropriated from a trust and then used to purchase land, on which money 
was subsequently raised by way of equitable mortgages. The mortgagees had 
purchased their equitable interests for value without notice, and the question arose 
whether the earlier claim of the beneficiaries to trace their money into the estate was 
an equitable interest (in which case they would enjoy priority over the mortgagees) or 
a mere equity (in which case they would not enjoy priority). Fry J decided in favour 
of the beneficiaries, ruling that their claim was an equitable interest.66 
It is noteworthy that in Re Ffrench’s Estate67 the Irish Court of Appeal took 
the contrary approach by classifying the right of a beneficiary to trace as a mere equity. 
Thus as Keane notes ‘there is a clear divergence between Irish and English law in this 
area’.68 However, since the overarching aim of this thesis is to investigate the nature 
and function of ‘mere equities’ as these claims are understood and applied within the 
English legal system,69 it is necessary to defer to the decision in Cave and to hold that 
the claim of a beneficiary to trace is an equitable interest. 
In addition to the rights of a beneficiary of a trust in reference to the trust assets, 
there are a number of other equitable claims which the courts have identified as 
‘equitable interests’ (or ‘equitable estates’) as distinguished from ‘mere equities’ (or 
‘equities’). These include: (i) all equitable security interests, including equitable 
mortgages, equitable liens, and equitable charges;70 (ii) restrictive covenants and estate 
contracts;71 (iii) equities of redemption.72 It is also likely that all equitable claims 
which take the form of incorporeal hereditaments are classifiable as equitable estates. 
                                                     
65 Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 (Ch). 
66 Ibid 649 (Fry J). 
67 Re Ffrench’s Estate (1887) 21 LR Ir 83. 
68 R Keane, Equity and the Law of Trusts in the Republic of Ireland (2nd edn, Bloomsbury 
Professional 2011) para 4.18. See also D Sheehan, ‘Proprietary Remedies for Mistake and Ignorance: 
An Unseen Equivalence’ (2002) 10 RLR 69, 76. 
69 See above ch 1, pt I. 
70 Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 (Ch) 649 (Fry J); Abigail v Lapin [1934] AC 491 (PC) 505 (Lord 
Wright); National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1238B (Lord Upjohn); 
Drayne v McKillen [2011] EWHC 3326 (QB) [43] (Coulson J). See also Rice v Rice (1853) 2 Drewry 
73, 79; 61 ER 646, 648 (Sir RT Kindersley V-C). 
71 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1238B (Lord Upjohn), quoting FR 
Crane, ‘The Deserted Wife’s Licence’ (1955) 19 Conv 343, 346. 
72 Re Wells [1933] 1 Ch 29 (CA) 44 (Lord Hanworth MR); National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth 
[1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1259G-1260A (Lord Wilberforce). 
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Thus in Phillips v Phillips73 Lord Westbury LC held that an equitable rentcharge was 
an ‘equitable estate’ and not ‘an equity as distinguished from an equitable estate’. And 
while the courts have not yet expressly confirmed that other analogous rights, such as 
equitable easements and equitable profits à prendre, are equitable estates rather than 
mere equities, it seems highly unlikely that they would take any other view. Indeed, 
Pettit argues that equitable easements and profits ought to be added to the list of 
equitable interests.74 
 
 
v. The findings: Summary 
 
In summary, the following findings were made as a result of reviewing the relevant 
case law. First, the confirmed examples of mere equities are (i) all equitable claims to 
have a transaction rescinded, (ii) all claims to have a document rectified and (iii) all 
so called equities by estoppel. Second, contractual licences and deserted wives’ 
equities were identified as mere equities in a series of cases in the 1950s and 1960s, 
but it was later established that these claims are not capable of binding third parties 
and hence are neither mere equities nor equitable interests. Third, there is some 
evidence in the cases that (i) the claims of intermediate trustees, (ii) equitable rights 
of entry, (iii) claims to seek relief against the forfeiture of a lease and (iv) claims to 
have a contract specifically performed are mere equities, but since this evidence is 
very limited these claims cannot be taken as confirmed examples of mere equities. 
Fourth, the confirmed examples of equitable interests are (i) the claims of beneficiaries 
of trusts, (ii) all equitable security interests, including equitable mortgages, equitable 
liens and equitable charges, (iii) restrictive covenants and estate contracts, (iv) equities 
of redemption and, probably, (v) all equitable claims which take the form of 
incorporeal hereditaments, including equitable rentcharges, equitable easements and 
equitable profits à prendre. 
Having explained how the relevant cases were found and presented the 
findings that were made as a result of reviewing these cases, the next step is to compare 
the confirmed examples of mere equities with the confirmed examples of equitable 
                                                     
73 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 218; 45 ER 1164, 1167 (Lord Westbury LC). 
74 PH Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts (12th edn, OUP 2012) 21, fn 111. 
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interests in order to ascertain the juridical nature of the dividing line between these 
two categories of equitable proprietary claim. 
 
 
PART III: THE NATURE OF THE DIVIDING LINE 
 
As explained above, this part will evaluate the legal nature of the dividing line between 
mere equities and equitable interests. It will achieve this aim by investigating the 
claims which fall within each category in order to identify the characteristics which (i) 
all these claims have in common and (ii) distinguish them from all the claims which 
fall within the opposing category. 
The part will first consider the theory, which has already been encountered in 
chapter two,75 that the discretionary nature of mere equities is what distinguishes them 
from equitable interests. It will argue that this theory is either too inclusive (ie, that 
the characteristic of being discretionary accommodates certain equitable interests) or 
too restrictive (ie, that the characteristic of being discretionary excludes certain mere 
equities) depending on the meaning which is assigned to the term ‘discretionary’. The 
part will then formulate, and argue in favour of, an alternative theory which posits that 
the reason equitable interests are distinct from mere equities is that equitable interests, 
on the one hand, are combinations of juridical claims which include at least some 
rights in rem, while mere equities, on the other hand, are equitable rights of action and 
hence are pure rights in personam. 
 
 
1. More at the discretion of the court 
 
As shown in chapter two,76 while commentators cannot quite agree on precisely what 
the distinction between mere equities and equitable interests is, it nevertheless seems 
that the greater part of scholarly opinion is in favour of the view that mere equities are 
more ‘discretionary’ than equitable interests.77 It is submitted, however, that this 
                                                     
75 Ch 2, pt II, s 2. 
76 Ch 2, pt II, s 2. 
77 See, eg, HWR Wade, ‘Husband and Wife—Deserted Wife’s Right to Matrimonial Home—
Equitable Interests and “Mere Equities”’ [1955] CLJ 158, 160-61. 
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theory is not attractive in light of the claims which, according to the preceding review, 
have been classified by the courts as either mere equities or equitable interests. 
Unfortunately none of the commentators in question is precise about the exact 
sense in which he or she considers mere equities to be discretionary. Looking that the 
confirmed examples of mere equities, however, it seems that there are two ways in 
which a mere equity can be discretionary. First, a mere equity can be discretionary in 
the weak sense that the court has the power to refuse to award relief on the mere equity 
on equitable grounds including laches, acquiescence and unclean hands.78 (In brief 
outline, ‘laches’ occurs where the claimant delays in exercising the claim and this 
delay is coupled with some form of related prejudice to the defendant;79 
‘acquiescence’ occurs where the claimant omits to exercise the claim in circumstances 
where that omission may reasonably lead the defendant to presume that the claimant 
never will exercise the claim;80 ‘unclean hands’ describes the claimant where he is 
guilty of some misconduct which has ‘an immediate and necessary relation’ to the 
claim.81) 
Second, in addition to being discretionary in the weak sense, a mere equity can 
be discretionary in the strong sense that the court, in awarding relief on the mere 
equity, has a power to formulate its order in accordance with what it considers to be 
the minimum award necessary to do justice to the claimant given all the circumstances 
of the case. This form of discretion is typified by equities by estoppel: in awarding 
relief on an equity by estoppel, it is necessary for the court to ‘look at the 
circumstances in each case’82 in order to ‘analyse the minimum equity to do justice to 
the plaintiff’.83 
                                                     
78 Note that the jurisdiction to refuse relief on equitable grounds has been expressly recognised by 
statute: Limitation Act 1980, s 36(2). 
79 Transview Properties Ltd v City Site Properties Ltd [2008] EWHC 1221 (Ch) [149] (Briggs J). See 
also D Hodge, Rectification: The Modern Law and Practice Governing Claims for Rectification for 
Mistake (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) para 5-06. 
80 Transview Properties Ltd v City Site Properties Ltd [2008] EWHC 1221 (Ch) [149] (Briggs J). See 
also D Hodge, Rectification: The Modern Law and Practice Governing Claims for Rectification for 
Mistake (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) para 5-06. 
81 Dering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 1 Cox 318, 319; 29 ER 1184, 1185 (Sir James Eyre CB). See 
also Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] UKHL 40, [2002] 1 WLR 3024 [70] (Lord 
Millett). 
82 Plimmer v The Mayor, Councillors, and Citizens of the City of Wellington (1884) 9 App Cas 699 
(PC) 714 (Sir Arthur Hobhouse). 
83 Crabb v Arun DC [1976] 1 Ch 179 (CA) 198G (Scarman LJ). See also Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 
(CA) 235E-F (Robert Walker LJ). 
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All the confirmed mere equities are discretionary in at least the weak sense. 
That is to say, all equitable claims to rescind or rectify and all equities by estoppel 
may be rejected by the court on equitable grounds. Thus it is well established that the 
court may withhold an award of rescission or rectification in accordance with equitable 
principles.84 The ability of the court to withhold these remedies was demonstrated in 
Allcard v Skinner.85 In that case, the court dismissed an otherwise valid claim to 
rescind a gift for undue influence on the ground that the claimant was guilty of laches 
and acquiescence. Furthermore, it is well established that the court will refuse to grant 
relief upon an equity by estoppel where the claimant comes to the court with unclean 
hands.86 This principle was applied in J Willis & Son v Willis.87 In that case, it was 
discovered that the claimants, in order to support their claim in proprietary estoppel, 
had submitted a statement of expenditure on improvements to the land which the 
claimants knew to be false. In these circumstances, the court did not hesitate to 
withhold relief on the ground of unclean hands. 
However, the characteristic of being discretionary in the sense that the court 
may refuse to grant relief is not unique to mere equities. It is also a characteristic of at 
least some equitable interests. Thus estate contracts are confirmed equitable interests, 
yet the court may nevertheless refuse to grant specific performance of an estate 
contract on discretionary equitable grounds.88 This is what occurred in Hope v 
Walter.89 In that case, a contract was entered for the sale of a house which, unbeknown 
to the parties, was being used by the tenant as a brothel. The purchaser, on discovering 
that the house was being used as a brothel, refused to complete the sale and the vendor 
accordingly sued for specific performance. In these circumstances, the court refused 
to grant specific performance: Lord Lindley MR asserting that to do so ‘would be 
contrary to those principles of justice and fairness by which this Court is always 
guided’.90 It might be objected that estate contracts are an exceptional case; however, 
                                                     
84 Grand Metropolitan plc v The William Hill Group Ltd [1997] 1 BCLC 390 (Ch) 395h (Arden J); D 
Hodge, Rectification: The Modern Law and Practice Governing Claims for Rectification for Mistake 
(Sweet & Maxwell 2010) paras 5-02-5-05. 
85 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 (CA). 
86 See, eg, Williams v Staite [1979] 1 Ch 291 (CA); J Willis & Son v Willis [1986] 1 EGLR 62 (CA); 
Wilkie v Redsell [2003] EWCA Civ 926. See also C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and 
Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 16-022-16-023. 
87 J Willis & Son v Willis [1986] 1 EGLR 62 (CA). 
88 Hope v Walter [1900] 1 Ch 257 (CA). 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid 259 (Lord Lindley MR). 
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the evidence suggests that these are not the only equitable interests on which the court 
may refuse to grant relief. Thus in Hourigan v The Trustees Executors and Agency Co 
Ltd91 the High Court of Australia dismissed an action by a beneficiary to enforce his 
interest under a trust on grounds of laches and acquiescence. 
In short, while the characteristic of being discretionary in the weak sense 
accommodates all mere equities, it also accommodates at least some equitable 
interests. It follows that this characteristic cannot be what distinguishes mere equities 
from equitable interests. 
On the other hand, the characteristic of being discretionary in the strong sense 
appears to exclude all the equitable interests. At any rate, the present writer does not 
know of any case where the court, in granting relief on an equitable interest, assumed 
a power to formulate its order in accordance with what the court considered to be the 
minimum award necessary to do justice given all the circumstances. Hence it is 
necessary to presume that the court has not afforded itself any such power and that, 
accordingly, an equitable interest can never be discretionary in the strong sense. 
It is not the case, however, that that all mere equities are discretionary in the 
strong sense. Thus claims to have a document rectified are clearly not at the discretion 
of the court in the same way that equities by estoppel are. ‘The purpose of 
rectification,’ as Carnwath LJ said in KPMG v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd, ‘is to 
ensure that the terms of the written document accurately reflect the state of agreement 
between the parties.’92 It follows that the power of the court in granting a claim to 
rectify is necessarily restricted to amending the instrument in order to make it accord 
with what the parties actually intended; the court does not have any discretion to 
analyse the minimum award necessary to do justice and then to formulate an order in 
accordance with that analysis. The same can probably be said as regards equitable 
claims to have a transaction rescinded. As explained above, the aim of the court in 
granting rescission is to undo the transaction ab initio by restoring the parties as nearly 
as possible to their original positions;93 hence the aim of the court is not to do justice 
                                                     
91 Hourigan v The Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1934) 51 CLR 619. See also Zarbafi v 
Zarbafi [2014] EWCA Civ 1267 [70] (Briggs LJ). 
92 KPMG v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 363, [2008] 1 P&CR 11 [16] 
(Carnwath LJ). 
93 Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 WLR 129 (CA) 137B (Sir Donald Nicholls V-C). 
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by formulating an order according to what the court considers to be the particular 
merits of the case.94  
Thus while the characteristic of being discretionary in the strong sense 
excludes all equitable interests, it also excludes certain mere equities. It follows that 
this characteristic cannot be what distinguishes mere equities from equitable interests. 
In conclusion, the theory that the gist of the distinction between mere equities 
and equitable interests is that mere equities are more discretionary than equitable 
interests does not work. This is because the term ‘discretionary’ either accommodates 
certain equitable interests or excludes certain mere equities depending on which 
available meaning is ascribed to that term. In other words, the discretionary character 
of certain mere equities is virtually indistinguishable from the discretionary character 
of certain equitable interests. Hence the fact that mere equities are all discretionary 
claims (at least in the weak sense) does not account for what Lord Wilberforce 
described as the ‘sharp distinction’ which exists between these claims and equitable 
interests.95 
 
 
2. Equitable rights of action 
 
Accordingly, the prevailing theory that the dividing line between mere equities and 
equitable interests is the discretionary character of mere equities does not stand up to 
proper scrutiny and ought to be dismissed. The chapter will now submit an alternative 
theory which builds on a close examination of the confirmed examples of mere 
equities and equitable interests. In outline, this theory posits that equitable interests 
are combinations of juridical claims which include rights in rem, whereas mere 
equities are equitable rights of action and consequently are pure rights in personam. 
The terms ‘rights in rem’ and ‘rights in personam’ require clarification. These 
terms are used in the analysis of juridical claims and are almost always taken to 
describe mutually exclusive categories. The meanings of these terms can differ 
                                                     
94 D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 13.09. 
Although it seems that the Australian courts in particular may have assumed a more extensive 
discretion in granting rescission to do justice according to the merits of the case in question: see ibid 
paras 13.14-13.25. 
95 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 (HL) 721B (Lord Wilberforce). 
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depending on the purpose of the analysis;96 for most purposes, however, a ‘right in 
rem’ is used to mean a claim which is binding on a large and indefinite class of 
people,97 whilst a ‘right in personam’ is used to mean a claim which is binding on a 
small and definite class of people.98 These are the meanings that will be used in the 
present analysis. 
Although historically a pure right in personam,99 the interest of a beneficiary 
under a trust is generally regarded today as including rights in rem.100 Thus, in his 
analysis of a beneficiary’s interest,101 Nolan shows that this interest is a combination 
of distinct juridical claims, some of which are binding on a large and indefinite class 
of people (rights in rem), others of which are binding on a small and definite class 
(rights in personam). According to Nolan, the beneficiary’s rights in rem ‘consist 
principally in the beneficiary’s primary, negative, right to exclude non-beneficiaries 
from the enjoyment of trust assets’.102 In contrast, the beneficiary’s other rights—
including his positive rights to benefit from the trust assets—are rights in personam, 
‘enforceable only against a very limited class of persons’.103 
As shown above, the claim of a trust beneficiary is the prototypical example 
of an equitable interest. It seems likely, therefore, that the other confirmed equitable 
interests would similarly be regarded as combinations of juridical claims which 
include at least some rights in rem. The case of Re Nisbet and Potts’ Contract104 
supports this view. In that case, Farwell J examined the legal nature of another form 
of equitable interest, the restrictive covenant, in order to ascertain whether that interest 
was capable of binding a squatter taking the servient land by adverse possession. 
Farwell J did not in terms describe the restrictive covenant as conferring rights in rem; 
                                                     
96 See WN Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1916-1917) 
26 Yale Law Journal 710, 714-15; RC Nolan, ‘Equitable Property’ (2006) 122 LQR 232, 254. 
97 Note that for present purposes nothing turns on the fact that certain scholars include in their 
description of a right in rem the condition of being defined by reference to a thing: see P Birks, An 
Introduction to the Law of Restitution (OUP 1985) 49-50; J Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 
(OUP 1997) 25-31; D Sheehan, The Principles of Personal Property Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 2. 
Contra WN Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1916-
1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710, 720-33. 
98 See J Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law (R Campbell ed, 3rd rev 
edn, J Murray 1869) lecture XIV, 381; WN Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning’ (1916-1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710, 718. 
99 For further discussion, see below ch 5, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. But for the classic account, see FW 
Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) lecture IX. 
100 See Re Knox [1963] IR 263, 289-90 (Kingsmill Moore J). 
101 RC Nolan, ‘Equitable Property’ (2006) 122 LQR 232. 
102 Ibid 236. 
103 Ibid 237. 
104 Re Nisbet and Potts’ Contract [1905] 1 Ch 391 (Ch), affd [1906] 1 Ch 386 (CA). 
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nevertheless, he did express the view that the restrictive covenant was more than a 
personal right binding the owner of the land, but constituted ‘an equity attached to the 
property of such a nature that it is annexed to and runs with it in equity’ and which 
could only be enforced ‘by means of the land itself’.105 The implication of this 
language was that the restrictive covenant, like the interest of a beneficiary of a trust, 
did not consist wholly of rights in personam, but included at least some rights in rem. 
Having concluded that equitable interests are rights in rem, it is now necessary 
to analyse the legal nature of mere equities. It seems that mere equities are essentially 
rights to obtain equitable relief, that is to say, equitable rights of action.106 This 
conclusion is supported by an examination of the confirmed mere equities, namely, 
equitable claims to rescind a transaction or to rectify a document and equities by 
estoppel. All of these claims, which have already been outlined, have three common 
features. First, they arise in circumstances where some form of injustice has occurred 
or is likely to occur. Second, they allow the injured party to go to the court to acquire 
the appropriate equitable remedy against the defendant. Third, they necessarily cease 
to exist once the court has granted that remedy, since from this point onwards the 
rights of the parties are defined by, and derive from, the order of the court.107 When 
considered together, these features are strongly indicative of bare equitable rights of 
action, for they demonstrate that none of the confirmed mere equities, in and of itself, 
confers on the claimant any greater or more permanent entitlement than a right to go 
to the court to obtain a particular equitable remedy. As was submitted in argument in 
the case of Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset,108 the right of a claimant with a mere equity is 
‘to bend the ear of the court of conscience to listen sympathetically to his tale’. 
The status of mere equities as bare equitable rights of action is underlined by 
the case of Prosser v Edmonds.109 The main significance of this case is that it sets 
down the core principle governing the assignment of mere equities to third parties, and 
for this reason the case will be discussed in greater detail in chapter six.110 For present 
purposes, it suffices to say that in Prosser (for reasons that will be fully explained in 
chapter six) the Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer, Sir Frederick Pollock, had to 
                                                     
105 Ibid 396-97 (Farwell J). 
106 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL) 
916D (Lord Hoffmann). 
107 See, eg, Williams v Staite [1979] 1 Ch 291 (CA). 
108 Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 (HL) 115B (argument). 
109 Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 160 ER 196. 
110 Ch 6, pt II. 
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analyse the rights of a person who had assigned away his interest under the trusts of a 
will in circumstances which entitled him to rescind the assignment in equity. 
According to the Chief Baron, the rights of the assignor—that is to say, his equitable 
claim to have the assignment rescinded—consisted of ‘nothing but a naked right to 
file a bill [for rescission] in equity’.111 In other words, the assignor’s mere equity did 
not constitute any higher right than a bare equitable right of action. 
It is significant that mere equities are rights of action because all rights of 
action are rights in personam rather than rights in rem. Indeed, the idea that a bare 
right of action—whether a mere equity or not—could be a right in rem seems absurd, 
since it would imply that a claimant could have a right to litigate against any member 
of a very large and indefinite class of people. It seems highly improbable that any such 
right could exist, for while it frequently occurs that a claimant with a right of action is 
faced with multiple potential defendants—for example under the doctrine of vicarious 
liability a claim in negligence may be enforceable against both the wrongdoer and his 
employer,112 subject to the rule against double recovery—these potential defendants 
invariably form a relatively small and definite class of people. This is not to suggest 
that no claim can be a right in rem if that claim can confer access juridical relief. 
Clearly, there are many claims—equitable interests among them—which can confer 
such access and yet are binding on a large and indefinite class of people. However, 
these claims are not rights of action per se: they are primary rights which do not confer 
any automatic right to litigate, but which are capable of generating secondary rights 
of action if and only if the primary claim is somehow violated.113 And as Hohfeld 
observes, these secondary rights are always rights in personam, enforceable against 
the person who violated the primary right.114 
In short, if a juridical claim is a right of action, then that claim is almost 
certainly a right in personam. As already demonstrated, mere equities are bare rights 
of action. Therefore it can reasonably be concluded that mere equities are rights in 
personam. 
                                                     
111 Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 494-95; 160 ER 196, 202 (Sir Frederick Pollock CB). 
112 See generally WVH Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (18th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) ch 
20. 
113 WN Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1916-1917) 26 
Yale Law Journal 710, 752-53. 
114 Ibid. 
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The status of mere equities as rights in personam was quite recently illustrated 
in the case of Re Crown Holdings (London) Ltd (in liq).115 In that case, two companies 
had gone into creditors’ voluntary liquidation, and the liquidators applied to the court 
under s 112 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to determine whether certain customers who 
had made payments to the companies under fraudulently induced contracts could 
assert an equitable interest in the sums paid. The representatives of the customers 
submitted that since the contracts were induced by fraud the customers were entitled 
to rescind them and thereby recover an equitable interest in the sums. However, the 
liquidators countered that when the companies went into liquidation the customers lost 
their claim to rescind the contracts. 
Murray Rosen QC, sitting as a deputy judge, seems to have accepted that a 
claim to rescind—being a mere equity—was capable of binding volunteers and 
purchasers with notice,116 and may also be capable of enforcement against the estate 
of a bankrupt individual.117 Nevertheless, the deputy judge was persuaded by the 
liquidators’ argument that the customers’ claim to rescind and thereby recover title to 
the sums paid under the contracts had been lost when the companies went into 
liquidation. 
The deputy judge based his decision on two points. The first point related to 
the judge’s analysis of the legal nature of a claim to rescind. In this regard, the judge 
concluded that such a claim was a personal right: 
 
… the ‘equity’ to rescind a fraudulently induced contract does not give the 
innocent party any proprietary rights in property which is transferred pursuant 
to that contract. The equity to rescind is a personal right against the fraudster.118 
 
In describing the claim to rescind as a ‘personal right’, the deputy judge clearly did 
not mean that this claim was incapable of being enforced against third parties. This 
would contradict the deputy judge’s apparent acceptance that claims to rescind are 
                                                     
115 Re Crown Holdings (London) Ltd (in liq) [2015] EWHC 1876 (Ch). 
116 Ibid [38], point (c) (Murray Rosen QC), quoting Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [1999] All ER (D) 433 
(CA) [99] (Potter LJ). 
117 Re Crown Holdings (London) Ltd (in liq) [2015] EWHC 1876 (Ch) [43] (Murray Rosen QC). 
Mere equities almost certainly are enforceable against a trustee in bankruptcy: see Re Eastgate [1905] 
1 KB 465 (KB). See also RM Goode, ‘Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions’ 
(1987) 103 LQR 433, 438. 
118 Re Crown Holdings (London) Ltd (in liq) [2015] EWHC 1876 (Ch) [38] (MH Rosen QC). 
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mere equities and hence capable of binding volunteers and purchasers with notice. It 
seems likely, therefore, that what the judge actually meant by this description was that 
a claim to rescind was a right in personam: a claim which is binding on a small and 
definite class of people. As will be explained below, saying that a claim is binding on 
a definite class of people is not the same thing as saying that a claim is ‘purely 
personal’ in the sense of being wholly incapable of affecting third parties. 
The second point on which the deputy judge based his decision related to his 
interpretation of the Insolvency Act 1986. In this connection, the judge held that upon 
the voluntary winding-up of a company all the assets which are beneficially owned by 
the company fall to be administered for the benefit of the company’s creditors in 
accordance with s 107 of the 1986 Act.119 Furthermore, the judge held that any asset 
which is legally owned by the company falls outside the ‘statutory trusts’ imposed by 
s 107 if and only if that asset ‘is subject to the present … proprietary rights of a third 
party’.120 
Having adopted this view of the operation of the 1986 Act, the deputy judge 
concluded as follows: 
 
[A]t the time of the Companies going into liquidation … the sums paid by their 
customers were sums to which the Companies had full legal and beneficial 
title. The customers’ equity to rescind as the result of any fraudulent 
misrepresentation was a personal right against the Companies, and did not 
encumber the sums which had been paid by the customers as against the 
general body of its creditors. Accordingly, the sums … paid … by customers 
were the Companies’ property as at the date which they went into … 
liquidation … and accordingly fall to be dealt with under section 107 of the 
Insolvency Act for the benefit of all the Companies’ creditors. To find 
otherwise, to the detriment of those creditors, would be contrary not just to 
accepted law, but to basic contract and property principles under established 
law.121 
 
                                                     
119 Ibid [42] (MH Rosen QC). 
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It is fair to say that the judge’s conclusions about the operation of the 1986 Act are 
questionable to say the least.122 For one thing, it seems highly anomalous that a claim 
to rescind should be lost on the voluntary winding-up of a company when the same 
claim would survive the bankruptcy of an individual.123 For another thing, it is difficult 
to see how a claim which was binding on a company before the company went into 
liquidation should cease to bind the company once the company goes into liquidation. 
In principle, the claim should continue to be enforceable, even if it subjects the 
company to a liability in respect of specific assets. As Segal observes in his comment 
on the case: 
 
[T]he statutory trust relied on by the Deputy Judge is irrelevant. In asserting 
rights in the name of the company, the liquidator stands in no better position 
than the company itself and therefore the rights to which the statutory trust 
applies are and remain subject to the limitations … which are in existence at 
the commencement of the winding up.124 
 
However, these criticisms relate to the judge’s interpretation of the 1986 Act rather 
than his analysis of the legal nature of a claim to rescind. Accordingly, despite the 
doubtfulness of the actual ruling, Re Crown Holdings can be understood as authority 
that mere equities are rights in personam. 
Therefore, having examined the available evidence, it is submitted that the 
reason equitable interests are distinct from mere equities is that equitable interests, on 
the one hand, are combinations of juridical claims which include at least some rights 
in rem, while mere equities, on the other hand, are equitable rights of action and hence 
are pure rights in personam. 
It is noteworthy that, as explained in chapter two,125 some commentators take 
the view that a mere equity is a form of power, and is distinguishable from an equitable 
interest on that basis.126 While this theory is not equivalent to the view that a mere 
equity is an equitable right of action, it is not necessarily inconsistent with it. In a 
                                                     
122 See N Segal, ‘The Impact of Insolvency on the Right to Rescind: The Flaw in the Crown’ (2016) 
29 Insolvency Intelligence 27. 
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125 Ch 2, pt II, s 2. 
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manner of speaking, a right of action is a type of power, because it necessarily implies 
a power in the claimant to go to the court to obtain the relief to which he is entitled. 
 
 
i. Addressing a potential objection 
 
It is necessary to address a potential objection to the view that mere equities are rights 
in personam. In short, it might be argued that if a claim is a right in personam, binding 
on a small and definite class of people, then that claim is necessarily incapable of 
enforcement against third parties, who, given their status as such, fall outside that 
small and definite class of people. And since mere equities are capable of enforcement 
against third parties, they cannot, so the argument goes, be rights in personam. 
This objection is misplaced. A claim may be a right in personam and yet 
capable of affecting third parties for reasons which are external to the legal nature of 
the claim itself. For example, contractual claims are rights in personam: binding on 
the small and limited class of people who have consented to the agreement.127 Yet 
despite its status as a right in personam, a contractual claim is nevertheless capable of 
generating a tortious remedy against a third party who induces one of the contracting 
parties to breach the agreement.128 In a sense, therefore, a contractual claim is capable 
of affecting third parties; these third party effects, however, do not derive from the 
legal nature of the contractual claim itself, but are the consequence of tortious 
principles acting on the contractual claim. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that the third party effects of mere equities 
sound in tort. The example of a contractual claim merely serves to demonstrate that 
the ability of mere equities to affect third parties does not, contrary to the above 
objection, entail that these claims are not rights in personam. The truth of the matter, 
it is submitted, is that a mere equity, like a contractual claim, is a right in personam 
which is nevertheless capable of affecting third parties because there is some 
additional factor in play, which factor acts on the mere equity but is external to it. 
This raises the question of what this ‘additional factor’ might be. This question 
will be addressed in chapters four and five which, as explained already, will investigate 
                                                     
127 See H Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) vol 1, para 18-139. 
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the rules and principles which underlie the proprietary features of mere equities, 
including the enforceability of these claims against all third parties except purchasers 
for value without notice. 
 
 
PART IV: OTHER MERE EQUITIES? 
 
One of the objectives of this chapter has been to define the nature of the dividing line 
between mere equities and equitable interests. Now that this objective has been 
achieved, the chapter will now apply the insight which has been gained in order to 
identify which equitable claims, besides the confirmed examples of mere equities, 
might also be mere equities. 
Outside of the confirmed examples, there are a number of claims which have 
been identified in the existing literature as mere equities or as potential mere equities. 
As explained in this chapter, there are a handful of claims which judges in isolated 
cases seem to have classified as mere equities. These are (i) the rights of intermediate 
trustees,129 (ii) equitable rights of entry,130 (iii) claims to seek relief against the 
forfeiture of a lease131 and (iv) claims to have a contract specifically performed.132 
And as explained in chapter two,133 there are certain claims which commentators have 
suggested are or might be mere equities. In addition to claims to seek relief against the 
forfeiture of a lease,134 these are (v) the rights of mortgagees to consolidation of 
mortgages,135 (vi) claims to re-open a foreclosure of mortgaged property,136 (vii) the 
rights of persons who are entitled to inherit in reference to the unadministered estate 
of the deceased,137 (viii) the rights of purchasers under estate contracts138 and (ix) 
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rights to assert an equitable interest in property which has been identified though the 
equitable tracing rules.139 
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is submitted that the only claims in the 
above list which could potentially be mere equities are the claims falling within 
categories (iii), (iv) and (vi): viz claims to seek relief against the forfeiture of a lease, 
claims to have a contract specifically performed and claims to re-open a foreclosure 
of mortgaged property. Each of the other claims in the above list is excluded from 
being a mere equity for at least one of the following two reasons. 
The first reason is that the claim in question falls within one of the confirmed 
categories of equitable interest and hence is not a mere equity. The claims which are 
excluded for this reason are the rights of purchasers under estate contracts (category 
(viii)) and rights to assert an equitable interest in property which has been identified 
though the equitable tracing rules (category (ix)). As demonstrated above, estate 
contracts are confirmed equitable interests,140 and while rights to trace are treated as 
mere equities under Irish law,141 under English law they count as equitable interests.142 
The second reason is that the claim in question, while not a confirmed equitable 
interest, is not an equitable right of action and therefore, according to the above 
analysis, is not a mere equity. Claims which are excluded for this reason are the rights 
of intermediate trustees (category (i)), equitable rights of entry (category (ii)), the 
rights of mortgagees to consolidation of mortgages (category (v)) and the rights of 
persons who are entitled to inherit in reference to the unadministered estate of the 
deceased (category (vii)). None of these claims is an equitable right of action per se: 
none of them gives the owner an immediate, automatic right to go to the court to obtain 
an equitable remedy. Thus an intermediate trustee does not have an automatic right to 
litigate: before he can obtain such a right, it is necessary for his primary rights qua 
beneficiary to be breached. Likewise, an equitable right of entry does not give the 
lessor a right of action against the lessee unless and until the lessee breaches one of 
the covenants which are secured by the right of entry.143 And a right to consolidation 
of mortgages is clearly not a right to litigate as such: rather, it is a procedural right 
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which allows the owner of multiple mortgages by the same mortgagor ‘to refuse to 
allow one mortgage to be redeemed unless the other or others are also redeemed’.144 
Lastly, a person who is entitled to inherit under a will or the rules of intestacy does not 
have an automatic right to sue the personal representatives of the deceased: he may 
acquire such a right, but only if and when the personal representatives commit a breach 
of duty.145 
By way of contrast, none of claims falling within categories (iii), (iv) and (vi) 
is excluded for either of the above reasons. None of them falls within one of the 
confirmed categories of equitable interest. Likewise, each of these claims can 
potentially be characterised as an equitable right of action. Thus where a person is said 
to have a claim to seek the specific performance of a contract or to pursue relief against 
the forfeiture of a lease or the foreclosure of a mortgage, it is implicit that that person 
has an automatic right to go to court to pursue the appropriate equitable remedy. 
In conclusion, out of the numerous claims which judges and commentators 
have suggested are or might be mere equities, the only claims which could potentially 
be mere equities—beyond the ‘confirmed’ cases of equitable claims to have a 
transaction rescinded or a document rectified and equities to seek relief under the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel—are claims to have a contract specifically performed 
and claims to seek equitable relief against the forfeiture of a lease or the foreclosure 
of a mortgage. However, whether or not any of these claims actually are mere equities 
is yet to be definitively confirmed in the cases. 
 
 
PART V: CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter was to answer the first two questions which this thesis asks, 
namely, ‘What are the different claims which are, or might be, mere equities as 
distinguished from equitable interests?’ and ‘What is the legal nature of the dividing 
line between mere equities and equitable interests?’ 
                                                     
144 Ibid para 25-055. 
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In order to achieve this aim, the chapter carried out a review of the case law in 
order to ascertain which claims have been classified by the courts as mere equities, on 
the one hand, or equitable interests, on the other. The findings that were made as a 
result of this review included, inter alia, the finding that equitable claims to have a 
transaction rescinded or a document rectified and equities by estoppel are confirmed 
mere equities. The chapter then examined these findings in order to determine the legal 
nature of the dividing line between mere equities and equitable interests. The 
predominant theory that the discretionary character of mere equities is what 
distinguishes them from equitable interests was rejected; and it was shown that the 
true reason for the distinction is that equitable interests are combinations of juridical 
claims which include at lease some rights in rem, while mere equities are equitable 
rights of action and hence pure rights in personam. The chapter then applied this 
definition of the dividing line between mere equities and equitable interests in order 
to analyse which equitable claims, other than the confirmed mere equities, might also 
be mere equities. It was found that, out of the numerous claims which judges and 
commentators have suggested are or might be mere equities, the only claims which 
potentially could be mere equities—beyond the confirmed examples—are claims to 
have a contract specifically performed and claims to seek relief against the forfeiture 
of a lease or the foreclosure of mortgaged property. 
Thus, in answer to the first question, the different claims which are or might 
be mere equities as distinguished from equitable interests include (i) claims to have a 
transaction rescinded in equity, (ii) claims to have a document rectified, (iii) claims to 
seek relief under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, (iv) claims to have a contract 
specifically performed, (v) claims to seek relief against the forfeiture of a lease and 
(vi) claims to seek relief against the foreclosure of a mortgage. In answer to the second 
question, the legal nature of the dividing line between mere equities and equitable 
interests is that equitable interests, on the one hand, are composites of juridical claims 
which include at least some rights in rem while mere equities, on the other hand, are 
equitable rights of action and therefore pure rights in personam. 
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Chapter 4 
The Enforceability of Mere Equities against Third Parties: A 
Property-based Analysis 
 
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will begin to answer the third question which this thesis asks, namely, 
‘What is the underlying doctrinal basis for the proprietary features of mere equities?’ 
As explained in chapter one,1 mere equities are said to have two features which can be 
described as ‘proprietary’. First, mere equities are said to be enforceable against all 
third parties who are volunteers or purchasers for value with notice.2 Second, mere 
equities are said to be capable of being assigned or devised in favour of a third party.3 
The aim of this chapter and of chapter five is to investigate the doctrinal basis 
for the first of these proprietary features, namely, the enforceability of mere equities 
against third parties. As explained in chapter two,4 while the academic commentary in 
this area is remarkably sparse, two competing strands of thought can be identified. 
According to the first, the enforceability of mere equities against third parties is 
founded on orthodox conceptions of property. According to the second, the 
enforceability of mere equities against third parties is grounded in equitable notions 
of unconscionability. 
This chapter and chapter five will build on these opposing points of view. The 
present chapter will consider the evidence for a property-based analysis. The chapter 
will submit that, in light of the available evidence, a property-based analysis of the 
third party effects of mere equities is not doctrinally workable. This will clear the air 
for chapter five, which will formulate, and then argue in favour of, an alternative 
theory which will build on the general idea that the third party effects of mere equities 
are based on equitable grounds of unconscionability. 
                                                     
1 Ch 1, pt II, s 1. 
2 See the authorities cited above at ch 1, pt II, s 1, fn 6.  
3 See the authorities cited above at ch 1, pt II, s 1, fn 13. 
4 Ch 2, pt II, s 3. 
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Part two of this chapter will set down the necessary groundwork. It will first 
examine how the enforceability of mere equities against third parties is demonstrated 
in the cases. The part will then clarify the point in issue by explaining why the legal 
nature of mere equities makes the third party effects of these claims prima facie 
problematic. Part three will then investigate the evidence which the authorities 
disclose for a property-based analysis and will evaluate this evidence in light of the 
wider doctrinal framework. Part four will then critically evaluate the idea, which is 
supported by some scholars, that an equitable claim to rescind or rectify is capable of 
binding third parties because it is an imperfection in the title of the original transferee. 
 
 
PART II: BACKGROUND 
 
As explained above, this part will set down the necessary groundwork for the 
discussion that will follow in this chapter and chapter five. It will begin by examining 
how the enforceability of mere equities against third parties is demonstrated in the 
cases. This examination will focus on the ‘confirmed’ examples of mere equities, 
which were identified in chapter three5 as equitable claims to have a transaction 
rescinded, claims to have a document rectified and claims to seek relief under the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel. The part will then explain why the legal nature of 
mere equities makes the third party effects of these claims prima face problematic. 
 
 
1. How the third party effects of mere equities are demonstrated in the cases 
 
In principle, if a third party takes an interest from a person who is bound by a mere 
equity, and does so as either a volunteer or a purchaser for value with notice of the 
facts generating the mere equity, then the mere equity is enforceable against the third 
party.6 The ability of the ‘confirmed’ mere equities to bind volunteers and persons 
taking with notice is well demonstrated in various cases. 
                                                     
5 Ch 3, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
6 See Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [1999] All ER (D) 433 (CA) [99] (Potter LJ). 
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For example, in Addis v Campbell7 Addis, who was in destitute circumstances, 
sold his contingent reversionary interest in a certain estate at a gross undervalue to one 
Crook. Gosling was the tenant for life in possession of the estate and a relative of 
Addis. Gosling was aware of the fraudulent nature of the sale to Crook, but 
nevertheless wished to keep the estate in the family, and so purchased the interest of 
Crook for its full value. Addis died, and an action was brought by the plaintiff, Addis’s 
successor, to recover the estate. The Master of the Rolls, Lord Langdale, held that the 
plaintiff was entitled to rescind against Gosling, who being a purchaser from Crook 
with notice of the fraud which the latter had practiced ‘could not place himself in a 
better situation than Crook stood’.8 
The case of Gresley v Mousley9 illustrates the assignability of mere equities in 
favour of third parties, and in this connection will be considered in chapter six.10 
However, the case also demonstrates the enforceability of mere equities against 
volunteers. In Gresley Sir Roger Gresley sold an estate at an undervalue to his 
solicitor, one Mousley. After Sir Roger Gresley’s death, an action was brought by the 
plaintiff, Sir Roger Gresley’s devisee, seeking to rescind the sale and recover the 
estate. By this point Mousley had died, and the estate was in the hands of the 
defendants, to whom Mousley had left the estate by his will. Nevertheless, Knight 
Bruce and Turner LJJ held that the plaintiff was entitled to have the sale rescinded 
against the defendants, who had acquired their adverse rights as volunteers. 
Craddock Brothers v Hunt11 was a rectification case. There, land was sold to 
the plaintiff, but a mistake in both the contract for sale and the final conveyance meant 
that a piece of land that should have been included in the sale to the plaintiff was not 
included. Subsequently, this piece of land was sold by the vendor to the defendant, 
who purchased with notice of the earlier mistake. In these circumstances, it was held 
that the plaintiff was entitled to claim rectification of the mistake in the conveyance 
and thus recover title to the piece of land from the defendant. 
The well-known case of Inwards v Baker12 is yet another illustration of the 
enforceability of mere equities against third parties. In that case, Baker wished to build 
                                                     
7 Addis v Campbell (1841) 4 Beav 401, 49 ER 394. 
8 Ibid 415; 399 (Lord Langdale MR). 
9 Gresley v Mousley (1859) 4 De G&J 78, 45 ER 31. 
10 Ch 6, pt III. 
11 Craddock Brothers v Hunt [1923] 2 Ch 136 (CA). 
12 Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29 (CA). 
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a bungalow for himself to live in, and was prevailed upon by his father to build the 
bungalow on certain land which belonged to the father. Baker then proceeded to build 
the bungalow on the land in the expectation that he would be allowed to live there for 
as long as he wished. The father died some twenty years after the bungalow was 
completed, having left the land by his will to the plaintiffs, who subsequently sought 
to recover possession of the land from Baker. Applying principles of proprietary 
estoppel, the court held that the father’s actions had generated an ‘equity’—a ‘mere 
equity’ in other words—entitling Baker to be allowed to continue in occupation. 
Furthermore, this equity was enforceable against the plaintiffs, who accordingly were 
not entitled to turn Baker out of possession. 
In Inwards the third parties were volunteers, but Lord Denning MR intimated 
that a claim in proprietary estoppel was enforceable against even a purchaser for value 
who took with notice.13 The enforceability of this type of claim against such a 
purchaser was subsequently demonstrated in the case of ER Ives Investment Ltd v 
High.14 High was the owner of a piece of land which adjoined land that was owned by 
the Wrights. The Wrights’ land included a yard, and High believed that he had a right 
of way to access his land over the yard. In reliance on this belief, High built a garage 
on his land that could only be accessed over the yard. The Wrights never objected to 
the building of the garage, nor to High’s use of the yard to access the garage. 
Subsequently, the Wrights sold the land to the plaintiff. The conveyance expressly 
stated that High had a right of way over the yard; nevertheless, the plaintiff later argued 
that since the right of way was never registered as a land charge under the Land 
Charges Act 1925, the plaintiff was not bound by the right of way. Accordingly, the 
plaintiff brought an action for an injunction to restrain High from using the yard. The 
plaintiff’s claim and subsequent appeal were dismissed. The court applied principles 
of proprietary estoppel and found that High had acquired against the Wrights an equity 
which the court would satisfy by allowing High to continue to have access over the 
yard. This equity was not registerable as a land charge under the 1925 Act, and bound 
the plaintiff since the latter had taken from the Wrights as a purchaser with notice of 
the equity.15 
                                                     
13 Ibid 37F (Lord Denning MR). 
14 ER Ives Investment Ltd v High [1967] 2 QB 379 (CA). 
15 See especially ibid 394G (Lord Denning MR). 
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A more recent case which demonstrates the enforceability of mere equities 
against third parties is KPMG LLP v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd.16 The case 
involved a claim by a landlord against his tenant for rectification of a break clause 
contained in the lease. Both the landlord and the tenant were successors in title; neither 
of them had been involved in the original grant of the lease. Nevertheless, the court 
granted rectification. The fact that the claim to rectify was being maintained by a third 
party against a third party seems not to have given rise to any contention. As Hodges 
notes in his discussion of the case: ‘No objection was ever taken to the parties’ legal 
standing, either to sue for rectification, or to be sued for that relief’.17 
These and other cases18 clearly demonstrate that in principle a mere equity is 
capable of enforcement against any third party who takes as either a volunteer or a 
purchaser for value with notice from the person initially bound by the mere equity. 
Yet while the enforceability of mere equities against third parties is well demonstrated 
in the authorities, it is the case nevertheless that the legal nature of mere equities makes 
the third party effects of these claims prima facie problematic. 
 
 
2. The point in issue 
 
In chapter three,19 it was found that the distinguishing characteristic which sets a mere 
equity apart from an equitable interest is that a mere equity is a bare equitable right of 
action and therefore is a pure right in personam. So unlike a right in rem, which is a 
claim binding on a large and indefinite class of people,20 a mere equity, as a right in 
                                                     
16 KPMG LLP v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd [2006] EWHC 67 (Ch), [2006] 2 P&CR 7. 
17 D Hodge, Rectification: The Modern Law and Practice Governing Claims for Rectification for 
Mistake (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) para 6-07. 
18 See, eg, Lansdown v Lansdown (1729) 2 Jac & W 205, 37 ER 605; (1730) Mosely 364, 25 ER 441; 
Small v Attwood (1832) You 407, 159 ER 1051, revd on other grounds Attwood v Small (1838) 6 
Clark & Finnelly 232, 7 ER 684; Hopgood v Brown [1955] 1 WLR 213 (CA) 224-25 (Evershed MR); 
Voyce v Voyce (1991) 62 P&CR 290 (CA). See also Bridgeman v Green (1757) Wilm 58, 64-65; 97 
ER 22, 25 (Lord Commissioner Wilmot); Daly v The Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 
371, 387-88 (Brennan J). 
19 Ch 3, pt III, s 2. 
20 See J Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law (R Campbell ed, 3rd rev 
edn, J Murray 1869) lecture XIV, 381; WN Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning’ (1916-1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710, 718. 
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personam, binds a small and definite class of people,21 comprising, at least initially, 
the parties to the transaction or course of dealing which generated the mere equity. 
The fact that mere equities are rights in personam is problematic when it comes 
to explaining the doctrinal basis for the enforceability of mere equities against third 
parties. If mere equities were rights in rem, then there would be no such difficulty: 
mere equities would bind the world at large, so a fortiori they would be enforceable 
against all successors in title who are volunteers or purchasers with notice. This 
analysis is not available, however, since mere equities are pure rights in personam. 
The corollary is that one is left having to explain how mere equities, being claims 
which bind a small and definite class of people, can affect third parties, who, given 
their status as such, fall outside that small and definite class of people. 
This shows that whatever might be the doctrinal basis for the enforceability of 
mere equities against third parties, it is not sufficiently explained by reference to the 
underlying legal form which mere equities take. It follows that if a workable analysis 
of the third party effects of mere equities is to be produced, then that analysis will 
necessarily draw on doctrinal concepts which are external to the basic legal nature of 
these claims. In a nutshell, it is the identification of these concepts which is the point 
in issue in this chapter and chapter five. 
 
 
PART III: A PROPERTY-BASED ANALYSIS 
 
As noted above, this part will first review the authorities which disclose evidence for 
a property-based analysis of the enforceability of mere equities against third parties. It 
will then critically evaluate this analysis in light of the wider doctrinal framework. The 
part will argue that while the enforceability of mere equities against third parties could 
be explained within the ambit of the property-based analysis, this analysis is not 
workable within the wider doctrinal framework for two reasons. The first reason is 
that the property-based analysis is inconsistent with the principle that the full 
beneficial interest in property passes under a voidable transfer. The second reason is 
that the property-based analysis is inconsistent with the equitable priority rules. 
                                                     
21 See J Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law (R Campbell ed, 3rd rev 
edn, J Murray 1869) lecture XIV, 381; WN Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning’ (1916-1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710, 718. 
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1. Reviewing the evidence for a property-based analysis 
 
In general outline, the property-based analysis for which evidence can be found in the 
cases posits that if a mere equity is capable of binding third parties, this is because that 
mere equity is conjoined with an equitable interest in the affected asset. Thus a 
claimant who is entitled to have a transaction rescinded in equity, or to have a 
document rectified, or to obtain relief under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, is 
seen as having two distinct yet interrelated equitable claims. First, the claimant has his 
mere equity properly so called, which gives him a right in personam against the 
immediate defendant to go to the court to obtain the appropriate remedy. Second, the 
claimant has an equitable interest, which gives him rights in rem in reference to the 
affected asset. The gist of this analysis is that the ability of the claimant to enforce his 
mere equity against third parties is attributable to the fact that this mere equity is 
conjoined with ancillary rights in rem, enforceable against a large and indefinite class 
of people. 
The main cases which disclose evidence for this property-based analysis are 
National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth,22 Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal 
Pty Ltd (in liq)23 and Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd.24 
In National Provincial Bank a husband deserted his wife and then transferred 
the family home, which was land registered under the Land Registration Act 1925, to 
a third party. The court had to decide whether the husband’s successor in title was 
entitled to possession of the home against the wife, who at all material times had been 
in occupation of the home. Before National Provincial Bank, it had been held in a 
series of earlier cases that when a wife was deserted by her husband she acquired an 
‘equity’ to remain in the family home, and that this equity, although it did not amount 
to an equitable interest in the land, was capable of binding successors in title.25 The 
wife in the present case submitted that she had such an equity, and that this equity 
                                                     
22 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL). 
23 Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1964) 113 CLR 265. 
24 Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 183 (Ch). 
25 See the authorities cited above at ch 3, pt II, s 2, sub-s ii, fn 51. 
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qualified as an overriding interest of a person in actual occupation under s 70(1)(g) of 
the 1925 Act, and accordingly bound the husband’s successor in title. 
The House of Lords held that any claim which the wife had in reference to the 
family home was purely personal between herself and her husband and therefore 
incapable of binding third parties. It followed that the wife did not have any claim that 
could qualify as an overriding interest under s 70(1)(g). 
Of interest here is the judgment of Lord Upjohn. In short, Lord Upjohn argued 
that the only equitable claims which could bind third parties were equitable interests, 
and that since the wife had at best an ‘equity’ and no equitable interest in the home, it 
followed that her rights were purely personal.26 The judge admitted, however, that 
mere equities were not equitable interests but nevertheless were capable of binding 
third parties, and hence posed a potential difficulty for his argument.27 Lord Upjohn 
got around this difficulty by suggested that the reason mere equities could bind third 
parties was that these claims were connected with an equitable interest in the affected 
land: 
 
… I myself cannot see how it is possible for a ‘mere equity’ to bind a purchaser 
unless such an equity is ancillary to or dependent upon an equitable estate or 
interest in the land. … [A] mere ‘equity’ naked and alone is, in my opinion, 
incapable of binding successors in title even with notice; it is personal to the 
parties.28 
 
Thus Lord Upjohn reasoned that if a mere equity was capable of binding third parties, 
this was by reason of the mere equity being conjoined with—or, as Lord Upjohn 
himself put it, ‘ancillary to or dependent upon’—an equitable interest in the affected 
asset. It follows that Lord Upjohn’s judgment in National Provincial Bank discloses 
strong evidence in favour of the property-based analysis. 
Latec Investments was decided two months before the House of Lords’ 
decision in National Provincial Bank. In Latec Investments, the mortgagee of a 
statutory mortgage under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) fraudulently exercised 
                                                     
26 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1237F-38B, 1238G-39B (Lord 
Upjohn). 
27 Ibid 1238B-C (Lord Upjohn). 
28 Ibid 1238D-G (Lord Upjohn) (emphasis added). 
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its power of sale over the mortgaged land. The purchaser, which was the wholly owned 
subsidiary of the mortgagee and implicated in the fraud, then granted an equitable 
charge over the land in favour of an innocent third party. The mortgagor then brought 
an action to have the sale rescinded against the fraudulent parties and against the third 
party. In its defence, the third party pleaded that it was a purchaser for value without 
notice. 
The High Court of Australia accepted that the mortgagor was entitled to 
rescind the sale against the fraudulent parties, but nevertheless held that since the third 
party was a purchaser for value without notice of the mortgagor’s rights, the mortgagor 
was not entitled to rescind against the third party. 
It will be necessary to consider Latec Investments in detail in the following 
discussion of the equitable priority rules. However, the judgment of Kitto J is of 
interest here because in it the judge distinguished between two forms of ‘equity’: on 
the one hand, an equity that was ‘accompanied by an equitable interest’; on the other, 
an equity that was ‘unaccompanied by an equitable interest’.29 According to Kitto J, 
equities which resembled a claim to rescind a transaction or rectify a document—in 
other words, mere equities—fell within the first category, while personal equities, like 
the equity of a deserted wife to remain in the family home, fell within the second 
category.30 Thus Kitto J appears to have pre-empted the view which Lord Upjohn 
would express two months later in National Provincial Bank that a mere equity was 
‘ancillary to or dependent upon’ an equitable interest in the affected asset.31 
Accordingly, Latec Investments can be seen as disclosing further evidence for the 
property-based analysis. 
Finally, in Blacklocks a vendor of registered land sought to rectify the sale in 
order to recover title to a plot of land which the parties had included in the sale by 
mistake. The judge, Mervyn Davies J, held that the vendor had acquired a claim to 
rectify the sale, but the case presented the added complication that the original 
purchaser had since resold the land to a third party. However, it was conceded that at 
the time of the resale the vendor had been in actual occupation of the disputed land 
and that the third party had not inquired after the vendor’s rights. It followed that the 
                                                     
29 Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265, 277 (Kitto J). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Note that Latec Investments was not cited in National Provincial Bank either in argument or in the 
judgments. 
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rights of the vendor would bind the third party as an overriding interest under s 
70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925, but only if those rights where capable of 
binding successors in title under the general law.32 In this regard, Mervyn Davies J 
followed National Provincial Bank and Latec Investments by holding that the 
applicable test was whether the vendor’s claim to rectify was conjoined with an 
equitable interest in the land: 
 
In [National Provincial Bank] … Lord Upjohn considered that a mere equity 
might be either ‘naked and alone’ or ancillary to or dependent upon an 
equitable estate or interest in land, and in Latec Investments … Kitto J made a 
distinction between an equity which is and an equity which is not accompanied 
by an equitable interest. It is plain that the wife’s equity in [National Provincial 
Bank] … was naked and alone and had not the enduring quality that might 
render it capable of being a right under section 70. But was the mere equity 
possessed by the [vendor] of the same kind, or was it an equity ancillary to an 
interest in land? If the equity was of the latter kind it may … have the ‘quality 
of being capable of enduring’ …33 
 
Mervyn Davies J held that the vendor’s claim to rescind the sale was ‘ancillary to an 
interest in land’.34 It followed that this claim was capable of binding successors under 
the general law and hence bound the third party as an overriding interest under s 
70(1)(g). 
Accordingly, Mervyn Davies J was in agreement with the earlier assertions of 
Lord Upjohn and Kitto J that in order for a mere equity to be capable of binding third 
parties it was necessary for that mere equity to be conjoined with an equitable interest 
in the affected asset. Thus Mervyn Davies J’s judgment in Blacklocks discloses 
additional evidence for the property-based analysis. 
The property-based analysis which these cases support is advantageous for two 
reasons. First, and most importantly for present purposes, the enforceability of mere 
equities against third parties can be explained within the ambit of this analysis. This is 
                                                     
32 Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 183 (Ch) 194D-195D (Mervyn Davies 
J). 
33 Ibid 195D-F (Mervyn Davies J). 
34 Ibid 196E (Mervyn Davies J). 
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because the property-based analysis allows the explanation that a mere equity, despite 
being a right of action and hence a pure right in personam, is enforceable against third 
parties because it is conjoined with, or engrafted on, an equitable interest which 
includes rights in rem in the affected asset. In this way, the third party effects of mere 
equities can be attributed to the fact that these claims are combined with additional 
claims whose legal nature means that they are intrinsically capable of binding third 
parties. Second, the property-based analysis has explanatory leverage as regards the 
assignability of mere equities to third parties. The assignment of mere equities will be 
examined in chapter six. For present purposes, it suffices to say that the core principle 
is that a mere equity cannot be assigned independently,35 but is nevertheless capable 
of passing on the assignment of some property right or interest to which the mere 
equity is ancillary.36 Despite this rule, however, there are some problematic cases 
where an assignment of a mere equity was permitted even though the assignor did not 
have any obvious property right or interest in the asset to which the mere equity 
related.37 Clearly, these cases would be less problematic if it were accepted that mere 
equities are conjoined with equitable interests in the assets which they affect. 
 
 
2. Voidable transfers 
 
Despite the advantages of the property-based analysis, it is submitted that this analysis 
is not workable within the wider doctrinal framework. Two arguments will be made 
in support of this submission. 
The first argument relates to cases where assets have been transferred under a 
transaction which was entered in circumstances that entitle the transferor to rescind in 
equity. In this situation, the transferor can be described as having a ‘power’ to recover 
title to the assets.38 This is because, as explained in chapter three,39 the object of 
                                                     
35 See especially Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 160 ER 196. 
36 See Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 (HL) 703F-G (Lord Roskill). 
37 Gresley v Mousley (1859) 4 De G&J 78, 45 ER 31; Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337; 
Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v Brougham (1882) 7 App Cas 307 (PC). 
38 See, eg, National Crime Agency v Robb [2014] EWHC 4384 (Ch), [2015] 3 WLR 23 [44] (Sir 
Terence Etherton C). See also D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd 
edn, OUP 2014) para 16.17. 
39 Ch 3, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
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rescission is to achieve restitutio in integrum,40 which requires, inter alia, the 
reciprocal restitution of all assets that have passed under the impugned transaction.41 
These cases are highly problematic for the property-based analysis because of 
what the courts analyse the transferor’s rights to be during period after the assets have 
been transferred but before rescission has taken place. The predominant view is that 
the transferor’s rights consist in his mere equity to have the transaction rescinded and 
do not include any interest, legal or equitable, in the assets transferred.42 In other 
words, before rescission occurs, the entire beneficial estate in the assets passes to the 
transferee, leaving the transferor with a bare equitable right of action to rescind.43 
This analysis is evidenced in various cases. In Bristol and West Building 
Society v Mothew44 the question arose what was the effect of an innocent 
misrepresentation in the situation where the representee, acting in reliance on the 
misrepresentation, advanced money to the representor. At first instance, Chadwick J 
decided that when the representor received the money he held it on constructive trust 
for the representee. In the Court of Appeal, however, Millett LJ, who gave the leading 
judgment, rejected this analysis, holding instead that until the transaction was 
rescinded the beneficial interest in the money remained vested in the representor: 
 
Misrepresentation makes a transaction voidable not void. It gives the 
representee the right to elect whether to rescind or affirm the transaction. … 
The right to rescind for misrepresentation is an equity. Until it is exercised the 
beneficial interest in any property transferred in reliance on the representation 
remains vested in the transferee.45 
                                                     
40 Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 WLR 129 (CA) 137B (Sir Donald Nicholls V-C); Shalson v Russo 
[2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] Ch 281 [122] (Rimer J); D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, 
The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 13.01. 
41 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] Ch 281 [122] (Rimer J). 
42 Banque Belge Pour L’Etranger v Hambrouck [1921] 1 KB 321 (CA) 332 (Atkin J); Daly v The 
Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 371, 389-90 (Brennan J); Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 
WLR 1 (Ch) 11H-12A (Millett J); Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 (CA) 
22F-H (Millett LJ); Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [1999] All ER (D) 433 (CA) [99] (Potter LJ); Shalson v 
Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] Ch 281 [108], [119], [126] (Rimer J); Independent Trustee 
Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 195, [2012] 3 WLR 597 [103] (Lloyd LJ); 
AC v DC [2012] EWHC 2032 (Fam) [29] (Mostyn J); National Crime Agency v Robb [2014] EWHC 
4384 (Ch), [2015] 3 WLR 23 [44] (Sir Terence Etherton C); Re Crown Holdings (London) Ltd (in liq) 
[2015] EWHC 1876 (Ch) [38] (MH Rosen QC). 
43 See Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 494-95; 160 ER 196, 201-02 (Sir Frederick 
Pollock CB). 
44 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 (CA). 
45 Ibid 22F-H (Millett LJ). 
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Likewise, in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley46 Potter LJ had to analyse the rights of the 
parties in the situation where a lender had been induced by the fraud of the borrower 
to lend money to the latter. The judge held that until the contract was rescinded the 
rights of the lender consisted in a mere equity and included no equitable interest in the 
loan money: 
 
[In the case of a transfer pursuant to a contract which is voidable for 
misrepresentation] the transferor may elect whether to avoid or affirm the 
transaction and, until he elects to avoid it, there is no constructive (resulting) 
trust … The result … is that, before rescission, the owner has no proprietary 
interest in the original property; all he has is the ‘mere equity’ of his right to 
set aside the voidable contract.47 
  
And in Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd48 Lloyd LJ 
distinguished the situation where a person disposed of his own property under a 
transaction which he was entitled to rescind from the situation where a trustee disposed 
of trust property in breach of trust. In the first situation, Lloyd LJ maintained that ‘until 
rescission … the original owner has no proprietary interest in the subject matter of the 
dealing, but has only a “mere equity” consisting of his right to set aside the 
transaction’.49 This was distinct from the second situation because, as the judge 
pointed out, ‘the beneficiaries have more than a mere equity; they still own their 
beneficial interests in the trust property unaffected by the disposition made without 
authority under the trust’.50 
These and other cases51 support the analysis that unless and until a voidable 
transaction is rescinded the full beneficial interest in any assets transferred pursuant to 
that transaction vests in the transferee, while the transferor has only a mere equity in 
the form of his claim to have the transaction rescinded. 
                                                     
46 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [1999] All ER (D) 433 (CA). 
47 Ibid [99] (Potter LJ). 
48 Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 195, [2012] 3 WLR 
597. 
49 Ibid [103] (Lloyd LJ). 
50 Ibid [104] (Lloyd LJ). 
51 See the authorities cited above in fn 42. 
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The principle that the full beneficial interest passes under a voidable 
transaction appears to refute the property-based analysis. According to the property-
based analysis, where a transferor of property has a mere equity to rescind the 
transaction and thus recover title, the transferor’s mere equity is conjoined with an 
equitable interest in the affected property, and for this reason is capable of binding 
third parties. This analysis is clearly incorrect. As the above cases demonstrate, the 
correct understanding of this situation is that the transferor has a mere equity only, and 
no equitable interest in the affected property unless and until rescission occurs. It 
follows that the property-based analysis is inconsistent with how the courts approach 
cases where property has passed under a voidable transaction. 
It might be objected that the courts have not always adhered to the view that a 
transferor under a voidable transaction retains no equitable interest in the subject of 
the transfer.52 Indeed, there were several cases in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century where the court expressed the opposite view.53 
The first case was Stump v Gaby.54 In Stump, one White conveyed an estate to 
the defendant in circumstances which entitled White to rescind the conveyance on 
grounds of undue influence. Subsequently, in order to prevent the conveyance from 
being disputed, White, by his will, confirmed the conveyance and, for additional 
confirmation, devised the estate to the defendant. The plaintiff, who was the heir at 
law of White, sought to have the conveyance rescinded. The defendants argued that 
since White had confirmed the conveyance and devised the estate the plaintiff had no 
title to the relief which he claimed. The plaintiff countered, firstly, that after the 
conveyance the rights of White regarding the estate were not capable of being devised 
and, secondly, that the confirmation was not valid. 
The Lord Chancellor, Lord St Leonards, rejected both arguments. As regards 
the first argument, he asserted that after White had made the conveyance his rights 
constituted an equitable interest in the estate which was capable of being devised under 
the subsequent will: 
 
                                                     
52 See especially R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (OUP 1997) 172-74. 
53 Stump v Gaby (1852) 2 De GM&G 623, 42 ER 1015; Gresley v Mousley (1859) 4 De G&J 78, 45 
ER 31; Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337; Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v Brougham (1882) 7 
App Cas 307 (PC). 
54 Stump v Gaby (1852) 2 De GM&G 623, 42 ER 1015. 
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[W]hat then is the interest of a party in an estate which he has conveyed … 
under circumstances which would give a right in this Court to have the 
conveyance set aside? In the view of this Court he remains the owner … and 
the consequence is that he may devise the estate, not as a legal estate, but as an 
equitable estate, … leaving the conveyance to have its full operation at law, 
but looking at the equitable right to have it set aside in this Court. The testator 
therefore had a devisable interest.55 
 
As regards the second argument, the Lord Chancellor held that the confirmation was 
valid, asserting that it was ‘beyond dispute that a man may, if he pleases, confirm a 
voidable conveyance’.56 Significantly, the Lord Chancellor made it clear that the 
confirmation was independently sufficient, exclusive of the devise, to dispose of the 
case: 
 
[T]he testator has devised the estate in express terms, and my opinion is, that 
if he had not so devised it, but had simply said, referring to the prior 
conveyance, ‘I confirm it,’ that alone would have been a valid confirmation.57 
 
The manner in which the Lord Chancellor disposed of the first argument was clearly 
at odds with the principle established in Bristol and West Building Society and the 
other cases mentioned above. In contrast with what was said in these cases, the Lord 
Chancellor’s comments in Stump suggest that if property is transferred under a 
transaction that the transferor is entitled to rescind, then the transferor continues to 
have an equitable interest in the property; not a mere naked right to litigate in equity. 
The other cases were Gresley v Mousley,58 Dickinson v Burrell59 and 
Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v Brougham.60 These cases establish a rule in relation 
to the assignment of mere equities which is highly problematic from a doctrinal 
perspective; in this connection, they will be considered in greater detail in chapter 
six.61 For present purposes, it suffices to say that in each of these cases, which were 
                                                     
55 Ibid 630; 1018 (Lord St Leonards LC). 
56 Ibid 631; 1018 (Lord St Leonards LC). 
57 Ibid 632; 1019 (Lord St Leonards LC). 
58 Gresley v Mousley (1859) 4 De G&J 78, 45 ER 31. 
59 Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337. 
60 Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v Brougham (1882) 7 App Cas 307 (PC). 
61 Ch 6, pt III. 
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all decided within the thirty years following Stump, the judge concurred with Lord St 
Leonards LC in maintaining that if a conveyance was voidable at the instance of the 
transferor, then the transferor retained an equitable interest in the subject of the 
conveyance, which interest could be assigned or devised.62 
It is submitted, however, that the cases in the Stump line do not seriously 
challenge the principle that upon a voidable transfer the full beneficial interest passes 
to the transferee, leaving the transferor with only a mere equity to rescind. This is the 
case for at least three reasons. 
The first reason is that, in Stump itself, White, the transferor, had validly 
affirmed the transaction.63 This fact, as Lord St Leonards LC acknowledged, was 
independently sufficient to dispose of the case, for it meant that any claim which White 
may have had to rescind the conveyance was barred and that, accordingly, it was not 
possible for the plaintiff to stand in the right of White to rescind the conveyance. In 
these circumstances, it was beside the point to ask whether an equitable claim to 
rescind a conveyance of land was devisable or automatically descended to the heir at 
law: the effect of the confirmation had been to nullify any claim to rescind that White 
may have had, so that even if White had not made the devise, the plaintiff still would 
not have been able to claim a right to rescind through White. It follows that when Lord 
St Leonards LC portrayed White as having retained an equitable interest that was 
capable of being devised, the Lord Chancellor’s comments were strictly obiter dicta.64 
The second reason is that, in suggesting that White had retained an equitable 
interest, Lord St Leonards LC went against the ratio decidendi of the earlier case of 
Prosser v Edmonds.65 This case—which was not referred to in Stump either in the 
judgment or in argument—has already been encountered in chapter three.66 As 
explained in that chapter, in Prosser Sir Frederick Pollock CB had to analyse the rights 
of a person who had transferred his interest under the trusts of a will in circumstances 
which entitled him to rescind the transfer in equity. According to the Chief Baron, the 
                                                     
62 Gresley v Mousley (1859) 4 De G&J 78, 89; 45 ER 31, 35 (Knight Bruce LJ); Dickinson v Burrell 
(1866) LR 1 Eq 337, 342 (Lord Romilly MR); Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v Brougham (1882) 7 
App Cas 307 (PC) 311 (Lord Selborne LJ). 
63 For a discussion re the affirmation of voidable transactions, see generally D O’Sullivan, S Elliott 
and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) ch 23. 
64 Interestingly, this point is one which other scholars always seem to overlook when discussing 
Stump: see, eg, R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (OUP 1997) 172; D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R 
Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) paras 3.45-3.51. 
65 Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 160 ER 196. 
66 Ch 3, pt III, s 2. 
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assignor had ‘a naked right to file a bill in equity’—that is to say, a mere equity—and 
no additional interest in the subject of the transfer.67 Therefore the Chief Baron 
adopted the same analysis that would subsequently find support in Bristol and West 
Building Society and the other cases in that line. 
The third reason is that after the decisions in Bristol and West Building Society 
and the subsequent cases, it is highly unlikely the courts today would accept the 
submission that a transferor of property under a voidable transaction retains an 
equitable interest in that property. That is to say, Bristol and West Building Society 
and the other cases seem to have decisively confirmed that the correct analysis is that 
before rescission takes place the transferor has a mere equity only, and no equitable 
interest in the transferred property. As the authors of the second edition of The Law of 
Rescission note: 
 
Although the point was formerly the subject of some uncertainty, it is now 
settled that title to property passes at law and in equity under a voidable 
contract, and that a claim to recover title upon equitable rescission is properly 
described as an ‘equity’ or ‘mere equity’.68 
 
It is necessary to add one caveat: in several relatively recent cases, judges have 
seemingly maintained that if a transaction is procured by the actual fraud69 of one 
party, than any property which is received by the fraudulent party from the innocent 
party under that transaction is held by the fraudulent party on constructive trust for the 
innocent party, who correspondingly has an equitable beneficial interest in the 
property from the outset.70 These cases, however, do not present a serious obstacle for 
the present argument. For one thing, the view that a transferor of property under a 
fraudulently induced transaction takes an immediate equitable interest in the property 
                                                     
67 Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 494-95; 160 ER 196, 201-02 (Sir Frederick Pollock 
CB). 
68 D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 16.12 
(footnotes omitted). 
69 Ie, fraud as defined in Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 (HL) 374 (Lord Herschell). 
70 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 (HL) 716C (Lord Browne-
Wilkinson); Collings v Lee [2001] 2 All ER 332 (CA) 337G (Nourse LJ); Halley v The Law Society 
[2003] EWCA Civ 97 [47], [54] (Carnwath LJ). 
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is controversial: it is inconsistent with what judges have said in earlier cases,71 and has 
been severely criticised by both judges and academic writers alike.72 It seems unlikely, 
therefore, that the constructive trust analysis will be followed in future cases; as Sir 
Terence Etherton C observed quite recently in National Crime Agency v Robb: 
 
The overall consensus, both judicial and academic, is that where a transaction 
is not void but is voidable for fraud, the fraudster acquires legal and beneficial 
title to the victim’s property and when the transaction is rescinded or set aside, 
but not before then, the equitable title to that property re-vests in the victim 
…73 
 
For another thing, if, contrary to the balance of the existing evidence, the constructive 
trust analysis were to attain general acceptance, this analysis would still only apply in 
cases where a transaction is procured through fraud. Hence the analysis would not 
apply in cases where a transferor is entitled to rescind on purely equitable grounds 
such as innocent misrepresentation or undue influence. In these cases, the orthodox 
view—namely that before rescission takes place the transferor has only a mere equity 
and no equitable interest in the subject of the transfer—would continue to hold sway. 
 
 
3. Equitable priorities 
 
The second argument which is advanced in support of the submission that the 
property-based analysis, despite its explanatory advantages, is not workable within the 
wider doctrinal framework relates to the consequences for priorities of the distinction 
between equitable interests and mere equities. 
                                                     
71 Banque Belge Pour L’Etranger v Hambrouck [1921] 1 KB 321 (CA) 332 (Atkin J); Lonrho plc v 
Fayed [1992] 1 WLR 1 (Ch) 11H-12A (Millett J); El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] 3 All 
ER 717 (Ch) 734D (Millett J), revd [1994] 2 All ER 685 (CA). 
72 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] Ch 281 [111]-[119] (Rimer J); National Crime 
Agency v Robb [2014] EWHC 4384 (Ch), [2015] 3 WLR 23 [43]-[44] (Sir Terence Etherton C); HW 
Tang, ‘Proprietary Relief without Rescission’ (2004) 63 CLJ 30; D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R 
Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 1.84. 
73 National Crime Agency v Robb [2014] EWHC 4384 (Ch), [2015] 3 WLR 23 [43] (Sir Terence 
Etherton C). 
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As discussed in chapter one,74 these consequences where originally systemised 
in the case of Phillips v Phillips.75 To recapitulate, in Phillips the owner of the equity 
of redemption in certain lands granted a rentcharge to the plaintiff and then transferred 
the equity of redemption to the defendants. Subsequently, when the plaintiff brought 
an action to enforce his security over the land, the defendants sought to rely on the 
defence of purchase for value without notice.76 The Lord Chancellor, Lord Westbury, 
held that the defence of purchase for value without notice was not available in a case 
where the court had to determine the priorities between competing equitable interests 
and that, accordingly, the defence was not available to the defendants in the present 
case. Furthermore, the Lord Chancellor outlined, obiter, three situations where the 
defence was available, the third of which was the following: 
 
Thirdly, where there are circumstances that give rise to an equity as 
distinguished from an equitable estate—as for example, an equity to set aside 
a deed for fraud, or to correct it for mistake—and the purchaser under the 
instrument maintains the plea of purchase for valuable consideration without 
notice, the Court will not interfere.77 
 
Judges in subsequent cases have consistently held that the effect of this statement—
the so called third proposition in Phillips78—is that where the court has to determine 
the priorities between an equitable interest and an earlier mere equity, the defence of 
purchase for value without notice is available to the owner of the equitable interest.79 
In actual fact, Lord Westbury LC did not specify whether he was describing a situation 
where a purchaser of an equitable interest could raise the defence, or whether his 
comments were limited to a purchaser of a legal interest. This point has not escaped 
the attention of O’Sullivan, who argues that Lord Westbury LC did not actually intend 
to describe a situation where the defence was generally available even to a purchaser 
of an equitable interest.80 However, while this argument is interesting from a historical 
                                                     
74 Ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
75 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 45 ER 1164. 
76 For a general description of the plea of bona fide purchase for value without notice, see above ch 1, 
pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
77 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 218; 45 ER 1164, 1167 (Lord Westbury LC). 
78 See Cloutte v Storey [1911] 1 Ch 18 (Ch) 24 (Neville J). 
79 See the authorities cited above at ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s i, fn 36. 
80 D O’Sullivan, ‘The Rule in Phillips v Phillips’ (2002) 118 LQR 296, 304-16. 
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point of view, from a doctrinal perspective it is largely otiose, for since Phillips there 
has been a long line of cases which has invested the third proposition with the 
particular meaning described above.81 Furthermore, the argument will be advanced in 
chapter five82 that, despite what O’Sullivan himself argues,83 the orthodox 
interpretation of the third proposition makes theoretical sense, given the legal nature 
of mere equities as pure rights in personam. 
The fact that it is not allowable for a purchaser of an equitable interest to raise 
the defence of purchase for value without notice against an earlier equitable interest, 
but that it is allowable for him to raise the defence against an earlier mere equity, is 
problematic for the property-based analysis. As explained above, this analysis 
maintains that a mere equity is enforceable against third parties because it is conjoined 
with, or engrafted on, an equitable interest which includes rights in rem in the affected 
asset. Yet if it really were the case that the third party effects of a mere equity derive 
from an underlying equitable interest, then it is difficult to see why a mere equity 
would be treated any differently from an equitable interest in re priorities. Hence the 
fact that different consequences for priorities do attach to equitable interests and mere 
equities respectively proves that the enforceability of a mere equity against third 
parties does not, in actual fact, derive from some underlying equitable interest. 
It seems that there are two main objections that might be raised against this 
argument. The first appeals to how the case of Latec Investments was reasoned. The 
second invokes the principle, established in the case of Rice v Rice,84 that an earlier 
equitable interest will be postponed to an later equitable interest if the owner of the 
later interest is found to have the superior ‘equity’. Each of these potential objections 
will now be dealt with in turn. 
 
 
i. Objection 1: Latec Investments 
 
The facts of Latec Investments have already been outlined. In that case, all three High 
Court Justices—Kitto, Taylor and Menzies JJ—agreed that the rights of the mortgagor 
                                                     
81 See the authorities cited above at ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s i, fn 36. 
82 Ch 5, p III, s 3, sub-s ii. 
83 D O’Sullivan, ‘The Rule in Phillips v Phillips’ (2002) 118 LQR 296, 316-22. 
84 Rice v Rice (1853) 2 Drewry 73, 61 ER 646. 
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(who was claiming to rescind the fraudulent sale of the mortgaged land) fell within the 
ambit of the third proposition in Phillips. This meant that the third party (who, after 
the sale, had purchased an equitable charge over the land) was entitled to raise the 
defence of purchase for value without notice, despite the fact that the third party’s 
interest was purely equitable. Hence the outcome of the case was that the equitable 
interest of the third party took priority over the earlier equitable rights of the 
mortgagor. 
According to the argument which the present author is making, the fact that 
the third party, being a purchaser of an equitable interest, was able to invoke the 
defence of purchase for value without notice proves that the mortgagor’s mere equity 
to rescind the fraudulent sale was not conjoined with an equitable interest in the land. 
This is because, if it had been the case that the mortgagor’s mere equity was conjoined 
with an equitable interest, then this mere equity would have been treated like an 
equitable interest for the purpose of priorities, in which case the third party would not 
have been able to invoke the defence: as per the main ruling in Phillips. 
The reason Latec Investments is potentially problematic is that, out of the three 
judges who decided the case, Kitto and Taylor JJ expressly held that the mortgagor 
had held an equitable interest in the land since the fraudulent sale occurred. (The third 
judge, Menzies J, adopted the orthodox view that a ‘relation back of the equitable 
interest’ could only occur once the fraudulent sale was rescinded.85) Kitto and Taylor 
JJ gave different reasons for adopting this analysis of the mortgagor’s rights. On the 
one hand, Kitto J suggested that the effect of the fraudulent sale had been to give the 
mortgagor a true equity of redemption in the land.86 On the other hand, Taylor J, 
referring to the Stump line of cases (see above), invoked the supposed principle that 
‘where the owner of property has been induced by fraud to convey it the grantor 
continues to have an equitable interest therein’.87 Despite their different lines of 
argument, however, both judges were in agreement that, when the fraudulent sale took 
place, the mortgagor acquired, in addition to his claim to rescind, an equitable interest 
in the land. 
The judgments of Kitto and Taylor JJ are a potential basis for objection to the 
above argument. This is because these judgments seemingly show that a mere equity 
                                                     
85 Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265, 290 (Menzies J). 
86 Ibid 274-75 (Kitto J). 
87 Ibid 284 (Taylor J). 
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can, in fact, be conjoined with an equitable interest in the affected asset, but 
nevertheless be treated differently from an equitable interest in re priorities. If this 
were the case, then the fact that different consequences for priorities attach to equitable 
interests and mere equities respectively would not, contrary to the above argument, 
prove that the third party effects of a mere equity do not derive from an underlying 
equitable interest. 
It is suggested, however, that a close reading of Kitto and Taylor JJ’s decisions 
reveals that these judges were not justified in holding that the mortgagor’s mere equity 
was conjoined with an equitable interest in the land. The root of the problem lies in 
the fact that both judges treated Phillips as a binding authority. This meant that, in 
order for Kitto and Taylor JJ to be warranted in asserting that the mortgagor had an 
equitable interest in the land which predated the equitable interest of the third party, it 
was necessary for these judges to give a credible account of why, taking into account 
the main ruling in Phillips, the third party nevertheless could raise the defence of 
purchase for value without notice. This is something which Kitto and Taylor JJ 
attempted but failed to achieve, for in each case the judge adopted an account that was 
either falsifiable or, if true, defeated the purpose of the hypothesis that the mortgagor’s 
mere equity was conjoined with an equitable interest. It follows that Kitto and Taylor 
JJ were not justified in holding that the mortgagor had an earlier equitable interest in 
the land and that, accordingly, their judgments do not present a serious basis for 
objection to the above argument. 
In order to substantiate this criticism of Kitto and Taylor JJ’s reasoning, it is 
necessary to investigate their respective judgments in some detail. The judgment of 
Taylor J will be considered first. 
 
 
Taylor J 
 
According to Taylor J, since the mortgagor had continued to have an equitable interest 
in the land from when the fraudulent sale occurred, the case was to be treated as a 
contest between adverse equitable interests, not as a contest between an equitable 
interest and an earlier mere equity. As Taylor J put it: 
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… where a grantor is entitled to set aside a conveyance for fraud he has … an 
equitable interest in the subject land … if he is to be postponed to an equitable 
interest acquired without notice at some later time it is not because it can be 
said … that he has a mere equity as distinguished from an equitable estate; if 
he is to be postponed then there must be some other reason.88 
 
In arguing that the contest was between adverse equitable interests, Taylor J seemed 
to have been driving towards the conclusion that the third party could not raise the 
defence of purchase for value without notice, as per the main ruling in Phillips. 
However, Taylor J did not let the matter rest there, but devised a way of avoiding what 
was arguably the natural result of his analysis. The judge noted that Lord St Leonards, 
writing extra-judicially in the year following Phillips,89 had argued that before Phillips 
a purchaser of an equitable interest had always been allowed to raise the defence of 
purchase for value without notice against an earlier equitable interest.90 Taylor J then 
formulated an interpretation of the third proposition in Phillips which drew heavily on 
this supposed antecedent context: 
 
Yet that case, which Lord St Leonards thought departed from the earlier law, 
did not deny the availability of the defence to a subsequent purchaser of an 
equitable interest without notice of an earlier interest which was of the 
character under consideration in the present case. It cannot, of course, be 
disputed at the present time that the defence of purchaser for value without 
notice of a prior equitable interest cannot be generally maintained but it does 
appear that it has always—that is to say, both before and after Phillips v 
Phillips91—been allowed to prevail where the person entitled to the earlier 
interest required the assistance of a court of equity to remove an impediment 
to his title as a preliminary to asserting his interest.92 
 
                                                     
88 Ibid 284-85 (Taylor J). 
89 E Sugden, A Concise and Practical Treatise of the Law of Vendors and Purchasers or Estates (14th 
edn, 1862) reproduced in JC Perkins (ed) (8th American edn, Kay and Brother 1873) 591-93. 
90 Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265, 285 (Taylor J). 
91 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 45 ER 1164. 
92 Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265, 285-86 (Taylor J) 
(emphasis added). 
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In short, Taylor J maintained that, before the decision in Phillips, the defence of 
purchase for value without notice had always been available to a purchaser of an 
equitable interest against an earlier equitable interest. According to Taylor J, while 
Phillips changed the law by denying that the defence was generally available in these 
circumstances, the third proposition preserved the old rule in the situation where ‘the 
person entitled to the earlier interest required the assistance of a court of equity to 
remove an impediment to his title as a preliminary to asserting his interest’. Therefore, 
in Taylor J’s opinion, the third proposition in Phillips did not refer to cases where the 
prior claim was a mere equity; rather, it related to cases where the prior claim was an 
equitable interest, but where that interest could not be asserted unless and until the 
owner had obtained the assistance of the court—presumably by having an earlier 
transaction rescinded or rectified. In this way, Taylor J sought to account for why the 
defence of purchase for value without notice was available, despite his contention that 
the mortgagor had an equitable interest in the land which predated the equitable 
interest of the third party. 
Taylor J’s suggestion that Phillips was a watershed case which departed from 
previously accepted doctrine is not entirely without historical support. It is certainly 
true that before Phillips judges’ understanding of the ambit of the defence of purchase 
for value without notice had not ossified,93 and there are examples of cases in which 
it was intimated that the defence was generally available to purchasers of equitable 
interests.94 For example, in Penny v Watts95 the Vice-Chancellor, Sir James Knight-
Bruce, held that a purchaser of land, the legal title to which was outstanding in 
mortgagees, could maintain the defence against an earlier estate contract. Thus 
Phillips did, as Taylor J suggested, mark a breaking point from earlier doctrine, for 
the case decisively confirmed, seemingly for the first time, that the defence could not 
be admitted in a competition between adverse equitable interests.96 
Nonetheless, while Taylor J may derive some support from the historical 
background against which Phillips was decided, his interpretation of that case is not 
particularly convincing. Simply put, it is highly unlikely that Lord Westbury LC, in 
                                                     
93 D O’Sullivan, ‘The Rule in Phillips v Phillips’ (2002) 118 LQR 296, 303-304. 
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articulating the third proposition, intended to establish an exception to his general 
ruling that it was not allowable for a purchaser of an equitable interest to maintain the 
defence of purchase for value without notice against the owner of an earlier equitable 
interest. It is submitted that there are two main reasons for rejecting Taylor J’s 
interpretation of Phillips. 
First, the idea that Phillips did not exclude the defence of purchase for value 
without notice from all contests between adverse equitable interests is inconsistent 
with what Lord Westbury LC actually said in that case. Significantly, the Lord 
Chancellor described the defence as a ‘the creature of a Court of Equity’ which could 
‘never be used in a manner at variance’ with the usual order of equitable priorities.97 
Given the emphatic nature of this language, the gloss which Taylor J sought to place 
on the decision in Phillips does not seem plausible. Clearly, Lord Westbury LC meant 
to lay down an absolute rule that the defence of purchase for value without notice 
could not be admitted in a contest between adverse equitable interests. The corollary 
is that when Lord Westbury LC admitted that the defence was available in cases that 
fell within the third proposition, the reason the Lord Chancellor did so was that he did 
not consider such cases to raise a question of priorities between equitable interests (as 
opposed to a question of priorities between an equitable interest and an earlier mere 
equity). 
Second, the very idea that the defence of purchase for value without notice can 
be admitted in a contest between adverse equitable interests seems contrary to the basic 
legal nature of that defence. 
As is well known, the defence of purchase for value without notice takes the 
form of a plea.98 A plea is a specialised form of equitable defence. In short, a plea is 
an allegation by the defendant of some fact or combination of facts which, if 
subsequently proved by the defendant,99 is independently sufficient to bar the 
claimant’s cause of action.100 It follows from the legal nature of a plea that the effects 
                                                     
97 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 216; 45 ER 1164, 1167 (Lord Westbury LC). 
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of a successful plea are necessarily negative: a successful plea does not establish that 
the defendant has any right to receive equitable relief per se; it merely establishes that 
that claimant has no right of action—ie, no equity—to pursue the equitable relief 
which he is seeking against the defendant.101 Hence the gist of the court’s response to 
a successful plea is simply to do nothing: the court refuses to assist the claimant by 
intervening against the defendant, but equally the court does not intervene in any 
positive sense in the defendant’s favour. As O’Sullivan pithily summarises it: ‘[t]he 
party pleading bona fide purchase does not ask for relief, but only to be left alone’.102 
That the defence of purchase for value without notice operates in this way does 
not cause any theoretical difficulties when the defence is raised in the context in which 
it is most familiar. This is where the claimant is seeking to enforce an equitable interest 
against a subsequent purchaser of a legal estate in the property.103 In this situation, if 
the defendant successfully raises the defence, then the court simply refuses to intercede 
in the claimant’s favour against the defendant.104 As Lord Hatherley put it in Pilcher 
v Rawlins: ‘equity declines all interference with the purchaser, having ... no ground on 
which it can affect his conscience’.105 The practical result is that the parties are left to 
enforce their rights at common law,106 which generally favours the defendant because 
he is the one with the legal estate. 
By way of contrast, the idea that the defence of purchase for value without 
notice could be raised in a contest between adverse equitable interests generates 
considerable theoretical difficulties.107 In such a contest, each party is claiming, as 
against the other party, the superior right to have his equitable interest satisfied out of 
the asset which is the subject of that interest. In other words, the parties are seeking to 
enforce mutually inconsistent rights. In these circumstances, a court of equity cannot 
decline all interference between the parties, which would be the usual response to a 
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successful defence of purchase for value without notice.108 This is because non-
interference would entail the absurd result that neither party would be able to enforce 
his equitable rights against the other. Clearly, the situation is different from a case 
where a subsequent purchaser acquires a legal estate and the common law is allowed 
to reassert itself, for neither party has a legal estate: their respective rights are purely 
equitable and thus cognisable only by a court of equity. 
Consequently, in order to support his argument that in certain cases the defence 
of purchase for value without notice could be admitted in a dispute between equitable 
interests, Taylor J engaged in an extensive reading-down of the principles established 
in Phillips. He argued that Phillips did not, in actual fact, bar the defence from all 
contests between adverse equitable interests, but retained the defence in cases where 
the earlier interest required assistance from a court of equity. However, there are two 
reasons why this interpretation of Phillips is not convincing. First, the interpretation 
is inconsistent with what Lord Westbury LC actually said in Phillips. Second, the idea 
that a purchaser of an equitable interest can maintain the defence of purchase for value 
without notice against an earlier equitable interest is inconsistent with the basic legal 
nature of that defence. It is necessary to conclude, therefore, that Taylor J failed to 
harmonise his view that the mortgagor could assert an earlier equitable interest in the 
land with the decision in Phillips and that, accordingly, Taylor J’s judgment cannot be 
regarded as a sound basis for objection to the above argument. 
 
 
Kitto J 
 
We turn now to Kitto J. As explained above, Kitto J was also of the opinion that the 
mortgagor had continued to have an equitable interest in the land from when the 
fraudulent sale took place. However, Kitto J gave a different account of why the third 
party could raise the defence of purchase for value without notice in these 
circumstances. Unlike Taylor J, Kitto J appeared to accept the orthodox view that a 
purchaser of an equitable interest is unable to invoke the defence against an earlier 
equitable interest. Rather, Kitto J approached the problem by arguing that, in a contest 
of priorities where the earlier incumbrancer has an equity which is accompanied by an 
                                                     
108 See the sources cited above in fn 104. 
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equitable interest, the defence relates to the mere equity rather than to the equitable 
interest. As Kitto J himself put it: 
 
… the equity is distinct from, because logically antecedent to, the equitable 
interest, and it is against the equity and not the consequential equitable interest 
that the defence must be set up. That the defence of purchase for value without 
notice (in the absence of the legal estate) is a good defence against the assertion 
of the equity in such a case had been established long before Lord Westbury’s 
time. … The reason of the matter … is that the purchaser who has relied upon 
the instrument as taking effect according to its terms and the party whose rights 
depend upon the instrument being denied that effect have equal merits, and the 
court, finding no reason for binding the conscience of either in favour of the 
other, declines to interfere between them. Consequently the party complaining 
of the fraud or mistake finds himself unable to set up as against the other the 
equitable interest which he asserts; but the fact remains that it is against the 
preliminary equity, and not against the equitable interest itself, that the 
defence of purchase for value without notice has succeeded.109 
 
Thus Kitto J reasoned that, in a competition between a subsequent purchaser of an 
equitable interest and an earlier incumbrancer whose mere equity is conjoined with an 
equitable interest in the affected asset, it is allowable for the subsequent purchaser to 
invoke the defence of purchase for value without notice, since in these circumstances 
the defence is not directed against the earlier equitable interest, but against the mere 
equity. This analysis is not vulnerable to the criticisms which have been levelled 
against Taylor J’s judgment, for Kitto J was not suggesting that the defence could be 
available in a contest between adverse equable interests per se. Instead, Kitto J’s 
proposal was that, where a mere equity is conjoined with an equitable interest, the 
mere equity is ‘logically antecedent’ to the equitable interest, by which the judge 
seems to have meant that the claimant is unable to assert the equitable interest while 
the earlier transaction to which the mere equity relates continues on foot. If a purchaser 
subsequently acquires an equitable interest in the affected asset and successfully raises 
                                                     
109 Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265, 277-78 (Kitto J) 
(emphasis added). 
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the defence of purchase for value without notice, the purchaser defeats the mere equity 
only, but in doing so he renders the impugned transaction immutable as between 
himself and the claimant, with the result that the claimant is barred from asserting his 
equitable interest against the purchaser. In this situation, any question of priorities 
between the parties’ respective equitable interests is nugatory: to all intents and 
purposes, the claimant’s equitable interest perishes together with his mere equity. 
The problem with Kitto J’s analysis is that it largely defeats the purpose of his 
argument that the mortgagor’s rights included an equitable interest in the land. As 
explained above, the main advantage of the analysis that a mere equity is conjoined 
with an equitable interest in the affected asset is that the enforceability of the mere 
equity against third parties can be attributed to the equitable interest. According to 
Kitto J, however, a claimant with a mere equity cannot assert the attendant equitable 
interest unless and until he has exercised his mere equity. This would mean that, 
pending the grant of equitable relief, the only right which the claimant would be able 
to assert against a third party would be the mere equity. The necessary implication, of 
course, is that the mere equity is capable of enforcement against a third party without 
assistance from the underlying equitable interest. And once it is accepted that a mere 
equity can bind third parties in and of itself, the primary rationale for the theory of an 
underlying equitable interest disappears. 
Therefore, while both Kitto and Taylor JJ attempted to give a credible account 
of why, despite their analysis of the mortgagor’s rights, the third party could 
nevertheless raise the defence of purchase for value without notice, their respective 
arguments were not satisfactory. It follows that Kitto and Taylor JJ were not justified 
in holding that the mortgagor had, in addition to his mere equity, an earlier equitable 
interest in the land and that, accordingly, their judgments do not present a serious basis 
for objection to the present writer’s argument. 
 
 
ii. Objection 2: The principle in Rice v Rice 
 
There is a second objection which could be made against the argument that the 
different consequences for priorities which attach to equitable interests and mere 
equities respectively indicate that the third party effects of mere equities do not derive 
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from some underlying equitable interest. This objection relates to the principle which 
appears first to have been established in Rice v Rice.110 
In Rice, a purchaser of land procured a conveyance of the estate which he then 
used to secure an advance by way of equitable mortgage. The purchaser then 
absconded without having paid either the vendor or the mortgagee. In these 
circumstances, the vendor could assert an equitable security interest in the land—
namely an equitable lien for the unpaid purchase money—which predated the 
equitable mortgage. Nevertheless, the Vice-Chancellor, Sir Richard Kindersley, held 
that the equitable mortgage had priority over the vendor’s interest. According to the 
Vice-Chancellor, in a contest between adverse equitable interests, priority goes to the 
earlier interest only if the relative merits of the parties are equal in all other respects.111 
In the present case, the relative merits were not equal because the vendor had endorsed 
the receipt of the purchase money on the deed and then delivered the title deeds to the 
purchaser, thus enabling the purchaser to present himself to the mortgagee as the 
absolute owner. 
Thus Rice established the principle that, in a competition between adverse 
equitable interests, the court will postpone the earlier interest to the subsequent interest 
if the court is satisfied that the owner of the subsequent interest has the superior 
equity—that is to say, the greater merit. This principle has been applied most 
frequently in cases where the owner of the earlier interest was guilty of inequitable 
conduct112 such as failing to retain title deeds,113 failing to register the earlier 
interest,114 or making representations or misstatements of a sufficiently tangible and 
distinct nature.115 However, the principle has also been applied in cases where the 
earlier owner was innocent: for example, in Taylor v London and County Banking 
Co116 the owner of the earlier interest had not behaved inequitably, yet the owner of 
the subsequent interest was found to have the superior equity, the reason being that 
the latter was a purchaser for value while the former was a volunteer. In any event, it 
                                                     
110 Rice v Rice (1853) 2 Drewry 73, 61 ER 646. 
111 Ibid 78; 648 (Sir RT Kindersley V-C). 
112 J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) para 4-047. 
113 Rice v Rice (1853) 2 Drewry 73, 61 ER 646. 
114 Abigail v Lapin [1934] AC 491 (PC). 
115 Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Co v R (1875) LR 7 HL 496 (CA) 506-07 (Lord Cairns 
LC). 
116 Taylor v London and County Banking Co [1901] 2 Ch 231 (CA) 263 (Stirling LJ). 
106 
 
has been said that ‘a strong case’ is required in order to justify the court postponing an 
earlier equitable interest.117 
In Rice, Sir Richard Kindersley V-C described the general approach which the 
court takes in deciding whether the owner of the subsequent equitable interest has the 
better equity. He stated that the court does not apply ‘any technical rule or any rule of 
partial application’, but refers to ‘broad principles of right and justice which a Court 
of Equity applies universally’.118 In particular, the Vice-Chancellor emphasised that 
the court is required to have regard to three factors: 
 
… the nature and condition of their [the parties’] respective equitable interests, 
the circumstances and manner of their acquisition, and the whole conduct of 
each party with respect thereto.119 
 
The fact that the Vice-Chancellor identified the ‘nature and condition’ of the 
respective interests as a factor which could affect priorities is significant.120 It presents 
a possible basis for objection to the argument that the property-based analysis is 
falsified by the different consequences for priorities which attach to mere equities and 
equitable interests respectively. In short, it might be countered that a mere equity does 
indeed derive its third party effects from an underlying equitable interest, but that since 
this interest is tied to the mere equity, it is necessarily inferior, as regards its ‘nature 
and condition’, to a freestanding equitable interest. Accordingly, an equitable interest 
which is tied to a mere equity is intrinsically more susceptible than a freestanding 
equitable interest to being postponed under the principle in Rice. And this greater 
susceptibility—or so the argument goes—manifests itself in the rule that the defence 
of purchase for value without notice can be maintained even by a purchaser of an 
equitable interest against an earlier mere equity. 
It seems that several scholars have found this line of argument persuasive, most 
notably Everton.121 Everton maintains that the third party effects of a mere equity are 
                                                     
117 Cory v Eyre (1863) 1 De GJ&S 149, 167; 46 ER 58, 65 (Turner LJ). 
118 Rice v Rice (1853) 2 Drewry 73, 78-79; 61 ER 646, 648 (Sir RT Kindersley V-C). 
119 Ibid 78; 648 (Sir RT Kindersley V-C). 
120 In Rice itself, the Vice-Chancellor held that the competing interests were equal in this respect: ibid 
79-80; 648-49 (RT Kindersley V-C). 
121 AR Everton, ‘“Equitable Interests” and “Equities”—In Search of a Pattern’ (1976) 40 Conv 209. 
See also C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 8-013. 
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attributable to an underlying equitable interest, which she terms a ‘latent’ equitable 
interest.122 She argues that since latent equitable interests depend for their existence 
‘upon the successful pursuit of a remedy’,123 they are inferior in quality to ‘patent’ 
equitable interests, which ‘depend for their existence simply upon the act of the 
parties’.124 According to Everton, it is this difference in quality which accounts for the 
different consequences for priorities which attach to mere equities (ie, latent equitable 
interests) and equitable interests (ie, patent equitable interests) respectively. As 
Everton herself puts it: 
 
In a competition between what have been called ‘patent’ equitable interests … 
the earlier prevails, but in a competition between these and ‘latent’ equitable 
interests … the plea of bona fide purchase for value without notice operates. 
Inasmuch as the general rule affording priority to the earlier of two equitable 
interests is said to rest on the principle ‘where the equities are equal, the first 
in time prevails’ it is suggested that this approach is sound, for surely an 
equitable interest which comes into existence through the act of the parties is 
by no means so frail a creature as the equitable interest which depends for its 
very existence upon the successful pursuit of a remedy, and, this being so, it is 
hard to see how ‘the equities are equal’ …125 
 
Despite this scholarly support, the property-based analysis cannot be salvaged by 
appealing to the principle in Rice. The problem with this line of argument is that it 
depends on the view that the principle in Rice and the defence of purchase for value 
without notice are mutually inclusive doctrines, when this is not in fact the case.126 On 
the one hand, the principle in Rice requires the court to have regard to ‘all the 
circumstances’ in order to determine which party has the better equity.127 This is 
different from how the defence of purchase for value without notice works. As 
explained above, this defence takes the form of a plea, which means that it ‘reduces 
                                                     
122 AR Everton, ‘“Equitable Interests” and “Equities”—In Search of a Pattern’ (1976) 40 Conv 209, 
215. 
123 Ibid 218. 
124 Ibid 215. 
125 Ibid 218. 
126 See D O’Sullivan, ‘The Rule in Phillips v Phillips’ (2002) 118 LQR 296, 302-04. 
127 Rice v Rice (1853) 2 Drewry 73, 83; 61 ER 646, 650. 
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the cause … to a single point, and from thence creates a bar to the suit’.128 Hence in a 
case where the defence is validly raised, the court does not have regard to all the 
circumstances in order to determine who has the better equity, but limits its analysis 
to the question of whether each element of the plea has been proved. In these 
circumstances, the conceptual room does not exist for the principle that priority goes 
to the party with the greater merit to operate. In the words of O’Sullivan, who makes 
the same argument: 
 
The decision that the purchaser has a superior equity follows from an 
assessment of the merits of the competing claims, whereas that inquiry is 
excluded on a plea of bona fide purchase.129 
 
 
4. A property-based analysis: Summary 
 
In summary, the cases of National Provincial Bank, Latec Investments and Blacklocks 
disclose evidence in favour of the analysis that a mere equity is conjoined with an 
equitable interest in the affected asset. While the enforceability of mere equities 
against third parties can be explained within the remit of this analysis, there are at least 
two reasons why this analysis is not workable within the wider doctrinal framework. 
The first reason is the principle, established in the Bristol and West Building Society 
line of cases, that the rights of a person who transfers property under a transaction 
which he is entitled to rescind consist in his mere equity only, and do not include any 
equitable interest in the property transferred. While there are some older authorities 
which challenge this analysis—principally the case of Stump—it is highly unlikely 
that these cases can be said to represent the modern law. The second reason is that 
different consequences for priorities attach to mere equities and equitable interests 
respectively, seeming to falsify the idea that a mere equity derives its third party effects 
from an underlying equitable interest. There are two objections that might be levelled 
against this argument, the first appealing to how the case of Latec Investments was 
                                                     
128 J Mitford, ‘A Treatise on the Pleadings in Suits in the Court of Chancery by English Bill’ in S 
Tyler (ed), Mitford’s and Tyler’s Pleadings and Practice in Equity (Baker, Voorhis & Co 1876) 312 
(footnotes omitted). 
129 D O’Sullivan, ‘The Rule in Phillips v Phillips’ (2002) 118 LQR 296, 303. 
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decided, the second invoking the equitable principle of priorities which was 
established in the case of Rice. However, a close examination reveals that neither of 
these potential objections is a plausible answer to the argument that the property-based 
analysis is disproved by the fact that mere equities are treated differently from 
equitable interests as regards priorities. In conclusion, despite the body of evidence 
presented by National Provincial Bank, Latec Investments and Blacklocks, the 
property-based analysis is not doctrinally workable. 
This dismissal of the property-based analysis clears the way for the next 
chapter, which will seek to build on the general idea that the enforceability of mere 
equities against third parties is founded on equitable grounds of unconscionability. 
However, before this line of inquiry can be pursued, it is necessary to evaluate the 
idea, which is supported by various scholars, that an equitable claim to rescind or 
rectify a transfer of property is capable of binding third parties because it constitutes 
an imperfection in the title of the original transferee. 
 
 
PART IV: THE IMPERFECT TITLE ANALYSIS 
 
A number of scholars maintain that a mere equity to rescind or rectify constitutes an 
imperfection in the title which the defendant acquires in the affected asset.130 
According to this view, where a person transfers an asset to another person in 
circumstances which entitle the transferor to rescind or rectify the transfer, the title 
which the transferee acquires under the transfer is affected ab initio by some inherent 
limitation or innate status of defeasibility. This imperfection is initially inchoate, but 
it is capable of crystallising into an equitable beneficial interest which vests in the 
transferor if and when the transferor exercises his mere equity to rescind or rectify.131 
Unless and until rescission or rectification occurs, the transferor has no interest, legal 
                                                     
130 See B Häcker, ‘Proprietary Restitution after Impaired Consent Transfers: A Generalised Power 
Model’ (2009) 68 CLJ 324, 329-31; R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2011) para 3-05; D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission 
(2nd edn, OUP 2014) paras 21.29-21.30. 
131 This interest then gives the claimant the right to call for a reconveyance of the legal title in 
accordance with the rule in Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115, 49 ER 282, affd (1841) Cr & Ph 
240, 41 ER 482. See B Häcker, ‘Proprietary Restitution After Impaired Consent Transfers: A 
Generalised Power Model’ (2009) 68 CLJ 324, 330. 
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or equitable, in the affected asset, but only a so called ‘power in rem’ to enforce his 
mere equity and thereby become the beneficial owner of the asset.132 
The advantage of this analysis is that it can potentially explain why a mere 
equity to rescind or rectify is capable of binding the successors in title of the original 
transferee. This is because, if the transferee is analysed as having acquired a title which 
is defined from the outset by an innate status of defeasibility, than any successor in 
title of the transferee—other than a purchaser for value without notice—will 
necessarily take subject to the same imperfection, for no person can give a better title 
than he himself actually has.133 In this way, the imperfection will continue to subsist 
unless and until either the original transfer is rescinded or rectified or the asset is 
acquired by a purchaser for value without notice. It is noteworthy that this analysis is 
expressly adopted by the authors of The Law of Rescission: 
 
The claim to recover property on rescission … is an imperfection in the title of 
the transferee. Nemo dat quod non habet (no one may give a title greater than 
he has) that imperfection must persist unless and until a subsequent transferee 
obtains a better title, free from the claim to recover the asset upon rescission. 
A person taking with notice or as a volunteer from the initial transferee under 
the voidable transaction does not obtain a better title. They obtain only their 
predecessor’s defeasible title. Rescission crystallizes the imperfection in the 
title obtained by the remote recipient so as to revest ownership in the rescinding 
party. The right to rescind where property … is transferred to a third party 
therefore derives from an application of the nemo dat principle, and is in 
substance a rule of property law.134 
 
Thus for those who support the idea that the enforceability of mere equities is founded 
on orthodox rules of property, the theory of imperfect title presents another possible 
line of argument. Furthermore, this theory is not affected by the failings which define 
the analysis that a mere equity is conjoined with an equitable interest in the relevant 
                                                     
132 See P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 183-84, 299-300; B Häcker, ‘Proprietary 
Restitution after Impaired Consent Transfers: A Generalised Power Model’ (2009) 68 CLJ 324, 329-
31; C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson (eds), Goff and Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th 
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133 See Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 215; 45 ER 1164, 1166 (Lord Westbury LC). 
134 D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) paras 
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asset. On the one hand, the theory is fully consistent with the cases in the Bristol and 
West Building Society line which, as explained above, state that a transferor under a 
voidable transaction does not retain any legal or equitable interest in the subject of the 
transaction.135 On the other hand, since the theory of imperfect title does not assert that 
the third party effects of a mere equity derive from some underlying equitable interest, 
the theory is not disproved by the fact that different consequences for priorities attach 
to mere equities and equitable interests respectively.136 
Despite these advantages, however, it is submitted that the theory of imperfect 
title, like the property-based analysis, is not workable within the wider doctrinal 
framework. The reason why this is the case relates to the very idea of an ‘imperfect’ 
title. 
The source of the difficulty is that, in many cases where a transferee acquires 
title to an asset which the transferor is entitled to recover by exercising an equitable 
claim to rescind or rectify, the title of the transferee will be both legal and indefeasible 
at common law. This is because there is no jurisdiction to rectify for mistake at 
common law,137 and while there is a common law jurisdiction to rescind, this 
jurisdiction is far more limited than its equitable counterpart, for, with some limited 
exceptions, it does not extend beyond cases of actual fraud or duress.138 Thus in the 
common situation where a transferor is entitled to recover some asset by exercising a 
mere equity to rescind or rectify an earlier transaction on equitable grounds—such as 
innocent misrepresentation, undue influence or mistake—his rights to challenge that 
transaction are necessarily exclusively equitable.139 From the point of view of the 
common law, the transaction is unimpeachable, and title to the asset has vested in the 
transferee indefeasibly, that is to say, freely of any imperfection which the transferor 
can crystallise by exercising a power in rem. 
The reason this poses a problem for the above theory is that courts of equity 
do not assume the power to define the nature of common law ownership. As Maitland 
demonstrates in his Lectures, while courts of equity have, from a very earlier stage, 
assumed the authority to engraft their own unique system of rights and interests onto 
                                                     
135 See the authorities cited above in fn 42. 
136 See Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 (Ch) 646-47 (Fry J). See further above ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s 
i. 
137 Rectification is an exclusively equitable remedy: see D Hodge, Rectification: The Modern Law 
and Practice Governing Claims for Rectification for Mistake (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) para 1-09. 
138 D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 10.23. 
139 J O’Sullivan, ‘Rescission as a Self-help Remedy: A Critical Analysis’ (2000) 59 CLJ 509, 518. 
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the legal estate, they have never proposed to delineate the incidents of the legal estate 
itself.140 It follows that in the situation posed above—ie, where the transferee has 
acquired the legal ownership of the asset in question, but the rights of the transferor to 
disturb that ownership by having the transaction rescinded or rectified are purely 
equitable—the transferor’s power to recover ownership in equity cannot derive from 
some innate status of defeasibility which affects the transferee’s title. This is because 
the transferee has a legal title which is perfect and indefeasible at common law, and a 
court of equity would not presume to contradict this proposition. 
A possible objection to this argument is that, in the situation just described, it 
is not the transferee’s dry legal title which is defeasible, but rather his underlying 
beneficial ownership. In other words, while the transferee may have an indefeasible 
title at common law, his corresponding title in equity is imperfect, and it is this 
imperfection, rather than any fault in the legal title, which will crystallise into an 
equitable interest vested in the transferor if and when the transferor exercises his 
equitable claim to rescind or rectify the earlier transaction. The well-known cases of 
Allcard v Skinner discloses evidence in favour of this argument.141 In Allcard, the 
claimant sought to rescind a gift of shares which she had made in favour of the 
defendant in circumstances which raised a presumption that the gift had been procured 
through undue influence. In the Court of Appeal, all three Lord Justices of Appeal held 
that the claimant had obtained a claim to rescind in equity when she made the gift, but 
a majority, consisting of Lindley and Bowen LJJ (Cotton LJ dissenting), held that this 
claim had since become barred by the claimant’s laches and acquiescence. For present 
purposes, the interesting point about Allcard is that, although the disputed gift 
transferred the legal ownership in the shares, Lindley LJ characterised the defendant 
as having received an imperfect equitable title under the gift: 
 
A gift made by [the claimant] under these circumstances to [the defendant] 
cannot in my opinion be retained by the donee. The equitable title of the donee 
is imperfect by reason of the influence inevitably resulting from her position, 
and which influence experience has taught the Courts to regard as undue.142 
 
                                                     
140 See FW Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 17-20. 
141 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 (CA). 
142 Ibid 184 (Lindley LJ). 
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Despite this statement from Lindley LJ, however, the argument that the transferee has, 
in addition to his legal title, an imperfect equitable title cannot succeed. The argument 
relies on the view that the rights of the transferee are composed of two separate estates, 
namely a legal estate and a corresponding equitable estate. Yet this is an impossible 
suggestion, for it contradicts the fundamental rule that if the owner of the legal title is 
the only person who is beneficially interested in the asset in question, then the 
beneficial estate is absorbed into the legal estate unless and until a person other than 
the legal owner becomes beneficially entitled, in which case that person acquires an 
equitable title which did not exist previously.143 To adopt the contrary view is to 
assume the theory of duel estates, namely the proposal that there are always two titles 
to property, the legal and the equitable, and that these titles exist concurrently unless 
and until they become vested in different parties.144 The theory of duel estates, 
however, is a fallacy, and has been dismissed as such in several important cases.145 
In actual fact, there are only two situations where the theory of imperfect title 
might be workable. The first is where the earlier transaction is voidable on grounds 
which are recognised at common law—namely fraud or duress—but due to the stricter 
approach which the common law takes to the restitutio in integrum requirement,146 the 
transferor is unable to rescind at common law, meaning that he is compelled to seek 
rescission in equity. In this situation, it may be possible to argue that equity is 
responding to an imperfection which the common law recognises as persisting in the 
legal title of the transferee, although it is doubtful whether any such imperfection 
could, in fact, continue to exist at common law after the intercession of the restitutio 
in integrum impossible bar. The second situation is where the transferee acquired a 
purely equitable title under the earlier transaction. In these circumstances, the 
transferee’s title is not a creature of the common law but of equity and therefore is 
capable of being defined as an inherently defeasible title in accordance with equitable 
principles. 
                                                     
143 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 (HL) 706E-F (Lord 
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144 See generally JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: 
Doctrines and Remedies (5th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2014) ch 4. 
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Accordingly, if the theory of imperfect title has any scope of application, it 
cannot extend beyond these two categories of case. In particular, the theory cannot 
apply in the common situation where a transferee acquires the legal title to an asset 
which the transferor is entitled to recover by exercising a claim to rescind or rectify 
on purely equitable grounds, such as innocent misrepresentation, undue influence or 
mistake. It follows that, as a generalised account of why mere equities are capable of 
enforcement against third parties, the theory of imperfect title necessarily fails. 
 
 
PART V: CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter began to investigate the doctrinal basis for the enforceability of mere 
equities against third parties. It aimed to critically consider the evidence in favour of 
the general idea that this proprietary characteristic is founded on orthodox conceptions 
of property. 
In order to achieve this aim, the chapter first set down the necessary 
groundwork by demonstrating how the enforceability of mere equities against third 
parties is established  through the cases and by clarifying why the legal nature of mere 
equities as rights in personam makes the third party effects of these claims prima facie 
problematic. 
The chapter then turned to investigate the evidence which the authorities 
disclose for a property-based analysis of the enforceability of mere equities against 
third parties. It was found that the cases of National Provincial Bank, Latec 
Investments and Blacklocks disclose evidence in favour of the analysis that the reason 
a mere equity is capable of binding third parties is that the mere equity is conjoined 
with, or engrafted on, an equitable interest, which includes equitable rights in rem in 
the affected asset. It was then argued, however, that while the third party effects of 
mere equities could be explained within the ambit of this property-based analysis, 
there were two reasons why the analysis was not workable within the wider doctrinal 
framework. The first reason was that the analysis was inconsistent with the principle, 
established in the Bristol and West Building Society line of cases, that a person who 
transfers an asset under a transaction which he is entitled to rescind does not retain any 
legal or equitable interest in the asset. The second reason was that the different 
consequence for priorities which attach to mere equities and equitable interests 
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respectively falsifies the idea that a mere equity derives its third party effects from an 
underlying equitable interest. 
Finally, the chapter critically considered the theory, which is proposed by 
certain scholars, that a mere equity to rescind or rectify constitutes an imperfection in 
the title which the defendant acquires in the affected asset, and therefore binds 
successors in title in accordance with the maxim nemo dat quod non habet. It was 
argued that since courts of equity have never assumed a power to define the incidents 
of common law ownership, the potential scope of application of this theory is limited 
to cases where the earlier transaction is voidable on legal grounds, or the title acquired 
by the defendant under that transaction is equitable. It followed that this theory 
necessarily failed as a generalised explanation of why mere equities are capable of 
enforcement against third parties. 
In conclusion, while there is a substantial body of evidence in favour of the 
general idea that the enforceability of mere equities against third parties is founded on 
orthodox conceptions of property, this evidence breaks down under critical scrutiny. 
This conclusion clears the air for chapter five, which will formulate, and then argue in 
favour of, an alternative theory which will build on the general proposition that the 
third party effects of mere equities are founded on equitable grounds of 
unconscionability. 
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Chapter 5 
The Enforceability of Mere Equities against Third Parties: A 
Conscience-based Analysis 
 
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter continues the investigation, which began in the previous chapter, into the 
doctrinal basis for the enforceability of mere equities against third parties. As noted in 
chapter two,1 while the academic literature in this area is remarkably sparse, two 
competing strands of thought can be identified. According to the first, the 
enforceability of mere equities against third parties is grounded in orthodox 
conceptions of property. According to the second, the enforceability of mere equities 
against third parties is founded on equitable notions of unconscionability. 
The previous chapter critically considered the evidence for the first of these 
opposing points of view. That chapter found that while the authorities do disclose 
evidence in favour of the idea that the enforceability of mere equities against third 
parties is based on traditional conceptions of property, this evidence breaks down 
under critical scrutiny. This finding clears the air for the present chapter, which will 
advance an analysis that builds on the alternative proposal that the third party effects 
of mere equities are founded on grounds of unconscionability. 
Part two will argue for the existence of a principle, which this chapter will term 
the conscience-based principle, in accordance with which a right in personam may be 
imposed afresh in equity against a successor in title of the person originally bound by 
that right. The part will support this argument by appealing to historical cases in which 
courts of equity applied the conscience-based principle in order to enforce what was 
then a right in personam against successors in title. Part three will then argue in favour 
of the analysis that the conscience-based principle is the doctrinal basis for the 
enforceability of mere equities against third parties. Finally, part four will highlight 
the explanatory advantages of this analysis, which include the ability to explain why 
                                                     
1 Ch 2, pt II, s 3. 
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mere equities are treated differently from equitable interests as regards the plea of 
bona fide purchase for value without notice (as discussed in chapter one2). 
 
 
PART II: THE CONSCIENCE-BASED PRINCIPLE 
 
As explained above, this part will argue for the existence of a principle according to 
which a right in personam may be imposed afresh in equity against a successor in title 
of the person originally bound on grounds of conscience. The part will begin by 
outlining this conscience-based principle in the abstract. It will then demonstrate that 
this principle was the theoretical basis on which courts of equity initially began to 
enforce the historical use, the restrictive freehold covenant and the erstwhile deserted 
wife’s equity against successors in title. 
 
 
1. Outlining the conscience-based principle 
 
In chapter three,3 it was argued that a claim may be a right in personam, binding on a 
small and definite class of people,4 but nevertheless capable of affecting third parties 
for reasons which are external to the legal nature of the claim itself. The example was 
given of a contractual claim, which is a right in personam―exigible against the small 
and definite class of people who have consented to the agreement5―but which can 
generate a tortious remedy against a third party who induces one of the contracting 
parties to breach the agreement.6 In a manner of speaking, therefore, a contractual 
claim is capable of affecting third parties, despite its status as a right in personam. It 
was observed, however, that these third party effects do not derive from the legal 
nature of the claim itself, but are the consequence of tortious principles acting upon 
the contractual claim. 
                                                     
2 Ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
3 Ch 3, pt III, s 2, sub-s i. 
4 See J Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law (R Campbell ed, 3rd rev 
edn, J Murray 1869) lecture XIV, 381; WN Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning’ (1916-1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710, 718. 
5 See Clore v Theatrical Properties Ltd (1936) 3 All ER 483 (CA); H Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts 
(33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) vol 1, para 18-139. 
6 See, eg, Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 El & Bl 216, 118 ER 749. See generally WVH Rogers, Winfield and 
Jolowicz on Tort (18th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) paras 18-2-18-8. 
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The conscience-based principle contended for here is loosely analogous to the 
doctrine of interference with contract: it elevates a right in personam to a species of 
proprietary claim by allowing that right to affect third parties. Unlike the doctrine of 
interference with contract, however, the conscience-based principle is exclusively 
equitable. Furthermore, the principle is not restricted to one particular category of 
claim, but has been applied by courts of equity in a range of different contexts. In 
terms of historical examples, the principle appears to have been especially pronounced 
in contexts where a claim has been in the early stages of its development into an 
equitable proprietary claim.7 In this connection, it was the theoretical basis on which 
courts of equity first began to enforce the historic use, the restrictive freehold 
covenant, and the erstwhile deserted wife’s equity against successors in title. The 
question of how the conscience-based principle is represented in these three contexts 
will be examined presently. Before doing this, however, it will be helpful to give a 
summary of the general principle which, it is argued, can be distilled from the discrete 
examples. 
The conscience-based principle does not rely on orthodox conceptions of 
property and ownership, but appeals to quintessentially equitable notions of moral 
fraud and good conscience.8 Under the conscience-based principle, a claim in relation 
to property which bound the original owner in personam may be treated as having 
been imposed afresh on his successor in title. It is the essence of the conscience-based 
principle, therefore, that it explains the empirical phenomenon of equitable property 
as a series of personal claims rather than as a single claim which binds the property in 
rem and accordingly imposes an automatic, general liability on the entire world.9 
In outline, there are two main strands to the conscience-based principle, 
although each of these strands appears to be founded on the same implicit proposition, 
namely, that any intention on the part of the original owner that his successor in title 
should take freely of the claim in personam subject to which he, the original owner, 
                                                     
7 Interestingly, some commentators characterise mere equities as developing or embryonic forms of 
equitable proprietary interest: see especially M Neave and M Weinberg, ‘The Nature and Function of 
Equities’ (1978-1980) 6 University of Tasmania Law Review 24; (1978-1980) 6 University of 
Tasmania Law Review 115. But see the discussion below at ch 8, pt III, s 3. 
8 For a discussion of the concept of fraud in equity, see generally JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG 
Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th edn, LexisNexis 
Butterworths 2014) ch 12. 
9 See J Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law (R Campbell ed, 3rd rev 
edn, J Murray 1869) lecture XIV, 381; WN Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning’ (1916-1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710, 718. 
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held the property would be a fraudulent or an unconscionable intention vis-à-vis the 
holder of the claim in personam.10 This proposition underlies certain presumptions 
about the intentions of the original owner and his successor in title which, in turn, 
provide a court of equity with a sufficient raison d’être to treat the personal claim as 
having been imposed afresh on the successor in title. It is these presumptions which 
form the two strands of the conscience-based principle. 
According to the first strand of the principle, there is a prima facie presumption 
that the original owner was innocent and therefore intended that his successor in title 
should take subject to the claim in personam.11 If this presumption of innocence holds 
in light of the surrounding facts, then a court of equity will give effect to it by treating 
the personal claim as continuing against the successor in title. The presumption of 
innocence will not hold, however, if the successor took as a purchaser for valuable 
consideration. This is because the provision of valuable consideration is presumed to 
evince that the original owner, in actual fact, did intend that his successor in title 
should take freely of the personal claim.12 It is here that the second strand of the 
principle comes in. According to this strand, if the successor in title was a purchaser 
for value but nevertheless took with notice of the personal claim, then the court will 
take the view that he was privy to the fraudulent or unconscionable intention of the 
original owner to defeat the personal claim. In this situation, the court will 
constructively treat the transaction between the parties as having re-imposed the claim 
in personam on the successor in title on equitable grounds of conscience.13 The net 
result of these two strands, of course, is that, in equity, even a ‘personal’ claim may 
be capable of binding the successor in title of the original owner if said successor took 
as a volunteer or as a purchaser for value with notice. 
The conscience-based principle contended for here is not an ex post facto 
rationalisation on the part of the present writer. As already stated, this principle was 
the theoretical foundation on which courts of equity first began to enforce the erstwhile 
use, the restrictive freehold covenant, and the former deserted wife’s equity against 
successors in title. The assertion that the conscience-based principle played this 
                                                     
10 See Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774, 777-78; 41 ER 1143, 1144 (Lord Cottenham LC). 
11 See Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 215; 45 ER 1164, 1166 (Lord Westbury LC). 
12 See D Fox, ‘Purchase for Value without Notice’ in PS Davies, S Douglas and J Goudkamp (eds), 
Defences in Equity (Hart Publishing 2018) 57-59. 
13 See K Gray and SF Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th edn, OUP 2009) para 3.4.12. 
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historical role is borne out by a closer examination of the various claims in question, 
commencing with the use. 
 
 
2. Historical examples of the conscience-based principle 
 
 
i. The use 
 
The historical use was the forerunner of the modern trust.14 Very broadly, the use was 
an arrangement whereby one party, the feoffor, conveyed an estate in land to another 
party, the feoffee, on condition that the feoffee would hold the land to the use (ie for 
the benefit) of the cestui que use. The main incidents of the use were, firstly, that the 
cestui que use would take the profits of the land and, secondly, that the feoffee would 
convey the land according to the direction of the cestui que use.15 Originally viewed 
as a kind of extra-legal arrangement,16 within the fifteenth century the enforcement of 
uses on behalf of the cestui que use became a prominent aspect of the judicial work of 
the Chancery.17 The jurisdiction over uses was always the concern of the Chancery 
exclusively of the courts of common law, although the precise reasons for this are 
somewhat obscure.18 As Baker remarks, ‘it was not impossible to conceive of an action 
of assumpsit to enforce a use of land’.19 The likely reason for the dominance of the 
Chancery in this area seems to be that the more rigid strictures of the courts of common 
law, as embodied in their forms of action and procedures, made these courts less 
suitable for the enforcement of uses.20 In addition to the general unsuitability of the 
                                                     
14 See generally KE Digby, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Real Property (5th edn, 
Stevens & Sons Ltd 1897) ch 6; FW Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 
lectures 3, 9; J Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol 6 (OUP 2003) ch 35; D Fox, 
‘Purchase for Value without Notice’ in PS Davies, S Douglas and J Goudkamp (eds), Defences in 
Equity (Hart Publishing 2018) 54-64. 
15 E Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England or a Commentary upon Littleton: 
Not the Name of the Author only, but of the Law Itself (F Hargrave and C Butler eds, 16th rev edn, E 
Brooke and others 1809) [272b]; D Fox, ‘Purchase for Value without Notice’ in PS Davies, S 
Douglas and J Goudkamp (eds), Defences in Equity (Hart Publishing 2018) 55. 
16 JH Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol 6 (OUP 2003) 654-55. 
17 DM Kerly, An Historical Sketch of the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (CUP 1890) 
78. 
18 FW Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 28. 
19 JH Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn, OUP 2007) 362. See also FW 
Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 28. 
20 FW Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 27. 
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common law processes that existed at the time, there may also have been a sense that 
the personal confidence reposed by the feoffor in the feoffee made uses the natural 
concern of a court of conscience.21 
From an early period, the Chancery began to model the rights of the cestui que 
use upon the estates and interests that already were recognised and enforced at 
common law.22 As a result of this process of analogy, the use came to partake of an 
estate in land as regards its ostensible characteristics. As Maitland observes: 
 
The beneficiary was treated as having an estate in fee simple, or in fee tail or 
for life in the use or trust, an equitable estate; or as having a term of years in 
the use or trust. These estates and interests were to devolve and be transmitted 
like the analogous estates and interests known to and protected by the common 
law.23 
 
Although the Chancery took inspiration from the legal estate in developing the 
incidents of the use, the two categories of right remained fundamentally different. On 
the one hand, a legal interest or estate was conceptualised as a right against the land 
itself—a right in rem. On the other hand, a use was always regarded as a right against 
the person of the feoffee24—a right in personam—to insist that the feoffee perform the 
duty which he had undertaken, namely, to hold the land for the benefit of the cestui 
que use. The use was never conceptualised as a right in rem. On the contrary, judges 
and commentators were generally careful to observe a strict distinction between the 
use and the established categories of real right. Such a distinction was indicated by 
Coke when he characterised the rights of a cestui que use as ‘not issuing out of the 
land, but as a thing collateral, annexed in privity to the estate of the land, and to the 
person touching the land’.25 Coke’s contemporary, Bacon, was even more categorical 
                                                     
21 JH Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol 6 (OUP 2003) 655. See also FW 
Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 30. 
22 FW Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 107. See also KE Digby, An 
Introduction to the History of the Law of Real Property (5th edn, Stevens & Sons Ltd 1897) 327-28. 
23 FW Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 107-08. 
24 As Digby observes, ‘The earliest conception of a use was … a trust binding on the conscience of 
the feoffee, a personal obligation upon him’: KE Digby, An Introduction to the History of the Law of 
Real Property (5th edn, Stevens & Sons Ltd 1897) 326. 
25 E Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England or a Commentary upon Littleton: 
Not the Name of the Author only, but of the Law Itself (F Hargrave and C Butler eds, 16th rev edn, E 
Brooke and others 1809) [272b]. 
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when he stated that a use was neither jus in re (which he equated with an estate in the 
land) nor jus ad rem (which he identified as a demand to be enforced against the 
land).26 
As its conceptual form as a right in personam would suggest, the use initially 
was enforceable only against the feoffee. In the mid-fifteenth century, however, the 
Chancery began, on a case by case basis, to give a cestui que use a remedy against a 
third person who came into the land as a successor in title from the feoffee. This was 
the beginning of an incremental process by which, over the course of the next two 
centuries, the Chancery gradually extended the use to an ever widening class of 
persons in privity of estate with the original feoffee, until eventually the use was 
enforceable against any person who claimed through the feoffee as a volunteer or as a 
purchaser for value with actual or constructive notice of the use. This historical process 
of piecemeal extension is well-documented in the literature,27 the classic account being 
that of Maitland in his Lectures.28 The eighth edition of Megarry & Wade features a 
concise statement of the different stages that were involved: 
 
As case followed case the extensions became very wide. In 1465 it was laid 
down that a trust would be enforced against anyone who took a conveyance of 
the land with notice of the trust. In 1483 the Chancellor said that he would 
enforce a trust against the trustee’s heir. In 1522 it was said that a trust would 
be enforced against anyone to whom the land had been conveyed as a gift. It 
was later decided that others such as the executors and execution creditors of 
the trustees would be bound by the trust.29 
 
At this point, it is important to be clear about what the extension of the use to 
successors in title actually signified. The extension was not the result of any 
reconceptualisation of the use as a right in rem, nor did the extension immediately 
result in any reconceptualisation of the use as a right in rem. On the contrary, the use 
                                                     
26 F Bacon, Reading upon the Statute of Uses (E Brooke 1785) 5. 
27 See KE Digby, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Real Property (5th edn, Stevens & 
Sons Ltd 1897) 326-27; FW Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 112-14; 
AWB Simpson, A History of the Land Law (2nd edn, OUP 1986) 179-81; C Harpum, S Bridge and M 
Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 5-010; 
J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) para 2-005. 
28 FW Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 112-14. 
29 C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell 2012) para 5-010. 
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continued, as it had before, to be regarded as a right in personam, albeit a right in 
personam which in many respects had a misleading resemblance to a right in rem.30 
The proposition that the extension of the use to successors in title had little or no effect 
on its basic conceptual form is easily proved. For one thing, it emerges from the 
writings of Coke and Bacon that have already been mentioned. Coke and Bacon were 
writing in the seventeenth century; nearly two centuries had passed since the Chancery 
first began to enforce uses against successors in title, yet both men could confidently 
state that the use was not a right in rem. For another thing, and more fundamentally, 
despite the use’s extension to almost every class of successor in title, the enforceability 
of the use was nevertheless more restricted than would have been the case if the use 
had been a true right in rem. If the use had been a right in rem, then it would have been 
enforceable against all persons taking a subsequent interest or estate in the land, 
including persons who did not derive title through the feoffee.31 This was not the case, 
however. The use bound the feoffee and was capable of binding his successors in title, 
but nevertheless ‘was unenforceable against those holding an estate or interest that did 
not depend on privity with the original feoffee to use’.32 This ‘privity limitation’33 had 
empirical consequences. One consequence was that, until statutory reform in the 
nineteenth century,34 a trust was unenforceable against a lord who came into the land 
by escheat.35 Another consequence was that a trust was unenforceable against a 
squatter who took the land by adverse possession.36 Indeed, this latter aspect of the 
privity limitation survived until 1906 when, in the case of Re Nisbet and Potts’ 
                                                     
30 See especially FW Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 23, 107, 115. 
31 Cf Re Nisbet and Potts’ Contract [1905] 1 Ch 391 (Ch), affd [1906] 1 Ch 386 (CA). 
32 D Fox, ‘Purchase for Value without Notice’ in PS Davies, S Douglas and J Goudkamp (eds), 
Defences in Equity (Hart Publishing 2018) 56. See also AWB Simpson, A History of the Land Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 1986) 181. 
33 D Fox, ‘Purchase for Value without Notice’ in PS Davies, S Douglas and J Goudkamp (eds), 
Defences in Equity (Hart Publishing 2018) 56 
34 Trust Property, Escheat Act 1834 (4 & 5 Will 4 c 23). 
35 Peachy v Duke of Somerset (1720) 1 Strange 447, 93 ER 626 (Lord Macclesfield LC); KE Digby, 
An Introduction to the History of the Law of Real Property (5th edn, Stevens & Sons Ltd 1897) 327; 
C Sweet, Challis’s Law of Real Property: Chiefly in Relation to Conveyancing (3rd edn, Butterworth 
& Co 1911) 36; FW Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 115; D Fox, 
‘Purchase for Value without Notice’ in PS Davies, S Douglas and J Goudkamp (eds), Defences in 
Equity (Hart Publishing 2018) 56. 
36 EB Sugden, Gilbert: The Law of Uses and Trusts (3rd edn, W Reed and P Phelan 1811) 429, fn 6; 
FA Lewin, Lewin: A Practical Treatise on the Law of Trusts (8th edn, Blackstone Publishing Co 
1888) 364; FW Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 116; D Fox, ‘Purchase 
for Value without Notice’ in PS Davies, S Douglas and J Goudkamp (eds), Defences in Equity (Hart 
Publishing 2018) 56. 
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Contract,37 it was held that an equitable interest was enforceable against a successful 
squatter. 
These observations ought to dispel any suspicion that the extension of the use 
to successors in title was achieved through the reconceptualisation of the use as a right 
in rem—at the time, legal interests and estates were the only claims that were 
perceived as affecting property in rem. In actual fact, the extension of the use to 
successors in title was achieved by means of something very close to the conscience-
based principle contended for here. This emerges from a recent article by Fox.38 The 
article considers the historical evolution of the plea of bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice. Of interest here is the discussion in the first half of the article, which 
deals with the development in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries of the 
rules which determined when a use bound a third person who claimed an estate in the 
land through the original feoffee. 
In broad outline, it would appear that the original basis for the extension of the 
use to successors in title was the express intention of the feoffor to bind the original 
feoffee and his heirs and assigns to hold the land for the benefit the cestui que use.39 
At some early stage, this intention came to be prima facie imputed to the original 
feoffee and all persons who claimed an estate in the land through him. As Fox 
observes, ‘privity raised a presumption that the feoffees for use intended to preserve 
the trust and confidence imposed on them’.40 The normative justification for this 
presumption seems obvious: any alternative intention would have been inconsistent 
with the original feoffment to use and would have amounted to an intention to defraud 
the feoffor and the cestui que use. Accordingly, upon any subsequent conveyance or 
grant of the estate, the court would presume that the feoffee was acting innocently and 
therefore intended his conveyance or grant to preserve the personal confidence which 
he had voluntarily undertaken. If this presumption held, then the court would give 
effect to it by treating the subsequent conveyance or grant as having re-established the 
use. The general effect is described by Fox as follows: 
 
                                                     
37 Re Nisbet and Potts’ Contract [1905] 1 Ch 391 (Ch), affd [1906] 1 Ch 386 (CA). 
38 D Fox, ‘Purchase for Value without Notice’ in PS Davies, S Douglas and J Goudkamp (eds), 
Defences in Equity (Hart Publishing 2018). 
39 Vide the restrictive freehold covenant in Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774, 41 ER 1143, which was 
expressed as being entered by the covenantor on behalf of himself and his heirs and assigns. 
40 D Fox, ‘Purchase for Value without Notice’ in PS Davies, S Douglas and J Goudkamp (eds), 
Defences in Equity (Hart Publishing 2018) 61. 
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The use lay outside any formal conception of property recognized at common 
law. The explanation for the ‘running’ of the use lay partly in the intention of 
the original feoffor to use to bind his heirs and assigns, and partly in the 
intention of each subsequent feoffee or grantee. The personal confidence was 
re-imposed with each new transaction. So far as default rules figured at all, 
they were only standard presumptions about the party’s intentions as to the 
running of the confidence, which necessarily confined them to transactions 
linked by privity.41 
 
The extension of the use to successors in title, therefore, was achieved through a 
presumption that each successive feoffee or grantee who succeeded to the estate was 
a conscientious person who intended, as against his own heirs and assigns, to preserve 
the personal obligation to hold the land for the benefit of the cestui que use. The flip 
side, of course, was that each successor in title could seek to rebut this presumption 
by establishing that his predecessor in title did, in actual fact, intend that he should 
take freely of the use.42 At least initially, evidence that would suffice to rebut the 
presumption may not have been limited to any definite criteria. As it happened, 
however, ‘the consideration for a transaction evolved as a key reason determining 
whether the use still bound the estate after the original feoffee had conveyed it to a 
stranger’.43 
Fox demonstrates how the role of consideration in evidencing transactive 
intention developed out of the early sixteenth century rules that determined which 
party took the use of land upon its conveyance.44 On the one hand, if the conveyance 
was for valuable consideration, then this was seen evidencing an intention that the use 
of the land was to pass from the feoffor to the feoffee along with the legal estate. The 
reason for this was that the intention to bargain away the land was regarded as 
inconsistent with any intention on the part of the feoffor to retain the use of the land.45 
On the other hand, if the conveyance was not for value, and if the conveyance itself 
was silent about the location of the use, then this was seen as evidencing an intention 
                                                     
41 Ibid 57. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid 57-59. See generally FW Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd edn, CUP 1936) 75-78; 
AWB Simpson, A History of the Land Law (2nd edn, OUP 1986) 177-79. 
45 D Fox, ‘Purchase for Value without Notice’ in PS Davies, S Douglas and J Goudkamp (eds), 
Defences in Equity (Hart Publishing 2018) 58-59. 
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that the conveyance was to the use of the feoffor and that, accordingly, the feoffee was 
to hold the legal estate for the feoffor. Fox shows how in the sixteenth century these 
presumptions were applied mutatis mutandis to the situation where a feoffee to use 
wrongfully conveyed the land to a third person. If the conveyance was for valuable 
consideration, then this was seen as establishing that the feoffee intended ‘the stranger 
to hold to his own use rather than for the original cestui que use’.46 If, however, the 
conveyance was not for value, then the court would assign to the feoffee an innocent 
intention that the conveyance was to be made to the original use.47 In this way, 
purchase for valuable consideration emerged as the sole means available to a successor 
in title of proving that the real transactional intention of his predecessor in title was 
that he, the successor, should take the land freely of the personal confidence that 
previously had been undertaken to the cestui que use. In other words, the presence of 
value proved that the predecessor in title, in actual fact, was fraudulent. 
A purchase for valuable consideration, however, did not necessarily mean that 
the successor in title took freely of the original use. As Fox explains in his article, the 
rules on consideration coalesced with another rule which had developed separately. 
This rule, whose evolution can be traced as far back as the mid-fifteenth century,48 
was that a purchaser who took with notice of a use subject to which his predecessor in 
title had held the land was ‘particeps criminis’ in the fraudulent or unconscionable 
intention of the predecessor to defeat the use.49 Such a purchaser was accordingly to 
be treated as having taken subject to the personal undertaking to the cestui que use 
which had bound the estate in the hands of the predecessor. As can be seen, this rule 
worked very differently from the rules on consideration: the rule did not purport to 
ascertain, and then to give effect to, the intention of the parties as regards the running 
of the use; instead, the rule purported to operate in spite of, and in opposition to, the 
fraudulent or unconscionable intention of the parties to defeat the use. In short, the 
rule was founded on the notion that it would have been unconscionable for the 
successor in title to benefit from the wrongdoing in which both he and his predecessor 
                                                     
46 Ibid 59. See also AWB Simpson, A History of the Land Law (2nd edn, OUP 1986) 180. 
47 D Fox, ‘Purchase for Value without Notice’ in PS Davies, S Douglas and J Goudkamp (eds), 
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in title were implicated. Maitland captures the basic principle with the pithy remark 
that, ‘If you buy with notice, then in conscience it is my land’.50 The net effect of the 
rule was that even a purchaser for valuable consideration would take subject to the 
personal confidence that bound his predecessor in title provided that he was a 
purchaser with notice. The corollary, of course, was that a purchaser for valuable 
consideration without notice took freely of the original use. Such a purchaser was not 
particeps criminis in the wrongdoing of the feoffee to use; against such a purchaser, 
therefore, there was no justification for treating the conveyance as having re-imposed 
the earlier use of the land.51 
From this account, it is clear that the theoretical basis on which the use was 
extended to successors in title corresponds with the conscience-based principle the 
existence of which was suggested above. All the rudiments of the principle were 
present. To begin with, there was the foundational premise that any intention on the 
part of the feoffee to use that his successor in title should take freely of the personal 
rights of the cestui que use was a fraudulent or unconscionable intention. Furthermore, 
this premise formed the rationale for two rules which were close parallels of the two 
strands of the conscience-based principle. The first was the prima facie presumption, 
which could be rebutted by a purchase for valuable consideration, that the feoffee to 
use was innocent and therefore intended that his successor in title should take subject 
to the rights of the cestui que use. The second was the rule that if the successor in title 
was a purchaser with notice of the rights of the cestui que use, then the court would 
consider that he was privy to the unconscionable intention of his predecessor in title 
to defraud the original feoffor and the cestui que use, and on this ground would treat 
the conveyance as having re-established the earlier use. Consequently, it is possible 
conclude that the theoretical foundation on which courts of equity first began to 
enforce the historical use against successors in title corresponded with the conscience-
based principle contended for here. 
 
 
ii. The restrictive freehold covenant 
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The extension of the use to successors in title may be the earliest example, but is by 
no means the only historical context in which the conscience-based principle played a 
key role. As already stated, the conscience-based principle was the theoretical basis 
on which the restrictive freehold covenant was initially held to be capable of binding 
a successor in title of the covenantor. This occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, 
some four hundred years after the Chancery first began to enforce the use against 
persons who were in privity of estate with the original feoffee to use. 
In broad outline, a freehold covenant is an undertaking in a deed by which the 
owner or the purchaser of land promises that a particular form of activity will or will 
not be carried out on that land.52 A covenant that a particular form of activity will be 
carried out on the land is called a ‘positive covenant’. Examples of positive covenants 
include a covenant to carry out repairs on the land and a covenant to supply water to 
neighbouring land. On the other hand, a covenant that a particular form of activity will 
not be carried out on the land is termed a ‘restrictive covenant’. Examples of restrictive 
covenants include a covenant not to erect buildings on the land and a covenant not to 
carry on a particular trade on the land. Unless a contrary intention is expressed, a 
freehold covenant is deemed to be made by the covenantor on behalf of himself and 
his successors in title.53 The covenant is enforceable by the covenantee against the 
covenantor just like any other contract. The remedies that are available to the 
covenantee are damages at common law for breach of the covenant54 and an injunction 
in equity to restrain breach55 or to compel performance56 of the covenant. 
Until the mid-nineteenth century, a freehold covenant was considered to be a 
purely contractual arrangement, its benefits and burdens defined and confined by 
orthodox principles of contractual privity.57 A necessary corollary was that a freehold 
covenant did not give the covenantee a remedy against a person who came into the 
land as a successor in title of the covenantor and subsequently proceeded to use the 
land in a manner that was inconsistent with the covenant.58 The covenantee had a claim 
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to damages against the covenantor, but he did not have any claim to damages against 
the successor nor, crucially, any equity to seek an injunction to restrain the successor 
from breaching the covenant. Thus freehold covenants were vulnerable to subsequent 
dealings with the land, a fact which greatly lessened their practical utility. Despite 
these problems, the common law continued, and to this day continues, to regard the 
burden of freehold covenants as incapable of ‘running with the land’.59 At first, courts 
of equity followed the common law by refusing to grant an injunction against a 
successor in title of the covenantor.60 This approach changed abruptly when, in the 
well-known case of Tulk v Moxhay,61 a restrictive freehold covenant was held for the 
first time to be enforceable in equity against a purchaser of the land with notice of the 
covenant. 
In Tulk, the plaintiff was the owner of an area of open ground in Leicester 
Square and of several houses that adjoined the square. The plaintiff sold the area of 
open ground to one Elms. The deed of conveyance contained a covenant by Elms that 
he and his heirs and assigns would ‘keep and maintain the said piece of ground … in 
an open state, uncovered with any buildings’. The land then passed through several 
conveyances before eventually it was sold to defendant, who purchased with notice of 
the covenant. The defendant indicated that he intended to build on the land in 
contravention of the covenant and the plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the 
defendant from doing so. An injunction was granted by Lord Langdale MR and upheld 
by Lord Cottenham LC on appeal. 
As already stated, Tulk was the first case where a court of equity enforced a 
restrictive freehold covenant against a successor in title of the covenantor.62 A close 
reading of that case reveals that this extension to a successor in title, as with the use 
four centuries earlier, was not initially achieved through the elevation of the restrictive 
covenant to the status of a right in rem. On the contrary, Lord Cottenham LC was 
careful to state that ‘the question is, not whether the covenant runs with the land, but 
whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the 
contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which he purchased’.63 These 
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words are revealing, because if the Lord Chancellor had considered that the covenant 
created an equitable right in rem, then, a fortiori, the case would have been decided 
on the footing that the covenant ‘ran’ with the land. Clearly, the Lord Chancellor was 
not basing his decision on this line of reasoning. Instead, he appears to have been 
assuming as an initial premise that the rights created by the covenant were personal 
and did not give the plaintiff any equitable estate or interest in the land. 
In actual fact, Lord Cottenham LC seems to have rested his decision on the 
conscience-based principle. This emerges from his remark that, ‘nothing could be 
more inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able to sell the property 
the next day for a greater price, in consideration of the assignee being allowed to 
escape from the liability which he had himself undertaken’.64 These words are 
indicative of the second strand of the conscience-based principle. This is hardly 
surprising: the defendant in Tulk was a purchaser for value with notice of the covenant, 
and the second branch of the principle, it will be recalled, holds that if a purchaser for 
value takes with notice of a personal claim that relates to the property, then a court of 
equity will constructively treat the transaction as having re-imposed the personal claim 
on the purchaser. The justification for this, as previously explained, is conscience: the 
successor in title, in purchasing with notice, is treated as being particeps criminis in 
the fraudulent or unconscionable intention of his predecessor in title to defeat the 
personal claim subject to which he held the property. Clearly, this kind of reasoning 
directed the Lord Chancellor, hence his observation that ‘nothing would be more 
inequitable’ then if the original purchaser were to have sold the land ‘in consideration 
of’ the next purchaser ‘being allowed to escape from’ the personal rights which the 
covenant had created. 
Accordingly, the conscience-based principle appears to have been the original 
theoretical basis on which the restrictive freehold covenant was extended in equity to 
a successor in title of the covenantor. That extension, however, was achieved within a 
doctrinal setting which antecedently assumed the proposition that a restrictive 
covenant did not create an equitable interest or estate in the land. That proposition 
would not be regarded as good law today. After the decision in Tulk, the restrictive 
covenant gradually came to be recognised as generating an equitable right in rem. The 
first clear indication that the restrictive covenant was being reconceptualised in this 
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manner seems to have been in London and South Western Railway Co v Gomm.65 
There, Sir George Jessel MR considered Tulk and suggested, in direct contrast to the 
basis on which that case was actually decided, that ‘notice was required merely to 
avoid the effect of the legal estate, and did not create the right’ of the covenantee 
against the subsequent purchaser.66 Any ambiguity about the conceptual form of the 
restrictive covenant was finally resolved in the case of Re Nisbet and Potts’ Contract.67 
There, it was held that a restrictive covenant was an equitable interest in the land and 
was capable, as a result, of binding a subsequent owner even if said owner did not 
derive title through the original covenantor, having come into the land by adverse 
possession. 
The reclassification of the restrictive covenant as an equitable right in rem was 
probably the result of the way in which judges initially applied the rule in Tulk. To 
begin with, judges took a very expansive view of the rule. Tulk was regarded as having 
established a general principle that was not confined to any particular class of 
covenant. The mere fact of purchase with notice was considered to be sufficient to 
bind a successor in title to a freehold covenant which had been entered by his 
predecessor in title.68 In the immediate aftermath of Tulk, therefore, a positive 
covenant was held to be enforceable in equity against a successor in title of the 
covenantee,69 as was a covenant that did not confer any identifiable benefit on land 
that had been retained by the covenantee.70 In one notorious example, it was held that 
even a simple contract in reference to the user of a chattel might be capable of binding 
a subsequent owner.71 In short, it looked at one point as though any agreement in 
relation to property, real or personal, might be capable of binding a successor in title. 
These developments engendered concerns that the rule in Tulk was getting out of hand, 
so the courts began to adopt a more restrictive approach to the rule. The first step was 
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to exclude positive covenants from the operation of the rule;72 the second was to limit 
the application of the rule to covenants which benefitted land that had been retained 
by the covenantee.73 In this way, the modern rule emerged that a freehold covenant 
can run with the land in equity only where that covenant is restrictive in character and 
there is both a dominant tenement and a servient tenement.74 The reclassification of 
the restrictive covenant as an equitable interest in the land is likely to have been just 
one stage in the wider process of bringing the rule in Tulk to heel. The effect of the 
reclassification was to transmute the rule from the field of contract to the arena of real 
property rights. The necessary result, in accordance with the principle of numerus 
clausus,75 was to make it harder for contracting parties to use the rule as a means of 
creating novel forms of property. The elevation of the restrictive covenant to the status 
of an equitable interest, therefore, was consistent with what, at the time, was the 
dominant judicial policy towards the rule in Tulk. 
The reclassification of the restrictive covenant as an equitable interest in land 
is not problematic for the present argument. It is clear that when Lord Cottenham LC 
decided Tulk he did not consider that the covenant in question created any equitable 
interest or estate in the land. Of course, if one examines the decision in Tulk in the 
light of modern understanding of restrictive covenants, then one might be tempted to 
say that the Lord Chancellor invented or discovered a novel category of equitable right 
in rem. Yet while such an approach might be retrospectively valid from a doctrinal 
point of view, from a historical perspective it would be anachronistic. As far as the 
Lord Chancellor was concerned, the rights of the covenantee were personal contractual 
rights that did not run with the land as an inherent characteristic, but which were to be 
treated as binding the subsequent purchaser on grounds of conscience. Accordingly, 
despite the subsequent reclassification of the restrictive covenant as an equitable 
interest in land, the fact remains that the theoretical basis on which the restrictive 
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covenant was initially extended to a successor in title was the conscience-based 
principle. 
 
 
iii. The deserted wife’s equity 
 
The so called deserted wife’s equity, already encountered in chapter three,76 was a 
notorious if short-lived judicial creation.77 It was said to arise when a husband, who 
was the sole owner of the home in which he and his wife lived together, left the home 
and deserted his wife, who for her part continued to live in the home. The equity 
existed for the wife’s benefit; its function was to safeguard her continued occupation 
of the matrimonial home against both the husband and the husband’s creditors and 
successors in title. An innovation of Denning LJ in the 1952 case of Bendall v 
McWhirter,78 the equity was abruptly terminated thirteen years later by a unanimous 
House of Lords in National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth.79 Despite the brevity of 
its existence, however, the deserted wife’s equity is a vivid and comparatively recent 
example of how the conscience-based principle can be used to extend a personal claim 
in reference to property to a successor in title of the original owner. 
Before the decision in Bendall, there were two principal ways in which the 
marital status protected a deserted wife’s continued occupation of the matrimonial 
home.80 The first was the old common law rule that as between husband and wife 
neither could have an action in tort against the other.81 This rule prevented a deserting 
husband from bringing an action to recover possession of the matrimonial home from 
his wife.82 The only legal means available to the husband of recovering possession 
was to make an application under s 17 of the Married Women’s Property Act 1882,83 
which allowed ‘any question between husband and wife as to the title to or possession 
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of property’ to be decided in a summary way.84 This route, however, was generally 
less advantageous to the husband, for it was accepted that under s 17 the court had ‘a 
discretion to be exercised in the interest of the parties to restrain or postpone the 
enforcement of legal rights’.85 The second way in which the martial status protected a 
deserted wife was the husband’s general duty to provide his wife with a suitable place 
to live.86 The protection afforded by this duty was evidenced in Lee v Lee.87 There, the 
Court of Appeal upheld an injunction which required a deserting husband to allow his 
wife and children to occupy the matrimonial home and prohibited the husband from 
selling or assigning any right, title or interest which he had in the home ‘unless and 
until he shall first have provided reasonably suitable alternative accommodation … 
for his wife and children’.88 
There are three points to note about the rights of a deserted wife before the 
decision in Bendall. First, the bare fact that she had been deserted by her husband did 
not give the wife any additional legal or equitable right in the matrimonial home. Even 
before the desertion had taken place, the husband could not have treated his wife as a 
trespasser; equally he owed her a duty to provide her with a suitable place to live. 
These incidents were necessary to the marital status; they did not arise as a result of 
the husband’s desertion. Accordingly, a deserted wife did not have any greater right 
to occupy the matrimonial home than a wife who had not been deserted. Second, while 
the wife had a right to be provided with a suitable home, her right did not automatically 
attach to any particular property.89 This fact was demonstrated by the injunction which 
was upheld in Lee: that injunction did not give the wife an unqualified right to occupy 
any particular property, it merely secured her right against her husband to be provided 
with suitable accommodation. The third point is arguably a necessary corollary of the 
second. It is that the marital status did not confer on a deserted wife any legal or 
equitable interest in the matrimonial home which she could enforce against the 
husband’s creditors and successors in title. This point was illustrated by the case of 
Thompson v Earthy.90 There, a husband deserted his wife and then sold the 
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matrimonial home to a purchaser who then brought an action to recover possession 
from the wife. Roxburgh J held that since the wife had ‘no estate or interest, legal or 
equitable, in the land’ the purchaser was entitled to an order for possession.91 
Bendall was the first time that the rights of a deserted wife were extended to a 
successor in title. In that case, a husband left the matrimonial home, of which he was 
the freehold owner, and deserted his wife. Subsequently, the husband was adjudicated 
bankrupt, causing the freehold estate in the home to become vested in his trustee in 
bankruptcy. The trustee then obtained an order for possession against the wife who, at 
all material times, had continued in occupation of the home. However, the wife 
successfully appealed against that order. The Court of Appeal held that the trustee’s 
right to recover possession of the home against the wife was no greater than that which 
had resided in the husband up until his bankruptcy. Accordingly, the trustee was not 
entitled to sue the wife as if she were a trespasser on the land, as this was something 
which the husband had not been entitled to do. In order to recover possession against 
the wife, it was necessary for the trustee to obtain an order of the court under, or in 
accordance with, s 17 of the Married Woman’s Property Act 1882. 
The majority opinion came from Romer LJ, with whom Somervell LJ agreed. 
Romer LJ rested his decision solely on ‘the general rule … that a trustee [in 
bankruptcy] takes no better title to property than the bankrupt had’.92 Romer LJ held 
that owing to this rule the present trustee was ‘no more entitled than was the … 
[husband] before his bankruptcy to revoke the wife’s licence on his own authority and 
to sue her for possession of the property’.93 It was implicit in Romer LJ’s reasoning 
that the rights of a deserted wife bound her husband’s trustee in bankruptcy only by 
virtue of the trustee’s special position as the husband’s personal representative and 
that, by further implication, her rights ought not be construed as capable of binding a 
purchaser from the husband. 
The minority view, which was advanced by Denning LJ, was far more 
circuitous and wide-ranging. As regards the final result, Denning LJ agreed with 
Romer LJ that the trustee took subject to the wife’s rights. Nevertheless, Denning LJ 
said that he felt it necessary ‘to go further and inquire what is the quality of the wife’s 
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right that it should lead to this result’.94 Denning LJ’s judgment consisted of two main 
elements. First, he explained what he considered to be the general nature of a deserted 
wife’s rights in reference to the matrimonial home. Second, and most interestingly for 
our purposes, he outlined what he regarded to be the theoretical basis on which these 
rights were to be extended to a trustee in bankruptcy. 
As regards the first element of his judgment, Denning LJ expressed the view 
that a deserted wife had a positive right to stay in the home where she had lived with 
her husband. Echoing an observation which he had made obiter in an earlier case,95 he 
asserted that the wife was a licensee of the husband ‘with a special right under which 
her husband cannot turn her out, except by an order of the court’.96 Clearly, Denning 
LJ understood this ‘special right’, or ‘equity’ as he would later call it,97 to be binding 
on the husband in personam, for he described it alternately as ‘purely personal’ and ‘a 
personal privilege with no legal interest in the land’.98 According to Denning LJ, the 
special right or equity of a deserted wife arose upon her being deserted by her husband. 
This emerges from his observation that the equity flowed ‘from the status of marriage, 
coupled with the fact of separation owing to the husband’s misconduct’.99 
Furthermore, because the equity could not be revoked by the husband at will, it was, 
in Denning LJ’s view, ‘analogous to a contractual licence to occupy land … so closely 
analogous that … no valid distinction can be made between them’.100 
Denning LJ depicted his account of a deserted wife’s rights as a rationalisation 
of the existing law. In actual fact, his account was a significant departure from 
accepted doctrine. For one thing, Denning LJ considered that the so called ‘special 
right’ or ‘equity’ of a deserted wife to stay in the matrimonial home only vested in the 
wife if and when her husband deserted her. This was a departure from the existing law, 
for, as explained already, none of the cases which were decided before Bendall had 
given a deserted wife any higher right to remain in the matrimonial home than a wife 
who had not been deserted. For another thing, Denning LJ considered the equity of a 
deserted wife to attach specifically to the matrimonial home. This, too, was a departure 
from existing doctrine: before Bendall, a deserted wife did not have a right to remain 
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in any particular property that belonged to her husband; her rights consisted in the fact 
that her husband could not sue her as a trespasser and that he owned her a general duty 
to provide her with a suitable place to live. Denning LJ’s only concession to doctrinal 
orthodoxy was that, by classifying a deserted wife’s equity as a personal right, he 
denied her any interest or estate in the matrimonial home. This may have been a nod 
to the earlier case of Thompson v Earthy. However, even this concession was rendered 
otiose by the second element of Denning LJ’s judgment, where he considered the basis 
on which this new-fangled deserted wife’s equity was to be extended to a trustee in 
bankruptcy. 
Denning LJ had no hesitation extending the deserted wife’s equity to the 
husband’s trustee in bankruptcy. He had already maintained that a near perfect analogy 
existed between the deserted wife’s equity and a contractual licence, and the Court of 
Appeal had recently decided in Errington v Errington101 that a contractual licence 
bound the devisee of the licensor. This decision departed from the orthodox principle 
that a contractual licence is a personal transaction which is incapable of binding 
successors in title.102 Nevertheless, the decision in Errington allowed Denning LJ to 
argue that since a contractual licence bound the devisee of the licensor, then, a fortiori, 
a contractual licence must also bind the licensor’s trustee in bankruptcy.103 It followed, 
in light of the analogy for which Denning LJ had contended, that the deserted wife’s 
equity also bound the husband’s trustee in bankruptcy—and in addition his devisee 
and, presumably, other successors in title. 
Denning LJ might have left his decision there. However, he noted that the 
decision in Errington had been called into question on the basis that ‘a contractual 
licence only gives rise to contractual obligations and not to any proprietary rights or 
interests, and that the burden of it does not therefore run with the land’.104 Thus 
Denning LJ proceeded to defend Errington by explaining what he considered to be the 
theoretical basis on which a contractual licence was capable of binding the successors 
in title of the licensor. The principle which he enunciated was a direct importation of 
the conscience-based principle as espoused by Lord Cottenham LC in the earlier case 
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of Tulk. Tulk has already been discussed at length. The reliance which Denning LJ 
placed on the reasoning in that case is apparent from the following passage:105 
 
Every contractual licence imports a negative covenant that the licensor will not 
interfere with the use and occupation of the licensee in breach of the contract. 
This negative covenant is binding on the successors in title of the licensor in 
the same way as is a restrictive covenant. It does not run with the land so as to 
give a cause of action in damages for breach of contract against the successor; 
but it is binding in equity on the conscience of any successor who takes with 
notice of it. He cannot therefore eject the licensee in disregard of it. It is an 
equity within the words of Lord Cottenham LC in Tulk v Moxhay,106 when he 
said: “If an equity is attached to the property by the owner, no one purchasing 
with notice of that equity can stand in a different situation from the person 
from whom he purchased.” 
 
As explained already, the theoretical basis on which Lord Cottenham LC extended the 
restrictive covenant to a successor in title of the covenantor was the conscience-based 
principle which has been contended for here. It is clear from the above passage that 
Denning LJ considered that the same principle was behind the decision in Errington 
to extend a contractual licence to a successor in title of the licensor. Furthermore, it is 
clear that, given the near perfect analogy which he held to exist between a contractual 
licence and the deserted wife’s equity, Denning LJ thought that the deserted wife’s 
equity was to be extended to the husband’s trustee in bankruptcy on the same footing. 
According to Denning LJ, therefore, although the equity which arose in favour of the 
wife was a purely personal right against her husband, this equity was nevertheless to 
be extended to the husband’s successors in title in accordance with the conscience-
based principle. Consequently, Denning LJ’s decision in Bendall is a recent example 
of how the conscience-based principle can be used to extend a personal right in 
reference to property to a successor in title of the original owner. 
Admittedly, Denning LJ’s decision in Bendall was the minority view. 
According to the majority, as explained already, the trustee took subject to the wife’s 
                                                     
105 Ibid 480-81 (Denning LJ). 
106 Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774, 778; 41 ER 1143, 1144 (Lord Cottenham LC). 
139 
 
rights by virtue of his special position as the husband’s personal representative. Thus 
a year later, in the case of Bradley-Hole v Cusen,107 the Court of Appeal applied the 
reasoning of the majority and ignored that of Denning LJ.108 Nevertheless, subsequent 
cases would follow Denning LJ’s view by enforcing the ‘equity’ of a deserted wife 
against the husband’s other successors in title, including a purchaser for value with 
notice of the equity.109 The result was that twelve years after his decision in Bendall, 
shortly before the decision of the House of Lords in National Provincial Bank, Lord 
Denning, now the Master of the Rolls, was able to describe a deserted wife as having 
‘no legal estate or equitable interest in the land’ but ‘an equity which the court will 
enforce against any successor except a purchaser for value without notice’.110 
In National Provincial Bank, the House of Lords terminated the deserted 
wife’s equity. The facts of this case have already been outlined in chapter four.111 To 
recapitulate, the case involved a husband who left the matrimonial home, of which he 
was the owner, and deserted his wife, who remained in occupation of the home. The 
husband then charged the home to a bank to secure his indebtedness to the bank. When 
the husband defaulted, the bank sought to enforce its charge and brought an action 
against the wife for possession of the home. The home was registered land, and the 
question arose whether a deserted wife had a right to stay in the matrimonial home 
which was capable of being an overriding interest of a person in actual occupation 
under s 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925. The House of Lords accepted that 
the wife had, at all material times, been in actual occupation of the home; accordingly, 
if the above question was to be answered in the affirmative, then she would have a 
right to remain in the home which she could raise against the bank’s claim for 
possession. 
The House of Lords decided the case in the bank’s favour. The court held that 
in order for a right to be capable of being an overriding interest under s 70, that right 
must ‘have the quality of being capable of enduring through different ownerships of 
                                                     
107 Bradley-Hole v Cusen [1953] 1 QB 300 (CA). 
108 Ibid 306 (Jenkins LJ). 
109 See especially Ferris v Weaven [1952] 2 All ER 233 (QB); Street v Denham [1954] 1 WLR 624; 
Jess B Woodcock & Sons Ltd v Hobbs [1955] 1 WLR 152 (CA). Cf Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee 
[1956] 1 Ch 7 (Ch). 
110 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 665 (CA) 686 (Lord Denning 
MR). 
111 Ch 4, pt III, s 1. 
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the land’.112 The supposed equity of a deserted wife did have this quality, being 
capable of binding the husband’s successors in title. However, the House of Lords 
held, unanimously, that no such equity in fact existed. The rights of a deserted wife 
were enforceable only against her husband; she had no equity that was capable of 
binding his successors in title, including his trustee in bankruptcy.113 Thus the House 
of Lords returned the law to the state in which it had been before 1952. Bendall and 
the cases which had followed it were overruled.114 The deserted wife’s equity was no 
more.115 
The deserted wife’s equity was a short-lived judicial innovation. Nevertheless, 
it is yet another example of a personal claim in reference to property which was 
extended to the successors in title of the original owner in accordance with the 
conscience-based principle. Thus the deserted wife’s equity can be added to the other 
examples of such rights which have already been considered, namely, the historical 
use and the restrictive freehold covenant. These examples are important to the present 
thesis. Collectively, they establish that the conscience-based principle contended for 
here is not an ex post facto rationalisation on the part of the present writer. On the 
contrary, they show that the conscience-based is a true doctrine of equity: the admitted 
basis of decision in a significant number of cases and hence capable of empirical proof. 
 
 
PART III: THE CONSCIENCE-BASED PRINCIPLE AND MERE EQUITIES 
 
Thus the conscience-based principle is a confirmed part of the doctrinal landscape. 
The principle explains how a mere equity, despite its status as a right in personam,116 
can be enforced against third party volunteers and purchasers for value with notice.117 
A mere equity, therefore, is analogous to the historical use, the restrictive freehold 
                                                     
112 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1226F-G (Lord Hodson), 1228E 
(Lord Cohen), quoting National Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 665 (CA) 
696 (Russell LJ). 
113 Ibid 1226D-E (Lord Hodson), 1233F-G, 1239A-B (Lord Upjohn), 1257C (Lord Wilberforce). 
114 With the exception of Ferris v Weaven [1952] 2 All ER 233 (QB), the court holding that the 
decision in that case could be supported by reference to the case’s particular facts: National 
Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1223B (Lord Hodson), 1240B (Lord Upjohn), 
1257E (Lord Wilberforce). 
115 Note that a husband or wife now has a statutory right to occupy the matrimonial home: Family 
Law Act 1996, s 30-32. Also see above, ch 3, pt II, s 2, sub-s ii, fn 52. 
116 See above, ch 3, pt III, s 2. 
117 See above, ch 4, pt II, s 1. 
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covenant before it was reclassified as an equitable interest, and the erstwhile deserted 
wife’s equity. Indeed, the deserted wife’s equity was said to be ‘a mere “equity,” 
analogous to a right to set aside or rectify a conveyance for fraud or mistake’.118 In 
consequence, it was held in Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee119 that the deserted wife’s 
equity could not be enforced against a purchaser of a merely equitable interest for 
value without notice.120 
It seems that there are three main objections which might be raised against the 
theory that the conscience-based principle is the doctrinal basis for the enforceability 
of mere equities against third parties. The first objection concerns the House of Lords’ 
decision in the National Provincial Bank case. The second objection concerns the 
burden of proof as regards notice in cases where a claimant asserts a mere equity 
against a purchaser for value from the original owner. The third objection holds that 
there is no practical reason to distinguish between a right in rem and a right in 
personam which nevertheless can bind a successor in title by means of the conscience-
based principle. Each of these objections will now be dealt with in turn. 
 
 
1. The effect of National Provincial Bank 
 
It is arguable that in National Provincial Bank the House of Lords, in addition to 
terminating the deserted wife’s equity, dismissed the theoretical basis on which that 
equity had been extended to successors in title, viz the conscience-based principle. 
Indeed, Lord Upjohn and Lord Wilberforce were critical of the view that a right which 
does not bind property in rem may nevertheless be capable of binding a person who 
takes with notice of that right. Thus Lord Upjohn remarked that, ‘in principle … to 
create a right over the land of another that right must in contemplation of law be such 
that it creates a legal or equitable estate or interest in that land and notice of something 
though relating to land which falls short of an estate or interest is insufficient’.121 In 
similar vein, Lord Wilberforce rejected as fallacious the view that, ‘because an 
                                                     
118 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 9 (Ch) 14 (Cross J). See also 
Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee [1956] 1 Ch 7 (Ch) 20 (Upjohn J). 
119 Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee [1956] 1 Ch 7 (Ch) 20-21 (Upjohn J). 
120 See further above, ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
121 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1237F (Lord Upjohn). 
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obligation binds a man’s conscience, it therefore becomes binding on the consciences 
of those who take from him with notice of the obligation’.122 
Lord Upjohn’s and Lord Wilberforce’s comments are clearly unfavourable to 
the conscience-based principle. Nevertheless, one would be placing too much weight 
on these comments if one were to suggest that their effect was to retrospectively 
invalidate that principle. Indeed, there are at least two reasons to oppose the drawing 
of strong conclusions from the apparent hostility to the conscience-based principle 
which Lord Upjohn and Lord Wilberforce exhibited in National Provincial Bank. 
The first reason is that the Law Lords were presented with an incomplete 
picture of the conscience-based principle. They appear to have assumed, incorrectly, 
that the conscience-based principle, like the deserted wife’s equity, was a 
comparatively recent innovation. The probable reason for this mistake was that 
Denning LJ based his decision in Bendall on the case of Tulk and the later cases which 
adopted its reasoning. As a result, the Law Lords appear to have assumed that the 
conscience-based principle was derived from Tulk. Indeed, neither the judgments nor 
the submissions of counsel showed any awareness that the conscience-based principle 
was, in actual fact, the theoretical basis on which the first kind of equitable proprietary 
right, the historical use, was originally extended in the mid-fifteenth century to 
successors in title. It seems, therefore, that the Law Lords who decided National 
Provincial Bank—Lord Upjohn and Lord Wilberforce included—were under the false 
impression that the conscience-based principle was an early Victorian innovation 
rather than a doctrine whose antecedents reach back at least to the late medieval period. 
The second reason is that, in the deserted wife’s equity, the Law Lords were 
faced with what arguably was a flagrant misuse of the conscience-based principle. The 
basis on which Denning LJ reached his decision in Bendall was difficult to justify. As 
explained already, before Bendall, the mere fact of her desertion did not give a wife 
any extended right in reference to the matrimonial home, nor did a wife, deserted or 
otherwise, have any necessary right to stay on any specific land which belonged to her 
husband. In Bendall, Denning LJ disregarded each of these limiting factors when he 
asserted that a wife, upon her desertion, gained a special right or equity to stay in the 
home where she had lived with her husband. To make matters worse, Denning LJ went 
on to assert that this completely novel category of right should be extended to the 
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husband’s successors in title by means of the conscience-based principle. Clearly, this 
was sufficient to give the conscience-based principle a bad name when the House of 
Lords came to review the deserted wife’s equity in National Provincial Bank. 
In short, unfamiliarity with the conscience-based principle, combined with a 
natural desire to comprehensively dismantle the basis on which Denning LJ reached 
his decision in Bendall, were the real reasons that Lord Upjohn and Lord Wilberforce 
spoke critically of that principle. With respect, however, the mere fact that an 
established principle was misapplied by one, idiosyncratic judge is not a sufficient 
reason to call its continued existence into question, especially when that principle is 
one of considerable longevity. To put it bluntly, to take their Lordships too literally is 
to throw the baby out with the bathwater. At the end of the day, equity is a flexible, 
discretionary jurisdiction: almost all of its core principles have the potential to be 
misused. This does not mean that all equitable principles are bad, merely that the judge 
who applies them is expected to show proper restraint and due regard for precedent—
qualities which Lord Denning arguably lacked. It does not follow, of course, that 
National Provincial Bank has no relevance to the conscience-based principle. National 
Provincial Bank was a clear signal that the courts ought to take a conservative rather 
than a liberal approach to the extension of new categories of right to successors in 
title.123 However, to the extent that they might be taken to support the view that the 
conscience-based principle was no longer valid, Lord Upjohn and Lord Wilberforce 
went too far. 
 
 
2. The burden of proof re notice 
 
As explained in chapter one,124 a mere equity—provided it does not relate to registered 
land—is liable to be defeated by any successor in title who successfully maintains the 
plea of bona fide purchase for value without notice. However, if a successor in title 
should wish to raise the plea against an earlier mere equity, then he bears the evidential 
onus of proving all the elements which comprise the plea, including purchase for value 
                                                     
123 See A Dunn, ‘National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth (1965)’ in C Mitchell and P Mitchell 
(eds), Landmark Cases in Equity (Hart Publishing 2012) 571-72. 
124 Ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
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and purchase without notice.125 The corollary is that when a claimant brings an action 
to enforce a mere equity against the successor in title of the original defendant, there 
is no onus on the claimant of proving that the successor took as a volunteer or as a 
purchaser for value with notice; rather, it is for the successor to prove the contrary.126 
This is arguably problematic for the hypothesis that the conscience-based 
principle is how a mere equity binds successors in title. In order to see why, it is 
necessary to reconsider the elements of that principle. 
As explained above, there are two strands to the conscience-based principle. 
Each of these strands derives from the same normative foundation, namely, that any 
intention on the part of the original owner that his successor in title should take freely 
of the personal claim subject to which he, the original owner, held the property would 
be an unconscionable intention vis-à-vis the holder of the personal claim. Despite this 
shared normative basis, however, the two strands of the conscience-based principle 
are fundamentally distinct. The first strand of the principle appeals to intention. It 
generates a prima facie presumption that the original owner was innocent and 
therefore intended that his successor in title would take subject to the personal claim. 
This presumption of innocence can be rebutted by evidence that the successor in title 
took as a purchaser for value, in which case, the second strand of the principle comes 
into play. In marked contrast to the first strand, the second strand does not appeal to 
intention, but to wrongdoing. It holds that if the successor in title was a purchaser for 
value but nevertheless took with notice of the personal claim, then the court will view 
him as particeps criminis in the fraudulent or unconscionable intention of the original 
owner to defeat that claim. 
The distinct philosophies which underpin the two strands of the conscience-
based principle have implications for what one initially might expect to be the rules 
regarding the evidential onus in cases where the principle applies. As regards the first 
strand of the principle, it makes sense that the onus should be on the successor in title 
to prove that he took as a purchaser for value and thereby rebut the presumption of 
                                                     
125 See A-G v Biphosphated Guano Co (1879) 11 Ch D 327 (CA) 337 (Thesinger LJ); Re Nisbet and 
Potts’ Contract [1905] 1 Ch 391 (Ch) 402 (Farwell J); [1906] 1 Ch 386 (CA) 404 (Collins MR); C 
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also Thompson v Foy [2009] EWHC 1076 (Ch), [2010] 1 P&CR 16 [135] (Lewison). But see D 
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innocence. Clearly, as the starting presumption is that the original owner was innocent, 
the onus should be on the party who seeks to challenge that presumption, viz the 
successor in title. As regards the second strand of the principle—which comes into 
play only if the successor in title establishes purchase for value—it would make 
intuitive sense for the onus to be on the holder of the personal claim to prove that the 
successor purchased with notice of the personal claim. This is because the existence 
of notice makes the successor in title a participant in the equitable fraud which the 
original owner has committed against the holder of the personal claim, and it is 
axiomatic that the burden of proving fraud ‘rests upon the person who claims to have 
been wronged’.127 
The above analysis does not sit comfortably with the rules on pleading which 
have developed in reference to mere equities. In a case where the holder of a mere 
equity brings an action against the successor in title of the original owner, the analysis 
would predict that if the successor proved purchase for value, then the onus would 
shift to the holder of the mere equity to prove purchase with notice.128 As explained 
already, however, mere equities do not follow this pattern: it is never necessary for the 
holder of a mere equity to assert that a successor in title of the original owner was a 
purchaser with notice; the onus is always on the successor to assert and then to prove 
that he is both a purchaser for value and a purchaser without notice. This indicates a 
departure from the axiom that, in cases where wrongdoing is in issue, the evidential 
onus is on the complainant rather than the potential wrongdoer. 
It is by no means fatal to the present hypothesis, however, that the evidential 
onus as regards notice is on the successor in title rather than the holder of the mere 
equity. It is true that the burden of proving fraud is ordinarily on the complainant. 
Nevertheless, there are situations where equity presumptively infers that wrongdoing 
has occurred from indirect evidence and thereby shifts onto the defendant the onus of 
proving that no wrongdoing has, in actual fact, taken place. An example of this shifting 
of the evidential onus is the doctrine of so called presumed undue influence.129 Undue 
influence is a species of equitable fraud.130 In broad outline, it occurs where one party 
                                                     
127 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 AC 773 [13] (Lord 
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vests trust and confidence in another party and the other party proceeds to take unfair 
advantage of that relationship in order to procure from the first party a transaction.131 
Undue influence can be proved directly.132 However, a presumption that undue 
influence had occurred will arise if, given the nature of the relationship that existed 
between the parties, the transaction cannot ‘be reasonably accounted for’ in reference 
to ‘ordinary motives on which ordinary men act’.133 The evidential onus then shifts to 
the ascendant party to prove that, in actual fact, he did not take unfair advantage of his 
relationship with the weaker party. 
It is proposed that a shift in the evidential onus is the reason that the holder of 
a mere equity does not have to assert that a successor in title of the original owner took 
with notice. According to this analysis, purchase for value is a double-edged sword in 
the hands of the successor in title. As explained already, it is necessary for the 
successor in title to prove that he purchased for value because this is the only way in 
which he can rebut the presumption that the original owner was innocent. In rebutting 
this presumption, however, the successor in title necessarily proves that he took under 
a transaction which constituted a species of fraud against the holder of the mere equity. 
This fact—while not direct proof—is indirect evidence that the successor in title was 
privy to an unconscionable intention to defeat the mere equity. Consequently, 
purchase for value, in addition to proving that the original owner is guilty of 
wrongdoing vis-à-vis the holder of the mere equity, is apt to raise a presumption that 
the successor in title was particeps criminis in that wrongdoing. It is then necessary 
for the successor to rebut this second presumption by proving that, in addition to being 
a purchaser for value, he purchased without notice of the mere equity and so could not 
have been privy to an unconscionable intention to defeat it. 
The cases on presumed undue influence show that the shifting of the evidential 
onus onto the potential wrongdoer is a purely ‘forensic tool’134 whose justification lies 
in public policy.135 It might be asked, therefore, what is the policy behind the evidential 
presumption that a purchaser for value was privy to the unconscionable intention of 
his predecessor in title to defeat a mere equity. It seems that there are two main 
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possibilities. The first is that the court is concerned to harmonise the rules of pleading 
which apply to mere equities with those that apply to equitable interests. As a general 
rule, it is not necessary for the owner of an equitable interest to assert that a purchaser 
for value took with notice of that interest; the onus is on the purchaser of proving that 
he purchased without notice.136 The reason for this is that, as explained in chapter 
three,137 an equitable interest includes rights in rem: it binds the entire world, so 
naturally the evidential onus is on the person who alleges that he took freely of it. A 
mere equity, on the other hand, is not a right in rem. Nevertheless, it may be the case 
that the courts have taken the view that the burden of proof as regards notice should 
be the same for mere equities as it is for equitable interests. The second possibility is 
simply that equity will not allow the successor in title to take advantage of the fact that 
the original owner has committed a species of fraud against the holder of the mere 
equity unless the successor can first prove that he was not involved in that fraud. 
 
 
3. A distinction without a difference? 
 
The third objection is that the distinction between a true equitable right in rem, on the 
one hand, and a right in personam which nevertheless binds successors in title, on the 
other, is a distinction without a difference. When all is said and done, both rights serve 
the same proprietary function: they operate ‘to exclude any one of a very large and 
indefinite class of people from access to some enjoyment of the asset, whether or not 
those people have in fact consented to such exclusion’.138 Arguably, it is of purely 
theoretical significance that some proprietary rights can bind a successor in title 
because they are rights against the entire world, whereas other proprietary rights can 
bind a successor in title because of the conscience-based principle. Once it has been 
judicially determined that a particular right is proprietary, the doctrinal question of 
how that right is proprietary, it might be argued, has little or no relevance to the 
resolution of concrete legal problems. For all practical purposes, all rights which can 
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bind successors in title in equity, including mere equities, may as well be characterised 
as equitable rights in rem. 
This objection is misplaced, however. It may indeed be the case that the 
distinction between a true equitable right in rem, on the one hand, and a right in 
personam which nevertheless can bind successors in title via the conscience-based 
principle, on the other hand, is largely theoretical in nature. The distinction, however, 
can still have important practical consequences. Two such consequences will now be 
identified. 
 
 
i. The privity limitation 
 
The first concerns cases where the right in question relates to property which is 
acquired by a subsequent owner who does not derive his interest or estate through the 
original owner. An example of such a case is where the right relates to land over which 
a squatter subsequently acquires a paramount legal estate through adverse 
possession.139 
In this type of scenario, it is arguably a question of decisive importance 
whether the prior right is an equitable right in rem or a right in personam which 
nevertheless can bind successors in title through the conscience-based principle. On 
the one hand, if the prior right is an equitable right in rem, then it necessarily binds the 
subsequent owner.140 This is because the right is enforceable against the entire world, 
so, a fortiori, it is necessarily enforceable against the subsequent owner.141 
On the other hand, if the prior right is a right in personam which nevertheless 
can bind successors in title via the conscience-based principle, then that right, in all 
probability, does not bind the subsequent owner. In order to see why this is the case, 
think back to the historical use. The use, it will be recalled, bound the original feoffee 
to use and was capable of binding his successors in title, but nevertheless was 
incapable of binding a subsequent owner who did not derive his title through the 
                                                     
139 See, eg, Re Jolly [1900] 2 Ch 616 (CA): a party in adverse possession acquired an absolute title to 
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140 Re Nisbet and Potts’ Contract [1905] 1 Ch 391 (Ch), affd [1906] 1 Ch 386 (CA). 
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original feoffee.142 In other words, the use was subject to a ‘privity limitation’:143 its 
enforceability was limited to persons who were in privity of estate with the original 
feoffee to use. This privity limitation was a direct consequence of how the Chancery 
enforced the use against successors in title. As already explained, the reason that the 
use was capable of binding successors in title was that, upon each successive 
devolution of the land, the Chancery was willing to presume, or otherwise to act as if 
it were the case, that the predecessor in title intended that his successor in title would 
take subject to the use. Clearly, this approach did not translate to the case where a 
person—for example, a successful squatter—acquired an original interest or estate 
which did not derive through any person who was bound to the use. This is because, 
in this situation, the intention of the previous owner—presumed or otherwise—could 
not have played any role in defining the nature of the interest or estate that was 
acquired by the subsequent owner. As a result, the subsequent owner took freely of 
the original use. 
The privity limitation was a necessary consequence of the doctrinal basis on 
which the use was extended to successors in title. As explained already, the basis on 
which this extension was achieved corresponded to the conscience-based principle. It 
follows that the privity limitation should, in principle, apply to other rights in 
personam which rely on the conscience-based principle to bind successors in title. This 
includes mere equities, although the point does not seems to have arisen in any decided 
case so far. 
 
 
ii. The plea of purchase for value without notice 
 
The second practical consequence of the distinction concerns the circumstances in 
which a purchaser of an equitable, as distinguished from a legal, interest can raise 
purchase for value without notice in the form of a plea. The general nature of a plea, 
and the circumstance in which purchase for value without notice can be raised in the 
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form of a plea, have already been touched on in chapter four.144 To reiterate, a plea is 
an equitable defence of a particular kind. In essence, a plea does not deny the truth of 
the facts which the claimant alleges in support of his action, but alleges some 
additional fact which, if proved, necessarily operates to bar the action.145 The effect of 
a plea, therefore, is that it ‘reduces the cause, or some part of it, to a single point, and 
from thence creates a bar to the suit, or to the part to which the plea applies’.146 A plea 
is ordinarily contrasted with the form of equitable defence known as a demurrer. A 
demurrer is like a plea in that it does not deny the truth of the facts which the claimant 
alleges.147 A demurrer differs from a plea, however, in that it does not allege any 
additional fact, but asserts that the facts which the claimant alleges are insufficient to 
support his action.148 
In modern times, the plea of purchase for value without notice is generally 
raised in cases where the holder of an earlier equitable proprietary right over certain 
property asserts that right against a subsequent purchaser of an interest in the same 
property.149 In this situation, whether or not the purchaser can raise the plea depends 
on the nature of the subsequent interest and, to an extent, on the nature of the earlier 
equitable proprietary right. If the subsequent interest is legal—this is, of a kind that 
can be recognised and enforced at common law—then the purchaser can raise the plea 
of purchase for value without notice.150 If, on the other hand, the subsequent interest 
is purely equitable, then the picture is less clear. The general rule is that the purchaser 
cannot raise the plea in this situation.151 As explained in previous chapters,152 however, 
the cases acknowledge at least one exception to this rule, namely, that if the earlier 
equitable right constitutes a mere equity—for instance, an equitable right to recover 
property which has passed under a transaction that is liable to be rescinded or 
rectified—then even a purchaser of a purely equitable interest can raise the plea of 
purchase for value without notice.153 
                                                     
144 Ch 4, pt III, s 3, sub-s i. 
145 J Mitford, ‘A Treatise on the Pleadings in Suits in the Court of Chancery by English Bill’ in S 
Tyler (ed), Mitford’s and Tyler’s Pleadings and Practice in Equity (Baker, Voorhis & Co 1876) 311-
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146 Ibid 312. 
147 Ibid 204. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Cf Bassett v Nosworthy (1673) Rep Temp Finch 102, 23 ER 55. 
150 See, eg, Pilcher v Rawlins (1872) LR 7 Ch App 259 (CA). 
151 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 45 ER 1164. 
152 See above, ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s i; ch 4, pt III, s 3. 
153 See the authorities cited above, ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s i, fn 36. 
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It is proposed that the distinction outlined above is the real factor which 
determines whether a subsequent purchaser of a purely equitable interest can raise the 
plea of purchase for value without notice against an earlier equitable proprietary right. 
On the one hand, if the earlier right takes the form of a true equitable right in rem, then 
in principle the purchaser should not be able to raise the plea. On the other hand, if the 
earlier right takes the form of a right in personam which relies on the conscience-based 
principle to bind a successor in title, then the purchaser should be able to raise the plea. 
In order to explain why this is the case, the situation where the earlier equitable 
right takes the form of an equitable right in rem will be considered first. In this 
situation, the point in issue clearly is not whether the earlier right has been imposed 
afresh against the subsequent purchaser. This is because the earlier right belongs to a 
class which operates against persons generally, so a fortiori its enforceability against 
subsequent purchasers is not contingent on it being imposed afresh with each 
successive transaction. This does not mean, of course, that the prior right is necessarily 
enforceable against a subsequent purchaser of an equitable interest. On the contrary, 
as noted in chapter four,154 it is well-known that equitable rights are subject to the 
inherent infirmity that they can be postponed in priority to a competing equitable 
interest which arose subsequently.155 It follows that if the earlier equitable right takes 
the form of a right in rem, then the point in issue is one of equitable priorities: that is 
to say, the court has to decide whether the earlier equitable right is postponed to the 
subsequent equitable interest, or vice versa. 
It is highly significant that the question which faces the court in this situation 
is one of priorities. The basic principles of equitable priorities have already been 
considered.156 In brief outline, where there are competing equitable interests in the 
same property, the general rule is that priority goes to the interest with the better 
equity, that is to say, with the greater merit in the contemplation of a court of equity.157 
There is no hard and fast rule that determines which interest has the greater merit. 
Rather, it is necessary for the court to examine the case contextually, taking into 
account ‘the nature and condition of … [the] respective equitable interests, the 
circumstances and manner of their acquisition, and the whole conduct of each party 
                                                     
154 Ch 4, pt III, s 3, sub-s ii. 
155 See, eg, Rice v Rice (1853) 2 Drewry 73, 61 ER 646; Abigail v Lapin [1934] AC 491 (PC); Taylor 
v London and County Banking Co [1901] 2 Ch 231 (CA). 
156 Ch 4, pt III, s 3, sub-s ii. 
157 Rice v Rice (1853) 2 Drewry 73, 78; 61 ER 646, 648 (Sir Richard Kindersley V-C). 
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with respect thereto’.158 The temporal order in which the competing equitable interests 
came into existence is relevant if and only if they have equal merit in every other 
respect.159 In this situation, temporal order is decisive, with priority going to 
whichever interest was the first to arise in point of time.160 
It is significant that the point in issue is one of priorities because the wide range 
of factors which the court takes into account to determine priority means that the 
purchaser cannot raise purchase for value without notice in the form of a plea. It is 
true that when the court evaluates the relative merits, purchase for value and purchase 
without notice weigh in favour of the purchaser.161 However, these factors do not, 
either collectively or individually, exhaust the range of factors which the court is 
bound to take into account in its evaluation. Accordingly, although the purchaser can 
allege purchase for value without notice as a part of his general defence, this is not an 
allegation with, if proved, will operate as a necessary bar to the action, which, as 
explained above, is the essence of a plea. On the contrary, there are cases where the 
court concluded that a prior equitable interest took priority over a subsequent equitable 
interest despite the fact that the subsequent interest was purchased for value and 
without notice.162 Consequently, the assertion that was made above is correct: if the 
earlier right takes the form of an equitable right in rem, then in principle the purchaser 
of the subsequent equitable interest should not be able to maintain a plea of purchase 
for value without notice. 
On the other hand, if the earlier right takes the form of a right in personam 
which relies on the conscience-based principle to bind a successor in title, then the 
situation is arguably a very different one. In this scenario, the question of whether the 
earlier right takes priority over the subsequent equitable interest is logically posterior 
to the question of whether the earlier right has been imposed afresh on the purchaser 
as per the conscience-based principle. In contrast to the situation where the earlier 
right is a right in rem—and therefore inherently capable of enforcement against the 
purchaser—the earlier right in this case, being a right in personam, is inherently 
incapable of enforcement against the purchaser unless the conscience-based principle 
                                                     
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. 
160 See, eg, Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 45 ER 1164; Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 
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161 See Taylor v London and County Banking Co [1901] 2 Ch 231 (CA) 263 (Stirling LJ); D 
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operated to preserve the earlier right against him. It follows that if the case falls outside 
the scope of the conscience-based principle, then the earlier right is, in essence, a non-
right so far as the purchaser is concerned. In this situation, it is clearly not possible 
that the earlier right could have taken priority over the purchaser’s subsequent 
equitable interest. Accordingly, it is not necessary for the court to evaluate the relative 
merits; the case is decided on the simple footing that the earlier right, by its very nature 
as a right in personam, is incapable of enforcement against the purchaser. 
Since the earlier right, if it is a right in personam, has to be imposed afresh as 
per the conscience-based principle before any question of priorities can arise, it 
follows that a subsequent purchase of an equitable interest for value without notice 
will have a more conclusive effect than would be the case if the earlier right were an 
equitable right in rem. This is because purchase for value and purchase without notice 
collectively prove that the case falls within neither of the two strands of the 
conscience-based principle. If the subsequent purchaser was a purchaser for value, 
then the first strand of the conscience-based principle cannot apply, because, as 
explained already, the provision of valuable consideration disproves the prima facie 
presumption that the predecessor in title was innocent. Similarly, if the purchaser was 
a purchaser without notice of the earlier right, then the second strand of the conscience-
based principle cannot operate, because in this situation there are no grounds for 
holding that the purchaser was privy to an unconscionable intention to defeat the 
earlier right. It follows that if the purchaser maintains and proves that he purchased 
his subsequent equitable interest for value and without notice of the earlier right, he 
thereby proves the earlier right cannot have been imposed afresh against him in 
accordance with the conscience-based principle; he proves, in other words, that the 
earlier right is a non-right so far as he is concerned. 
It follows that if the earlier right is a right in personam, then ‘purchase for 
value’ and ‘purchase without notice’ collectively operate as a necessary bar to the 
claimant’s cause of action. This must be the case, for if the earlier right is a non-right 
so far as the purchaser is concerned, then obviously the claimant cannot assert that 
right in any action against the purchaser. In marked contrast to the situation where the 
earlier right is an equitable right in rem, therefore, it is competent for the purchaser of 
a subsequent equitable interest to raise purchase for value without notice in the form 
of a plea. Consequently, as suggested above, if the earlier right takes the form of a 
right in personam which relies on the conscience-based principle to bind a successor 
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in title, then in principle the purchaser should be able to set up a plea of purchase for 
value without notice. 
 
 
PART IV: EXPLANATORY ADVANTAGES OF THE CONSCIENCE-BASED ANALYSIS 
 
Hence the proposed analysis that the conscience-based principle is the doctrinal basis 
for the enforceability of mere equities against third parties is capable of withstanding 
critical scrutiny. However, this analysis also has considerable explanatory leverage. 
The chapter will now highlight three areas in which this explanatory leverage is most 
apparent. 
First, and most obviously, the proposed analysis explains how, in principle, a 
mere equity can be enforceable against third parties, despite the fact that a mere equity, 
being a bare right of action, is a right in personam. In short, when a mere equity first 
comes into existence, it is a personal claim vis-à-vis the claimant and the original 
defendant, entitling the claimant to pursue a specific equitable remedy against the 
defendant. Ceteris paribus, the mere equity would be unenforceable against any third 
party whose rights would be adversely affected by the grant of that remedy. However, 
if the third party derives his adverse rights through the original defendant, then the 
court, in accordance with the conscience-based principle, may nevertheless treat the 
transaction between the third party and the original defendant as having imposed the 
mere equity afresh against the third party. In this situation, the mere equity is 
enforceable against the third party, but nevertheless continues in its character as a pure 
right in personam, binding on a small and definite class of people—all that has 
happened is that this small and definite class has been extended on grounds of 
conscience to include the third party. 
Second, the proposed analysis is consistent with the cases outlined in chapter 
four163 which demonstrate the enforceability of mere equities against third parties.164 
                                                     
163 Ch 4, pt II, s 1. 
164 Addis v Campbell (1841) 4 Beav 401, 49 ER 394; Gresley v Mousley (1859) 4 De G&J 78, 45 ER 
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In each of these cases, the third party derived his adverse interest through the original 
defendant, either by operation of law or under a subsequent transaction. Furthermore, 
the third party acquired his interest either as a volunteer or as a purchaser for value 
with notice of the facts generating the mere equity. Hence all the requirements for the 
application of the conscience-based principle were present: the third party was in 
privity of estate with the original defendant, and since he took either as a volunteer or 
with notice, the case was capable of falling within the first or the second strand of the 
conscience-based principle respectively. 
Third, the proposed analysis accounts for the main consequence of the dividing 
line between equitable interests and mere equities: namely the rule (introduced in 
chapter one165) that it is not allowable for a purchaser of an equitable interest to invoke 
the plea of purchase for value without notice against an earlier equitable interest, but 
that it is allowable for him to invoke the plea against an earlier mere equity.166 As 
explained above, in a contest between an earlier equitable claim and a subsequent 
equitable interest, if the earlier claim is an equitable right in rem, binding on persons 
generally, then, in principle, the owner of the subsequent interest should not be able 
to raise the plea of purchase for value without notice. This would explain why a 
purchaser of an equitable interest is unable to raise the plea against an earlier equitable 
interest, for, as explained in chapter three,167 an equitable interest is a combination of 
juridical claims which includes rights in rem over the asset which is the subject of the 
interest. On the other hand, if the earlier claim is a right in personam that nevertheless 
is capable of binding successors in title as per the conscience-based principle, then, in 
principle, the owner of the subsequent interest should be able to raise the plea. 
Accordingly, if the proposed analysis is accepted, then the different consequences for 
priorities which attach to mere equities as compared with equitable interests can be 
rationalised as the corollary to the fact that the doctrinal basis for the enforceability of 
mere equities against third parties is the conscience-based principle. 
Hence the analysis that the conscience-based principle is the doctrinal basis for 
the enforceability of mere equities against third parties, in addition to withstanding 
                                                     
165 Ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
166 Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 (Ch) 646-47 (Fry J). See also the other authorities cited above, 
ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s i, fn 36. 
167 Ch 3, pt III, s 2. 
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critical scrutiny, has considerable explanatory force. For these reasons, it is concluded 
that this analysis is probably correct. 
 
 
PART V: CONCLUSION 
 
Both chapter four and the present chapter have been investigating the doctrinal basis 
for the enforceability of mere equities against third parties. In chapter four, the 
suggestion that the third party effects of mere equities are based on orthodox 
conceptions of property was considered and ultimately rejected. In the present chapter, 
the aim has been to recommend an alternative analysis which builds on the general 
idea that the third party effects of mere equities are founded on equitable notions of 
unconscionability. 
In order to achieve this aim, the chapter began by arguing for the existence of 
a conscience-based principle, according to which a right in personam may be imposed 
afresh against a successor in title of the party originally bound by that right. This 
argument was supported by appealing to the historical examples of the former use, the 
restrictive freehold covenant and the erstwhile deserted wife’s equity. It was shown 
that the theoretical basis on which these claims were (at least initially) extended to 
third parties was the conscience-based principle. 
The chapter then argued in favour of the analysis that the conscience-based 
principle is the doctrinal basis for the enforceability of mere equities against third 
parties. The main objections to this analysis were dealt with. It was demonstrated that 
neither the House of Lords’ decision in National Provincial Bank nor the burden of 
proof as regards notice presents a convincing ground for objection the proposed 
analysis. Furthermore, it was shown that practical consequences attach to the 
distinction between an equitable right in rem and a right in personam which is capable 
of binding third parties in accordance with the conscience-based principle. Two such 
consequences were identified: first, that rights in rem are capable of binding all 
successive owners, while rights in personam which bind third parties in accordance 
with the conscience-based principle should be subject to a privity limitation; second, 
that while a purchaser of an equitable interest should not be allowed to raise the plea 
of purchase for value without notice against an earlier equitable right in rem, he ought 
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to be allowed to raise the plea against an earlier right in personam which depends on 
the conscience based principle to bind third parties. 
Finally, the chapter argued that its proposed analysis has significant 
explanatory leverage, and that this is most apparent in three areas. First, it was shown 
that this analysis explains how, in principle, mere equities can be enforced against 
third parties despite the fact that these claims are pure rights in personam. Second, it 
was show that the analysis is consistent with the cases, outlined in chapter four,168 
which demonstrate the enforceability of mere equities against third parties. Third, it 
was shown that the proposed analysis accounts for why mere equities are treated 
differently from equitable interests as regards the plea of bona fide purchase for value 
without notice (as discussed in chapter one169). 
In conclusion, it seems from the available evidence that the doctrinal basis for 
the enforceability of mere equities against third parties is the conscience-based 
principle. This conclusion represents a partial answer to the third question which this 
thesis asks, namely, ‘What is the underlying doctrinal basis for the proprietary features 
of mere equities?’ However, the enforceability of mere equities against third parties is 
only one of the proprietary features which are associated with this category of claim: 
in addition to being enforceable against third parties, mere equities are said to be 
capable of being assigned or devised in favour of a third party (as noted in chapter 
one170). Thus before a full answer can be given to the above question, it will be 
necessary first to consider the doctrinal basis for the assignability of mere equities to 
third parties. The assignment of mere equities will be examined in the next chapter. 
 
                                                     
168 Ch 4, pt II, s 1. 
169 Ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
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Chapter 6 
The Assignability of Mere Equities to Third Parties 
 
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter concludes the investigation, which began in chapter four, into the 
doctrinal basis for the proprietary features of mere equities. Whereas chapters four and 
five considered the enforceability of mere equities against third parties, the present 
chapter will examine the doctrinal basis for the assignability of mere equities in favour 
of third parties. As explained in chapter two,1 the assignment of mere equities is an 
area which, at first glance, does not appear to give rise to any significant doctrinal or 
conceptual difficulty. After all, courts of equity have long accepted that even purely 
personal claims, such as contractual claims, may be capable of assignment.2 
Nevertheless, if the case law on the assignment of mere equities is examined closely, 
what appear to be substantial doctrinal inconsistences are revealed. It is important that 
these apparent inconsistencies are addressed if the doctrinal basis for the assignment 
of mere equities is to be properly understood. 
Part two will outline the core principles which govern the assignment of mere 
equities in favour of third parties. Part three will then examine a group of well 
established cases3 which seem to permit a mere equity to be assigned in circumstances 
where, according to the core principles, such an assignment should not be allowed. 
Parts four, five and six will then consider three different ways in which this group of 
cases can be explained and will evaluate which of these approaches is the most 
plausible. 
 
 
PART II: THE CORE PRINCIPLES 
 
                                                     
1 Ch 2, pt II, s 3. 
2 See generally SJ Bailey, ‘Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth 
Century’ (1931) 47 LQR 516; (1932) 48 LQR 248; (1932) 48 LQR 547. 
3 Gresley v Mousley (1859) 4 De G&J 78, 45 ER 31; Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337; 
Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v Brougham (1882) 7 App Cas 307 (PC). 
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As explained above, this part will outline the core principles which govern the 
assignment of mere equities in favour of third parties. In order to avoid confusion, it 
is necessary to be clear that the assignability of mere equities is the exception rather 
that the rule. As a general rule, a mere equity is not capable of assignment, but is a 
claim which can properly be described as being personal to the person in whose favour 
it first arises.4 The general rule against the assignment of mere equities is tied in with 
the more wide-ranging principles which govern the assignment of rights of action. In 
this regard, it continues to be a fundamental principle of English law that a bare right 
to litigate cannot be assigned because such an assignment savours of maintenance or 
champerty.5 The normative justification for this principle is grounded in the perceived 
public interest in discouraging so called ‘trafficking in litigation’:6 a practice which 
would be encouraged if the law were to facilitate the assignment of bare rights of 
action. This general prohibition on the assignment of bare rights of action has been 
held to apply in a number of cases:7 for example in Hill v Boyle8 it was held that a 
simple right to sue a trustee for breach of trust could not be assigned by the 
beneficiaries to a third party. Likewise, the same general prohibition has been held to 
apply in cases involving an alleged assignment of a mere equity.9 This stands to reason 
because, as was demonstrated in chapter three,10 one of the defining characteristics of 
mere equities is that they are equitable rights of action, being simple claims to pursue 
a specific equitable remedy. 
The general rule that a mere equity is not capable of being assigned was 
established in Prosser v Edmonds.11 This case has already been considered briefly in 
chapters three and four.12 In Prosser, one Robert Todd, the assignor, made two 
successive assignments to different assignees of his interest under the trusts of his 
father’s will. The second assignee brought an action to have the first assignment 
rescinded in equity on the ground of an alleged fraud committed by the first assignees 
against the assignor. The assignor refused to be joined as a plaintiff to the suit; 
however, the second assignee argued that he was entitled under the second assignment 
                                                     
4 See Bendall v McWhirter [1952] 2 QB 466 (CA) 477 (Denning LJ). 
5 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 (HL) 703C (Lord Roskill). 
6 Ibid 694G (Lord Wilberforce). 
7 See generally Halsbury’s Laws of England (5th edn, 2017) vol 13, para 98. 
8 Hill v Boyle (1867) LR 4 Eq 260, 263-64 (Sir John Stuart V-C). 
9 See especially Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 160 ER 196, discussed below. 
10 Ch 3, pt III, s 2. 
11 Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 160 ER 196. 
12 Ch 3, pt III, s 2; ch 4, pt III, s 2. 
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to the relief which he sought. The first assignees demurred on the ground that that the 
second assignee had no cause of action.13 The suit was heard in the Court of Exchequer 
by the Chief Baron, Sir Frederick Pollock. The Chief Baron held that the first 
assignment had divested the assignor of his entire interest in the property that was the 
subject of the assignment. In consequence, even if the assignor did acquire a claim to 
rescind the first assignment, that claim was not coupled with any interest in the 
property, but was ‘a mere naked right to file a bill in equity’.14 In the opinion of the 
Chief Baron, the law of maintenance and champerty meant that such a claim was not 
capable of being assigned either at law or in equity. The result was that the second 
assignee could not have acquired, under the second assignment, any right or interest 
that would have enabled him to maintain an action to have the first assignment set 
aside. The Chief Baron allowed the demurrer accordingly. 
The rule which was established in Prosser continues to apply today. Thus in 
the comparatively recent case of Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West 
Bromwich Building Society15 Lord Hoffmann maintained that a claim to rescind a 
mortgage was a right of action and therefore incapable of being assigned by the 
mortgagor as an independent right.16 
As noted above, the rule that mere equities are not assignable is one aspect of 
the general approach which the courts take to the assignment of rights of action. In 
order to properly understand the rule, therefore, it is necessary to consider it in the 
context of the more general trends which have occurred in this area. In this regard, 
while it continues to be the case today that a bare right of action cannot be assigned,17 
it is also true that over the course of the twentieth century the courts adopted a more 
liberal stance about when a third party assignee would be permitted to stand in the 
right of his assignor to litigate.18 This process was recognised and confirmed by the 
House of Lords in Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse.19 Lord Roskill gave the 
                                                     
13 For discussion on the nature of a demurrer, see generally J Mitford, ‘A Treatise on the Pleadings in 
Suits in the Court of Chancery by English Bill’ in S Tyler (ed), Mitford’s and Tyler’s Pleadings and 
Practice in Equity (Baker, Voorhis & Co 1876) 203-05. See also above, ch 5, pt III, s 3, sub-s ii. 
14 Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 496; 160 ER 196, 202 (Sir Frederick Pollock CB). 
15 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL). 
16 Ibid 916D-E (Lord Hoffmann). 
17 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 (HL) 703C (Lord Roskill). 
18 See ibid 702C-E (Lord Roskill), referring to Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] 1 Ch 363 (CA). 
See also Halsbury’s Laws of England (5th edn, 2017) vol 13, para 99. 
19 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 (HL). 
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following summary of the circumstances in which the law of maintenance and 
champerty would not prevent a right of action form passing on assignment: 
 
If the assignment is of a property right or interest and the cause of action is 
ancillary to that right or interest, or if the assignee had a genuine commercial 
interest in taking the assignment and in enforcing it for his own benefit, I see 
no reason why the assignment should be struck down as an assignment of a 
bare cause of action or as savouring of maintenance.20 
 
In the Trendtex case itself, Trendtex purported to assign its right of action against a 
Nigerian bank, CBN, to Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse was a substantial creditor of 
Trendtex and had guaranteed Trendtex’s legal costs in connection with its action 
against CBN. In these circumstances Credit Suisse was held to have a sufficient 
commercial interest in the success of the litigation to support an assignment to it of 
Trendtex’s right of action. However, the agreement between Trendtex and Credit 
Suisse was problematic because it manifestly involved the likelihood that a third party 
with no genuine commercial interest in the litigation would make a profit out of the 
cause of action against CBN. This likelihood meant that the assignment amounted to 
trafficking in litigation; hence the assignment was void under the English law of 
maintenance and champerty.21 
The above citation from Lord Roskill’s judgment is relevant to the present 
discussion because it encapsulates the main exception to the general rule that mere 
equities are not assignable. It is settled that if a mere equity is ancillary to some 
property right or interest which is vested in the person who holds the mere equity, then 
it is allowable for that person to assign the mere equity together with that property 
right or interest to a third party.22 Such an assignment is not objectionable under the 
law of maintenance and champerty because, as opposed to being an assignment of a 
naked right of action, it is predominantly an assignment of a property right or interest: 
the mere equity being purely ‘incidental and subsidiary’ to the enjoyment of that 
                                                     
20 Ibid 703F-G (Lord Roskill). 
21 See especially ibid 694F-G (Lord Wilberforce). 
22 In addition to the cases discussed below, see D Hodge, Rectification: The Modern Law and 
Practice Governing Claims for Rectification for Mistake (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) para 6-05. 
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property right or interest.23 The situation is easily distinguished from what occurred in 
the case of Prosser. In Prosser, as already explained, the assignor parted with his entire 
interest in the contested property under the first assignment. Accordingly, even if, as 
the second assignee argued, the assignor acquired a mere equity to rescind the first 
assignment, the assignor retained no right or interest in the contested property to which 
his mere equity could have been ancillary. It followed that the second assignee was 
bound to fail, because the only right which the second assignment could have 
purported to pass to him was a mere naked right of action. 
There are various cases where it was held that the assignee of some property 
right or interest succeeded to the mere equity of his assignor to obtain equitable relief 
in reference to that property right or interest. Jalabert v Duke of Chandos24 is an early 
example. In that case, the Duke of Chandos granted the lease of a lodge to Moore, who 
subsequently assigned part of his interest to Jalabert, the claimant. Afterwards, a 
mistake was discovered in the original grant, and the claimant brought a bill to be 
relieved of that mistake in equity. The Lord Keeper, Sir Robert Henley, held that the 
claimant was permitted to stand in the right of Moore to have the original grant 
rectified.25 
In the case of Boots The Chemist Ltd v Street,26 a mistake had occurred in the 
drafting of the rent review provisions of a lease. It had been the common intention of 
the original landlord and tenant that a rent review could take place in every fifth year 
of the term, but by mistake the lease referred to rent reviews at the end of the seventh 
and fourteenth years. The original landlord sold and transferred his freehold reversion 
to the claimant, who then brought an action to have the mistake in the lease rectified. 
The claim was upheld by Falconer J. According to the judge, it did not matter that the 
claimant was not one of the original parties because the transfer of the freehold 
reversion was ‘effective to pass such interest as there … may have been in the original 
landlords to have the lease rectified’.27 In the later case of Nurdin & Peacock plc v DB 
Ramsden & Co Ltd,  Neuberger J referred to Boots The Chemist Ltd and remarked 
obiter that ‘it seems to me pretty plain that the right of a landlord to rectify a lease 
                                                     
23 Dawson v Great Northern and City Railway Co [1905] 1 KB 260 (CA) 271 (Stirling LJ); Ellis v 
Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399 (CA) 407 (Bankes LJ). 
24 Jalabert v Duke of Chandos (1759) 1 Eden 372, 28 ER 729. 
25 Ibid 377; 731 (Sir Robert Henley LK). 
26 Boots The Chemist Ltd v Street [1983] 2 EGLR 51 (Ch). 
27 Ibid 52 (Falconer J). 
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must be assignable together with the reversion’.28 This is consistent with the case of 
KPMG LLP v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd,29 where it was held that a landlord was 
entitled to rectify a mistake in the tenant’s break clause, despite the fact that both 
parties were successors in title who had not been involved in the original grant of the 
lease. 
In Berkeley Leisure Group Ltd v Williamson,30 Stone was the registered 
proprietor of a parcel of land which included Shenley Villa, a concreate forecourt 
which adjoined the Villa, and certain other land which could only be accessed over 
the concrete forecourt. Stone sold and transferred part of this parcel of land to the 
defendants. The intention of the parties had been that the sale would comprise the Villa 
only; however, the concrete forecourt was mistakenly included in the sale and transfer 
to the defendants. Stone then sold his entire residual interest in the parcel of land to 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff then brought an action against the defendants to have the 
first transfer rectified so that it did not include the concreate forecourt. In the Court of 
Appeal, Morritt and Bedlam LJJ upheld the plaintiff’s claim, with the result that the 
concreate forecourt retrospectively vested in the plaintiff under the second transfer. In 
reaching their decision, the Lord Justices rejected the contention that because the 
plaintiff was not a party to the first transfer he did not have standing to claim 
rectification of the mistake in that transfer.31 According to Lindsey J in the subsequent 
case of Harbour Estates Ltd v HSBC Bank plc,32 Berkeley Leisure Group Ltd decided 
‘that a right to claim rectification of the boundary of the land conveyed passed with 
the conveyance of the land itself’.33 
The facts of Holaw (470) Ltd v Stockton Estates Ltd34 were similar to Berkeley 
Leisure Group Ltd. Holaw (470) Ltd involved a transfer of land to the defendant 
which, by mistake, failed to reserve to the transferor a right of way over the transferred 
land for the benefit of adjoining land which remained vested in the transferor. The 
transferor then transferred the adjoining land to the claimant, who then brought an 
action against the defendant to have the first transfer rectified. The claim for 
rectification failed on the facts; however, Neuberger J was careful to observe that it 
                                                     
28 Nurdin & Peacock plc v DB Ramsden & Co Ltd [1999] 1 EGLR 119 (Ch) 124 (Neuberger J). 
29 KPMG LLP v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd [2006] EWHC 67, [2006] 2 P&CR 7. 
30 Berkeley Leisure Group Ltd v Williamson [1996] Lexis Citation 3168 (CA). 
31 Ibid 6 (Morritt LJ). 
32 Harbour Estates Ltd v HSBC Bank plc [2004] EWHC 1714 (Ch), [2005] Ch 194. 
33 Ibid [29] (Lindsey J). 
34 Holaw (470) Ltd v Stockton Estates Ltd (2001) 81 P&CR 29 (Ch). 
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was ‘beyond doubt’ that if the transferor had been entitled to rectify against the 
defendant, then the claimant would have been entitled to the same relief.35 
All of these cases involved a mere equity to have a transaction rectified. 
However, other kinds of mere equity are capable of passing together with a transfer of 
some property right or interest to which they are ancillary or incidental. Thus in Earl 
of Ardglasse v Muschamp36 T granted to the defendant a rentcharge over certain land 
in circumstances where T was entitled to rescind the grant on equitable grounds. T 
subsequently conveyed the land to the plaintiff, who afterwards brought a successful 
action to rescind the earlier grant, thereby freeing the land from the rentcharge. 
Although these cases provide isolated examples, they do not explain in general 
terms what kind of connection between a mere equity and a property right or interest 
is necessary in order for the mere equity to be capable of assignment together with the 
property right or interest. Broadly speaking, however, in all of the cases where a mere 
equity was held to have passed upon the assignment of a property right or interest, the 
mere equity provided access to relief which functioned to support or enhance in some 
way the practical enjoyment of the property right or interest.37 It is therefore a 
reasonable interpretation that in order for a mere equity to be sufficiently incidental or 
ancillary to a property right or interest so that the mere equity can be assigned together 
with the property right or interest, the mere equity must support or enhance in some 
way the property right or interest. 
The case of Gross v Lewis Hillman Ltd38 seems to confirm this analysis. In 
Gross, the defendants sold the freehold reversion in certain shop premises to G, which 
subsequently transferred its interest in the premises to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then 
alleged that the sale to G had been procured by the defendants by means of 
misrepresentation, and on that footing sought to have the original sale rescinded. Cross 
LJ handed down the leading judgment. Significantly as regards the present discussion, 
the judge held that even if G had been entitled to rescind the sale for misrepresentation 
(which, according to Cross LJ, G had not been entitled to do), the mere equity to 
rescind would not have passed together with the reversion upon the subsequent 
transfer to the plaintiff, who accordingly was not entitled to the relief which she 
                                                     
35 Ibid [46] (Neuberger J). 
36 Earl of Ardglasse v Muschamp (1684) 1 Vern 237, 23 ER 438. 
37 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 (HL) 703A-B (Lord Roskill). 
38 Gross v Lewis Hillman Ltd [1970] 1 Ch 445 (CA). 
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sought.39 This ruling is consistent with the above argument, for if G had held a mere 
equity to rescind the original sale, then that mere equity would not have functioned to 
support or enhance G’s interest in the shop premises. On the contrary, the mere equity 
would only have entitled G to recover the purchase money, subject to G executing a 
reconveyance of the shop premises to the defendants. Accordingly, the mere equity 
would not have been ‘ancillary to’ the freehold reversion which G acquired under the 
sale, and therefore would not have been capable of passing together with the reversion 
upon the subsequent transfer by G to the plaintiff. 
In summary, the core principle which governs the assignment of mere equities 
is that a mere equity is not assignable unless the mere equity is ‘incidental’ or 
‘ancillary’ to some property right or interest which itself is capable of being assigned, 
in which case the mere equity may be assigned together with the property right or 
interest. This rule is demonstrated in various cases, although none of these cases makes 
it explicitly clear what connection between a mere equity and a property right or 
interest is necessary in order for the former to pass upon the assignment of the latter. 
In light of the available evidence, however, it seems generally to be the case that in 
order for a mere equity to be sufficiently ancillary to a property right or interest, it is 
necessary for the mere equity to give access to relief which supports or enhances in 
some way the practical enjoyment of the property right or interest. 
 
 
PART III: THE DIFFICULT CASES 
 
Now that the core principles which govern the assignment of mere equities have been 
outlined, the chapter will examine the cases of Gresley v Mousley,40 Dickinson v 
Burrell41 and Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v Brougham,42 which are often said to 
exemplify the assignability of mere equities in appropriate circumstances, 43 but which 
on closer consideration are highly problematic from a doctrinal point of view. In broad 
outline, these cases establish that if A transfers property to B in circumstances which 
                                                     
39 Ibid 460E-F (Cross LJ). 
40 Gresley v Mousley (1859) 4 De G&J 78, 45 ER 31. 
41 Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337. 
42 Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v Brougham (1882) 7 App Cas 307 (PC). 
43 See, eg, Dawson v Great Northern and City Railway Co [1905] 1 KB 260 (CA) 271 (Stirling LJ); J 
McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) para 2-007, fn 27. See also 
Halsbury’s Laws of England (5th edn, 2017) vol 13, para 99, fn 2. 
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give A an equitable claim to rescind, and A, instead of claiming rescission, afterwards 
purports to dispose of his entire interest in the same property in favour of C, then it is 
allowable for C to bring an action against B (or B’s successor in title) to rescind the 
transfer by A to B.44 Thus in Gresley v Mousley Sir Roger Gresley sold an estate to 
his solicitor at an undervalue and afterwards devised the same property to the plaintiff. 
Knight Bruce and Turner LJJ held that the plaintiff was entitled to rescind against the 
defendants, who were the persons claiming under the conveyance to the solicitor. In 
Dickinson v Burrell James Dickinson sold and conveyed his interest in the estate of 
one George Whitehead to the defendant. Subsequently, Dickinson executed a 
voluntary deed which, after reciting that he disputed the validity of the conveyance to 
the defendant, conveyed his entire interest in Whitehead’s estate on trust. The 
plaintiffs, who were beneficiaries under the trusts thus established by Dickinson, 
claimed to have the conveyance to the defendant set aside on equitable grounds. The 
defendant demurred on the ground that the plaintiffs, being third parties to the original 
conveyance, could have no title to claim rescission. The Master of the Rolls, Lord 
Romilly, dismissed the demurrer. Finally, in Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v 
Brougham the plaintiff became bankrupt and the official assignee of his estate 
proceeded to release the plaintiff’s equity of redemption in a sheep station in favour 
of the defendant mortgagees. Afterwards, the plaintiff took a conveyance of the 
official assignee’s entire remaining interest in the plaintiff’s own estate. The plaintiff 
then brought an action against the defendants to have the release set aside on grounds 
of misrepresentation or mutual mistake. The defendants maintained that the 
conveyance to the plaintiff could not have given the plaintiff a right to claim the relief 
which he sought. However, the Privy Council (speaking through Lord Selbourne LC) 
rejected this argument and advised that the plaintiff had the same locus standi as the 
official assignee to set aside the release.45 
The difficulty with these cases arises from the fact that they were decided in 
the aftermath of the earlier decision in Stump v Gaby.46 In Stump, which has already 
been discussed in chapter four,47 Lord St Leonards LC suggested that where a 
                                                     
44 See generally D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 
2014) paras 22.09-22.14. 
45 Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v Brougham (1882) 7 App Cas 307 (PC) 311 (Lord Selbourne LC). 
Although the action failed on other grounds. 
46 Stump v Gaby (1852) 2 De GM&G 623, 42 ER 1015. 
47 Ch 4, pt III, s 2. 
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conveyance is voidable at the instance of the grantor, the grantor retains an equitable 
interest in the property conveyed which he can assign.48 This view subsequently 
formed an integral part of the reasoning in the later cases mentioned above; hence 
these cases were all decided on the footing that when A executed the conveyance to B 
he retained an equitable interest in the property conveyed which he was then able to 
transfer under the subsequent disposition to C. Thus in Gresley Knight Bruce and 
Turner LJJ accepted that Sir Roger ‘had after the sale [to the solicitor] a devisable 
interest in the property sold’.49 In Dickinson Lord Romilly MR seems to have taken it 
for granted that if the sale by Dickinson to the defendant was voidable, then Dickinson 
retained an interest in the property sold which he was then able to convey under the 
subsequent deed.50 And in Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd the Privy Council were of 
opinion that 
 
if that release was voidable in equity, it is clear, both on principle and on 
authority, that there was an equitable interest in the … station, which … 
continued to be part of the estate vested in the official assignee, and that the 
deed executed by … [the official assignee] was sufficient to pass that interest 
[to the plaintiff].51 
 
If, as Lord St Leonards LC proposed, it were the case that a grantor under a voidable 
conveyance retains an equitable interest in the subject of the conveyance, then the 
decisions in these cases would have been wholly consistent with the core principles 
considered above on the assignment of mere equities. In short, after the voidable 
conveyance by A to B, A would have held, in addition to his mere equity to rescind 
the conveyance and thus recover the legal title to the property conveyed, an equitable 
interest in that property which he could assign. A’s mere equity would almost certainly 
have been ancillary to this equitable interest, because the enforcement of the mere 
equity would have been a necessary step in the recovery of the property which was the 
subject of the equitable interest.52 Accordingly, as per the core principles outlined 
above, it would have been allowable for A to assign his mere equity together with his 
                                                     
48 Stump v Gaby (1852) 2 De GM&G 623, 630; 42 ER 1015, 1018 (Lord St Leonards LC). 
49 Gresley v Mousley (1859) 4 De G&J 78, 89; 45 ER 31, 35 (Knight Bruce LJ). 
50 Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337, 342 (Lord Romilly MR). 
51 Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v Brougham (1882) 7 App Cas 307 (PC) 311 (Lord Selbourne LC). 
52 See Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265, 290 (Menzies J). 
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equitable interest to C, who then would have been able to enforce for his own benefit 
the cause of action which had previously vested in A. It is clear that this sort of 
reasoning underpinned Lord Romilly MR’s decision in Dickinson: 
 
… if James Dickinson had sold or conveyed the right to sue to set aside the 
indenture … without conveying the property, or his interest in the property, 
which is the subject of that indenture, that would not have enabled the 
[plaintiffs] … to maintain this bill; but if [the plaintiffs] had bought the whole 
of the interest of James Dickinson in the property, then it would. The right of 
suit is a right incidental to the property conveyed …53 
 
The difficulty with this analysis is that its foundational premise is false. It is untrue to 
say that a transferor of property under a voidable conveyance retains an equitable 
interest in that property; instead, the doctrinally correct view is that the transferor 
generally does not retain any interest, legal or equitable, in the property transferred. 
This point was argued for extensively in chapter four.54 In summary, it was shown in 
that chapter that what Lord St Leonards LC said in Stump was both strictly obiter and 
inconsistent with the earlier case of Prosser, the ratio decidendi of which was that 
even if a transfer of property is voidable the transferor retains no equitable interest in 
that property (see above). In addition, it was demonstrated that the understanding of 
the law which was upheld in Prosser has since been re-affirmed in a series of 
comparatively recent cases and appears now to represent the consensus view.55 
Finally, reference was made to the general rule that purchase of a merely equitable 
interest for value without notice can be raised by way of plea against a transferor who 
asserts a mere equity to rescind or rectify his conveyance.56 It was shown that this rule 
only makes sense if it is accepted that the transferor’s mere equity is not conjoined 
with any equitable interest in the property conveyed.57 
The decisions in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd were 
therefore based on an erroneous analysis of what the rights of the respective parties 
                                                     
53 Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337, 342 (Lord Romilly MR) (emphasis added). 
54 Ch 4, pt III, s 2. 
55 See Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 (CA) 22F-H (Millett LJ) and the other 
authorities cited above at ch 4, pt III, s 2, fn 42. 
56 See Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 (Ch) 646-47 (Fry J) and the other authorities cited above at 
ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s i, fn 36. 
57 See above, ch 4, pt III, s 3. 
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were. The doctrinally correct analysis was that the conveyance by A to B divested A 
of his entire beneficial interest in the property transferred; after the conveyance, the 
only right which A had with which he could have disturbed the title acquired by B was 
a bare right of litigation to have the conveyance set aside. Consequently, when A 
afterwards purported to dispose of his interest in the same property in favour of C, A 
was not, in actual fact, entitled to any interest in the property which could pass under 
that disposition. It follows that, contrary to what a number of commentators and some 
judges have assumed,58 Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd are not 
analogous to cases such as Boots The Chemist Ltd and Berkeley Leisure Group Ltd; 
they are not, in other words, cases where a mere equity was assigned together with 
some property right or interest to which that mere equity was ancillary. 
It is suggested that the cases of Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne Banking 
Corp Ltd leave the law on the assignment of mere equities in a highly unsatisfactory 
state. These cases establish a definite rule, but they support this rule by resorting to a 
legal argument which relies on a proposition of doctrine that was disproved decades 
before in the case of Prosser v Edmonds. As a result, when the cases are examined in 
the light of the true rights of the parties involved, the cases seem to envisage that A 
can do something which, according to the core principles that have already been 
considered, he ought not to be able to do, namely, assign a mere equity to rescind as 
an independent right. In conclusion, the cases of Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne 
Banking Corp Ltd give rise to doctrinal difficulties which, for reasons that are not 
entirely clear, have largely gone unmentioned in the literature and hence continue to 
be unresolved. The remainder of this chapter will aim to shed some light into this area 
by looking at the different ways in which the decisions in the above cases could be 
explained and by evaluating which of these explanations is the most plausible. 
It seems that there are three main ways in which the cases of Gresley, 
Dickinson and Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd can be explained. The first approach is 
simply to say that the cases are inconsistent with the core principles on the assignment 
of mere equities and therefore must have been wrongly decided. By contrast, the 
second and third approaches aim to harmonise the cases with the core principles, 
although they do so in different ways. On the one hand, the second approach argues 
                                                     
58 See, eg, Dawson v Great Northern and City Railway Co [1905] 1 KB 260 (CA) 271 (Stirling LJ); 
Majestic Homes Pty Ltd v Wise [1978] Qd R 225, 232-33 (Stable SPJ). 
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that the cases can be understood in reference to concepts which fall outside the remit 
of the core principles. It does so by appealing to the idea that in certain situations 
equitable title is retrospectively deemed to have revested in the transferor before the 
formal order for rescission had been made. On the other hand, the third approach 
argues that the cases are explicable within the remit of the core principles. This 
approach appeals to the Trendtex case by arguing that, in the cases in question, it was 
allowable for A to assign his mere equity to C because C had ‘a genuine commercial 
interest’ in taking the assignment and enforcing the mere equity.59  Each of these 
possible approaches will now be considered. It will be argued that, on balance, the 
second approach is the most plausible. 
 
 
PART IV: THE CASES WERE WRONGLY DECIDED 
 
The first possibility to be considered is that Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne 
Banking Corp Ltd were wrongly decided. On the face of it, there is much that can be 
said for this approach. As explained already, the decisions in these cases were founded 
on the mistaken premise that a person who transfers property under a conveyance 
which he is entitled to rescind retains an equitable interest in that property. In short, 
the cases were badly reasoned, and this is enough to cast the decisions in those cases 
into doubt. Nevertheless, the argument that the cases were wrongly decided is not as 
attractive as it may at first appear. While it is true that recent cases have rejected the 
premise that a transferor under a voidable conveyance retains an equitable interest in 
the property transferred,60 none of these cases has called into question the actual 
decisions in Gresley, Dickinson or Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd.61 Likewise, when 
the secondary literature discusses the assignment of mere equities, these cases are 
generally treated as an accepted element of the law in this area. Consequently, despite 
the problematic way in which the cases were originally reasoned, the basic rule which 
the cases establish appears to have been approved in the literature. Given this general 
acceptance, it follows that an approach which simply dismisses the cases as wrongly 
                                                     
59 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 (HL) 703F (Lord Roskill). 
60 See Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 (CA) 22F-H (Millett LJ) and the other 
authorities cited above at ch 4, pt III, s 2, fn 42. 
61 On the contrary, one judge has stated that the authority of these cases is ‘beyond question’: Latec 
Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265, 289 (Menzies J). 
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decided is bound to be less attractive than an approach which can harmonise the 
decisions in these cases with the available doctrinal framework. Thus the view that the 
cases were wrongly decided must be viewed as the least favoured option. 
 
 
PART V: RETROSPECTIVE EQUITABLE TITLE 
 
As indicated above, the second approach to the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and 
Melbourne appeals to the principle that, when rescission occurs, an equitable title is 
retrospectively deemed to have vested in the transferor ab initio. The general nature 
and functions of the retrospective equitable title which arises upon rescission will be 
discussed first. The role which this principle could play in accounting for the cases of 
Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne will then be considered. The advantages of this 
analysis will then be highlighted, and potential objections to it dealt with. 
 
 
1. Retrospective equitable title and its functions 
 
It is well established that when a voidable transfer of property is rescinded at the 
instance of the transferor, the transferor is treated as having had an equitable interest 
in that property which dates back to the time when he made the conveyance.62 In other 
words, 
 
When a decree is made for setting aside a conveyance it relates back, and the 
grantee is to be treated as having been, from the first, a trustee for the grantor, 
who, therefore, has an equitable estate, not a mere right of suit.63 
 
The retrospective equitable title which arises on rescission is an instrumental device 
which serves two main functions. The first is to enable the transferor to take advantage 
of the equitable tracing rules in circumstances where the property transferred has since 
                                                     
62 See, eg, ibid 290 (Menzies J); Daly v The Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 371, 389 
(Brennan J); Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 WLR 1 (Ch) 12A (Millett J); Shalson v Russo [2003] 
EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] Ch 281 [122] (Rimer J). 
63 Gresley v Mousley (1859) 4 De G&J 78, 86; 45 ER 31, 34 (argument), quoted in Latec Investments 
Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265, 290 (Menzies J). 
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been exchanged for other property.64 Thus in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc65 
the victims of a fraud sought, by rescinding their contracts with the fraudster, to claim 
an equitable interest in certain land which represented the money that the victims had 
paid to the fraudster under the contracts. This required the victims to have had an 
equitable interest in the money which they could then trace into the land.66 According 
to Millett J, this was no obstacle to the victims of the fraud because, once the contracts 
had been rescinded, the victims were to be treated as having had an equitable interest 
in the money from the outset: 
 
[I]f the … victims of the fraud can trace their money in equity it must be 
because, having been induced to purchase the shares by false and fraudulent 
misrepresentations, they are entitled to rescind the transaction and revest the 
equitable title to the purchase money in themselves, at least to the extent 
necessary to support an equitable tracing claim …67 
 
The second function of the retrospective equitable title which arises on rescission is 
best illustrated by considering the scenario which is contemplated by the rule in 
Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne. As indicated above, this scenario is where A 
makes a voidable conveyance of property to B and subsequently purports to make a 
disposition of the same property in favour of C. In this situation, the disposition to C 
is initially ineffective at law and in equity. This is because A has already transferred 
all his legal and beneficial interest in the property to B;68 hence A does not retain any 
interest in the property which he can dispose of in favour of C. However, this analysis 
only holds for as long as the conveyance to B is not rescinded. Once the conveyance 
to B is rescinded (for these purposes it does not matter whether it is A or C who brings 
the action to rescind), A is retrospectively deemed to have acquired, at the time when 
                                                     
64 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] 3 All ER 717 (Ch) 734C-D (Millett J); Lonrho plc v 
Fayed [1992] 1 WLR 1 (Ch) 12A (Millett J); Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 
1 (CA) 22H-23B (Millett LJ). But see D Fox, Property Rights in Money (OUP 2008) para 6.58; D 
O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 16.40. 
65 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] 3 All ER 717 (Ch), revd on other grounds [1994] 2 All 
ER 685 (CA). 
66 It was necessary to establish an equitable interest because there was no pre-existing fiduciary 
relationship between the victims and the fraudster: see A Televantos, ‘Losing the Fiduciary 
Requirement for Equitable Tracing Claims’ (2017) 133 LQR 492, 493-94. 
67 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] 3 All ER 717 (Ch) 734C-D (Millett J). 
68 Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 160 ER 196. 
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he made the conveyance to B, an equitable title to the property. It follows that the 
subsequent disposition by A to C becomes retrospectively effective to transfer A’s 
equitable title to C. The practical outcome of this is that when the court orders B (or 
B’s successor in title) to reconvey the legal title to the property, the reconveyance 
ought to be in favour of C instead of A. 
Thus the retrospective equitable title which arises when rescission occurs also 
serves to give effect in equity to dispositions which, before rescission, were ineffective 
due to the existence to the prior voidable conveyance. The function which the 
retrospective equitable title plays in this regard was indicated by Menzies J in Latec 
Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd: 
 
[T]he result of the eventual avoidance of the conveyance upon the position ab 
initio and throughout of the persons by whom and to whom the conveyance of 
property was made … [is that], in the event of a successful suit (which may be 
maintained by a devisee), the conveyor had an equitable estate capable of 
devise …69 
 
It is important to emphasise that since the retrospective equitable title arising on 
rescission is essentially instrumental in character, its effects do not exceed its 
identified functions. Thus in the case of Lonrho plc v Fayed Millett J confirmed that, 
when rescission takes place, the court will not treat equitable title as having vested in 
the transferor ab initio in order to retrospectively impose on the transferor the duties 
and obligations of a trustee.70 This seems to be the correct approach, for potentially 
exposing the transferor to retrospective liability for breach of trust would exceed the 
fundamental aim of the equitable remedy of rescission, which, as explained in chapter 
three,71 is to terminate the transaction ab initio by restoring the parties as nearly as 
possible to their original positions. 
 
 
2. When the retrospective equitable title arises 
 
                                                     
69 Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265, 290-91 (Menzies J). 
70 Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 WLR 1 (Ch) 11H-12C (Millett J). 
71 Ch 3, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
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It is suggested that the principle that rescission causes equitable title to vest in the 
transferor retrospectively could play a role in harmonising the rule in Gresley, 
Dickinson and Melbourne with the rule that a mere equity cannot be assigned as an 
independent right. Whether or not the principle can play this role, however, depends 
on a preliminary question of equitable doctrine. The question is essentially one of 
timing, namely, at what point does a voidable conveyance count as having been 
‘rescinded’ for the purpose of causing an equitable title in the property conveyed to 
vest retrospectively in the transferor ab initio? Unfortunately, this question is not an 
easy one to answer: the case law in this area is ambiguous—described by one set of 
commenters as ‘enormously confused’72—and support can be found in different cases 
for two seemingly contradictory points of view.73 
The first point of view holds that the retrospective vesting of equitable title 
results from the actions of the court. According to this view, the point from which an 
equitable title is retrospectively deemed to have vested in the transferor ab initio is 
when the transferor has brought an action to rescind the voidable conveyance and the 
court has decided in his favour to order rescission. In short, a retrospective equitable 
title arises only once the court has formally adjudicated that the transferor has a good 
claim to the relief which he seeks. The view that it is the action of the court which 
generates a retrospective equitable title is intimated in the above quotation74 which 
states that the relation back of equitable title occurs when ‘a decree is made for setting 
aside a conveyance’. 
The premise that the retrospective vesting of equitable title does not take place 
unless and until the court decides to grant rescission reflects the traditional view that 
rescission in equity is effectuated by the court’s actions in granting the decree rather 
than by the actions of the rescinding party.75 This general philosophy is implicit in 
various judicial statements, many of which emphasise the fact that the grant of 
rescission in equity is implemented and controlled by the terms of the court’s decree.76 
                                                     
72 D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 11.56. 
73 See generally ibid paras 16.23-16.38. 
74 See above, fn 63. 
75 See generally J O’Sullivan, ‘Rescission as a Self-help Remedy: A Critical Analysis’ (2000) 59 CLJ 
509, 518-20. 
76 See, eg, Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 WLR 129 (CA) 137B-C (Sir Donald Nicholls V-C); Erlanger v 
The New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218 (HL) 1278 (Lord Blackburn); Spence v 
Crawford [1939] 3 All ER 271 (HL) 288B-C (Lord Wright). See also D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R 
Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 11.83. 
175 
 
The following observations by Lord Wright in Spence v Crawford77 are a typical 
example: 
 
The remedy [of rescission] is equitable. Its application is discretionary, and, 
where the remedy is applied, it must be moulded in accordance with the 
exigencies of the particular case. … The court must fix its eyes on the goal of 
doing ‘what is practically just.’ How that goal may be reached must depend on 
the circumstances of the case, but the court will be more drastic in exercising 
its discretionary powers in a case of fraud than in a case of innocent 
misrepresentation.78 
 
The second point of view for which support can be found in the cases is that the 
retrospective vesting of equitable title results from the actions of the transferor 
independently of the court.79 According to this view, the point from which an equitable 
title retrospectively vests in the transferor ab initio is when the transferor has 
personally elected to disaffirm the voidable conveyance. Crucially, the transferor may 
do this before he has brought an action to have the conveyance formally rescinded by 
order of the court. This view, therefore, is different from the alternative view that a 
retrospective equitable title only arises once the court has decided to order rescission, 
for in that case there can be no relation back of the equitable title until after the 
transferor has brought his action to rescind. 
The proposition that an equitable title retrospectively vests in the transferor ab 
initio from when the transferor makes an election to disaffirm the voidable conveyance 
departs somewhat from the traditional view that rescission in equity is effectuated by 
order of the court. Nevertheless, there are various cases which contain statements in 
favour of this proposition. For example, in Lonrho plc v Fayed80 Millett J was clearly 
of the opinion that the retrospective vesting of equitable title occurred when the 
transferor elected to rescind: ‘A contract obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation is 
voidable, not void, even in equity. … [I]f the representee elects to avoid the contract 
                                                     
77 Spence v Crawford [1939] 3 All ER 271 (HL). 
78 Ibid 288B-F (Lord Wright). 
79 See, eg, Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 WLR 1 (Ch) 11H-12A (Millett J); Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley 
[1999] All ER (D) 433 (CA) [99] (Potter LJ); Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees 
Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 195, [2012] 3 WLR 597 [53] (Patten LJ); National Crime Agency v Robb 
[2014] EWHC 4384 (Ch), [2015] 3 WLR 23 [47] (Sir Terence Etherton C). 
80 Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 WLR 1 (Ch). 
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and set aside a transfer of property made pursuant to it the beneficial interest in the 
property will be treated as having remained vested in him throughout’.81 Likewise in 
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley82 Potter LJ said that where a transfer is voidable for 
misrepresentation ‘the transferor may elect whether to avoid or affirm the transaction 
and, until he elects to avoid it, there is no constructive (resulting) trust’.83 And in 
Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd84 Pattern LJ also expressed 
the view that the beneficial interest revested retrospectively when the transferor 
elected to disaffirm the transaction: ‘Rescission [for misrepresentation] avoids the 
contract ab initio. In relation to assets transferred to the representor, … title revests in 
the representee retrospectively once the election to rescind the contract is made’.85 
 
 
i. Comparison with rescission at common law 
 
In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to clarify that even if it is true that an 
election to disaffirm is effectual in equity, it does not follow that the equitable remedy 
of rescission should be equated with rescission at common law. At common law, 
rescission is essentially a ‘self-help’ remedy:86 the act of the rescinding party in the 
strictest sense. Thus where a transaction is voidable at common law, the rescission of 
that transaction is fully effectuated if and when the injured party makes a personal 
election to disaffirm the transaction.87 Thus the process of rescission occurs 
independently of any orders of the court; for instance, it is not necessary for the court 
to order the revesting of legal title because this is an automatic consequence of the 
election to disaffirm. The role of the court is limited to enforcing the rights which have 
                                                     
81 Ibid 11H-12A (Millett J). 
82 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [1999] All ER (D) 433 (CA). 
83 Ibid [99] (Potter LJ). 
84 Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 195, [2012] 3 WLR 
597. 
85 Ibid [53] (Patten LJ). 
86 See J O’Sullivan, ‘Rescission as a Self-help Remedy: A Critical Analysis’ (2000) 59 CLJ 509, 511-
12. 
87 Abram Steamship Co Ltd (in liq) v Westville Shipping Co Ltd (in liq) [1923] AC 773 (HL) 781 
(Lord Atkinson); Halpern v Halpern (No 2) [2006] EWHC 1728 (Comm), [2007] QB 88 [26] (Nigel 
Teare QC). 
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been secured as a result of the rescission which has already taken place.88 As the 
authors of the second edition of The Law of Rescission observe: 
 
Rescission at common law is effected by the rescinding party’s election to 
disaffirm the voidable transaction, in the sense that all the constituent elements 
that make up rescission follow from that election. After the election, and if 
necessary a tender of benefits received, the transaction is completely rescinded, 
and the judicial process need be invoked only for the purpose of declaring or 
enforcing the rights secured.89 
 
In a handful of cases, judges have suggested that rescission is always a self-help 
remedy, the implication being that rescission in equity is also effectuated by the act of 
the rescinding party.90 This view is clearly mistaken, however; rescission in equity is 
never a self-help remedy in the true sense of the word. Even if it is correct that an 
election to rescind a transaction which is voidable on equitable grounds can take effect 
in equity, the effect of that election is necessarily restricted to causing an equitable 
title to vest retrospectively in the transferor ab initio. The legal title to property which 
has passed under the transaction and any other legal rights which have been created 
by the transaction are not affected by the election to disaffirm, for in the eyes of the 
common law these rights are indefeasible.91 Accordingly, even after he has elected to 
disaffirm, it is still necessary for the transferor to apply to the court for a decree which 
formally rescinds the transaction by, for instance, ordering a reconveyance of the legal 
title.92 Thus while the idea that an equitable title retrospectively vests in the transferor 
when he elects to disaffirm the transaction may be reminiscent of the approach to 
rescission at common law, it would be a mistake, nevertheless, to confuse the equitable 
and common law remedies. In equity, ‘rescission’ in the full sense of the word is never 
the independent act of the transferor. 
                                                     
88 Abram Steamship Co Ltd (in liq) v Westville Shipping Co Ltd (in liq) [1923] AC 773 (HL) 781 
(Lord Atkinson). 
89 D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 11.50. 
90 See especially Reese River Silver Mining Co Ltd v Smith (1869) LR 4 HL 64 (HL) 73 (Lord 
Hatherley LC); Abram Steamship Co Ltd (in liq) v Westville Shipping Co Ltd (in liq) [1923] AC 773 
(HL) 781 (Lord Atkinson); Alati v Kruger (1955) 94 CLR 216, 224 (Dixon CJ and Webb, Kitto and 
Taylor JJ). See also D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 
2014) paras 11.64-11.81. 
91 See J O’Sullivan, ‘Rescission as a Self-help Remedy: A Critical Analysis’ (2000) 59 CLJ 509, 518. 
92 See Clark v Malpas (1862) 4 De GF&J 401, 45 ER 1238, varying (1862) 31 Beav 80, 54 ER 1067. 
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3. Application to the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne 
 
It remains to be explained what kind of role the concept of a retrospective equitable 
title could play in explaining why, according to the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and 
Melbourne, A can apparently, by purporting to execute in favour of C a disposition of 
the property which he has already conveyed to B, assign to C his mere equity to rescind 
the conveyance to B, despite the general rule that a mere equity cannot be assigned. 
As intimated above, whether or not the concept can play such a role depends on the 
view which one takes of when the retrospective vesting of equitable title occurs. In 
this regard, there are two possibilities which have already been outlined. According to 
the first, the point from which A is deemed to have acquired an equitable title to the 
property ab initio is when the court formally decides that the conveyance to B ought 
to be rescinded. Significantly, this will be after C has brought the action to rescind and 
after the court has found that C can assert a mere equity to the relief which he seeks. 
According to the second possibility, an equitable title retrospectively vests in A ab 
initio when A makes a personal election to disaffirm the voidable conveyance to B. 
From the outset, it is possible to say that if the first view is the correct one, 
then the concept of retrospective equitable title cannot play any role in explaining why 
C, by virtue of the subsequent disposition by A to C, is able to assert a mere equity to 
rescind the earlier conveyance by A to B. This is because, in this situation, the 
retrospective equitable title would derive from the decision of the court to decree the 
rescission of the earlier conveyance, and therefore would be a consequence of C 
successfully asserting a mere equity to rescind. And if the retrospective equitable title 
is a consequence of C successfully asserting a mere equity to rescind, then clearly the 
retrospective equitable title cannot play any role in explaining why C is able to assert 
a mere equity to rescind the earlier conveyance. Any such explanation would be highly 
circular and unlikely to win acceptance. 
Things are different, however, if the second view is considered the correct one. 
In this situation, it is possible to explain the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne 
on the basis that the subsequent disposition to C amounted to a personal election by A 
to disaffirm the earlier conveyance to B. According to this analysis, the process of 
logic which underlies the rule can be expressed in the following stages. (i) A conveys 
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property to B in circumstances which give A an equitable claim to rescind. (ii) 
Subsequently, A purports to dispose of his entire interest in the same property in favour 
of C. (iii) The purported disposition by A to C amounts to an election by A to disaffirm 
the earlier conveyance to B. (iv) From this point onwards, equity retrospectively 
considers that when A made the conveyance to B A acquired an equitable title to the 
property conveyed. (v) As a result, the subsequent disposition of the property by A to 
C becomes retrospectively effective to transfer A’s equitable title to C (as per the 
second function of the concept of a retrospective equitable title, discussed above). (vi) 
The equitable title thus acquired by C gives him a sufficient interest to enforce the 
cause of action which previously had vested in A to apply to the court to have the 
earlier conveyance to B formally rescinded, hence the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and 
Melbourne. 
In a nutshell, therefore, this analysis posits that it is the action of A in making 
the purported disposition to C that brings the backdated equitable interest into 
existence. The purported disposition by A to C then operates retrospectively to have 
carried from A to C the backdated interest together with A’s mere equity to rescind 
the earlier conveyance to B. 
 
 
4. Advantages of this analysis and potential objections to it 
 
The above analysis of the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne has four main 
advantages. First, as indicated above, the analysis accounts for the rule itself. Second, 
the analysis accounts for this rule in a way which is consistent with the core principle 
that a mere equity cannot be assigned as an independent right. According to the 
analysis, although the subsequent disposition by A to C is initially ineffective due to 
A having previously conveyed his entire legal and beneficial interest in favour of B, 
that disposition almost instantly becomes retrospectively effective to transfer an 
equitable title from A to C. As a result, the mere equity of A to apply to the court to 
have his earlier conveyance to B formally rescinded can legitimately be treated as 
having passed under the disposition to C together with the equitable title, as per the 
principle that a mere equity can be assigned in conjunction with a property right or 
interest to which it is ancillary. Third, the analysis does not depend on the fallacious 
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view propagated by Stump v Gaby that when A makes the voidable conveyance to B 
A acquires an automatic and immediate equitable interest in the property conveyed. 
The fourth advantage is that it is possible, within the ambit of the analysis, to 
harmonise the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne with the decision in Prosser. 
This advantage is an important one, and it will be discussed in greater detail below. 
Despite these advantages, however, there seem to be two main objections 
which could be raised against the above analysis. The first concerns the conventional 
principles which have developed on how an election to rescind is made. The second 
relates to the argument that the very notion of an election to disaffirm is a common 
law concept whose apparent translocation into equitable doctrine is misconceived. 
Each of these potential objections will now be considered. It is suggested that neither 
of them is fatal to the above analysis. 
 
 
i. Objection 1: Making an election to rescind 
 
It is admittedly the case that stage (iii) in the above analysis is based on a presumption 
that the conduct of A in making the subsequent disposition to C is independently 
sufficient to qualify as an election by A to disaffirm the earlier conveyance to B. 
However, it might be objected that this presumption is not plausible in light of the 
conventional principles on how an election to rescind is made.93 
It is well-established that in order for there to be an effective election to rescind 
a voidable transaction, it is generally necessary for the rescinding party ‘by express 
words or by act’ to communicate to the counterparty that he, the rescinding party, 
intends to disaffirm the transaction.94 The communication by the rescinding party of 
his intention to disaffirm the transaction must be unequivocal,95 although it is not 
necessary for this communication to take any particular form.96 Thus in Abram 
                                                     
93 See generally D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 
2014) paras 11.03-11.49. 
94 Clough v The London and North Western Railway Co (1871) LR 7 Ex 26, 34 (Mellor J). See also 
Abram Steamship Co Ltd (in liq) v Westville Shipping Co Ltd (in liq) [1923] AC 773 (HL) 781 (Lord 
Atkinson). 
95 Clough v The London and North Western Railway Co (1871) LR 7 Ex 26, 34 (Mellor J); Abram 
Steamship Co Ltd (in liq) v Westville Shipping Co Ltd (in liq) [1923] AC 773 (HL) 781 (Lord 
Atkinson); Car and Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell [1965] 1 QB 525 (CA) 551A-B (Sellars 
LJ). 
96 D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 11.04. 
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Steamship Co Ltd (in liq) v Westville Shipping Co Ltd (in liq)97 it was held that an 
effective election to disaffirm occurred when the rescinding party wrote a letter to the 
counterparty informing the latter of his intention to repudiate the voidable contract.98 
By contrast, in Clough v The London and North Western Railway Co99 it was held that 
a rescinding party could make an election to rescind by bringing legal proceedings if 
he included an appropriately worded statement in his pleadings.100 Re Eastgate101 is 
another example. There, a fraudster purchased and took possession of certain goods 
with the intention of not paying for them, and the defrauded vendor later retook 
possession of the goods. Bigham J held that the actions of the vendor amounted to an 
effective election by him to disaffirm his contract with the fraudster.102 
There are two things to note about how these principles apply to the conduct 
of A in making the subsequent disposition to C. The first thing to note is that A’s 
conduct could plausibly be said to evidence the necessary intention to disaffirm the 
earlier conveyance to B. This is because A, in making the subsequent disposition to 
C, is clearly asserting rights of alienation over the property which are inconsistent with 
the continued existence of the earlier conveyance.103 The second thing to note is that 
A’s conduct, despite evidencing the necessary intention to disaffirm, would not be 
independently sufficient to qualify as an election by A to rescind the conveyance to B. 
It would also be necessary for A to communicate his intention in some unequivocal 
manner to B: hence the possible objection that the presumption in stage (iii) of the 
above analysis is not plausible. 
It seems that there are two possible responses to this objection. The first is to 
read into the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne the proviso that it is necessary 
for A to inform B of the subsequent disposition to C before A’s conduct in making 
that disposition can qualify as an election by A to disaffirm his earlier conveyance to 
B. However, although this response would meet the objection, it would not present a 
particularly appealing solution. Neither the judges who decided these cases nor 
counsel seemed to attach any importance to the question of whether A had 
                                                     
97 Abram Steamship Co Ltd (in liq) v Westville Shipping Co Ltd (in liq) [1923] AC 773 (HL). 
98 Ibid 784-85 (Lord Atkinson). 
99 Clough v The London and North Western Railway Co (1871) LR 7 Ex 26. 
100 Ibid 36 (Mellor J). See also Nicholas v Thompson [1924] VLR 554, 582 (McArthur J). 
101 Re Eastgate [1905] 1 KB 465 (KB). 
102 Ibid 467 (Bigham J). 
103 See D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 
11.04. 
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unequivocally communicated to B that he intended to disaffirm the earlier conveyance. 
Indeed, in Gresley it is not clear whether B, who had died by the time that C brought 
his action to rescind, was ever made aware of the subsequent disposition by A to C. It 
is therefore suggested that this response would constitute too extensive a gloss on the 
rule established in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne. 
The second response to the above objection is more appealing. It is to call 
attention to the fact that the requirement that the rescinding party communicate his 
intention to disaffirm to the counterparty is only a general rule and not an absolute 
necessity. Even at common law, there are situations where an election to disaffirm a 
contract obtained by fraud can be effective to rescind that contract, despite there not 
having been any communication by the rescinding party to the fraudulent party of the 
former’s intention to disaffirm the contract. This point is illustrated by the well-known 
case of Car and Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell.104 There, Caldwell sold his car 
to a fraudster, who took the car and absconded after giving Caldwell a cheque for 
£965. Soon afterwards, Caldwell discovered that the cheque was in fact worthless, and 
immediately informed the police and the Automobile Association about the fraud. The 
car subsequently passed through several hands until eventually it was sold to a bona 
fide purchaser for value without notice of the fraud. In these circumstances, the court 
decided that Caldwell was entitled as against the innocent purchaser to possession of 
the car. The court held that Caldwell, by his actions after discovering the fraud, had 
rescinded the sale to the fraudster at common law, and therefore had recovered the 
ownership of the car before the subsequent sale to the innocent purchaser. 
Significantly, the fact that Caldwell had not been able to communicate to the fraudster 
his intention to disaffirm the original sale did not, given the exceptional circumstances 
of the case, prevent Caldwell from evincing an election to rescind. As Upjohn LJ 
observed: 
 
If one party, by absconding, deliberately puts it out of the power of the other 
to communicate his intention to rescind … I do not think he can any longer 
insist on his right to be made aware of the election to determine the contract. 
In these circumstances communication is a useless formality. I think that the 
                                                     
104 Car and Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell [1965] 1 QB 525 (CA). 
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law must allow the innocent party to exercise his right of rescission otherwise 
than by communication or repossession.105 
 
The decision in Caldwell has been criticised by some scholars.106 Nevertheless, the 
case was applied in very similar circumstances by the Court of Appeal in Newtons of 
Wembley Ltd v Williams,107 and continues to be regarded as good law in England and 
Wales.108 Furthermore, the rule in Caldwell has been codified in other jurisdictions.109 
Caldwell demonstrates that where a contract is voidable for fraud the 
rescinding party can, in exceptional circumstances, evince an intention to rescind 
which is effective at common law, even if the rescinding party does not communicate 
that intention to the counterparty. Admittedly the ratio of Caldwell is restricted to 
cases where the voidable contract was procured by a rogue who later absconds and 
thereby makes it impracticable for the rescinding party to communicate his election to 
rescind.110 Thus the ratio has no direct application to the situation which occurred in 
Gresley and Dickinson, where the conveyance by A to B was voidable on purely 
equitable grounds and B had not absconded. Nevertheless, Caldwell is significant 
because the case shows that it is not an absolute rule at common law that the rescinding 
party communicate his election to rescind to the counterparty. And if it is not an 
absolute rule at common law that the rescinding party communicate his election to 
rescind, then this is highly unlikely to be an absolute rule in equity either. 
Furthermore it is likely that the exceptions to the general rule that an election 
to rescind ought to be communicated by the rescinding party to the counterparty are 
considerably wider in equity than at common law. In other words, it is probable that 
an election to rescind is far less likely to be ineffective in equity than at common law 
by reason of the rescinding party not having communicated his election to the 
                                                     
105 Ibid 555D-E (Upjohn LJ). 
106 See, eg, WR Cornish, ‘Rescission without Notice’ (1964) 27 MLR 472. But see FJ Odgers, 
‘Contract—Voidable for Misrepresentation—Meaning of Rescission’ [1963] CLJ 180. 
107 Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 QB 560 (CA). In this case, however, the rescinding 
party failed despite having validly elected to disaffirm the fraudulent sale, it being held that the 
fraudster was to be treated as a mercantile agent in possession with the consent of the rescinding party 
under s 9 of the Factors Act 1889, and accordingly as having the powers of such an agent with respect 
to disposition under s 2 of the 1889 Act. 
108 See, eg, Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v The Brimnes (Owners) [1975] 1 QB 929 (CA). 
109 Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (NZ), s 8(1)(b); Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 
2012 (Vic), s 26(1)(b). 
110 Car and Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell [1965] 1 QB 525 (CA) 555F-G (Upjohn LJ). See 
also D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 
11.36; E Peel, Treitel: The Law of Contract (13th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) para 9-088. 
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counterparty. The reason for this concerns the fundamental distinction between 
rescission at law and rescission in equity and the different policy considerations which 
arise from that distinction. 
As explained above, rescission at common law is fully the act of the rescinding 
party.111 Thus if the rescinding party successfully disaffirms the voidable contract, he 
thereby extinguishes the contract and revests in himself the legal ownership of any 
property which he has transferred under the contract. This automatic and immediate 
revesting of the legal title can have serious consequences. For one thing, it can expose 
the counterparty to liability for strict liability torts such as conversion or trespass to 
goods.112 For another thing, and more importantly, if the counterparty subsequently 
purports to sell the property to a third party, then the third party may not acquire a 
good title,113 even if he is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the fraud.114 
Indeed, this is precisely what happened to the innocent purchaser in Caldwell.115 In 
light of these consequences, it is to be expected that the courts would take a 
comparatively strict approach to rescission at common law by insisting that, save in 
exceptional circumstances like those which occurred in Caldwell, it is necessary for 
the rescinding party to communicate to the counterparty his election to disaffirm the 
contract. 
Rescission in equity is different. As demonstrated above, in equity, ‘rescission’ 
in the full sense of the term is formally effectuated by order of the court; it is never the 
fully independent act of the rescinding party. If an election to rescind is effectual in 
equity, then its effect is limited to causing an equitable title to vest retrospectively in 
the rescinding party ab initio. This retrospective vesting of equitable title does not 
entail such potentially serious consequences for the counterparty and for third party 
purchasers as does the automatic and immediate revesting of legal title which results 
from a successful election to rescind at common law. As regards the counterparty, he 
is far less likely to incur personal liability following an effectual election to rescind in 
equity. For one thing, the counterparty will not assume liability to the rescinding 
                                                     
111 Halpern v Halpern (No 2) [2006] EWHC 1728 (Comm), [2007] QB 88 [26] (Nigel Teare QC); D 
O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 11.50. 
112 See D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 
16.41.  
113 Cf Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 QB 560 (CA). 
114 Car and Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell [1965] 1 QB 525 (CA). 
115 For criticism of this aspect of the case, see Law Reform Committee, Twelfth Report: Transfer of 
Title to Chattels (Cmnd 2958, 1966) para 16; J O’Sullivan, ‘Rescission as a Self-help Remedy: A 
Critical Analysis’ (2000) 59 CLJ 509, 532. 
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party’s equitable title unless and until his conscience is affected by knowledge of the 
fact that he holds subject to that title.116 For another thing, even once the counterparty’s 
conscience is affected, the extent of his personal liability to the rescinding party is 
likely to be limited. As Millett J observed in Lonrho plc v Fayed: 
 
It is a misake [sic] to suppose that in every situation in which a constructive 
trust arises the legal owner is necessarily subject to all the fiduciary obligations 
and disabilities of an express trustee. Even after the [rescinding party] has 
elected to avoid the contract and reclaim the property, the obligations of the 
[counterparty] would in my judgment be analogous to those of a vendor of 
property contracted to be sold, and would not extend beyond the property 
actually obtained by the contract and liable to be returned.117 
 
As regards the position of a third party who purchases from the counterparty following 
the election to rescind but before the rescinding party recovers the legal title, if the 
third party takes as a bona fide purchaser for value of a legal interest without notice, 
then in principle he will take freely of the rescinding party’s equitable title.118 
Accordingly, the consequences of an election to rescind are on the whole less 
detrimental to the other interested parties if that election takes effect in equity 
exclusively of the common law. There is correspondingly less of a requirement for the 
equitable rules on rescission to insist that the rescinding party communicate his 
election to rescind to the counterparty in order for that election to be effectual. 
It is difficult to say whether or not the equitable doctrine of rescission actually 
does take a less strict approach than the common law to the rule that an election to 
rescind be communicated to the counterparty. The cases do not seem to offer any 
guidance on this question. Despite the lack of guidance in the cases, however, the fact 
remains that, given the fundamental differences between the common law and 
equitable doctrines of rescission, it would be highly surprising if equity did not take a 
more liberal approach to the rule that an election to rescind be communicated to the 
counterparty. It would make far more sense for the equitable doctrine of rescission to 
                                                     
116 See proposition (ii) of Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s summary of the principles of trust law at 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 (HL) 705C-F. 
117 Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 WLR 1 (Ch) 12B-C (Millett J). 
118 See Pilcher v Rawlins (1872) LR 7 Ch App 259 (CA). 
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look past the formulaic issue of whether the rescinding party has communicated an 
election to rescind to the counterparty and instead focus on the evaluative question of 
whether the rescinding party by his words or conduct has sufficiently demonstrated an 
intention to disaffirm the voidable transaction. 
In conclusion, the apparent rule that in order for an election to rescind to be 
effectual it is necessary for the rescinding party to communicate his intention to the 
counterparty is not an absolute requirement even at common law. Furthermore—
although the cases admittedly do not provide any guidance on this point—given the 
way in which rescission works in equity, it is at least arguable that an election to 
rescind is far less likely to be ineffectual in equity than at common law by reason of 
the rescinding party not having communicated his election to the counterparty. On the 
contrary, it seems more probable that the equitable doctrine of rescission places greater 
emphasis on the evaluative question of whether or not the rescinding party, by his 
words or conduct, has made it sufficiently clear that he no longer intends to treat the 
voidable transaction as binding on him. 
What do these conclusions mean for the above analysis? They mean that the 
presumption in stage (iii) of the analysis—that the conduct of A in making the 
subsequent disposition to C is independently sufficient to qualify as an election by A 
to rescind the earlier conveyance to B—is a plausible presumption. As indicated 
above, A’s conduct in this regard manifests a clear intention to disaffirm the earlier 
conveyance, for it entails the assertion by A of rights of alienation which are 
inconsistent with the continued existence of the earlier conveyance. Accordingly, A’s 
conduct should, in principle, be independently sufficient to qualify as an election to 
rescind the earlier conveyance, provided that A is not affected by the rule that an 
election to rescind must be communicated by the rescinding party to the counterparty. 
In light of the above discussion, however, it appears unlikely that this rule is observed 
by equity as strictly as it is observed by the common law; hence it is by no means 
unreasonable to suggest that A is not affected by the rule. Thus the presumption in 
stage (iii) of the analysis is a perfectly plausible one, and the potential objection that 
it is not can be dismissed. 
 
 
ii. Objection 2: A common law concept 
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The second potential objection directly attacks the foundational premise in the present 
analysis of the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne, namely the proposition that 
an election to disaffirm a transaction which is voidable on equitable grounds can 
operate to immediately trigger the retrospective vesting of equitable title in the 
rescinding party ab initio. As noted above, the cases of Lonrho, Twinsectra and 
Independent Trustee Services can be cited in support of this proposition.119 
Nevertheless, it might be objected that the notion of ‘an election to disaffirm’ is not in 
origin an equitable concept, but is a mechanism which was developed at common law 
and was only translocated into the equitable doctrine of rescission because of a 
mistaken analogy with common law principles. 
It is conceded that there is a lot that can be said in favour of this objection. An 
election to disaffirm has always been the mechanism by which rescission is effectuated 
at common law.120 By way of contrast, before the mid-nineteenth century, there was 
no suggestion in the case law that if a transaction was voidable on equitable grounds, 
then the personal election of the rescinding party to disaffirm that transaction had any 
immediate effect on the rights of the parties.121 On the contrary, it seems to have been 
universally accepted that, in equity, the entire process of rescission was effectuated 
and controlled by judicial decree.122 Then, from about 1870 onwards, cases such as 
Reese River Silver Mining Co Ltd v Smith123 and Abram Steamship Co Ltd (in liq) v 
Westville Shipping Co Ltd (in liq)124 began to confuse the common law and equitable 
doctrines of rescission by suggesting that rescission in equity was a self-help 
remedy.125 It has already been demonstrated that the analogy which these cases 
unthinkingly drew between the common law and equitable doctrines was false: 
rescission in equity is never a self-help remedy, and this so whether or not an election 
to disaffirm can have the limited effect of immediately vesting a retrospective 
equitable title in the rescinding party. Despite its falsity, however, it is highly probable 
that this analogy was the principal factor which subsequently gave rise to the 
proposition, supported in Lonrho, Twinsectra and Independent Trustee Services, that 
a personal election to disaffirm a transaction which is voidable on equitable grounds 
                                                     
119 See above, fn 79. 
120 J O’Sullivan, ‘Rescission as a Self-help Remedy: A Critical Analysis’ (2000) 59 CLJ 509, 517. 
121 D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 11.59. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Reese River Silver Mining Co Ltd v Smith (1869) LR 4 HL 64 (HL). 
124 Abram Steamship Co Ltd (in liq) v Westville Shipping Co Ltd (in liq) [1923] AC 773 (HL). 
125 See above, fn 90. 
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can effectuate a partial rescission by causing the backdated equitable title to vest 
immediately in the rescinding party. 
Consequently, it would seems that the basic assertion underlying the above 
objection is probably true. It does indeed appear to be the case that the notion of 
electing to disaffirm a voidable transaction was originally an exclusively common law 
concept whose translocation into equitable doctrine was the result of an unthinking 
analogy with common law principles. Nevertheless, while this objection may be 
correct in its underlying assertions, it is not necessarily fatal to the above analysis. 
Simply put, although the idea that an election to disaffirm can operate to vest 
an equitable title in the rescinding party may derive from the mistaken view that 
rescission in equity is a self-help remedy, it does not follow that this idea is necessarily 
bad in and of itself. In principle, there is no reason why the modern authorities ought 
not to take the view that the rescinding party acquires a backdated equitable title when 
he elects to disaffirm the transaction, rather than when the court decrees rescission. 
On the contrary, such an approach seems to be justified with reference to both basic 
equitable principle and policy considerations. In terms of principle, it is well 
established that equity sees as done that which ought to be done.126 It is on this basis, 
for example, that equity pre-empts the execution of a specifically enforceable contract 
for sale by giving the purchaser an immediate equitable title to the subject of the 
sale.127 Arguably, the idea that an equitable title vests in the rescinding party when he 
elects to disaffirm the transaction could be regarded as another manifestation of the 
same principle: in a similar way to how equity anticipates the execution of a contract 
for sale, equity is anticipating the enforcement by the rescinding party of his mere 
equity to go to court and acquire an order for the reconveyance of legal title.128 Indeed, 
this analogy is lent further credence by the observations of Millett LJ in the case of 
Lonrho, where, as noted above, the judge likened the obligations of the counterparty 
when rescission occurred to the obligations of ‘a vendor of property contracted to be 
sold’.129 In terms of policy, there are good reasons for allowing the rescinding party to 
secure a limited equitable title before he enforces his right to an order formally 
rescinding the voidable transaction. For one thing, it would give the rescinding party 
                                                     
126 JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and 
Remedies (5th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2014) ch 3. 
127 Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499 (Ch) 506 (Sir George Jessel MR). 
128 Cf R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (OUP 1997) 174-75. 
129 Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 WLR 1 (Ch) 12B-C (Millett J). 
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an equitable interest in the property and thereby help to secure his right to relief against 
any third party who purchases an equitable interest from the counterparty, for while 
such a third party would be able to raise the plea of purchase for value without notice 
against a mere equity,130 he would not be able to do so against a prior equitable 
interest.131 For another thing, allowing the rescinding party to secure a limited 
equitable interest should make it easier for him to obtain interim relief against the 
counterparty, in particular to obtain an interim injunction restraining the counterparty 
from dealing with the subject of the voidable transaction (something which would be 
in the best interests of innocent third parties as well as the rescinding party).132 
In conclusion, the original translocation into equitable doctrine of the concept 
of an election to rescind was almost certainly founded on the patently mistaken view 
that rescission in equity is a self-help remedy. This confusion created the conditions 
which subsequently gave rise to the idea that an election to disaffirm could be effectual 
in equity in the limited sense of causing the backdated equitable title to vest 
immediately in the rescinding party. Nevertheless, the simple fact that this idea 
emerged from a mistaken analogy between the common law and equitable doctrines 
of rescission does not make that idea inherently bad. On the contrary, the view which 
was expressed in Lonrho, Twinsectra and Independent Trustee Services can be 
justified with reference to basic equitable principle and policy considerations. 
Therefore, while the above objection is correct in its underlying assertion that an 
unthinking analogy gave rise to the idea that the backdated equitable title vests in the 
rescinding party when he elects to disaffirm, that idea can adequately be supported on 
independent grounds. It follows that this objection is not fatal to the above analysis of 
the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne. 
 
 
iii. Prosser v Edmonds distinguished 
 
Having examined the potential objections to the above analysis of the rule in Gresley, 
Dickinson and Melbourne, it is now necessary to consider the additional advantage, 
                                                     
130 See Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 (Ch) 646-47 (Fry J) and the other authorities cited above at 
ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s i, fn 36. 
131 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF&J 208, 45 ER 1164; Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 (Ch). 
132 See D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 
16.21. 
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which has already been flagged up, of this analysis. This advantage is that it is 
possible, within the ambit of the analysis, to harmonise the rule in Gresley, Dickinson 
and Melbourne with the decision in Prosser v Edmonds.133 This matters because, for 
reasons that have already been discussed, Prosser is of fundamental importance to the 
principles on the assignment of mere equities. It follows that the cogent account of 
these principles which the present chapter aims to achieve will require some 
explanation of the doctrinal relationship between Prosser and the rule established in 
Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne. 
The facts in Prosser have already been considered and they are very similar to 
the facts that were in issue in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne. Looking at the cases 
closely, however, it seems that there is one potentially significant criterion of 
difference: in Prosser the assignor (A) appears to have been hostile to the action 
brought by the second assignee (C) against the first assignee (B). Thus A had refused 
to join with C as a plaintiff to the action and so had been made a defendant along with 
B; furthermore, Sir Frederick Pollock CB was careful to note that A ‘had no complaint 
to make’ about the first assignment.134 This apparent hostility of A to the action 
brought by C distinguishes Prosser from both Gresley and Melbourne, where A was 
dead by the time that C commenced proceedings against B. The case of Dickinson, on 
the other hand, shares a number of features in common with Prosser. Thus in 
Dickinson A was still alive when C brought the action against B; A did not joint with 
C as a plaintiff to that action; and A was accordingly made a defendant to the action. 
Nevertheless, Dickinson is distinguishable from Prosser in that, in Dickinson, A was 
not a hostile defendant, and did not deny the allegation that his conveyance to B had 
been procured by equitable fraud. On the contrary, in the deed by which A purported 
to effect the subsequent disposition to C, A made an express declaration that he 
disputed the validity of the earlier conveyance to B.135 
It is suggested that this criterion of difference serves to harmonise Prosser 
(where it was decided that C could not stand in any right which A may have had to 
rescind the earlier conveyance to B) with Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne (where 
it was decided that, in principle, C could enforce any right which A may have had to 
rescind the earlier conveyance to B). It should be clear at this point that, according to 
                                                     
133 Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 160 ER 196. 
134 Ibid 491, 495; 200, 202 (Sir Frederick Pollock CB). 
135 Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337, 338. 
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the above analysis, whether C can bring a claim to rescind the earlier conveyance to 
B depends on whether the conduct of A in making the subsequent disposition to C 
qualifies as an election by A to disaffirm the earlier conveyance (as per stage (iii) in 
the analysis). It has been argued that, so far as equity is concerned, the conduct of A 
in this regard generally ought to qualify as an election by A to disaffirm: hence the 
rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne. However, it is necessary to stress that this 
rule can only be a general one, for the fact remains that the question of whether a 
rescinding party has elected to disaffirm ‘is to be determined in the circumstances of 
each case’.136 This is significant for the decision in Prosser, for if the particular 
circumstances of that case are examined, and the unusual feature that A seems to have 
been hostile to the proceedings taken into account, then it is feasible that the conduct 
of A in making the subsequent assignment to C did not, in the circumstances, qualify 
as an election by A to disaffirm his earlier assignment to B. This is not to suggest that 
the apparent hostility of A to the proceedings had the effect of invalidating what 
beforehand had been a valid election to disaffirm; such an argument would necessarily 
fail because of the established rule that once an election to disaffirm has been made it 
is irrevocable.137 It is rather the case that the apparent hostility of A to the action 
brought by C against B is indirect evidence that A, at the time when he made the 
subsequent assignment to C, did not intend by his actions to call into question the 
earlier assignment to B. In this way, Prosser can be interpreted as falling outside of 
the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne on the basis that, in Prosser, A never 
elected to disaffirm his transaction with B. 
In conclusion, the above analysis is attractive for the additional reason that it 
allows the decision in Prosser to be harmonised with what was said in Gresley, 
Dickinson and Melbourne. As indicated above, this is not a trivial advantage, 
especially in light of the general importance of these cases to the principles governing 
the assignment of mere equities. 
 
 
PART VI: GENUINE COMMERCIAL INTEREST 
                                                     
136 D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 
11.04, citing Boynton v Monarch Life Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 606. 
137 Car and Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell [1965] 1 QB 525 (CA) 551B (Sellers LJ); D 
O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) paras 11.54-
11.55. 
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The third approach to rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne appeals to the 
exception that was established in Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse138 to the basic 
rule that a bare right of action cannot be assigned. The case of Trendtex has already 
been considered. In short, it was held in that case that an assignment by Trendtex to 
Credit Suisse of Trendtex’s right to claim damages against CBN could have been 
supported on the basis that Credit Suisse had ‘a genuine commercial interest’ in the 
outcome of the litigation between Trendtex and CBN.139 According to the third 
approach, the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne can be understood as another 
manifestation of the exception that was established in Trendtex. Simply put, this 
analysis maintains that the reason C is entitled to claim rescission against B is that C 
had a ‘genuine interest’ in the enforcement of A’s mere equity to rescind the earlier 
conveyance to B, which meant that A’s mere equity, despite its being a naked right to 
litigate, was capable of passing by assignment under the subsequent disposition by A 
to C, thus allowing C to stand in the right of A to rescind the earlier conveyance to B. 
This analysis enjoys some advantages over the alternative approach considered 
above which appeals to the retrospective equitable title that arises when rescission 
occurs. For one thing, the current analysis certainly has the advantage of relative 
simplicity. For another, it can account for the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and 
Melbourne within the ambit of the core principles considered above on the assignment 
of mere equities. In other words, the analysis does not have to appeal to superadded 
concepts, such as the notion of a backdated equitable title, in order to make sense of 
the rule. 
Nevertheless, the view that A can assign his mere equity to C because C has a 
genuine interest in the enforcement of that mere equity is problematic for at least two 
reasons. The first reason is that it is difficult to say precisely what ‘genuine interest’ 
C could assert in the enforcement of such a mere equity. In the Trendtex case itself, 
Credit Suisse had quite an obvious interest in taking an assignment of Trendtex’s claim 
against CBN: Credit Suisse was a substantial creditor of Trendtex, which itself was in 
financial difficulties and unlikely to be able to meet its obligations to Credit Suisse 
unless its claim against CBN were successfully enforced. By way of contrast, in the 
                                                     
138 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 (HL). 
139 Ibid 703C-D, F (Lord Roskill). 
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situation to which the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne applies, it is difficult 
to identify any comparable interest that C could assert in taking an assignment of a 
mere equity to set aside the earlier conveyance by A to B. Admittedly, C will acquire 
a genuine interest in the enforcement of such a mere equity after the subsequent 
disposition by A to C has taken place. This is because, as explained above, one of the 
consequences of rescission is that it gives effect in equity to dispositions which, before 
rescission, were ineffectual due to the existence of the voidable transaction. However, 
it would be absurd to suggest that this ‘genuine interest’ is the reason that A can assign 
his mere equity to C under the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne. To put it 
briefly, since this interest does not arise until after the subsequent disposition by A to 
C, then it would be highly circular to argue that this interest could play any role in 
supporting the assignment of A’s mere equity to C under that very same disposition. 
The second reason the present analysis of the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and 
Melbourne is problematic is that it cannot feasibly be harmonised with the case of 
Prosser. In Prosser, it was decided that C could not take an assignment of any mere 
equity to rescind which A may have been able to assert against B. It follows that, if 
the present analysis were adopted, it would be necessary to explain why, in Prosser, 
C did not have a genuine interest in taking an assignment of a mere equity to rescind 
the earlier transaction between A and B while, in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne, 
C presumably did have a genuine interest. There is no clear solution to this problem. 
It has already been argued that, for the purposes of the rule, the only significant 
distinction between Prosser, on the one hand, and Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne, 
on the other, is that, in Prosser, A was actively hostile to the action brought by C to 
rescind the earlier transaction. Yet this criterion of difference does not have any 
discernible relevance to the question of whether or not C had a sufficient ‘genuine 
interest’ for the exception that was recognised in Trendtex to apply. Accordingly, it is 
not possible, within the ambit of the present analysis, to harmonise Prosser with the 
rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne. 
In summary, three different approaches to the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and 
Melbourne have been considered. The first approach holds that the cases were wrongly 
decided. The second and third approaches seek to harmonise these decisions within 
the available theoretical framework: the second does so by appealing to the backdated 
equitable title which arises when rescission occurs; the third does so by referring to 
the exception that was established in the case of Trendtex to the rule that a bare right 
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to litigate cannot be assigned. It has been argued already that the first approach ought 
to be considered the least favoured option. As between the second and third 
approaches, while the third approach has the advantage of relative simplicity, the 
second approach is, on balance, the preferable option. For one thing, the third approach 
runs into the intractable difficulty of identifying what ‘genuine interest’ C could have 
in taking an assignment of A’s mere equity. This is not an issue for the second 
approach. For another thing, it is possible within the ambit of the second approach, but 
not within the ambit of the third approach, to harmonise the decision in Prosser with 
what was said in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne—as explained above, this is a 
significant advantage of the second approach. Therefore, out of the various options 
that have been considered, the second approach provides, on balance, the most 
convincing theoretical explanation for the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne. 
 
 
1. Where C would have taken in default of the voidable conveyance 
 
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that there is one category of case—
closely analogous to, but nevertheless distinct from, the situation to which the rule in 
Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne applies—where the exception that was recognised 
in the Trendtex case has a much higher degree of explanatory value. This category of 
case is where A was the owner of property which—either by operation of law or under 
some earlier transaction, and in default of A exercising his power of alienation over 
that property—would have descended to C on the death of A. However, before his 
death, A transferred the property to B under a conveyance which was voidable at the 
instance of A. A then died, having not exercised his right to rescind the conveyance to 
B. In these circumstances, it seems that, in equity, it is generally allowable for C to 
enforce the right which had vested in A to rescind the conveyance to B, and thereby 
recover for his own benefit the property transferred. 
There have been a number of cases which fit within this general pattern. For 
example, there were various cases decided before 1926 where a freehold estate in land 
had been transferred under a voidable conveyance and the transferor had subsequently 
died. In these circumstances, it was held that the heir at law of the transferor was 
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entitled to stand in the right of the transferor to set aside the voidable conveyance.140 
For the most part, the rule established by these cases no longer exists, since the 
Administration of Estates Act 1925 abolished the concept of heirship except in certain 
limited situations.141 In principle, however, a similar rule ought to operate in favour of 
a person who is entitled to succeed under the current rules of intestacy,142 although 
this proposition does not appear to have been tested in any case so far. In addition to 
the heir at law cases, there have also been cases where the effect of the voidable 
conveyance was to prevent the descent of property from the transferor to the claimant 
under the terms of a settlement which predated the voidable conveyance. Again, it was 
held that the claimant was entitled to enforce the right of the transferor to rescind the 
voidable conveyance.143 
Another category of case which at first glance may appear to fall within the 
general pattern observed above is where the transferor initially devises certain 
property to a devisee and afterwards transfers the same property under a voidable 
conveyance. Despite some contrary authority from the late eighteenth century,144 it 
has been held that in these circumstances it is not allowable for the devisee to enforce 
the right which had vested in the transferor to rescind the voidable conveyance.145 
These cases, however, do not seriously controvert the above observations, since they 
were decided on the highly specific ground that even a voidable conveyance can 
operate to revoke a previous will.146 
In cases which fall within the above pattern, the notion that a backdated 
equitable title vests in A when he elects to disaffirm the voidable conveyance to B has 
no explanatory value. This is because, between A making the voidable conveyance 
and his subsequent death, A generally did not engage in any conduct which could be 
construed as evidencing an intention to disaffirm. This is to be contrasted with the 
situation to which the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne applies, where A, 
                                                     
140 See, eg, White v Small (1682) 2 Chan Cas 103, 22 ER 867; Coleby v Smith (1683) 1 Vern 205, 23 
ER 416; Clark v Ward (1700) Prec Ch 150, 24 ER 72; Clarkson v Hanway (1723) 2 P Wms 203, 24 
ER 700; Bennet v Vade (1741) 2 Atk 324, 26 ER 597; Clark v Malpas (1862) 31 Beav 80, 54 ER 
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141 Administration of Estates Act 1925, s 45. 
142 D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) para 22.05. 
143 Englefeild v Englefeild (1686) 1 Vern 444, 23 ER 575; Addis v Campbell (1841) 4 Beav 401, 49 
ER 394. 
144 Hawes v Wyatt (1790) 3 Bro CC 156, 29 ER 463, reversing (1790) 2 Cox 263, 30 ER 122. 
145 Hick v Mors (1754) 3 Keny 117, 96 ER 1329; (1754) Amb 216, 27 ER 143. 
146 See also D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 
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after making the voidable conveyance to B, makes a second disposition of the same 
property in favour of C, and thereby asserts rights of alienation which are inconsistent 
with the existence of the earlier conveyance. 
In contrast with the situation to which the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and 
Melbourne applies, it seems that the present category of case is sufficiently explained 
with reference to the rule recognised in Trendtex that even a bare right of action can 
be assigned if the assignee has a ‘genuine interest’ in enforcing that right of action for 
his own benefit.147 Thus it is clear that, once A has made the voidable conveyance to 
B, C has a genuine interest in the enforcement of A’s mere equity to rescind against 
B. This is because, if A were to enforce his mere equity, then the conveyance to B 
would be terminated ab initio, thus restoring a state of affairs whereby, ceteris paribus, 
the property would descend to C on the death of A. It follows that, under the rule in 
Trendtex, it would be allowable for A to assign his mere equity to C inter vivos. A 
fortiori, A’s mere equity should be capable of descending to C upon A’s death in a 
similar manner to how, but for the voidable conveyance to B, C would have succeeded 
to the property in question. Consequently, it stands to reason that, on the death of A, 
C should acquire the necessary locus standi to have the conveyance to B set aside. 
Accordingly, while the approach which appeals to the backdated equitable title 
which arises when rescission occurs is the best way to account for the rule in Gresley, 
Dickinson and Melbourne, that approach does not have any explanatory value in the 
situation where C claims under the rules of intestacy or under a transaction which 
predates the voidable conveyance. In these cases, the alternative approach, which 
appeals to the Trendtex case, is the preferred option. 
 
 
PART VII: CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter was to conclude the examination, which began in chapter four, 
into the doctrinal basis for the proprietary features of mere equities by investigating 
the doctrinal basis for the assignability of mere equities in favour of third parties. The 
chapter achieved this aim as follows. 
                                                     
147 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 (HL) 703C-D, F (Lord Roskill). 
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The chapter began by outlining the core principles which govern the 
assignment of mere equities to third parties. It was established that the prevailing rule 
is that a mere equity, being a mere equitable right of action, is not capable of 
assignment as an independent right, but that a mere equity may nevertheless be 
assigned together with some property right or interest to which the mere equity is 
ancillary. The cases which illustrate this principle were then examined, and it was 
inferred from these cases that in order for a mere equity to be sufficiently ancillary to 
a property right or interest so that the mere equity may be assigned together with the 
property right or interest, it is necessary for the mere equity to enhance in some way 
the practical enjoyment of the property right or interest. 
The chapter then turned to consider the cases of Gresley, Dickinson and 
Melbourne. It was explained these cases establish a rule which is problematic in light 
of the core principles already discussed, for this rule seems to envisage that a mere 
equity to rescind can be assigned as an independent right. Three different ways in 
which Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne could be explained were then outlined. The 
first approach was simply to maintain that these cases were wrongly decided. By way 
of contrast, the second and third approaches aimed to harmonise these cases with the 
core principles on the assignment of mere equities, although they did so in different 
ways. Thus the second approach appealed to the notion that a backdated equitable title 
vests in the rescinding party when rescission takes place, while the third approach 
invoked the rule, which was established in the case of Trendtex, that an assignment of 
a bare right of action is allowable if the assignee has a ‘genuine commercial interest’ 
in the enforcement of the right of action. 
The chapter then turned to evaluate which of these three approaches was the 
most plausible. It was argued that, since the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne 
appears to have gained general acceptance in the primary and secondary literature, the 
first approach must be the least preferable. The second approach was then outlined 
and potential objections to it dealt with. It was shown that this approach not only 
explained the rule in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne, but also allowed these cases 
to be harmonised with the factually similar case of Prosser. The third approach was 
then considered. It was argued that while the third approach had the advantage of 
relative simplicity, this approach nevertheless ran into difficulty as regards the 
identification of a ‘genuine commercial interest’. Furthermore, it was observed that 
the third approach, unlike the second approach, did not allow the rule in Gresley, 
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Dickinson and Melbourne to be harmonised with the decision in Prosser. Therefore it 
was concluded that, out of the three approaches considered, the second approach was 
the most plausible. 
The purpose of this chapter and of the previous two chapters (chapters four and 
five) has been to answer the third question which this thesis asks, namely, ‘What is 
the underlying doctrinal basis for the proprietary features of mere equities?’ It is now 
possible to answer that question. As explained in chapter one,148 mere equities are said 
to have two features which can be described as ‘proprietary’. First, mere equities are 
said to be capable of enforcement against all third parties except for bona fide 
purchasers for value without notice. Second, mere equities are said to be capable of 
being assigned or devised in favour of third parties. In answer to the above question, 
the doctrinal basis underlying the enforceability of mere equities against third parties 
(the first proprietary feature of mere equities) is the so called conscience-based 
principle (which, as argued in chapter five,149 allows a right in personam to be imposed 
afresh against the successor in title of the party originally bound); while the doctrinal 
basis underlying the assignability of mere equities in favour of third parties (the second 
proprietary feature of mere equities) is the rule that if a right of action is ancillary to 
some property right or interest, then the right of action can be assigned together with 
the property right or interest. 
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Chapter 7 
The Function of Mere Equities 
 
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter aims to answer the fourth and fifth questions which this thesis asks, 
namely, ‘What function do mere equities perform?’ and ‘How well do mere equities 
perform their identified function?’ 
The function of mere equities has not been investigated sufficiently in the 
literature. In chapter two,1 it was posited that few scholars have touched on this area, 
while those who have adopt the arguably wholly uninformative standpoint that the 
function of mere equities is to fill in gaps which are left over by other, more traditional 
forms of equitable response, such as the trust. In particular, it was observed that no 
scholar has explored the alternative possibility that the different kinds of mere 
equity—rather than serving a purely residual role—perform the function of remedying 
one particular form of injustice. It was argued that this possibility is worth 
investigating, for if it were found that mere equities do, in fact, respond to a specific 
conception of injustice, then this could have implications for explaining the mere 
equity’s unique role within the wider scheme of equitable rights and interests. 
The present chapter will seek to remedy this oversight in the literature by 
investigating the idea that mere equities perform the specialised function of remedying 
a definite form of injustice. Part two will commence this investigation by analysing 
the different situations in which mere equities have been held to exist in order to 
ascertain the necessary factual ingredients of this type of claim. Part three will then 
flesh out this analysis by taking a normative approach to the question of why these 
particular factual ingredients contribute to establishing a mere equity. Part four will 
then draw on the foregoing analysis in order to infer what function mere equities are 
likely to perform, before proceeding to evaluate how well mere equities perform their 
identified function as compared with other potential categories of equitable response. 
 
                                                     
1 Ch 2, pt II, s 4. 
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PART II: THE NECESSARY FACTUAL INGREDIENTS OF MERE EQUITIES 
 
 
1. Detrimental action and vitiated intention 
 
In order to ascertain whether mere equities perform the specialised function of 
remedying a particular conception of injustice and, if so, what this conception of 
injustice might be, it will be necessary to analyse the different situations in which mere 
equities have been held to exist and thereby determine the necessary factual 
ingredients of this category of claim. The analysis will focus on the claims whose 
status as mere equities has been confirmed in the authorities. As demonstrated in 
chapter three,2 these ‘confirmed’ mere equities are (i) all equitable claims to have a 
transaction rescinded, (ii) all claims to have a document rectified and (iii) all claims to 
seek relief under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. The particular circumstances in 
which these mere equities arise, and the form of the remedies to which they entitle the 
claimant, have already been outlined in chapter three.3 
The results of this analysis are interesting. The cases where mere equities are 
held to exist are diverse, yet there are certain features that recur between them with 
sufficient regularity to suggest that the mere equity does, in fact, respond to a coherent 
conception of injustice. Hence, in any case where a mere equity arises, it seems that 
the jointly necessary factual ingredients of that case include the following two 
elements: first, the claimant must have acted to his own detriment; second, the 
claimant’s intention to do that act must have been induced by some vitiating factor. 
In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to clarify our terminology, 
beginning with the term ‘detriment’. ‘Detriment’ is capable of two overlapping but 
nevertheless distinct meanings. The first meaning describes a factual element which a 
case either does or does not present. The second meaning is a subset of the first, and 
describes a necessary element of a cause of action in proprietary estoppel.4 Clearly, 
the present writer is using the term in the first sense. This is because ‘detriment’ in the 
second sense would exclude cases in which a mere equity to rescind or rectify has been 
                                                     
2 Ch 3, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
3 Ch 3, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
4 Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18, [2009] 1 WLR 776 [29] (Lord Walker). 
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held to exist, for while ‘detriment’ is a necessary factual ingredient of such cases (see 
below), it does not have to be specifically pleaded by the claimant as an element of his 
cause of action. 
In terms of substantive meaning, ‘detriment’ is given the same meaning here 
as it is given under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. In this connection, detriment 
is not an a priori concept; it is an empirical conception and therefore incapable of rigid 
definition.5 As Robert Walker LJ remarked in Gillett v Holt, detriment ‘is not a narrow 
or technical concept’ and ‘need not consist of the expenditure of money or other 
quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something substantial’.6 Detriment that 
is sufficient for the purposes of proprietary estoppel has classically been found where 
the claimant built or carried out improvements on land belonging to someone else,7 
but it has been found in a wide range of other contexts as well, such as where the 
claimant built on his own land,8 where he sold part of his land without reserving a 
right of way in favour of the retained land,9 and where he carried out work for another 
for many years and substandard remuneration.10 The concept of detriment is certainly 
wide enough to encompass a case where the claimant entered a legal contract or 
disposition, thereby incurring obligations to his counterparty and/or divesting himself 
of rights in favour of another. 
A ‘vitiating factor’ refers to any of the circumstances that are recognised at law 
and in equity, or in equity exclusively of the common law, as having the legal effect 
of impairing but not voiding the intention of the claimant to do a particular act.11 
Examples of vitiating factors include actual fraud, innocent misrepresentation, 
mistake, duress, undue influence and unconscionable conduct.12 
It is not difficult to demonstrate that the confirmed examples of mere equities 
arise in cases where the claimant has acted to his detriment in circumstances where his 
                                                     
5 See Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 (CA) 232D (Robert Walker LJ). See generally C Harpum, S Bridge 
and M Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) paras 
16-012-16-017. 
6 Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 (CA) 232D (Robert Walker LJ). 
7 See, eg, Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29 (CA). 
8 ER Ives Investment Ltd v High [1967] 2 QB 379 (CA). 
9 Crabb v Arun DC [1976] 1 Ch 179 (CA). 
10 Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA 159, [2003] 1 P&CR 8. 
11 See M Chen-Wishart, ‘The Nature of Vitiating Factors in Contract Law’ in G Klass, G Letsas and P 
Saprai (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (OUP 2014) 295-98. See also P Birks, 
Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 106. 
12 See generally D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 
2014) pt 2. 
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intention to do so was impaired by some vitiating factor. As explained in chapter 
three,13 where a claimant alleges a claim to have a contract or disposition rescinded, it 
is necessary for him to establish that he entered the contract or disposition in 
consequence of some vitiating factor: such as the misrepresentation14 or undue 
influence15 of another, or because of his own serious mistake as to the legal effect of 
the transaction16 or some other matter that was fundamental to it.17 Detriment, 
therefore, is a necessary feature of any case where a claim to rescind arises, because 
in all such cases the claimant acted to his detriment by entering the contract or 
disposition in question. Likewise, the intention of the claimant to enter the contract or 
disposition was vitiated either by the misrepresentation or undue pressure that was 
directed against him, or by his own serious mistake about the effect of the transaction. 
Where, on the other hand, the claimant asserts a claim to have the instrument 
that embodies a contract or disposition rectified, it is necessary for him to establish 
that the instrument does not incorporate the terms which he intended it to incorporate 
when he executed it.18 Yet again, the claimant acted to his detriment in entering the 
contract or disposition in question. Furthermore, his intention to enter the contract or 
disposition was vitiated by mistake: the mistake in this case being the claimant’s false 
belief when he executed the instrument that the instrument embodied the terms which 
he intended. 
Finally, where a claimant alleges a claim to seek equitable relief via the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel, it is necessary for him to establish (i) that the owner 
of property caused him to believe that he had or would acquire a certain right in that 
property, (ii) that he acted to his detriment in reliance on this belief, and (iii) that his 
belief turned out to be ill-founded.19 In a case, therefore, where a right to seek relief 
via proprietary estoppel arises, the claimant necessarily acted to his detriment. This 
detriment will not, in contrast to a case where a right to seek rescission or rectification 
arises, necessarily take the form of the claimant having entered a contract or 
                                                     
13 Ch 3, pt II, s 2, sub-s i. 
14 See, eg, Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1 (CA). 
15 See, eg, Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 (CA). 
16 See, eg, Gibbon v Mitchell [1990] 1 WLR 1304 (Ch). 
17 See, eg, Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26, [2013] 2 AC 108. 
18 Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 183, [2008] 2 All ER (Comm) 387 
[134] (Lawrence Collins LJ). 
19 See generally Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498 (Ch) 1503H (Edward Nugee QC); Thorner v Major 
[2009] UKHL 18, [2009] 1 WLR 776 [29] (Lord Walker); C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, 
Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 16-001. 
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disposition; as explained above, detriment that is sufficient for the purpose of 
proprietary estoppel has been found to exist in a variety of different forms. In addition, 
the claimant’s intention to do the detrimental act was vitiated by the mistake 
underlying his ill-founded belief that he had or would acquire rights in the property. 
Therefore there is a strong case to be made that the mere equity responds to 
the injustice that results from the claimant having acted to his detriment in 
circumstances where his intention to do so was induced by some vitiating factor. The 
analysis would not be complete, however, without considering how this interpretation 
of the cases compares with the main alternatives. 
 
 
i. Wrongdoing 
 
One possible alternative is that mere equities respond to wrongdoing. Wrongdoing is 
certainly a feature of many cases where a mere equity was held to have arisen. It is a 
feature of cases where the court granted rescission of a contract or disposition which 
the claimant was induced to enter by actual fraud, duress, or one of the species of 
equitable fraud such as innocent misrepresentation or undue influence.20 Wrongdoing 
is also a feature of many cases where the court granted relief via the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel. A necessary feature of such cases is that the owner of the property 
encouraged the claimant’s ill-founded belief that he, the claimant, had or would 
acquire a certain right in the property.21 Encouragement can take many forms, but has 
typically involved conduct that could be said to amount to equitable wrongdoing, such 
as where the owner made a false representation to the claimant as to the claimant’s 
rights in the property,22 or where the owner was aware of the claimant’s mistake but 
stood by and allowed the claimant to act to his detriment.23 
The theory that mere equities respond to wrongdoing cannot, however, account 
for the fact that mere equities have been found to arise in cases where the vitiating 
factor was mistake and wrongdoing was not an established feature of the case. An 
                                                     
20 See, eg, Norton v Relly (1764) 2 Eden 286, 28 ER 908: gift procured by undue influence set aside; 
Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1 (CA): contract procured by misrepresentation set aside. 
21 Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498 (Ch) 1503H (Edward Nugee QC); C Harpum, S Bridge and M 
Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 16-007. 
22 See, eg, Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] 1 QB 133 (Ch). 
23 See, eg, Munt v Beasley [2006] EWCA Civ 370. 
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example of such a case is where the court held that the claimant had a right to seek 
rescission of a voluntary transaction which he entered in consequence of his own 
serious mistake.24 Another example is where the court found that the claimant had a 
right to pursue rectification of a unilateral instrument that did not accord with his 
intention.25 A third example is where the court held that the claimant had a right 
compel rectification of a contract that the parties executed in the mistaken belief that 
it embodied their intended agreement.26 If mere equities did respond to wrongdoing 
per se, then they would be incapable of arising in cases such as these where 
wrongdoing has not occurred. The fact that they are so capable indicates that mere 
equities do not, in actual fact, respond to wrongdoing. 
 
 
ii. Unjust enrichment 
 
Another possibility is that mere equities respond to unjust enrichment. It is true that 
where a mere equity arises, it frequently will be the case that the claimant, in acting to 
his detriment, has enriched someone else and that this enrichment can be considered 
unjust given the claimant’s vitiated intention. There are, however, two problems with 
the theory that mere equities respond to unjust enrichment. 
The first problem is that the remedies to which a mere equity entitles the 
claimant are not necessarily restitutionary remedies, which they would be if they were 
founded on the reversal of unjust enrichment.27 A remedy is restitutionary if its basic 
function is to restore to the claimant property or the value of property that has been 
received from him by the defendant.28 Out of all the remedies a right to which 
constitutes a mere equity, rescission is capable of having the most restitutionary 
flavour, for where title to money or property has passed from the claimant under the 
transaction to be rescinded, the remedy will involve the restitution of those benefits to 
the claimant.29 Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to think of rescission as a 
                                                     
24 Gibbon v Mitchell [1990] 1 WLR 1304 (Ch). See also Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26, [2013] 2 AC 
108. 
25 Re Butlin’s Settlement Trusts [1976] 1 Ch 251 (Ch). 
26 Joscelyne v Nissen [1970] 2 QB 86 (CA). 
27 G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd edn, OUP 2015) 9. 
28 Ibid 3. 
29 See especially Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Scrimgeour [1994] 1 WLR 1271 (CA) 1280D 
(Nourse LJ). 
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necessarily restitutionary remedy, for rescission does not always involve the 
restitution of money or property.30 For example, where the court rescinds a purely 
executory contract, the relief will not involve the restitution of money or property to 
the claimant; it will merely involve the extinguishment of any choses in action that 
have arisen under the contract.31 As for rectification, while this remedy often has 
restitutionary consequences in that it operates to restore title to a provider of 
property,32 this is not universally the case, as, for example, where rectification is 
awarded for the benefit of a donee under a voluntary disposition.33 Finally, proprietary 
estoppel manifestly is not a restitutionary remedy because the admitted aim of the 
court in granting the relief is to do the minimum necessary to prevent an 
unconscionable result;34 the relief, therefore, is by no means restricted to depriving the 
defendant of what he has gained.35 
The second problem with the theory that mere equities respond to unjust 
enrichment is that mere equities have been held to arise in cases where the defendant 
was not enriched at the expense of the claimant. Such cases are admittedly rare, for 
ordinarily the claimant, in acting to his detriment, will have caused some kind of legal 
or economic benefit to accrue to the defendant. The fact that such cases are capable of 
existing at all, however, is inconsistent with the theory that mere equities respond to 
unjust enrichment. Thus, for example, in Salvation Army Trustee Co Ltd v West 
Yorkshire Metropolitan CC36 the defendant informed the claimant that the defendant 
would exercise its power to compulsorily purchase from the claimant the site of the 
claimant’s meeting hall and the claimant, in reliance on that representation, 
constructed a new hall on a different site. Here, it cannot be said that the defendant 
was enriched as a result of the claimant building the new hall. Nonetheless, the court 
found a mere equity, holding that the claimant was entitled to seek equitable relief on 
principles of proprietary estoppel. 
 
                                                     
30 G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd edn, OUP 2015) 22. 
31 D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) paras 1.14-
1.19. See also G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 26. But see 
Nahan NY, ‘Rescission: A Case for Rejecting the Classical Model?’ (1997) 27 University of Western 
Australia Law Review 66, 72-73. 
32 See, eg, Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 183 (Ch). 
33 See, eg, Wright v Goff (1856) 22 Beav 207, 52 ER 1087. 
34 Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA 159, [2003] 1 P&CR 8 [56] (Robert Walker LJ). 
35 G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd edn, OUP 2015) 521. 
36 Salvation Army Trustee Co Ltd v West Yorkshire Metropolitan CC (1981) 41 P&CR 179 (QB). 
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iii. Summary 
 
In summary, the theory that mere equities respond to wrongdoing and the theory that 
they respond to unjust enrichment are the main alternatives to the interpretation 
advanced here. Neither of these theories, however, can account for all of the cases 
where mere equities are held to arise. Furthermore, the theory that mere equities 
respond to unjust enrichment is inconsistent with the fact that the main examples of 
mere equities entitle the claimant to remedies that are not necessarily restitutionary. 
By way of contrast, the interpretation advanced here—that mere equities respond to 
the injustice that results from the claimant having acted to his detriment in 
circumstances where his intention to do so was impaired by some vitiating factor—is 
capable of explaining all of the cases where the main examples of mere equities are 
found to exist. It must be accepted, therefore, that this interpretation represents the 
better theory of the conception of injustice to which the mere equity responds. 
 
 
2. Detrimental action and vitiated intention not sufficient 
 
Accordingly, in a case where a claimant asserts one of the confirmed examples of a 
mere equity against a defendant, the necessary factual ingredients of the claimant’s 
claim include the following two elements. First, the claimant must show that he acted 
to his detriment, for example, by entering a contract or disposition or by building on 
land that does not belong to him. Second, the claimant must prove that his intention to 
do that act was induced by some vitiating factor such that his intention cannot, in 
fairness to the claimant, be characterised as a product of his autonomous will. 
While the elements of detrimental action and vitiated intention are necessary 
for the claimant to establish a mere equity against the defendant, it is important for the 
purposes of the present argument to appreciate that these elements are never sufficient. 
The premise that the elements of detrimental action and vitiated intention are 
insufficient to found a mere equity can be supported in two ways. First, the premise 
can be deduced as a logical consequence of the elements themselves. Second, the 
premise can be supported with empirical evidence from the cases. 
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The first line of reasoning holds that the elements of detrimental action and 
vitiated intention cannot be sufficient to support a mere equity given the traditionally 
equitable character of that class of claim. The confirmed examples of mere equities 
are rights to remedies that are equitable in the quintessential sense that they operate 
upon the conscience of the defendant.37 It is not necessary at this stage to consider 
what it means for a mere equity to operate upon the conscience of the defendant;38 
suffice it to say, the fact that a mere equity does so operate indicates that the necessary 
ingredients of a mere equity must include at least one element that relates in some way 
to the defendant’s conduct or state of mind. The elements of detrimental action and 
vitiated intention, however, do not relate to the defendant’s conduct or state of mind; 
these elements relate specifically to the conduct and state of mind of the claimant and 
therefore, as a necessary corollary, cannot relate to the conduct or state of mind of any 
other person, the defendant included. Accordingly, the elements of detrimental action 
and vitiated intention cannot be jointly sufficient to support a mere equity; the 
necessary ingredients of a mere equity must include at least one additional factor that 
relates in some way to the conscience of the defendant. 
The argument that the elements of detrimental action and vitiated intention 
cannot be sufficient to support a mere equity is corroborated by empirical evidence 
from the cases. The cases in the Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien39 line of authority 
provide a good illustration.40 These cases classically involve the following facts.41 A 
wife initially agrees with a lender to stand as surety for her husband’s indebtedness to 
the lender but subsequently seeks to have her contract with the lender rescinded on the 
ground that she was induced to enter it by her husband’s undue influence. In this 
factual scenario, the general rule established by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in O’Brien 
and developed in later cases is that the court will not rescind the contract unless the 
wife can establish, in addition to her husband’s undue influence, that the lender was 
                                                     
37 See Clough v The London and North Western Railway Co (1871) LR 7 Ex 26, 33 (Mellor J); Ward 
v Kirkland [1967] 1 Ch 194 (Ch) 235E (Ungoed-Thomas J); Crabb v Arun DC [1976] 1 Ch 179 (CA) 
195D-E (Scarman LJ); Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil Great Britain Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 87 (Ch) 
95C (Peter Millett QC); KPMG LLP v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd [2006] EWHC 67 (Ch), [2006] 
2 P&CR 7; D Hodge, Rectification: The Modern Law and Practice Governing Claims for 
Rectification for Mistake (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) para 1-09. 
38 Although see generally W Ashburner, Principles of Equity (Butterworth & Co 1902) 51-53. 
39 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 (HL). 
40 See also, eg, Barclays Bank plc v Boulter [1999] 1 WLR 1919 (HL); Wright v Cherrytree Finance 
Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 449, [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 877; Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 
2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 AC 773. 
41 But see Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 (HL) 198C-F (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
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put on inquiry but had failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the contract was 
not being induced by undue influence. This general rule was usefully summarised in 
Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2)42 by Lord Hobhouse as follows: 
 
[Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s] speech thus provides a structured scheme for the 
decision of cases raising the issue of enforceability as between a lender and a 
wife. It can be expressed by answering three questions: (1) Has the wife proved 
what is necessary for the court to be satisfied that the transaction was affected 
by the undue influence of the husband? (2) Was the lender put on inquiry? (3) 
If so, did the lender take reasonable steps to satisfy itself that there was no 
undue influence?43 
 
If the elements of detrimental action and vitiated intention were jointly sufficient to 
found a mere equity, then, in the factual scenario in question, it would not be necessary 
for the wife to establish that the lender was put on inquiry but subsequently failed to 
take reasonable steps. These elements relate to the conduct and state of mind of the 
lender; they do not contribute to proving that the wife acted to her detriment, nor that 
her intention to do so was induced by a vitiating factor. The fact, therefore, that the 
rule in O’Brien does require the wife to prove that the lender was put on inquiry but 
failed to take reasonable steps entails that detrimental action and vitiated intention are 
not jointly sufficient to support a mere equity. The rule also corroborates the argument 
that the necessary ingredients of a mere equity must include, in addition to detrimental 
action and vitiated intention, at least one element that relates to the conduct or state of 
mind of the defendant. 
 
 
3. The three defendant-related factors 
 
Consequently, while the elements of detrimental action and vitiated intention are 
jointly necessary to establish a mere equity, they nevertheless are jointly insufficient. 
They must be jointly insufficient because they relate exclusively to the conduct and 
                                                     
42 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 AC 773. 
43 Ibid [101] (Lord Hobhouse). 
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state of mind of the claimant whereas, for the reasons already provided, the necessary 
elements of a mere equity must include at least one additional factor that relates to the 
conduct or state of mind of the defendant so as to justify intervention of a 
quintessentially equitable kind against him. It is now necessary to consider what this 
additional factor might be. 
As a first step, it is necessary once again to analyse the different factual 
scenarios where mere equities have been held to exist, only this time the purpose of 
the analysis will be to ascertain the various ways in which the established facts related 
to the defendant’s conduct or state of mind. As before, the analysis will focus on the 
confirmed examples of mere equities, these being an equitable claim to have a contract 
or disposition rescinded, a claim to have a document rectified and a claim to seek 
equitable relief under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. 
The analysis discloses a strong pattern. In every instance where the claimant 
established a mere equity against the defendant (subject to one exception that will be 
discussed below), at least one (and in some cases more than one) of the following three 
defendant-related factors was an established feature of the case. First, the defendant 
acquired the rights that were adversely affected by the finding of the mere equity (a) 
from the claimant (b) as a consequence of the claimant having acted to his detriment 
and (c) without paying consideration to the claimant. Second, the defendant, by words 
or conduct, materially contributed to the vitiating factor. Third, the defendant (a) knew 
about, or was put on inquiry as to the existence of, the vitiating factor but (b) 
nevertheless elected to stand by and allow the claimant to act to his detriment. 
The first defendant-related factor is most obviously capable of existing as a 
feature of cases involving voluntary transactions. It was a feature of cases like 
Huguenin v Baseley44 and Gibbon v Mitchell45 where the claimant, having previously 
made a voluntary disposition, established a right to have the disposition rescinded on 
the ground that he was induced to make it either by the undue influence of a third 
party,46 or by his own serious mistake about its effect.47 It was also a feature of cases 
                                                     
44 Huguenin v Baseley (1807) 14 Ves Jun 273, 33 ER 526. 
45 Gibbon v Mitchell [1990] 1 WLR 1304 (Ch). 
46 See, eg, Bridgman v Green (1755) 2 Ves Sen 627, 28 ER 399, affd (1757) Wilm 58, 97 ER 22; 
Huguenin v Baseley (1807) 14 Ves Jun 273, 33 ER 526; Bainbrigge v Browne (1881) 18 Ch D 188 
(Ch). 
47 See, eg, Lady Hood of Avalon v Mackinnon [1909] 1 Ch 476 (Ch); Gibbon v Mitchell [1990] 1 
WLR 1304 (Ch); Wolff v Wolff [2004] EWHC 2110 (Ch), [2004] STC 1633; Re Griffiths [2008] 
EWHC 118 (Ch), [2009] Ch 162 (Ch); Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26, [2013] 2 AC 108. 
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like Re Butlin’s Settlement Trusts48 where the claimant initially executed a voluntary 
deed or other unilateral instrument but subsequently established a right to have that 
instrument rectified on the ground that it did not accord with his donative intention.49 
In each of these cases, the defendant was the person who, having taken under the 
transaction, was interested in opposing the rescission or rectification of that 
transaction.50 In each case, therefore, the defendant acquired his opposing rights from 
the claimant, as a direct consequence of the claimant acting to his detriment by 
entering the transaction, and without giving the claimant consideration (the transaction 
being a voluntary one). 
The first defendant-related factor is also, albeit less obviously, capable of 
existing in certain cases involving contracts and other multilateral transactions. It was 
a feature of cases like Joscelyne v Nissen51 where the claimant, having entered a 
written contract with the defendant, established a right to have the instrument rectified 
on the ground that it did not express the common intention of the parties.52 In these 
cases, the defendant acquired his opposing rights through the instrument; he therefore 
acquired them from the claimant as a consequence of the claimant acting to his 
detriment by executing the instrument. Furthermore, to the extent that the defendant’s 
rights under the instrument were opposed to the rectification of the instrument, they 
were acquired by the defendant without his giving the claimant consideration for them. 
The defendant, it is true, was not a volunteer. It must be remembered, however, that 
the aim of rectification is to make the instrument accord with the actual agreement 
between the parties,53 so a fortiori any rights that would be adversely affected by an 
order for rectification cannot form any aspect of the parties’ actual bargain. It follows 
that the opposing rights acquired by the defendant under the instrument cannot have 
been included in the actual bargain between himself and the claimant. These rights 
were dehors the agreement and therefore any consideration given by the defendant to 
the claimant cannot have extended to them. 
                                                     
48 Re Butlin’s Settlement Trusts [1976] 1 Ch 251 (Ch). 
49 See also, eg, James v Couchman (1885) 29 Ch D 212 (Ch). 
50 Gibbon v Mitchell [1990] 1 WLR 1304 (Ch) 1310A-B (Millett J). 
51 Joscelyne v Nissen [1970] 2 QB 86 (CA). 
52 See also, eg, Swainland Builders Ltd v Freehold Properties Ltd [2002] 2 EGLR 71 (CA). 
53 See especially Mackenzie v Coulson (1869) LR 8 Eq 368, 375 (Sir WM James V-C): ‘Courts of 
Equity do not rectify contracts; they may and do rectify instruments purporting to have been made in 
pursuance of the terms of contracts’. 
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The second defendant-related factor—that the defendant by his words or 
conduct materially contributed to the factor that vitiated the claimant’s intention—is 
a feature of a wide variety of factual scenarios where the claimant was held to have a 
mere equity. It is a feature of cases like Redgrave v Hurd54 and Allcard v Skinner55 
where the claimant initially entered a contract or disposition but subsequently 
established a right to rescind against the defendant (the counterparty or disponee under 
the transaction) on the ground that the defendant induced him to enter the transaction 
by means of conduct amounting to misrepresentation, undue influence, or 
unconscionable conduct.56 In this class of case, the defendant’s wrongdoing was 
always a material contributing factor in vitiating the claimant’s intention to enter the 
contract or disposition: indeed, in most instances, the defendant’s wrongdoing was the 
primary reason that the claimant’s intention was vitiated. 
The second defendant-related factor was also a feature of cases like Lovesy v 
Smith.57 These were cases where the claimant, having entered a multilateral 
instrument whilst labouring under a unilateral mistake as to the terms of that 
instrument, established a right to have the instrument rectified on the ground that the 
defendant (the counterparty to the instrument) induced the claimant’s mistake by 
fraudulent means. In this factual scenario, the defendant materially contributed to the 
vitiating factor because his fraudulent conduct was the principal reason that the 
claimant was mistaken. 
The second defendant-related factor was also a feature of many cases where 
the court granted relief under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. As already 
explained, where a claimant brings a claim in proprietary estoppel, it is necessary for 
him to prove that the defendant (the owner of the property) encouraged the claimant 
in his ill-founded belief that he, the claimant, had or would acquire a certain right over 
the property.58 In cases where the claimant’s claim succeeded, the necessary 
encouragement frequently involved some affirmative conduct on the part of the 
defendant.59 For instance, in cases like Hopgood v Brown60 the defendant encouraged 
                                                     
54 Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1 (CA). 
55 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 (CA). 
56 See also, eg, Boustany v Pigott (1995) 69 P&CR 298 (PC). 
57 Lovesy v Smith (1880) 15 Ch D 655 (Ch). 
58 Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498 (Ch) 1503H (Edward Nugee QC). 
59 See generally C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property 
(8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 16-008. 
60 Hopgood v Brown [1955] 1 WLR 213 (CA) 223-24 (Evershed MR). 
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the claimant to believe that that he, the claimant, had a certain right over the property 
by representing to the claimant that such was in fact the case.61 Alternatively, in cases 
like Gillett v Holt,62 Jennings v Rice63 and Thorner v Major64 the defendant made 
assurances to the claimant, and thus encouraged the claimant to believe, that he, the 
claimant, would acquire a certain right over the property in the future.65 In all cases 
that involved these forms of affirmative conduct, the second defendant-related factor 
was present: the defendant materially contributed to the vitiating factor because his 
representation or assurance encouraged the claimant in his ill-founded belief as to his 
present or future rights over the property. 
Finally, the third defendant-related factor—that the defendant had actual or 
constructive notice of the vitiating factor but nevertheless stood by and allowed the 
claimant to act to his detriment—is a feature of several factual scenarios where a mere 
equity was held to exist. It was a feature of cases like Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien66 
where the claimant, having entered a contract with the defendant, established a right 
to rescind against the defendant on the grounds (i) that the claimant was induced to 
enter the contract by the misrepresentation or undue influence of a third party and (ii) 
that before the contract was entered the defendant had notice of the misrepresentation 
or undue influence.67 Notice was either actual, as where the defendant was taken to 
have actually known about the misrepresentation or undue influence,68 or constructive, 
as where the defendant knew about facts that were sufficient to put him on inquiry as 
to the possibility of misrepresentation or undue influence but nevertheless failed to 
take reasonable steps.69 In cases that fall within this fact pattern, the third defendant-
related factor was present because the defendant, being fixed with notice of the 
vitiating factor, stood by and allowed the transaction to proceed to the detriment of the 
claimant. 
                                                     
61 See also, eg, Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] 1 QB 133 (Ch). 
62 Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 (CA). 
63 Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA 159, [2003] 1 P&CR 8. 
64 Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18, [2009] 1 WLR 776. 
65 See also, eg, Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431 (CA).  
66 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 (HL). 
67 See generally D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 
2014) ch 9. 
68 See, eg, Kempson v Ashbee (1874) LR 10 Ch App 15 (CA) 21 (Sir WM James LJ). 
69 See, eg, Wright v Cherrytree Finance Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 449, [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 877. 
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The third defendant-related factor was a feature of cases like Thomas Bates 
and Sons Ltd v Wyndham’s (Lingerie) Ltd.70 These are cases where the claimant, 
having executed a multilateral instrument whilst labouring under a unilateral mistake 
about the terms of that instrument, established a right to rectify the instrument on the 
ground that before the instrument was executed the defendant (the counterparty to the 
instrument) had actual knowledge of the claimant’s mistake but nevertheless failed to 
tell the claimant about the mistake. In this factual scenario, third defendant-related 
factor applied because the defendant, being privy to actual knowledge of the mistake 
that vitiated the claimant’s intention, stood by and allowed the claimant to act to his 
detriment. 
The third defendant-related factor was also a feature of cases where the 
claimant established a right to relief under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel on the 
ground of acquiescence.71 In cases of acquiescence, the defendant knew about the 
claimant’s ill-founded belief that he, the claimant, had a certain right in the defendant’s 
property.72 Furthermore, the defendant encouraged that belief not by actively 
representing to the claimant that such was the case, but by passively standing by and 
allowing the claimant to act in reference to the property as if the claimant were, in 
actual fact, the owner of the right in question.73 In cases falling within this factual 
scenario, the third defendant-related factor was present because the defendant knew 
about the claimant’s mistake but nevertheless stood passively by and allowed the 
claimant to act to his detriment. 
The various cases where a mere equity has been held to exist do not appear to 
include any cases where the established facts did not present at least one of the 
defendant-related factors already discussed. The only exception seems to be a line of 
cases where the claimant established a right to have a contract rescinded in equity on 
the ground that both he and the defendant entered the contract whilst labouring under 
the same fundamental mistake as to the facts or their respective rights.74 These cases 
do not present any of the three defendant-related factors: they do not present the first 
                                                     
70 Thomas Bates and Sons Ltd v Wyndham’s (Lingerie) Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 505 (CA) See also, eg, A 
Roberts & Co Ltd v Leicestershire CC [1961] 1 Ch 555 (Ch). 
71 See generally C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property 
(8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 16-009. 
72 Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96 (Ch) 105-06 (Fry J). 
73 See, eg, Watson v Goldsbrough [1986] 1 EGLR 265 (CA); Munt v Beasley [2006] EWCA Civ 370. 
74 Solle v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671 (CA); Grist v Bailey [1967] 1 Ch 532 (Ch); Magee v Pennine 
Insurance Co Ltd [1969] 2 QB 507 (CA). 
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factor because, the transaction being a contract, the defendant necessarily acquired his 
opposing rights from the claimant for consideration; they do not present the second 
factor because the defendant’s conduct did not materially contribute to the mistake 
that vitiated the claimant’s intention; nor do they present the third factor because the 
defendant, being equally mistaken, necessarily did not have notice of the mistake when 
the contract was entered. These cases, however, were effectively overruled in the 
Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd,75 where the Court 
of Appeal established that common mistake cannot operate as a ground for rescission, 
although it may operate to make a contract void at common law.76 Accordingly, the 
cases that permitted rescission for common mistake do not seriously challenge the 
present argument; on the contrary, the fact that these cases were effectively overruled 
supports the argument that the three defendant-related factors define the proper limits 
of the mere equity claim. 
 
 
4. The role of the defendant-related factors 
 
To summarise, in every case where the existence of a mere equity was established, 
there was at least one of the following defendant-related factors in play. First, the 
defendant acquired his adverse rights (a) from the claimant (b) as a consequence of 
the claimant having acted to his detriment and (c) without paying consideration to the 
claimant. Second, the defendant, by words or conduct, materially contributed to the 
vitiating factor. Third, the defendant (a) knew about, or was put on inquiry as to the 
existence of, the vitiating factor but (b) nevertheless elected to stand by and allow the 
claimant to act to his detriment. 
It would appear that these defendant-related factors assume, both individually 
and collectively, a particular role in reference to unconscionability. In order to avoid 
confusion, it is necessary to clarify how the term ‘unconscionability’ is being applied 
here. Unconscionability is a fundamental organising principle in equitable doctrine.77 
Indeed, it was said by one judge to be ‘the first principle upon which all courts of 
                                                     
75 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407, [2003] 
QB 679. 
76 Ibid [157] (Lord Phillips). 
77 Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 (CA) 225D (Robert Walker LJ). 
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equity proceed’.78 The term describes a characteristic of a person’s actual or proposed 
conduct. Broadly speaking, the characteristic which the term describes is one of 
wrongfulness or unethicalness, although it is difficult to be precise about what form 
of wrongfulness or unethicalness is being referred to in this context. There are at least 
two factors which contribute to this lack of precision. First, judges are not precise in 
how they use the term ‘unconscionability’; the expression is something which judges 
appear to have kept loose in order to ensure that equitable doctrine remains adaptable 
to the particular facts of each case.79 Second, the emphasis of the term does not seem 
to have remained entirely constant, but appears to have changed to some extent over 
time. Thus there are some earlier decisions where the judge made appeal to spiritual 
norms: most famously in The Earl of Oxford’s Case where Lord Ellesmere LC sought 
to characterise ‘Equity and good Conscience’ as running parallel with ‘the Law of 
God’.80 In more recent decisions, by way of contrast, judges are far more likely to 
place emphasis on secular norms of social interaction and ‘fair play’.81 In light of these 
factors, it should come as no surprise that the meaning of ‘unconscionability’ is 
difficult to pin down definitionally. Nevertheless, the term is not so malleable as to 
defy description,82 for the fact remains that throughout all cases and times the judicial 
application of the term has stood, in a broad sense, for the quality of wrongfulness or 
unethicalness that attaches to forms of conduct which are generally regarded, either 
implicitly or explicitly, as a violation of moral or social norms of obligation or 
necessity.83 It is within these parameters that the term ‘unconscionability’ is to be 
understood for the purpose of the present discussion. 
It appears that the role played by the defendant-related factors is to satisfy a 
court of equity that the defendant would be acting unconscionably if he were to insist 
on his formal rights in opposition to the mere equity asserted by the claimant. This 
view is supported in the cases. 
                                                     
78 Crabb v Arun DC [1976] 1 Ch 179 (CA) 187H-88A (Lord Denning MR), quoting Hughes v 
Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439 (HL). 
79 See South Carolina Insurance Co v Assurantie Maatschappij ‘De Zeven Provincien’ NV [1987] 1 
AC 24 (HL) 41C-D (Lord Brandon): ‘It is difficult, and would probably be unwise, to seek to define 
the expression “unconscionable conduct” in anything like an exhaustive manner’. 
80 The Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 1 Chan Rep 1, 4; 21 ER 485, 486 (Lord Ellesmere LC). 
81 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 (CA) 190 (Bowen LJ). 
82 Cf P Birks, ‘Annual Miegunyah Lecture: Equity, Conscience, and Unjust Enrichment’ (1999) 23 
Melbourne University Law Review 1, 17-27. 
83 See A Hudson, Equity and Trusts (6th edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2010) 1172-75. 
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For example, Gibbon v Mitchell84 is evidence that if the established facts of a 
case present the first defendant-related factor (ie not paying consideration), then the 
defendant cannot conscionably oppose the finding of a mere equity by insisting that 
his formal rights ought to be protected. The facts of Gibbon were these. Mr Gibbon, 
the claimant, executed a deed by which he purported to surrender his protected life 
interest under a previous settlement in favour of his two children, Jane and David. The 
claimant executed this deed with the intention that Jane and David should take 
immediate beneficial interests in the settlement fund. However, the actual effect of the 
deed was to cause a forfeiture of the claimant’s life interest and thereby bring into 
operation the discretionary trusts under s 33 of the Trustee Act 1925. In these 
circumstances, Millett J found that the claimant had executed the deed under a mistake 
as to its legal effect. On this ground, the judge held that the claimant was entitled to 
have the deed rescinded as against the beneficiaries of the discretionary trusts. 
For present purposes, it is significant that Millett J justified his decision in 
reference to grounds of unconscionability. This emerges clearly from the following 
quotation: 
 
Equity acts on the conscience. The parties whose interest it would be to oppose 
the setting aside of the deed are the unborn future children of Mr Gibbon and 
the objects of discretionary trust to arise on forfeiture, that is to say his 
grandchildren, nephews and nieces. They are all volunteers. In my judgment 
they could not conscionably insist upon their legal rights under the deed once 
they had become aware of the circumstances in which they had acquired 
them.85 
 
These words support the present argument. As Millett J made clear, the parties whose 
rights stood to be harmed as a result of the court finding a mere equity in favour of the 
claimant were the various beneficiaries of the discretionary trusts which had 
mistakenly been brought into operation by the deed. The beneficiaries acquired their 
opposing rights as a result of the claimant executing the deed; that is to say, they 
acquired their opposing rights from the claimant as a consequence of the detrimental 
                                                     
84 Gibbon v Mitchell [1990] 1 WLR 1304 (Ch). 
85 Ibid 1310A-B (Millett J). 
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action by the claimant. Furthermore, because the deed was a voluntary one, the 
beneficiaries acquired their opposing rights without paying consideration to the 
claimant. Accordingly, the established facts in Gibbon related to the beneficiaries as 
per the first defendant-related factor. The effect was, as Millett J indicated in the above 
quotation, to satisfy the court that the beneficiaries would be acting unconscionably if 
they were on insist on their legal rights. 
As regards the second defendant-related factor (ie materially contributing to 
the vitiating influence), the case of Redgrave v Hurd86 is evidence that the role played 
by this factor is to establish grounds of unconscionability against the defendant. The 
facts of the case were these. Redgrave was a solicitor with a small practice. He 
arranged with another solicitor, Hurd, that he would accept Hurd as a partner of the 
practice on condition that Hurd would agree to purchase Redgrave’s house. At an 
earlier meeting, Redgrave had represented to Hurd that the practice was worth about 
£300 per year. It was in reliance on this representation that Hurd, assenting to the 
arrangement, entered a contract with Redgrave for the purchase of the house. Hurd 
refused to complete the purchase, however, upon discovering that the practice was, in 
actual fact, worth significantly less than the £300 which Redgrave had suggested. In 
these circumstances, the Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of Fry J, held that 
Hurd was entitled as against Redgrave to have the contract rescinded on the ground 
that Redgrave had induced Hurd to enter the contract by the innocent but material 
misrepresentation that the practice was worth about £300. 
The leading judgment was handed down by the Master of the Rolls, Sir George 
Jessel. In it, his Lordship made the following remark: 
 
Even assuming that moral fraud must be shewn in order to set aside a contract, 
you have it where a man, having obtained a beneficial contract by a statement 
which he now knows to be false, insists upon keeping that contract. To do so 
is a moral delinquency: no man ought to seek to take advantage of his own 
false statements.87 
 
                                                     
86 Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1 (CA). 
87 Ibid 12-13 (Sir George Jessel MR). 
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The case of Redgrave supports the argument that the presence of the second defendant-
related factor is to establish grounds of unconscionability. In Redgrave, the detriment 
incurred by Hurd in entering the contract could not, in fairness to Hurd, be 
characterised as the product of his autonomous will. This was due to the vitiating factor 
in the form of the false impression that was created in the mind of Hurd by the 
misrepresentation that the practice was worth £300. Redgrave was directly responsible 
for this misrepresentation and, by extension, the false impression which it created in 
the mind of Hurd. It follows, a fortiori, that Redgrave materially contributed to the 
vitiating factor. Accordingly, the established facts of the case related to Redgrave as 
per the second defendant-related factor. The result, according to the Sir George Jessel 
MR, was that Redgrave would be guilty of ‘moral fraud’ or ‘moral delinquency’ if he 
were to insist on keeping the contract. This is equivalent to saying that Redgrave would 
be acting unconscionably if he were to insist on his formal rights in opposition to the 
mere equity asserted by Hurd. 
The role played by the third defendant-related factor is also to establish 
grounds of unconscionability against the defendant. This is demonstrated by cases in 
the O’Brien line of authority.88 These cases and the rule which they established have 
already been outlined. To reiterate, the cases typically involved a wife who, having 
initially agreed with a lender that she would stand as surety for the indebtedness of her 
husband to the lender, subsequently sought to rescind her contract with the lender on 
the ground that she was induced to enter it by the undue influence of her husband. In 
these circumstances, the rule established by the cases is that the court will refuse to 
rescind the contract unless the wife can prove that the lender was put on inquiry as 
regards the undue influence but nevertheless failed to take reasonable steps. For 
present purposes, it is necessary to observe that the accepted effect of the wife 
satisfying this evidential burden is that she thereby establishes grounds of 
unconscionability against the lender. As Lord Hobhouse explained in Etridge: 
 
… the wife is seeking to use the undue influence of her husband as a defence 
against the lender and therefore has to show that the lender should be affected 
                                                     
88 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 (HL) and the other cases cited above at fn 40. 
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by the equity—that it is unconscionable that the lender should enforce the 
secured contractual right against her.89 
 
This principle supports the present argument. In the class of case under consideration, 
the vitiating factor takes the form of the undue influence of the husband. It follows 
that where the wife proves that the lender was put on inquiry as to the existence of the 
undue influence but nevertheless failed to take reasonable steps, the significance of 
her doing so is to bring the case within the application of the third defendant-related 
factor. The effect, as indicated by Lord Hobhouse in the above quotation, is that the 
lender would be acting unconscionably if it were to insist on its formal rights under 
the contract. 
 
 
5. Unconscionability: The third necessary element 
 
It has already been argued that the jointly necessary factual ingredients of a mere 
equity must, in addition to the claimant-related factors of detrimental action and 
vitiated consent, include at least one additional factual element that relates to the 
conduct or state of mind of the defendant. Exactly what this element might be has 
deliberately been left open until now. In light of the available evidence, however, it 
can reasonably be inferred that this element relates to unconscionability. 
It has been demonstrated that, in every class of case where one of the main 
examples of a mere equity has been held to exist, the established facts presented at 
least one of the three defendant-related factors which have already been outlined. 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that these factors assume, both individually and 
collectively, a particular role as regards unconscionability: they operate to satisfy a 
court of equity that the defendant would be acting unconscionably if he were to insist 
on his formal rights in opposition to the mere equity which the claimant alleges. It 
follows that in every case where one of the main examples of a mere equity has been 
held to exist, grounds of unconscionability necessarily existed against the defendant. 
                                                     
89 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 AC 773 [101] (Lord 
Hobhouse). 
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The necessary implication is that unconscionability is the third factual element 
which, in addition to the claimant-related elements of detrimental action and vitiated 
intention, is jointly necessary to establish a mere equity. It can be concluded, therefore, 
that where a claimant asserts a mere equity against any particular defendant, the jointly 
necessary ingredients of the claim include the following elements. First, the claimant 
must show that he acted to his detriment, for instance, by entering a contract or by 
building on land that does not belong to him. Second, the claimant must show that, 
because of the presence of some vitiating factor such as mistake or undue influence, 
the detriment thus incurred by the claimant cannot, in whole or in part, be characterised 
as the product of his autonomous will. Third, the claimant must show that the 
defendant would be acting unconscionably if the defendant were to insist on his formal 
rights in opposition to the mere equity which is asserted by the claimant. 
This analysis might raise the question of why the joint presence of these three 
factual elements contributes to establishing a mere equity in favour of the claimant 
against the defendant. In response to this query, it is necessary to assume a normative 
approach to the issue. 
 
 
PART III: THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATION OF MERE EQUITIES 
 
It is said to be one of the characteristics of equity that it will interfere with strict rights 
where the justice of the case demands it.90 This statement is true, though it is subject 
to a major caveat. In general, equity recognises that it would be contrary to the 
common good for it to interfere with rights that have been formally created under 
contracts, deeds, or statutes.91 It is easy to see why this is the case. If equity did 
interfere with strict rights as a matter of course, then the consequences would be 
detrimental for society as a whole. Simply put, people would not be able to depend on 
what is theirs today being theirs tomorrow. Commerce and general wellbeing would 
clearly suffer in such an environment. Thus it should come as no surprise that, as a 
general rule, equity will ‘follow the law’ by refusing to disturb established rights, 
                                                     
90 Crabb v Arun DC [1976] 1 Ch 179 (CA) 187G-88A (Lord Denning MR). 
91 See Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96 (Ch) 105 (Fry J). See also Shaw v Applegate [1977] 1 
WLR 970 (CA) 977H-78A (Buckley LJ). 
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interests, and entitlements.92 It follows that the cases where equity will proceed against 
the grain of the strict rights which exist between the parties are the exception and not 
the rule. 
As explained in chapter three,93 mere equities are personal claims to equitable 
relief; they bind a particular defendant, and operate adversely against the rights of that 
defendant in some way. Cases in which mere equities arise are therefore ‘exceptional’ 
cases where equity will depart from the general principle of non-interference with 
strict rights. The justification for equity doing this seems obvious given the foregoing 
analysis. As already shown, in order for a claimant to establish that he has a mere 
equity against a certain defendant, it is necessary for him to show, in addition to the 
claimant-related elements of detrimental action and vitiated intention, that it would be 
unconscionable of the defendant to object to the appropriate remedy on the ground 
that that remedy would interfere with his strict rights. To put it another way, it is 
incumbent upon the claimant to prove that it would be contrary to received notions of 
the common good if the defendant were to attempt to frustrate the remedy by appealing 
to the general principle of non-interference. 
The cases in which the requisite grounds of unconscionability exist have 
already been outlined and empirically proved. These, it will be remembered, are the 
cases whose facts present any, or any combination of, the three defendant-related 
factors, namely, lack of consideration, material contribution, and standing by. So far, 
however, we have not given any consideration to the question of why, in these 
particular cases, it is unconscionable of the defendant to appeal to the general principle 
of non-interference. In other words, why is it the case that lack of consideration, 
material contribution, or standing by establish the grounds of unconscionability that 
are necessary to found a mere equity against the defendant. That question will be 
considered here. 
It is necessary from the outset to emphasise a point that may appear obvious 
but nevertheless is important to the present discussion. This is that it is generally in 
the common interest for persons to be protected from the detrimental consequences of 
their honest mistakes and the numerous species of fraud. People, after all, are 
inherently fallible, prone to be deceived, and subject to the influence of others. These 
                                                     
92 See generally J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) paras 5-005-5-006. 
93 Ch 3, pt III, s 2. 
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are qualities, moreover, which the less scrupulous are prepared to exploit. In a coherent 
cohesive society, therefore, it is, by and large, conducive to the common good for there 
to be safeguards in place to relieve the individual who has acted upon a honest 
misapprehension of the facts or who has been cheated or unfairly imposed upon. This 
principle has long been recognised and applied by the courts, especially courts of 
equity.94 As Lindley LJ remarked in Allcard v Skinner: 
 
… to protect people from being forced, tricked or misled in any way by others 
into parting with their property is one of the most legitimate objects of all laws 
…95 
 
This conception of the common good is in play in cases where the claimant-related 
elements are an established feature of the facts. In such a case, as already explained, 
the claimant acted in some way to his detriment under the influence of a serious 
mistake or one of the species of fraud, with the result that the detriment thus suffered 
by the claimant cannot, in whole or in part, be characterised as the product of his 
autonomous will. In these circumstances, the courts, in their capacity as custodians of 
a coherent cohesive society, have an interest in relieving the claimant from the 
detrimental consequences of his own actions insofar as those consequences are 
attributable to the fraud or mistake, and not just to the claimant’s own imprudence.96 
To adopt the traditional phraseology of courts of equity, the situation is one that 
‘shocks the conscience of the court’,97 thus allowing the claimant to ‘bend the ear of a 
court of conscience to listen sympathetically to his tale’.98 
It follows that where the claimant-related elements are present, equity 
recognises that, in an ideal world, it would be able to assist the claimant. In other 
words, these elements are jointly sufficient to arouse the sympathy of a court of equity 
for the claimant and, as it were, to give the claimant a moral title to receive an equitable 
remedy. Be this as it may, however, it has already been pointed out that the claimant-
                                                     
94 See Blenkinsopp v Blenkinsopp (1850) 12 Beav 568, 586; 50 ER 1177, 1185 (Lord Langdale MR): 
‘it is no new law to use the authority of a Court of Equity to prevent fraud, or to relieve from the 
effect of fraud’. 
95 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 (CA) 183 (Lindley LJ). 
96 See ibid 182-83 (Lindley LJ). 
97 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil Great Britain Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 87 (Ch) 95C (Peter Millett 
QC). 
98 Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 (HL) 115B (argument). 
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related factors are neither singly nor jointly sufficient to generate a mere equity against 
any particular defendant. The real reason for this, of course, is that the defendant is 
protected by the general principle of non-interference that has already been discussed. 
To put it another way, the claimant’s moral title to equitable relief is prima facie 
deferred to a countervailing conception of the common good, namely that the courts 
ought not to interfere with the enjoyment of strict rights. 
Accordingly, in a case where the claimant-related elements are jointly present, 
there are two competing notions of the common good in play. The first directs that the 
court ought not to relieve the claimant because this would have harmful consequences 
for the strict rights of the defendant. The second directs that the claimant ought to be 
relieved from the detrimental consequences of the mistake or inequitable conduct of 
which he complains. Ceteris paribus, the court gives priority to the first principle. In 
this way, the strict rights of the defendant are protected. 
However, things are different if, in addition to the claimant-related elements 
being jointly present, the established facts are characterised by any, or any 
combination of, the three defendant-related factors. This changes things because these 
factors, whether they appear singly or in combination, indicate that something has 
happened which weakens any appeal that the defendant might make to the general 
principle of non-interference with strict rights. The effect is to tip the balance in favour 
of the conception of the common good on which the claimant relies, namely, that the 
courts ought to relieve people from the effects of their honest mistakes and the 
multifarious manifestations of fraud. In these circumstances, a court of equity will 
intervene on behalf of the claimant by, for instance, rescinding a transaction or 
rectifying a document, even if in doing so the court will necessarily override some 
right, interest, or title that belongs to the defendant. The outcome is that the claimant 
has not only a moral title to an equitable remedy, but an actual right of action which 
binds the defendant in personam, that is to say, a mere equity. 
The question now is why do the defendant-related factors weaken any appeal 
that the defendant might make to the general principle of non-interference with strict 
rights? Looking at the matter broadly, it appears that the majority of the cases can be 
explained on the basis that the defendant cannot insist on his strict rights if he is 
somehow culpable for the mistake or wrongdoing of which the claimant complains.99 
                                                     
99 See Clough v The London and North Western Railway Co (1871) LR 7 Ex 26, 33 (Mellor J). 
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In these circumstances, the defendant has behaved in a way that is detrimental to the 
common good, either directly, such as where the defendant is himself the wrongdoer, 
or indirectly, such as where the defendant wilfully turned a blind eye to the likely 
existence of the mistake or wrongdoing. Having behaved detrimentally to the common 
good, it would be the height of hypocrisy for the defendant then to turn around and 
appeal to the common good in order to protect his strict rights from the remedy that is 
asserted by the claimant. The outcome is that any such appeal by the defendant would 
necessarily fail; the claimant thereby wins hands down. 
This explains why the second and third defendant-related factors (material 
contribution and standing by) tip the balance of in favour of the conception of the 
common good on which the claimant relies, since both of these factors constitute a 
form of wrongdoing100 on the part of the defendant. However, cases whose facts 
present the first defendant-related factor (lack of consideration) exclusively of the 
other two are ostensibly more difficult. In such cases, the defendant is innocent in the 
sense that he did not resort to any kind of fraud, cheating, or unfair imposition in order 
to obtain his disputed rights. This is demonstrated by the case of Gibbon v Michell,101 
where, as explained above, Millett J rescinded a voluntary deed against the interests 
of certain unborn beneficiaries. Clearly, these beneficiaries, being unborn, could not 
possibly be characterised as wrongdoers in any sense of the word. 
These kinds of case can be explained on the following basis. The principle of 
non-interference with strict rights is of universal application; however, it applies more 
strongly in some cases than in others. In particular, the principle applies more strongly 
in cases where the rights in question were the product of a bargain than in cases where 
those rights were acquired either for no consideration or dehors the true agreement 
between the parties. This is because the notion of the common good that is supported 
by non-interference is generally more pronounced in cases where the defendant 
bargained for the security of his strict rights than in cases where, as it were, the 
defendant has gained something for nothing. Now, in cases where the first defendant-
related factor is in play, as already explained, the defendant acquired his strict rights 
from the claimant either as a volunteer102 or, having acquired them under a contract, 
                                                     
100 Note that even ‘innocent’ misrepresentation connotes a species of moral fraud: see Redgrave v 
Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1 (CA) 12-13 (Sir George Jessel MR). 
101 Gibbon v Mitchell [1990] 1 WLR 1304 (Ch). 
102 See, eg, Huguenin v Baseley (1807) 14 Ves Jun 273, 33 ER 526; Gibbon v Mitchell [1990] 1 WLR 
1304 (Ch). 
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did so in circumstances where the actual bargain between the parties did not extend to 
the rights in question.103 The first defendant-related factor, therefore, is an instance 
where the principle of non-interference with strict rights applies less strongly, with the 
result that any appeal that the defendant might make to this principle is necessarily 
attenuated. The final outcome is similar to what it would have been if the defendant 
had been a wrongdoer: the balance of the common good is tipped in favour of assisting 
the claimant. 
Consequently, the individual or combined effect of the three defendant-related 
factors is to weaken any appeal that the defendant might make to the principle of non-
interference with strict rights. That is to say, where any one, or any combination, of 
these factors is present, a court of equity recognises that the principle of non-
interference with strict rights is attenuated and that, accordingly, the common good 
will be better served by relieving the claimant from the effects of the mistake or 
wrongdoing of which he complains. In these circumstances, the defendant would be 
behaving unconscionably—that is to say, he would be behaving contrary to the 
common good—if he were to insist on his strict rights in opposition to the remedy. 
The result is that a court of equity will not permit the defendant to oppose the remedy, 
but will, in effect, proceed against the defendant as if he were a willing participant in 
the decree. In other words, the court will treat the defendant as if he were a 
conscionable person who would want to act in accordance with the common good. 
Having analysed the likely normative reason that the necessary factual 
elements of mere equities contribute to establishing this category of claim, the chapter 
now proposes to draw on this analysis in order to ascertain what function mere equities 
are likely to perform, and then to evaluate how well mere equities perform their 
identified function. 
 
 
PART IV: THE FUNCTION OF MERE EQUITIES 
 
Clearly, the function of any juridical claim is determined by the reason that that claim 
was called into existence. The mere equity is no exception. Thus, in light of the 
                                                     
103 See, eg, Joscelyne v Nissen [1970] 2 QB 86 (CA); Swainland Builders Ltd v Freehold Properties 
Ltd [2002] 2 EGLR 71 (CA). 
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foregoing analysis, it seems that the function which mere equities perform is to uphold 
the common interest which all members of a coherent, cohesive society have in 
affording a measure of protection to persons who have acted in some way to their 
detriment under the influence of their own honest mistake or one of the species of 
fraud. This function brings mere equities into conflict with a competing notion of the 
common good, which directs that the court refrain from interfering with the strict 
rights of the defendant. It is for this reason that mere equities are limited to cases where 
at least one of the three defendant-related factors is present, for the effect of these 
factors, whether singly or in combination, is to weaken any appeal which the defendant 
might make to the general principle of non-interference with strict rights. In the 
language of courts of equity, it would be unconscionable in these circumstances for 
the defendant to set up his formal rights as a reason that the court should refuse to 
grant relief to the claimant. 
Now that the function which mere equities perform has been identified, it is 
necessary to consider how well mere equities perform this function. It is proposed that 
the legal nature of mere equities means that they are well suited to their allocated role. 
The legal nature of mere equities was investigated in chapter three,104 in 
relation to the dividing-line between mere equities and equitable interests. There, it 
was shown that mere equities are bare equitable rights of action. It follows that mere 
equities are what can be described as a ‘minimalist’ form of equitable response: they 
consist in nothing more than a basic, single claim to go to court to apply for a particular 
equitable remedy against a particular defendant, who correspondingly assumes a 
liability to have his rights interfered with pursuant to the grant of that remedy.105 
Significantly, mere equities, while they continue to be unenforced, do not subject the 
defendant to any fiduciary or other obligation in reference to any particular assets;106 
mere equities, therefore, are not trusts in any sense of the word, for a trust would imply 
that the defendant owed the claimant some form of obligation or duty in reference to 
specific property.107 In short, the legal nature of mere equities indicates that they are 
purely and simply a means of giving the claimant access to equitable relief. 
                                                     
104 Ch 3, pt III, s 2. 
105 See B McFarlane, N Hopkins and S Nield, Land Law (OUP 2017) 176-77. 
106 Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 WLR 1 (Ch) 11H-12A (Millett J). 
107 Green v Russell [1959] 2 QB 226 (CA) 241 (Romer LJ), quoting a passage which appears in A 
Underhill, The Law Relating to Private Trusts and Trustees (8th edn, Butterworth & Co 1926) 3. 
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The legal nature of mere equities is appropriate given the allocated function of 
this class of claim. There are two main reasons that this is the case. First, and most 
obviously, since mere equities give the claimant access to an appropriate equitable 
remedy, these claims do what is strictly necessary in order to perform their function: 
they uphold the common, social interest in affording a measure of protection to 
persons who have acted to their detriment under the influence of their own honest 
mistake or the wrongdoing of another. Second, because of the minimalist nature of 
mere equities as bare equitable rights of action, these claims do not exceed what is 
strictly necessary to perform their allocated function. In particular, it is appropriate 
that the burden of a mere equity consists wholly in the liability of the defendant to 
have his rights interfered with pursuant to the grant of the equitable remedy, and does 
impress any obligation or duty on the defendant. It would be difficult to justify the 
imposition of such an obligation or duty on the defendant given that the function of a 
mere equity is, in essence, to save the claimant from the detrimental consequences of 
his own, albeit unsoundly engendered, action. In other words, since the function of a 
mere equity does not specifically relate to anything that the defendant has done, a mere 
equity cannot, in fairness to the defendant, impose on him any greater burden than that 
which is strictly necessary in order to give the claimant access to a suitable equitable 
remedy. 
In answer to this latter point, it might be objected that mere equities do not 
focus solely on the actions and state of mind of the claimant, for, as demonstrated 
previously, the necessary factual ingredients of a mere equity include at least one of 
the defendant-related factors outlined above. However, it has already been 
demonstrated that these factors serve a very specific role in the formation of a mere 
equity. The defendant-related factors do not supply the raison d’être of a mere equity 
per se; they are not, as it were, the active ingredient. Rather, the defendant-related 
factors, whether they appear singly or in combination, are necessary solely because 
they cancel out any appeal which the defendant might make to the principle of non-
interference with strict rights. Accordingly the defendant-related factors, while 
essential to establish a mere equity, are not an aspect of the function which mere 
equities perform. These factors cannot, therefore, justify the extension of the burden 
of a mere equity beyond what is strictly necessary to give the claimant access to an 
appropriate equitable remedy. 
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Consequently, the legal nature of mere equities as bare equitable rights of 
action means that these claims are well adapted to their allocated function. This should 
come as no surprise: just as the function of a juridical claim is determined by the reason 
that that claim was called into existence, so too is the legal nature of a juridical claim 
determined by the function which that claim performs. This finding has significant 
implications for understanding the mere equity’s unique role within the wider scheme 
of equitable rights and interests. In particular, it resolves the problem of precisely why 
mere equities take the legal form which they do, and do not take the alternative form 
of a beneficial interest under a resulting or constructive trust, which, as noted in 
chapter two,108 some commentators have suggested ought to be the case.109 In a 
nutshell, because mere equities are a minimalist form of equitable response, they are 
better adapted than a trust for responding to a conception of injustice whose underlying 
basis concerns the conduct and state of mind of the claimant, and does not relate 
specifically to anything that the defendant himself has done. 
 
 
PART V: CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter was to answer the fourth and fifth questions which this thesis 
asks, namely, ‘What function do mere equities perform?’ and ‘How well do mere 
equities perform their identified function?’ 
In order to achieve this aim, the chapter began by analysing the different fact 
patterns in which mere equities have been held to exist in order to ascertain the 
necessary factual ingredients of this category of claim. It was found that the jointly 
necessary factual ingredients of mere equities include two claimant-related elements: 
first, the claimant acted to his detriment by, for instance, entering a transaction or 
building on land which belongs to someone else; second, the claimant’s intention to 
do that act was procured by some vitiating factor, such as undue influence or mistake. 
In addition to these claimant-related elements, it was shown that the necessary factual 
ingredients of mere equities must include at least one of the following three defendant-
related factors: first, the defendant acquired his adverse rights (a) from the claimant 
                                                     
108 Ch 2, pt II, s 1. 
109 See especially R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (OUP 1997) ch 7. 
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(b) as a consequence of the claimant having acted to his detriment and (c) without 
giving a reciprocal consideration to the claimant; second, the defendant, by words or 
conduct, materially contributed to the vitiating factor; third, the defendant (a) knew 
about, or was put on inquiry as to the existence of, the vitiating factor but (b) 
nevertheless elected to stand by and allow the claimant to act to his detriment. Finally, 
it was demonstrated that the defendant-related factors, both individually and 
collectively, assume a particular role as regards unconscionability: they lead the court 
to conclude that the defendant would be acting unconscionably if he were to reference 
his own rights as a reason that the court should not relieve the claimant from the 
detriment which he has incurred. 
The chapter then investigated the likely normative reason that these factual 
elements contribute to establishing a mere equity. It was argued that in a case where 
the claimant-related elements are present, there are two competing conceptions of the 
common good in play. The first directs that the claimant should not be relieved because 
this would entail interference with the formal rights of the defendant. The second 
directs that the claimant should be relieved from the consequences of the honest 
mistake or inequitable conduct of which he complains. It was suggested that the role 
of the defendant-related factors, whether they appear singly or in combination, is to 
weaken any appeal that the defendant might make to the principle of non-interference 
with strict rights, thereby tipping the balance in favour of the conception of the 
common good on which the claimant relies. The result is that the claimant is given a 
mere equity entitling him to obtain an appropriate equitable remedy against the 
defendant. 
Finally, the chapter drew on this analysis in order to ascertain what function 
mere equities are likely to perform, and then evaluated how well mere equities perform 
this function. The argument was made that the function of any juridical claim is 
determined by the reason that it was called into existence. Thus, in line with the above 
analysis, it was submitted that the function which mere equities perform is to uphold 
the common, social interest in granting a measure of protection to persons who have 
acted to their detriment under the influence of their own honest mistake or the 
inequitable conduct of another. It was then suggested that mere equities are well 
adapted to their allocated role. In particular, it was argued that the ‘minimalist’ nature 
of mere equities as bare equitable rights of action is appropriate given the fact that the 
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function of this category of claim is, fundamentally, to save the claimant from the 
consequences of his own actions. 
Thus, in answer to the fourth question which this thesis asks, the function 
which mere equities perform is to uphold the common interest which all members of 
a coherent, cohesive society have in affording a measure of protection to persons who 
have acted in some way to their detriment under the influence of their own honest 
mistake or one of the species of fraud. In answer to the fifth question which this thesis 
asks, the legal nature of mere equities as bare equitable rights of action means that 
these claims are well adapted to the performance of their identified function. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter concludes the thesis. Part two will present a summary of the key 
arguments and findings that were made in earlier chapters. Part three will highlight 
some of the potential implications of the thesis for legal practice and doctrine more 
broadly. 
 
 
PART II: SUMMARY OF KEY ARGUMENTS AND FINDINGS 
 
This thesis has examined the legal nature and practical function of mere equities as 
these claims are understood and applied within the English legal system. As explained 
in chapter one, the basic features and consequences of mere equities are generally well 
established in the authorities. Thus it is settled that mere equities are proprietary 
claims—they can be enforced against third parties and can be assigned to third 
parties—but that mere equities nevertheless fall short of equitable interests in property, 
the main consequence of which is that a mere equity can be defeated by a plea of bona 
fide purchase for value of an equitable interest without notice.1 Despite this clarity 
over the basic features and consequences of mere equities, the underlying legal nature 
and practical function of these claims are insufficiently understood. This lack of clarity 
gives rise to genuine analytical problems, and brings into question whether mere 
equities should even exist as a category of equitable response. This state of affairs is 
clearly unsatisfactory, especially in light of the fact that mere equities are the 
foundational organising concept for a large body of equitable doctrines, including the 
equitable remedies of rescission and rectification and the equitable doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel. 
                                                     
1 Note that the special vulnerability of mere equities to the plea of bona fide purchase for value 
without notice is of no consequence in the context of registered land: see above, ch 1, pt II, s 2, sub-s 
i. 
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The investigation into the legal nature of mere equities began in chapter three. 
In chapter three, a full review of the cases was carried out in order to ascertain which 
equitable claims have been classified by the courts as either mere equities or equitable 
interests. The different instances of mere equities were then compared with the 
different instances of equitable interests in order to evaluate the likely nature of the 
dividing line between these two categories. It was found that the dividing line between 
mere equities and equitable interests is not that mere equities are more ‘discretionary’ 
than equitable interests, as many scholars have claimed.2 Rather, the real reason mere 
equities are distinct from equitable interests is that equitable interests are combinations 
of juridical claims which include at least some rights in rem, whereas mere equities 
are equitable rights of action and therefore are pure rights in personam. 
The finding that mere equities are rights of action which bind the defendant in 
personam may be surprising given the proprietary features of these claims. However, 
the doctrinal basis for these features has been investigated in chapters four, five and 
six. 
In chapter four, the general idea that the enforceability of mere equities against 
third parties is grounded on orthodox conceptions of property was considered. It was 
found that there is a handful of cases which disclose evidence for a ‘property-based 
analysis’.3 The property-based analysis holds that the reason a mere equity can bind 
third parties is that the mere equity is ‘ancillary to or dependant upon’4 an equitable 
interest, which includes equitable rights in rem in the affected asset. The property-
based analysis has the advantage that it can explain the third party effects of mere 
equities; however, it was shown that the analysis is not workable within the wider 
doctrinal framework. For one thing, the analysis is inconsistent with the principle that 
a person who transfers an asset in circumstances which entitle him to rescind acquires 
a mere equity only, retaining no interest, legal or equitable, in the asset.5 For another 
thing, the idea that a mere equity derives its third party effects from some underlying 
equitable interest is falsified by the fact that mere equities are treated differently from 
equitable interests as regards the plea of bona fide purchase for value without notice. 
                                                     
2 See above, ch 2, pt II, s 2. 
3 Ie, National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL); Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel 
Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265; Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] 
1 Ch 183 (Ch). 
4 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 1238D (Lord Upjohn). 
5 See, eg, Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 (CA) 22H (Millett LJ). 
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Another theory that was evaluated in chapter four was that a mere equity to 
rescind or rectify a transfer constitutes an imperfection in the title which the defendant 
acquires in the affected asset. The imperfect title analysis is supported by several 
scholars.6 Moreover, the analysis potentially explains why mere equities to rescind or 
rectify can bind third parties, and does not encounter the doctrinal problems which 
affect the theory that mere equities are ancillary to equitable interests. Nevertheless, 
the imperfect title analysis was decisively rejected. In brief, the analysis fails because 
it relies on the premise that courts of equity assume a power to define the incidents of 
ownership at common law, when in fact courts of equity have never assumed any such 
power. 
The investigation into the doctrinal basis for the enforceability of mere equities 
against third parties which began in chapter four carried over into chapter five. In 
chapter five, however, a different line of inquiry was pursued, namely, that the third 
party effects of mere equities, rather than being founded on orthodox conceptions of 
property, are instead predicated on equitable notions of conscience. It was argued that, 
in equity, there is a principle, referred to in this thesis as the ‘conscience-based 
principle’, in accordance with which a right in personam may be imposed afresh 
against a successor in title of the person originally bound by that right. The conscience-
based principle is not an ex post facto rationalisation by the present writer; it was the 
theoretical foundation on which courts of equity first began to enforce a range of 
claims against successors in title. It was shown that the claims which historically were 
extended to successors in title in this way include the use (the forerunner to the modern 
trust), the restrictive freehold covenant and the erstwhile deserted wife’s equity. 
In chapter five, it was proposed that the conscience-based principle is the 
doctrinal basis for the enforceability of mere equities against third parties. Objections 
to the proposed analysis were dealt with, and the explanatory advantages of the 
analysis were highlighted. In particular, it was demonstrated that the proposed analysis 
accounts for the main consequence of the dividing line between mere equities and 
equitable interests, namely, the rule that while it is not allowable for a purchaser of an 
equitable interest to raise the plea of bona fide purchase for value without notice 
                                                     
6 See, eg, D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 
paras 21.29-21.30. 
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against an earlier equitable interest, it is allowable for him to raise the plea against an 
earlier mere equity.7 
In chapter six, the thesis turned to investigate the doctrinal basis for the other 
proprietary feature of mere equities, namely, the assignability of these claims in favour 
of third parties. The argument was made that since mere equities are rights of action 
(as established in chapter three) the assignment of mere equities is tied in with the 
more wide-ranging principles governing the assignment of rights of action in general. 
In this connection, it was shown that the doctrinal basis for the assignability of mere 
equities is the core principle that a right of action cannot be assigned as an independent 
right, but if a right of action is ancillary to some property right or interest, then the 
right of action can be assigned together with the property right or interest. Examples 
of cases which illustrate the application of this core principle to mere equities were 
outlined. It was inferred from these examples that in order for a mere equity to be 
sufficiently ancillary to a property right or interest so as to permit the assignment of 
the mere equity together with the property right or interest, the mere equity must 
support or enhance in some way the property right or interest. 
Having outlined the doctrinal basis for the assignability of mere equities in 
favour of third parties, chapter six turned to consider the cases of Gresley v Mousley,8 
Dickinson v Burrell9 and Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v Brougham.10 These cases are 
problematic given the core principles outlined above, for the cases establish a rule 
which at first glance seems to envisage that a mere equity to rescind can be assigned 
as an independent right. Three different ways in which Gresley, Dickinson and 
Melbourne can be understood were proposed. The first approach simply asserts that 
the cases were wrongly decided. By way of contrast, the second and third approaches 
seek to harmonise the cases with the core principles on the assignment of mere 
equities, although they do so in different ways. On the one hand, the second approach 
appeals to the well established principle that when a transaction is rescinded a 
backdated equitable title vests in the rescinding party. On the other hand, the third 
approach appeals to the rule, set down in Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse,11 
                                                     
7 See Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 (Ch) 646-47 (Fry J) and the other cases cited above at ch 1, pt 
II, s 2, sub-s i, fn 36. 
8 Gresley v Mousley (1859) 4 De G&J 78, 45 ER 31. 
9 Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337. 
10 Melbourne Banking Corp Ltd v Brougham (1882) 7 App Cas 307 (PC). 
11 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 (HL) 703F-G (Lord Roskill). 
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that a right of action can be assigned independently if the assignee has a ‘genuine 
commercial interest’ in enforcing the right of action. The three approaches to the rule 
in Gresley, Dickinson and Melbourne were evaluated and it was concluded that, on 
balance, the second approach is the most plausible. 
The practical function of mere equities was investigated in chapter seven. A 
review was carried out of the different fact patterns in which any of the confirmed 
examples of mere equities—ie, claims to rescind a transaction in equity, claims to 
rectify a document and claims to relief under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel—
was held to exist. From this review, it was found that there are three factual elements 
which are jointly necessary in order to establish a mere equity, two of which relate to 
the claimant, one of which relates to the defendant. On the one hand, the two claimant-
related elements are, first, that the claimant acted to his detriment and, second, that the 
intention of the claimant to so act was induced by some vitiating factor. On the other 
hand, the defendant related-element consists in any one, or any combination, of three 
potential factors. The first is that the defendant acquired his adverse rights (a) from 
the claimant, (b) as a consequence of the claimant having acted to his detriment and 
(c) without paying a reciprocal consideration to the claimant. The second is that the 
defendant materially contributed to the vitiating factor. The third is that the defendant 
(a) knew about, or was put on inquiry as to the existence of, the vitiating factor but (b) 
nevertheless stood by and allowed the claimant to act to his detriment. 
Having ascertained the jointly necessary factual ingredients of a mere equity, 
the chapter turned to consider the normative question of why these factual elements 
contribute to establishing a mere equity. It was found that where the claimant-related 
elements are jointly present, equity recognises that there are two opposing conceptions 
of the common interest in play, one directing that the claimant should be relieved, the 
other directing that the formal rights of the defendant should not be interfered with. 
Prima facie, the second conception of the common interest takes precedence; 
however, if the case presents any, or any combination, of the three defendant-related 
factors, the effect is to weaken any appeal that the defendant might make to this notion 
of the common good. As a result, the balance is tipped in favour of the conception of 
the common interest on which the claimant relies, with the result that his is given a 
mere equity entitling him to an appropriate remedy. 
Once the normative foundation of mere equities had been established, the 
argument was made that the function of any juridical claim, including a mere equity, 
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is determined by the reason that that claim was called into existence. Accordingly, it 
was concluded that the function which mere equities perform is to uphold the common 
interest which all members of a coherent, cohesive society have in affording a measure 
of protection to persons who have acted in some way to their detriment under the 
influence of some vitiating factor, such as one of the species of fraud or their own 
honest mistake. Finally, the question of how suited mere equities are to the 
performance of their identified function was considered. It was argued that the 
‘minimalist’ nature of mere equities as bare equitable rights of action means that these 
claims are well suited to their allocated role, which fundamentally is about saving the 
claimant from the detrimental consequences of his own, albeit unsoundly engendered, 
actions. 
 
 
PART III: IMPLICATIONS 
 
In defining the legal nature and practical function of mere equities, the present thesis 
has shed light on a significant juridical concept which previously was insufficiently 
understood. The immediate effect of this enhanced understanding is to deliver mere 
equities from the criticism that they are an anomalous category which defies 
comprehensive analysis. However, the thesis may have additional implications for 
legal practice and doctrine which are not so immediately obvious. It is now proposed 
to draw the thesis to a close by highlighting some of these potential implications. 
 
 
1. A category of unthinking reference 
 
One implication of the thesis is potentially to constrain the unfortunate habit exhibited 
by scholars and lawyers alike of referring unthinkingly, and often inaccurately, to the 
concept of a mere equity in legal discourse. There are various examples in the literature 
which demonstrate this tendency. Thus in chapter two it was shown that there are 
instances in the secondary literature where a commentator has suggested ad hoc that 
a particular claim is a ‘mere equity’ but has not backed up that suggestion with any 
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real evidence or argument.12 Practising lawyers too are guilty of the same tendency. 
For instance, in the case of Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding,13 already encountered in 
chapter three,14 the appellant argued that an equitable right of entry was a ‘mere equity’ 
and therefore not capable of registration under the Land Charges Act 1925.15 The 
submission that an equitable right of entry was a mere equity was a purely tactical one, 
being wholly unsupported by evidence or substantive legal argument. Nevertheless, 
Lord Wilberforce, who gave the leading judgment, seems to have been broadly in 
agreement with the appellant’s reasoning.16 The case of Drayne v McKillen17 is a more 
recent example of how in legal argument largely unfounded references can be made 
to mere equities. In Drayne, Coulson J had to consider the submission that an option 
to purchase shares was a ‘mere equity’ and accordingly did not give the grantee any 
beneficial interest in the shares. The basis for this submission was unclear to say the 
least, described by the judge as a ‘loose analogy’ with cases of misrepresentation.18 
The reason mere equities are so frequently used as a category of unthinking 
reference is that the legal nature of these claims has previously not been sufficiently 
explored in the literature. As a result, mere equities have come to be seen as a vague, 
undefined concept which can easily be manipulated to the exigencies of the present 
argument. However, this thesis has investigated the legal nature of mere equities. It 
has shown that the concept of a mere equity is not vague or undefined, but refers to 
something very specific. In essence, a mere equity is a bare right to claim an equitable 
remedy; it binds the defendant in personam, but nevertheless may be imposed afresh 
on a successor in title in accordance with the conscience-based principle. This being 
so, it is obvious that neither an equitable right of entry nor an option to purchase shares 
is a mere equity, since neither of these claims can be described as a bare right to obtain 
a remedy. Accordingly, the thesis acts as a discouraging influence on the present 
tendency in legal discourse to use mere equities as a category of uncritical reference, 
pointing the way instead to a more analytical approach to the classification of equitable 
claims. 
                                                     
12 Ch 2, pt II, s 1. 
13 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 (HL). 
14 Ch 3, pt II, s 2, sub-s iii. 
15 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 (HL) 715E (argument). 
16 Ibid 721A-D (Lord Wilberforce). 
17 Drayne v McKillen [2011] EWHC 3326 (QB). 
18 Ibid [46] (Coulson J). 
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Indeed, this more analytical approach has already been demonstrated. In 
chapter three,19 a number of ‘outlying claims’ were analysed and it was concluded 
that, out of the nine claims considered, only three of them could potentially be mere 
equities. These potential mere equities were (i) claims to have a contract specifically 
performed, (ii) claims to seek relief against the forfeiture of a lease and (iii) claims to 
seek relief against the forfeiture of a mortgage. 
 
 
2. Enforcement against third parties 
 
From a doctrinal standpoint, the thesis has implications for the enforceability of mere 
equities against third parties. In particular, the thesis has the effect of restricting the 
circumstances in which mere equities can be enforced against third parties. This is 
because the thesis establishes that the doctrinal basis for the third party effects of mere 
equities is the conscience-based principle. Thus a mere equity does not automatically 
bind the world as right in rem; a mere equity is a right in personam which depends for 
its proprietary effects upon the court treating every sequential dealing with the affected 
asset as imposing the mere equity afresh on the transferee. A consequence of this is 
that, in terms of enforceability against third parties, mere equities are affected by 
certain limitations that have no application to equitable interests, which, unlike mere 
equities, contain rights in rem. 
Two of these limitations have already been identified. The first is that a mere 
equity is incapable in principle of enforcement against a third party who takes even an 
equitable interest as a purchaser for value without notice. The second is that a mere 
equity is subject to a privity limitation, meaning that it cannot be enforced against a 
third party who does not derive his adverse interest through the person against whom 
the mere equity initially arose. In chapter five,20 it was demonstrated that each of these 
limitations on the enforceability of mere equities is the necessary corollary of mere 
equities being rights in personam which rely on the conscience-based principle to 
affect third parties. The first limitation is well established in the authorities: it is the 
basis for the rule that in a competition between an equitable interest and a prior mere 
                                                     
19 Ch 3, pt IV. 
20 Ch 5, pt III, s 3, sub-ss i, ii. 
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equity, the plea of bona fide purchase for value without notice is available to the owner 
of the equitable interest.21 The second limitation, by contrast, seems not to have been 
tested in any case so far, nor has it been noted before in the secondary literature. 
However, the finding that mere equities are rights in personam whose third 
party effects depend on the conscience-based principle may affect the enforceability 
of these claims in other, more subtle ways. In this regard, it is significant that the 
enforceability of a mere equity against a successor in title is contingent on what the 
court is willing to presume about the effect of the transaction under which the 
successor in title claims. This suggests a role for judicial creativity in the operation of 
the conscience-based principle. In particular, it may be the case that the court is not 
necessarily obliged to assume that the successor in title is bound by the mere equity in 
exactly the same degree as the person against whom the mere equity first arose. In 
other words, within the framework of the conscience-based principle, the potential 
exists for the court to recognise that the liability of the successor in title is more 
attenuated or fragile than that of his predecessor in title. One practical result of this 
approach could be to give the successor in title access to discretionary equitable 
defences which are not necessarily available to the predecessor in title. 
Cases involving innocent volunteers are a good example of how the court’s 
theoretical power to attenuate the liability of a successor in title may operate in 
practice. In principle, a mere equity binds any third party who takes as a volunteer, 
regardless of whether the third party took with or without notice of the facts generating 
the mere equity.22 Nevertheless, if the third party is an innocent volunteer, then a 
strong case arguably exists for allowing the third party to raise a defence of change of 
position in appropriate circumstances,23 despite the fact that such a defence may not 
be available to the person originally bound by the mere equity.24 As the above analysis 
demonstrates, this kind of protection could be extended to an innocent volunteer within 
the ambit of the conscience-based principle. 
 
 
                                                     
21 See Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 (Ch) 646-47 (Fry J) and the other cases cited above at ch 1, pt 
II, s 2, sub-s i, fn 36. 
22 See Bridgeman v Green (1757) Wilm 58, 64-65; 97 ER 22, 25 (Lord Commissioner Wilmot). 
23 See Lipkin Gorman (a firm) v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 (HL). 
24 The scope of the defence of change of position is uncertain: G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of 
Restitution (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 690. Yet it is highly unlikely that the defence would be made 
available where the defendant is guilty of fraud or unconscionable conduct. 
240 
 
3. The evolution of mere equities into equitable interests  
 
The thesis has implications for the future development of doctrine, especially for the 
question of whether a mere equity one day could be reclassified as a kind of equitable 
interest. The possibility that claims which are currently ‘mere equities’ could 
prospectively become ‘equitable interests’ is broached by Neave and Weinberg,25 
who, as noted in chapter two,26 argue that even confirmed mere equities—such as 
equitable claims to rescind or rectify—could develop into equitable interests in future 
cases. In short, Neave and Weinberg considered that the ‘mere equity’ label was a 
transient one—a kind of holding category for emerging forms equitable proprietary 
interest. 
As to whether the thesis makes it more or less likely that the kind of taxonomic 
shift envisioned by Neave and Weinberg will happen, it is difficult say. In some 
respects the thesis increases the likelihood that such a development could eventually 
take place; while in other respects the thesis has the opposite effect. 
In one sense, the thesis clearly opens the way for mere equities to be 
reclassified as equitable interests. In chapter five,27 the former use and the restrictive 
freehold covenant were cited as examples of claims which, although initially pure 
rights in personam, were nevertheless enforced by the courts against third parties by 
means of the conscience-based principle. Yet, as discussed in that chapter, both of 
these categories of claim were subsequently reclassified as equitable interests in 
property.28 Quite clearly, therefore, the thesis does raise the possibility that mere 
equities—which, like the early use and restrictive freehold covenant, are rights in 
personam—could travel along the same evolutionary path and similarly be reclassified 
in some future case as equitable interests. 
In another sense, however, the thesis precludes the possibility that in the future 
the confirmed examples of mere equities could be reclassified as equitable interests. 
In chapter seven,29 it was concluded that the function which mere equities perform is 
to uphold the common, social interest in granting protection to persons who act to their 
                                                     
25 M Neave and M Weinberg, ‘The Nature and Function of Equities (Part I)’ (1978-1980) 6 
University of Tasmania Law Review 24; ‘The Nature and Function of Equities (Part II)’ (1978-1980) 
6 University of Tasmania Law Review 115. 
26 Ch 2, pt II, s 2. 
27 Ch 5, pt II, s 2, sub-ss i, ii. 
28 See Re Nisbet and Potts’ Contract [1905] 1 Ch 391 (Ch), affd [1906] 1 Ch 386 (CA). 
29 Ch 7, pt IV. 
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detriment under the influence of their own honest mistake or one of the species of 
fraud. Furthermore, it was proposed that the legal nature of mere equities as bare 
equitable rights of action means that they are signally well adapted to the performance 
of their allocated function. Mere equities, it was explained, are a ‘minimalist’ form of 
equitable response: they consist wholly in a single claim to apply for an equitable 
remedy against the defendant, who correspondingly assumes liability to have his rights 
interfered with pursuant to the grant of that remedy. Significantly, mere equities are 
quite dissimilar to trusts, for, unlike trusts, mere equities do not subject the defendant 
to any fiduciary or other obligation in reference to any particular property.30 It was 
submitted that the minimalist character of mere equities is appropriate in light of the 
fact that the allocated function of these claims is, in essence, about protecting people 
who are adversely affected by their own actions. In other words, since the function of 
mere equities does not specifically relate to anything that the defendant has done, a 
mere equity cannot, in fairness to the defendant, impose any greater burden than 
whatever is strictly necessary to give the claimant access to equitable relief. 
These arguments show that if mere equities were to be reclassified as equitable 
interests, they could not, consistently with their allocated function, take the form of 
trusts. Such a development would result in the defendant being subject to the duties 
and obligations of a trustee, thereby exceeding what is strictly necessary to give the 
claimant access to equitable relief. This is significant to the present discussion, 
because in the past when judges and scholars have contemplated the possibility of 
mere equities being organised as equitable interests, they have generally presumed that 
they would take the form of beneficial interests under constructive or resulting trusts.31 
If mere equities were reclassified as equitable interests, then their allocated 
function would seem to require that they adopt a form which could not easily be 
identified with any established category of equitable interest in English law. The most 
appropriate form would probably be something akin to an equitable security interest. 
Unlike other security interests, however, a ‘mere equity’ interest would secure the 
appropriation of specific property not to the performance of a particular obligation,32 
but to the grant of a particular equitable remedy. So, for instance, in a case where the 
claimant has a mere equity to rescind a transaction in equity and thereby recover a 
                                                     
30 Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 WLR 1 (Ch) 11H-12A (Millett J). 
31 R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (OUP 1997) ch 7. 
32 See J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) para 36-001. 
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specific asset, it is potentially conceivable—in line with the established function of 
mere equities—that the claimant could be analysed as having an equitable interest 
consisting of equitable rights in rem to have that asset appropriated to the grant of 
rescission. Admittedly, such an interest would be consistent with the basic function of 
mere equities: it would be directed solely at giving the claimant access to the 
appropriate remedy, and would not impose any greater judicial burden on the 
defendant. Nevertheless, a ‘mere equity’ interest clearly would not fall within any of 
the categories of equitable interest which were listed in chapter three;33 it would be a 
novel category, as yet unknown to the English legal system. 
It is for this reason that this thesis arguably makes it less likely that mere 
equities will be reclassified as equitable interests in future cases. Simply put, it is 
doubtful to say the least that the English courts today would be willing to acknowledge 
for the first time the existence of what would be a completely novel category of 
equitable proprietary interest.34 
Consequently, while the thesis clearly has implications for the question of 
whether mere equities one day could be reclassified as equitable interests, these 
implications point in opposite directions. As a result, it is difficult to say whether the 
ultimate effect of the thesis is to make it more or less likely that such a development 
will take place. On the one hand, the analogy with the early use and restrictive freehold 
covenant would suggest that mere equities are liable to be reclassified in time as 
equitable interests. On the other hand, the juridical function which has been assigned 
to mere equities—and the consequences which this function would have for the legal 
nature of any prospective ‘mere equity’ interest—would tend to indicate that the 
current dividing-line between mere equities and equitable interests is here to stay. 
It is far from clear which of these considerations would be likely to have the 
greatest weight should the question of reclassification ever arise. If this were to 
happen, then a range of possible arguments and counterarguments would potentially 
be in play. 
For example, a proponent of the view that mere equities should be reclassified 
as equitable interests might argue that the courts would, in actual fact, be willing to 
recognise the existence of a novel category of ‘mere equity’ interest, especially in light 
                                                     
33 Ch 3, pt II, s 2, sub-s iv. 
34 Cf Law of Property Act 1925, s 4(1). 
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of the fact that s 116 of the Land Registration Act 2002 declares that a mere equity ‘in 
relation to registered land … has effect from the time the equity arises as an interest 
capable of binding successors in title’.35 However, an advocate of the contrary view 
might counter that the purpose behind s 116 is merely to confirm the applicability to 
mere equities of the rules in the 2002 Act governing the priority of competing interests 
in registered estates,36 and that s 116 accordingly cannot be interpreted as altering in 
any sense the fundamental legal nature of mere equities as bare equitable rights of 
action. On the contrary, the explanatory notes to the 2002 Act appear to confirm this 
understanding by stating that the expression ‘a mere equity’ appears to denote ‘a claim 
to discretionary equitable relief’.37 
Furthermore, an opponent of the view that mere equities should be reclassified 
as equitable interests might attack the apparent analogy between the early use and the 
restrictive freehold covenant, on the one hand, and the modern mere equity, on the 
other. Arguably, this analogy is less convincing then it may at first sight appear, for 
although the early use and restrictive freehold covenant were, like the modern day 
mere equity, pure rights in personam, the function of these claims was to secure to the 
cestui que use or covenantee long term access to the benefits inherent in particular 
assets. This is quite dissimilar to the juridical role of the contemporary mere equity, 
which, as explained already, is to provide the claimant with access to an appropriate 
equitable remedy; not to secure to the claimant beneficial enjoyment of assets over an 
extended period of time 
Unfortunately, within the confines of the present thesis, space does not permit 
a proper evaluation of these different arguments. The aim throughout this thesis has 
been to fill in the many conceptual gaps in the scheme of the law as regards mere 
equities—a scheme which unambiguously includes the proposition that a ‘sharp 
distinction’ exists between mere equities and equitable interests.38 To venture upon a 
critique of whether an alternative scheme would be more suitable, therefore, would be 
inconsistent with the overarching purpose of this thesis. It is worthwhile mentioning, 
however, that the view that mere equities will or should be reorganised as equitable 
                                                     
35 Land Registration Act 2002, s 116 (emphasis added). 
36 See Law Commission, Land Registration for the Twenty-first Century: A Conveyancing Revolution 
(Law Com No 271, 2001) para 5.36. 
37 Explanatory Notes to the Land Registration Act 2002, para 186. 
38 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 (HL) 721B (Lord Wilberforce). 
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interests may to a degree reflect the traditional uncertainty, noted in chapter one,39 
over the juridical nature and function of mere equities. To the extent that this is the 
case, the present writer submits that this thesis, in going some way towards dispelling 
this traditional uncertainty, would tend to favour the continuation of the status quo. 
 
                                                     
39 Ch 1, pt III. 
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APPENDIX A: CASES FOUND BY MEANS OF THE METHODOLOGY DESCRIBED IN CHAPTER 
THREE 
 
In chapter three, a review of the case law was conducted in order to ascertain which 
claims have been classified by the courts as mere equities. In part two, section one of 
that chapter, a description was given of the methodology which was applied in order 
to find the potentially relevant cases. The following is a list of the cases that were 
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